



SRMUN Charlotte 2017
Assessing the Challenges and Opportunities of Globalism in the 21st Century
March 30 - April 1, 2017
SC_charlotte@srmun.org

Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Charlotte 2017 and the Security Council (SC). My name is Morgan Emily Godfrey and I will be serving as your Director. This will be my second conference as a SRMUN staff member, having previously served as a Research Assistant for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee. I am currently pursuing two Bachelor's degrees, one in Political Science and one in International Studies with a concentration in Africa. Your Assistant Director is Dajer Fernandez, who is currently pursuing a degree in Political Science. This is Dajer's second time on staff as well, having served as a Research Assistant for General Assembly First Committee at SRMUN Atlanta 2016.

The SC is an exceptionally important committee. Within the UN, the SC is the only committee that can enforce its decisions and is looked at internationally as the body that maintains peace and security around the world. The SC itself is used to carry out the fundamental goals of the UN, outlined in the UN charter, and is thus considered the primary body of the UN. The Council consists of 15 Member States, five of which hold permanent seats, known as the Permanent 5 (P5).

Within the SC committee in Charlotte, there will be an open agenda and no pre-determined topics will be given to the delegates. This means that the delegates should instead prepare for two topics relating to international peace and security that are a top priority to their respective Member State. Delegates should also be up to date on current international and security issues. During the conference, the SC will engage in an international crisis simulation that will mirror real-world situations. Your success during committee is contingent upon the knowledge of current affairs and your respective Member State's positions on these issues.

Within the background guide, Dajer and I have produced Updates that are meant to provide a strong introduction to several important security issues currently facing the world and should be used to fuel each delegate's personal research. The background guide should not be used as the only method of analysis for these topics. Delegates are expected and encouraged to seek out more information and pursue intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for this committee should reflect the very complex natures of these issues and their externalities. Each delegation is expected to submit a position paper and to be prepared for lively debate on such matters at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit srmun.org. **All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, March 10, 2017, by 11:59 p.m. EST via the SRMUN website.**

I am beyond excited to serve as your Director for the SC and look forward to meeting you all. Dajer and I wish all of you the absolute best of luck while at the conference and firmly believe in your abilities as delegates to solve real world problems. Please do not hesitate to contact the Director-General Michael Oleaga, myself, or Dajer if you have any questions before the conference.

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The History of the Security Council

At the end of World War II in 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created, along with the Security Council (SC) under Chapter V, and originally had a total of 11 Member States.¹ Although currently located within the UN Headquarters in New York City, the SC first gathered in London on 17 January 1946.²³ Since then, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as the five main victors of the war, became the permanent members of the SC; together with six temporary seats, which later increased to ten in 1965 to make a total of 15 Member States.⁴ The ten non-permanent members of the SC are elected for two-year terms with five seats changing on a rotational basis.⁵

The SC elects a president, which is “held by each of the members in turn for one month, following the English alphabetical order of the Member States names.”⁶ The SC President’s role is defined by the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96/Rev.7), which includes presiding over the meetings, overseeing any crisis, and approving the agenda which is proposed by the UN Secretary-General as stated under Chapter II, Rule 7.⁷ Decisions by the SC require at least nine votes, five of which must be from the permanent members who also have the power to veto any procedural matters.⁸

Article 24 of Chapter V in the UN Charter states that, the SC has the power to make binding decisions which other Member States are obligated to follow.⁹ When maintaining peace and security, the SC’s first action has been to reach a peaceful consensus between the involved parties by setting forth an agreement, then undertake investigation and mediation, and appoint special peaceful envoys, or “request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.”¹⁰ Should the dispute escalate, the main mission is to bring the hostilities to an end through ceasefire directives or send military observers or peacekeepers to decrease the high tensions.¹¹ Much harsher decisions are sometimes required, and the SC has the power to set economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial restrictions, travel bans, sever diplomatic relations, blockades, and in some cases send collective military action.¹² Its jurisdiction also includes the admission of new Member States and “exercise the trusteeship function” of the UN, and recommend to the General Assembly (GA) the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the GA, elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).¹³

For 71 years since the creation of the SC, the Council has worked restore peace, as the founders envisioned, with its first peace mission being established in 1948 in the Middle East to “monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.”¹⁴ The general topics the SC deals with include ensuring that International Law is respected, disarmament of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons through SC Resolution 1540, drug control, crime prevention, and counter-terrorism.¹⁵

¹ “The UN Security Council,” The United Nations Foundation, <http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

² “About,” United Nations Security Council, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

³ “The UN Security Council,” The United Nations Foundation, <http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html> (accessed June 5, 2016).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ “Charter of the United Nations,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

⁶ “Security Council Presidency in 2016,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/presidency/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

⁷ “Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96/Rev.7),” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/rules/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

⁸ “Charter of the United Nations,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html> (accessed June 5, 2016).

