I. Assessing International Security with the Political Change in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

"South Africa believes that it is a prerequisite for peace and security in the region that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a confidence-building measure, verifiably proves to the international community that it has permanently and fully dismantled any nuclear weapons." -International Relations and Co-operation Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane¹

The Republic of South Africa is one of four states to voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons program. South Africa realized that possession of such dangerous materials provided no real strategic advantage and posed a threat to the security of South Africa, the continent of Africa, and the globe.² In 1990, South Africa was internationally isolated and not respected. After emerging from the apartheid era, denuclearizing, and engaging the world community, South Africa has made drastic improvements and is now a respected state and a two-time unanimous non-permanent Security Council representative. As our example shows, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not have to continue down the path it is heading.

The Republic of South Africa firmly opposes the continued development of nuclear weapons in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and calls upon the DPRK to abandon further efforts and rejoin the international community. South Africa emphasizes Security Council Resolution 825 (1993) and 1695 (2006), condemning the DPRK's nuclear testing and calling upon them to honor their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. South Africa also complies with Resolution 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which establishes an embargo on military and technological materials and bans weapons exports from the DRPK. In February 2010, South Africa intercepted a weapons shipment from the DRPK to Central Africa.³ The cargo contained tank parts and was likely bound for the Congo, illustrating the DRPK's continued disregard for international law.

South Africa believes that the DPRK can voluntarily denuclearize and rejoin the international community. However, all parties must recall the consensus reached at the 2003 Six-Party talks: resolution of the nuclear issue cannot be obtained through aggressive dialogue and threatening actions. Long-term aid packages from non-belligerent states in return for recommitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA inspections are a possible avenue for the denuclearization of the DPRK. Kim Jung-Un, the new leader of the DPRK, cannot rely on nuclear threats to obtain aid from the West. South Africa will continue to attempt to open dialogue with the DPRK from a position of mutual interest. The DPRK could benefit tremendously from strong political and economic ties to Africa, but these relations will not and cannot be developed if the DPRK continues to pursue nuclear weapons. South Africa finds that the recent provocative behavior of the DPRK, such as the nullification of the Korean War armistice,⁴ to be reprehensible and that all parties involved must reevaluate the methods and rhetoric being used.

II. Addressing the Humanitarian Situation in Sudan

"We are confident that Sudan and South Sudan ... will introduce a new era of increased cooperation and mutually beneficial coexistence." –Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa⁵

The Republic of South Africa believes that in order to solve the humanitarian situation in Sudan and South Sudan, the political crisis must first be addressed. South Africa's top foreign policy objective is the stabilization and revitalization of the African continent. In 2011, out of a total of 66 resolutions passed in the Security Council, 43

¹ http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/asia/2013/02/13/south-africa-and-russia-oppose-north-korea-nuclear-tests

² http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/01/abandoning-nuclear-weapons-lessons-from-south-africa/

³ http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/23/us-korea-north-arms-idUSTRE61M0AM20100223

⁴ http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html

⁵ http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2012/suda0928.html

pertained to Africa (65%).⁶ South Africa also believes that the only way to achieve positive change is through honest diplomatic engagement, not through condemnation and coercive action.⁷

South Africa, as a member of the Security Council, has been integral to the production of many resolutions addressing Sudan and South Sudan. RSA recognized the importance of Resolution 2063 (2012) and 2057 (2012) which extend the UN security missions in Darfur and South Sudan, two areas which have seen extensive violence. South Africa also fully supports Resolution 1999 (2011), recommending the admission of South Sudan as a member state to the United Nations.

South Africa was instrumental in ensuring that a UN peacekeeping force was deployed in Darfur. South Africa also led the push to establish the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which despite its lack of funding and limited success is a framework for expanding and improving peacekeeping operations in Sudan. South Africa, unlike many other states, has directly engaged with Sudanese President Omar El Bashir to convince him of the necessity of AMIS and the deployment United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID). South Africa has invested heavily in the infrastructure of both Sudan and South Sudan, hoping to break the cycle of the resource curse which has plagued Sudan. South Africa brought both sides together in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that brought an end to Sudan's debilitating civil war.⁸ South Africa established formal relations with South Sudan in September 2011, and has continued to help South Sudan rebuild: over 1,600 civil servants trained and heavy investments in the energy and transportation sector.⁹ South Africa also supports the recent agreements signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which will restart Sudanese and South Sudanese oil production and create a demilitarized buffer zone between the two states.¹⁰

South Africa believes that the indictment of Sudanese President Omar El Bashir should be deferred as his prosecution could destabilize Sudan and hinder the political process of peace and rebuilding. South Africa will take the lead in the AU-UN Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Sudan Committee, which aims to prevent further crises in the Sudan by building the capacities of both Sudan and South Sudan and ensuring that economic development take place in a sustainable way.

III. Examining the Use of Sanctions in Conflict

South Africa's experience with economic sanctions during the end of the Apartheid regime created a legacy of distrust of the international community. Isolation from the international community caused South Africa to protect itself, eventually leading to the development of a nuclear weapons program.¹¹ Former South Africa President F. W. de Klerk once said, "In the case of South Africa, [economic sanctions] halted economic growth. It didn't help those who it was intended to help; it actually harmed them more than it harmed the intended victims of the sanctions." In the case of South Africa, it was positive investment, especially in black education and industry, which was the greatest agent of change in ending Apartheid.¹²

The United Nations has an extensive and deplorable history of utilizing economic sanctions. Scholarship in the field supports these claims, finding that economic sanctions are a counterproductive tool that often deteriorates human rights situations of the target states.¹³ Sanctions can create black markets that provide opportunities for the ruling class to make enormous profit.¹⁴

The Republic of South Africa firmly opposes traditional economic sanctions. South Africa believes in empowering people and not using reckless tactics that create humanitarian and political crises. Change can come in positive ways, and these must be used before sanctions are even considered. Even targeted sanctions are an act of hostility, and coercive compliance is not a method that South Africa supports. However, if the United Nations community, through the appropriate avenues and bodies, unanimously agree to administer economic sanctions – whether general or targeted – South Africa will comply with the terms as it has in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

⁶ "://www.saiia.org.za/feature/coming-into-it-s-own-an-analysis-of-south-africa-s-voting-patterns-and-the-achievement-of-its-foreign-policy-goals-in-the-unsc.html

⁷ http://www.cmi.no/file/NatanRSASudan208.pdf

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ http://www.southafrica.info/news/international/southsudan-270911.htm#.UTYuqayNs7s

¹⁰ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21751896

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/46/1/59

¹⁴ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2674632