⁹ “Charter of the United Nations,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁰ “About,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ “Peace and Security,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/peacesecurity/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁵ “Key Issues,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/priorities/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

The overall budget, known as the Regular Budget, has been considered and approved by the GA's Fifth Committee under Article 17 of the UN Charter.¹⁶ Budgets for peacekeeping operations are separated and calculated "based on the missions' mandate from the SC."¹⁷ Within the UN, Member States are required to financially contribute to the Regular Budget and peacekeeping budget, however, some Member States may opt to voluntarily contribute more than required in the form of supplies, personnel, or other resources.¹⁸ Depending on each Member States' financial capabilities, the UN funds its peacekeeping budget differently with "greater discounts for poorer countries."¹⁹ The permanent Members States pay a larger share because "of their higher responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" as reinstated under GA Resolution 235.²⁰ The SC approves peacekeeping operations, and during the last two decades had a large increase in these operations, which led to a drastic rise of the budget debt of approximately USD 1.6 Billion as of 30 June 2015.²¹ Because of the higher financial responsibility and leverage the permanent members hold, many of the decisions from the SC are impacted by their willingness to expand or continue peacekeeping missions.

The UN budget goes through a rigorous approval process for any new or expanded peacekeeping missions. First, a survey mission is sent to the affected area and the budget will depend on the findings of this operation.²² Second, the Secretary-General presents a report to the SC to convince the need for a peacekeeping operation and the estimated costs.²³ Third, the SC meets to pass a resolution to establish a mandate to start the operation.²⁴ A team of UN peacekeepers is sent as soon as possible as established by the mandate.²⁵ From there on, the peacekeeping budget is prepared for a duration of 12 months, from July to June, based on the most recent mandate of the body.²⁶

The following Security Council Member States will be offered at SRMUN Charlotte 2017:

ANGOLA, CHINA, EGYPT, FRANCE, JAPAN, MALAYSIA, NEW ZEALAND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SENEGAL, SPAIN, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, URUGUAY, and VENEZUELA.

¹⁶ "Financing peacekeeping," The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ "The UN Regular Budget and Payments to Specialized Agencies," Better World Campaign, <https://betterworldcampaign.org/us-un-partnership/importance-of-funding-the-un/un-budget-process/> (accessed June 5, 2016).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Financing peacekeeping," The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml> (accessed June 5, 2016).

²¹ "Tables and Charts on UN Peacekeeping Operations Budget," Global Policy Forum, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/the-un-peacekeeping-operations-budget.html> (accessed June 6, 2016).

²² "Peace-keeping budgets," United Nations, <http://www.un.org/ga/61/fifth/peacekeepingfinance.pps> (accessed June 6, 2016).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

Security Council Addendum

I. Overview of Agenda

Adoption of Agenda

The Security Council's (SC) annual agenda can be generated from the following five sources: the previous year's agenda, the President of the SC, any United Nations (UN) Member State, the UN Secretary-General and/or other UN bodies. The SC may decide to keep some items on its agenda if more discussion is deemed necessary by the body. For example, a very universal yet timeless topic that reappears on the agenda is Women, Peace, and Security. The President of the Office of the SC plays a crucial role as well because the president has the capability of placing items on the agenda. In January 2000, for instance, the United States of America (USA), which held the SC presidency at the time, placed AIDS as a threat to international security on the agenda of the SC. Furthermore, Article 35 of the UN Charter grants UN Member States the right to refer disputes to the SC. In 1948, India used this mechanism to refer the situation in Kashmir to the SC. Likewise, under Article 99, the UN Secretary-General may bring items to the attention of the SC as seen when former Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar asked the SC to investigate Geneva Convention violations in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Other UN bodies may also refer items to the SC. The General Assembly (GA), for instance, is afforded this right under Article 11 of the UN Charter. GA Resolution 194 of 1948, for example, requested the SC to discuss the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The President of the SC and the Secretary-General prepare a provisional agenda based on all sources of potential agenda items. The provisional agenda is provided to the members of the SC who then discuss and adopt the agenda. The SC may choose to discuss or not to discuss any agenda item referred to it by another body or Member State.

How the SRMUN Security Council Will Set the Agenda

The SC at SRMUN will operate differently than previously simulated committees held at SRMUN conferences. As opposed to providing delegates with pre-selected topics to consider, the SC, in line with how the real committee operates at the UN, will have an open agenda. Each Member State is charged with setting the agenda, based on the current issues of importance to the SC, and by means of a majority vote. Each delegate will be responsible for presenting two potential topics within their position papers that they will later defend before the Council to be considered as agenda items. These two topics should reflect the most important issues or crisis affecting the said assigned Member State.

The SC will operate independently of the other organs at SRMUN due to the possibility of a crisis scenario. Therefore, other UN organs represented at SRMUN will not refer items to the SC. The Secretary-General and the President of the SC are staff members and will not impact substantive debate, except when necessary. This leaves the agenda in the hands of the SC delegates. Delegates to the SC thus should be equipped for a myriad of likely topics.

After the roll is called, the President of the SC will open discussion of the agenda. Delegates may make formal speeches and utilize caucuses to discuss potential topics and negotiate how to proceed. After some discussion and negotiation, delegates may make motions to set the agenda. An example of such a motion is:

“The Delegate from Ukraine moves for a discussion of the Situation in the Middle East.”

Note that the naming of the topic will affect the breadth of the topic. For instance, the issue of “Israeli practices concerning the human rights of the Palestinian people” is more focused than “the situation in the Middle East.” There can be multiple motions for different agenda items, but each motion can only name one potential agenda item. Motions for agenda items will be voted on in the order in which they are received. The first motion to receive nine or more affirmative votes will be the agenda item. At the conclusion of discussion of that agenda item (either through voting or adjournment of the agenda item), the SC will again move back into a discussion of setting the agenda, and the process will proceed until the next agenda item passes by nine or more votes. Delegates may choose to negotiate more than one agenda item at a time, but they can only vote on one item at a time. For example, delegates may choose to discuss the “Situation regarding Iran’s atomic energy program” and then “Children in

Armed Conflict.” Delegates would move to set the agenda as “Iran.” Once Iran has been discussed and resolutions have been voted on or discussion on Iran adjourned, then the Council will move to discuss the agenda again, and delegates would have to move to discuss Children in Armed Conflict.

II. Voting

All votes (both procedural and substantive) in the SC require nine affirmative votes to pass, as outlined in the UN Charter. For instance, a vote of eight in favor, with zero opposed and seven abstentions would fail. Substantive votes (resolutions, amendments, and second vote of division of question) additionally require the “concurring votes” of the permanent five (P5) members of the SC (People’s Republic of China, French Republic, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and the United States of America (USA)). The UN interprets that an abstention by a member of the P5 does not represent a veto. Therefore, for a resolution to pass, all members of the P5 must either vote yes or abstain, and the resolution must receive 9 affirmative votes. Note that the P5 have rarely utilized the veto in the past ten years; as of November 2016, only 18 vetoes have been cast in that time, and no vetoes were cast in 2010 and 2013.²⁷

The SRMUN SC will adhere to the voting rules set forward in the UN Charter.

III. Position Papers

Due to the open agenda of the SRMUN SC, delegates will be asked to write position papers that are different from all other SRMUN committees. Delegates should identify any relevant two issues related to international peace and security that best reflect the interests of their Member State. Position papers should present the significance of the two issues in the order in which their Member State wishes to address them. For instance, the Angola delegate, may propose the following two topics in order: 1) UN Efforts to Remove Landmines; and 2) Eliminating the Small Arms trade in Africa, whereas the UK may propose: 1) UN Participation in the Rebuilding of Iraq; and 2) Terrorism.

IV. Updates

As SRMUN draws closer, delegates will begin receiving Updates from the SC Director and Assistant Director. These Updates are meant to draw attention to particular international issues that may pertain to the crisis situation, as well as provide delegates with a base of topic knowledge from which they can build their own research. The updates are not meant to be viewed as part of the crisis itself, but rather a means of pointing the delegates in the right direction prior to the start of the conference.

V. Crisis

Background

The UN Charter states that the SC should be able to function continuously as the SC is the primary UN organ for dealing with crises that could impact international peace and security. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, for example, the SC held an emergency meeting at 2:00 am.

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Addressing a crisis situation is often incremental in the work of the SRMUN SC. If a crisis situation arises, the Secretariat will provide delegates with pertinent briefing materials and periodic updates. The Secretariat will also forward communications from the governments of SC Member States to their representatives; this may include reports and communiqués. Other committees at SRMUN may or may not become involved; however, if such a situation arises, the SC will be notified. If other SRMUN committees are not involved, then SC delegates SHOULD NOT interfere with the work of delegates in other committees. It is up to SRMUN SC delegates to decide a course of action to attempt to resolve a crisis. The primary tools for delegates to resolve a crisis are diplomacy and negotiation. Delegates should be prepared to represent the interests of their Member State in any potential crisis.

²⁷ "Security Council - Veto List," The United Nations, <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick> (accessed November 15, 2016).

VI. Outside Parties

Background

The UN Charter gives the SC the option to invite non-Member States of the SC to participate, without vote, in discussions that affect the non-Member State(s).

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The resources of SRMUN are limited, so logistically, it may not be possible to honor all requests. If a potential crisis requires it, SRMUN may seek ways to accommodate such a request. To invite a non-Member State, delegates must first advise the committee Director and Assistant Director (from a logistical standpoint). If it is cleared, a delegate should make a motion such as: "Under Article 32, the delegate from Argentina moves for the invitation of representatives from Cameroon to participate in a discussion of the agenda item under discussion." The motion requires a vote of nine in favor to pass.

VII. The Double Veto

Background

Representatives at the San Francisco, California, USA, conference that created the UN left ultimate decisions on whether a vote in the SC was procedural or substantive. On rare occasions, P5 members are able to question whether an item is procedural which requires nine affirmative votes and a yes or abstention from each of the P5. For instance, a P5 may challenge the President of the SC's ruling that an issue is procedural. The SC then has a substantive vote on whether the issue is procedural or not. The P5 member can veto this vote, making the issue substantive, and then veto the original motion. This is known as the double veto. The double veto is rarely used.

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The SRMUN SC has a limited meeting time, and the desire of the committee is to maximize the available time. The Director of the SC has the right to limit the use of the double veto on procedural issues that have minor impacts on debate such as suspension of the meeting and setting speakers' time. However, procedural motions such as agenda setting or inviting a party to a dispute, could be subject to a potential double veto.

To call for the double veto, a member of the P5 should raise their placard after a motion has been made, but before a vote has been taken and make the following motion:

"The delegate from China moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."

For Example:

"The Delegate from Egypt moves for a discussion of the Use of Pre-Emptive Force."

The Delegate from the UK raises their placard and is recognized:

"The Delegate from the UK moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."

Once the SC President accepts this motion, the SC moves to a substantive vote on whether or not the motion to set the agenda is procedural. A "yes" vote means that it is procedural; a "no" vote means that it is substantive. If the UK votes no, then the motion to set the agenda is considered substantive. At this point, the SC votes substantively on the motion to set the agenda. A no vote from any member of the P5 will veto the motion.

If you have any questions about these issues or any other SC related question, please do not hesitate to consult your Director, Assistant Director, the Director-General or Deputy Director-General.

Security Council Update I: Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Escalating Tensions

Introduction

In East Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) escalated its threats towards Japan and the Republic of Korea. The threats extended beyond just the region and reached the United States of America (USA), which historically had resurging threats from the DPRK.²⁸ The main location of the ongoing tensions is the Korean Peninsula between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, both of which have support from different Member States whose alliance has existed since the Cold War. Since the Korean War, following the 38th parallel, there has been the existence of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a cease-fire line set by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea.²⁹ Being relatively a new development in history, the DPRK announced on 23 April 2003, their possession of nuclear capabilities.³⁰ Furthermore in 2003, they resigned from the Treaty of on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).³¹ Since 2011, the DPRK has been ruled by Kim Jong-un, following the death of his father Kim Jong-il, and has escalated domestic and foreign tensions and a reorganization of its military and political rankings.³²

Current Situation

Tensions have been caused by illegal ballistic missile tests, nuclear proliferation by the DPRK, military exercises by the DPRK, Republic of Korea, and the United States of America (USA), and failure of diplomatic efforts through the Six-Party Talks. The United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) has continued to condemn the DPRK's ballistic missile test and holds emergency sessions to consider the ongoing situation. Through 2016, the DPRK conducted many ballistic tests, and resumed operations of their main nuclear facility in Yongbyon.³³ Diplomatic gridlock led to a lack of cooperation or results of peace, and allowed the DPRK to further develop its nuclear arsenal. Despite this, the USA and the Republic of Korea continued with their yearly military exercise drills in August 2016.³⁴ Due to the tension the military exercises put on the Korean Peninsula along the DMZ, the DPRK responded with warnings as it felt threatened by an invasion. The DPRK claimed the maneuvers were aggressive and escalated tensions in the region, which justified its actions as self-defense. Following the military exercises, on 5 September 2016, the DPRK fired three ballistic missiles off its east coast, according to the Republic of Korea's military, in a show of force timed to coincide with the G20 economic summit in China.³⁵

Following the response from the SC, the DPRK continued domestic political purges, which have set the political arena in high tensions and led to an unpredictable situation for the international community. The DPRK has had unpredictable domestic issues, which have led to widespread fear and instability. The latest of the executions includes the agriculture minister and an official at the education ministry in August.³⁶ This was then followed by the

²⁸ S/RES/2270. *Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, on 2 March 2016.* UN Security Council, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2270.pdf

²⁹ "Demilitarized Zone," History, <http://www.history.com/topics/demilitarized-zone> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³⁰ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³¹ Ibid.

³² "Kim Jong-un Biography," Biography, <http://www.biography.com/people/kim-jong-un-21125351> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³³ "North Korea Yongbyon nuclear site 'in operation,'" BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34254634> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³⁴ "US-South Korea military drills to proceed despite North Korea's warning," The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/30/us-south-korea-military-drills-north-korea-warning> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "North Korea executes officials with anti-aircraft gun in new purge – report," The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/north-korea-reportedly-executes-officials-anti-aircraft-gun-purge> (accessed October 12, 2016).

disappearance and possible execution of the vice foreign minister, a veteran diplomat, together with other four high-ranking diplomats in charge of European affairs.³⁷

Actions Taken by Security Council

The SC constantly takes actions against the DPRK, usually with additional sanctions, however, this has led the DPRK to continue their aggressive behavior. Within the last ten years, the SC has taken five notable actions against the DPRK. In 2006, Resolution 1718 was adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear test.³⁸ The resolution prohibited North Korea from conducting future nuclear tests or launching a ballistic missile. It also called for the Member State to completely abandon all nuclear weapon creation efforts and included sanctions to discourage and stop the DPRK from continuing its program.³⁹ Sanctions in this resolution included a travel ban on persons involved with the nuclear program within the Member State as well as exports to DPRK such as battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems.⁴⁰ These sanctions were designed to not only target the DPRK's nuclear program, but to disable the Member State from acting irrationally and aggressively towards its neighbors and other Member States it perceived as a threat. In addition, the resolution also created a committee composed of the then-15 SC members to serve as a monitoring body to review and adjust the sanctions as well as the violations of those sanctions.⁴¹

The next resolution, Resolution 1874, was unanimously adopted by the SC on 12 June 2009 and imposed more sanctions on the DPRK for failing to comply with the previous UN resolution and continuing their nuclear program. The resolution itself was passed in direct response to the Member State's underground nuclear test.⁴² In this resolution, the SC urged the DPRK to return to the negotiating table, mainly through the Six Party Talks with the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, Japan, Russian Federation, and the USA. Along with these things, the resolution also called or the DPRK to rejoin the NPT.⁴³

On 22 January 2013, the SC once again unanimously adopted Resolution 2087 after the DPRK successfully launched a satellite on 12 December 2012. The launch was in clear violation of the two previous resolutions as it was the development of technology that was applicable to the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic weapons programs.⁴⁴ The resolutions recalled previous sanctions against the development of weapons within the Member State and urged compliance as well as promising to take further action if the Member State refused to cooperate or acted aggressively once again. In addition, the resolution called for the DPRK to completely abandon its nuclear programs in irreversible ways in order to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁴⁵ This resolution also called, once again, for the DPRK to rejoin the Six-Party Talks, as well as urged other Member States to "remain vigilant" in regards to monitoring any persons or entities associated with the regime.⁴⁶

Once again unanimous in their decision to adopt a resolution on the DPRK, the SC adopted Resolution 2094 on 7 March 2013, in response to the DPRK's third nuclear test in February of the same year. In fact, the DPRK stated that their missile test was in direct response to the prior resolution, Resolution 2087.⁴⁷ The resolution sought to

³⁷ "North Korea purges vice foreign minister after UK-based diplomat defects – reports," RT, <https://www.rt.com/uk/362526-north-korea-diplomat-purged/> (accessed October 12, 2016).

³⁸ "UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea," Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea> (accessed October 14, 2016).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

increase the level of difficulty the DPRK would face when attempting to make further progress of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by obstructing its access to hard cash and the kind of technological equipment needed to build weapons and pursue the enrichment of uranium.⁴⁸ This resolution also called for Member States to detain and search any cargo or shipments to and from the DPRK if the shipments went through their territory. Additionally, it called upon the DPRK to completely abandon its nuclear programs and again prohibit the Member State from conducting any further experiments or provocations.⁴⁹

A recent SC resolution aimed at the DPRK was issued on 2 March 2016. Resolution 2270 was a direct response to the DPRK's fourth nuclear test and satellite launch on 6 January 2016 and 7 February 2016, respectively.⁵⁰ The launches were in direct violation of all aforementioned resolutions.⁵¹ This resolution continued to place sanctions on Pyongyang, the DPRK's capital city. In echoing the sentiments of previous resolutions, Resolution 2270 urged the DPRK to halt its nuclear and missile programs progress.⁵² Unlike the other resolutions however, this resolution emphasized the failure of the DPRK regime in meeting the needs of the North Korean people, instead focusing on their nuclear programs.⁵³

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Security Council Update II: **Tensions in the South China Sea**

Introduction

The South China Sea dispute has created tensions over island and ocean territories among many Member States in the region, the main figures being the People's Republic of China, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and even Taiwan.⁵⁴ Furthermore, in the dispute is the involvement of the United States of America (USA), which adds another variable to the situation. The tension varies among the military powers in the region, smaller Member States claiming legal possession over certain territories, foreign Member States, and unrecognized states. The claims over different ocean areas, islands, and territorial sovereignty are disputes based on historical, geographical proximity, and legal arguments made by all claimants.⁵⁵

Some examples of disputed territories include two largely uninhabited islands called the Paracels and the Spratlys, which may have reserves of natural resources around them. The sea "is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region."⁵⁶ China currently claims most of the territory under dispute, known as the "nine-dash line" and has set up air defense zones and promoted the protection of the territories it claims.⁵⁷ The claims go back many decades to 1947, when a map was issued detailing the territorial claims.⁵⁸ These were then followed by Taiwan's equal claims over the territory. Vietnam asserts that its claims over these areas precede those of China and that they rule and have sovereignty over most of the islands that can be proven through legal documentation from the 17th Century.⁵⁹ The Philippines argues it should have sovereignty over the Spratly Islands due to its geographical proximity. However, Philippines and China also dispute over who owns the Scarborough Shoal Island, which lies closer geographically to the Philippines.⁶⁰ Malaysia also lays claim to some islands in the Spratlys, stating the islands fall within their economic exclusion zones, "as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."⁶¹

Several conventions currently deal with defining the rules of the sea. The main example is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has provisions involving navigation, economic zones in the sea, resource claiming in the sea, and more importantly, settling disputes.⁶² South China Sea is one of the areas of most sea traffic in the world, furthermore, it is a central location for rich resources such as oil and gas reserves which are mostly uncovered.⁶³

Current Situation

⁵⁴ "Why is the South China Sea contentious?" BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349> (accessed October 1, 2016).

⁵⁵ "The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html> (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379493.shtml (accessed October 2, 2016).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," United Nations, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁶³ "South China Sea," United States Energy Information Administration, <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=SCS> (accessed October 22, 2016).

Security Implications

Throughout recent decades, the tensions have raised a significant number of incidents in the region. In 1974, the Chinese seized the Paracel from Vietnam, killing more than 70 Vietnamese troops.⁶⁴ In 1988, the two sides clashed in the Spratlys, with Vietnam again coming off worse, losing about 60 sailors. In early 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a lengthy maritime stand-off, accusing each other of intrusions in the Scarborough Shoal.⁶⁵ In May 2014, the introduction by China of a drilling rig into waters near the Paracel Islands led to multiple collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.⁶⁶ Since 2016, the Chinese navy has been carrying out exercises near the disputed Paracel Islands.⁶⁷ In the meantime, the USA continues to perform "freedom of navigation" operations in close proximity of the Chinese islands, which challenges China's territorial claims.⁶⁸ On 21 October 2016, another one of these operations occurred with China's Defense Ministry stating the USA's actions were "a serious breach of law and an intentional provocation."⁶⁹

South China Sea Tribunal

The Philippines, in 2013, took China to court and legally challenged their claims under the auspices of the UNCLOS.⁷⁰ This was a legal approach to prove ownership of these islands as they saw themselves unable to match militarily to competing states such as China. The results of this tribunal in July 2016 backed the Philippines' case accusing China of violating the sovereign rights of the Member State.⁷¹ The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague found no evidence supporting China's historical claim over the waters and resources it had exercised exclusive control over.⁷² In the end, the evidence showed no preceding documents that directly proved China had exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources. China responded by not accepting the outcome of the tribunal, which they argue was not sufficiently backed and took a biased approach to support the Philippines.⁷³

On the other hand, China supported their claims through a series of legal documents. Some main examples include the 1958 Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on China's Territorial Sea and the 1992 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which reaffirm China's territorial sovereignty of the claims on the basis of geographical and historical terms.⁷⁴ Furthermore, two documents reaffirm China's economic possession and ownership of resources and maritime rights in the territorial claims in the South China Sea, which include the 1998 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and the 1996 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on the Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁷⁵

Actions by China

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ "South China Sea dispute and Sino-Vietnam tensions," International Observer, <https://internationalobservernet.wordpress.com/2014/09/19/south-china-sea-dispute-and-sino-vietnam-tensions/> (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁶⁷ "South China Sea: Tribunal backs case against China brought by Philippines," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36771749> (accessed October 10, 2016).

⁶⁸ "China's Island Factory," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-1446c419-fc55-4a07-9527-a6199f5dc0e2> (accessed October 10, 2016).

⁶⁹ "US destroyer sails in South China Sea to make a point," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/21/politics/us-guided-missile-destroyer-south-china-sea/index.html> (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "South China Sea tribunal: Key points," BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36772813> (accessed October 10, 2016).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims.⁷⁶ A senior Chinese official said China has the right to set up an air defense zone over territory it claims in the South China Sea.⁷⁷ They have also stated it will “respect and uphold the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all states under international law in the South China Sea, and stays ready to work with other coastal states and the international community to ensure the safety of and the unimpeded access to the international shipping lanes in the South China Sea.”⁷⁸

However, through an artificial island building campaign, they moved to assert their claim over the South China Sea and backed it up by creating a string of island bases and set an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the territory.⁷⁹ This territory, the so-called “first island chain” stretches north in a curving line from the coast of Borneo, past Taiwan to southern Japan. Other Member States have felt China imposed itself with an “ambition to dominate.”⁸⁰ The Philippines and Taiwan see these steps of increased artificial island building as means to force territorial ownership, which leads to increased regional strength for China.⁸¹ The Philippines also claims China created this campaign in order to take over the oil and gas reserves in the territory, however, the USA has suggested these resources do not lie anywhere near the Spratly Islands.⁸²

Many have argued that China should negotiate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 10-member regional group that consists of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Chinese President Xi Jinping in the past has agreed to “negotiations based on respects to historical facts and according to international laws.”⁸³ However, even among this body, ASEAN Member States have not been able to come over a solution for the dispute that allows for peaceful remedies and fair resolution. Any possible discussions on the topic are blocked by Cambodia, China’s ASEAN ally on the topic who prefers with “dealing with the disputed claims on a bilateral basis.”⁸⁴

Actions Taken by the Security Council

No resolution has been passed in the Security Council (SC) addressing the increasing tensions in the South China Sea, however, with the building of artificial islands, high military presence, court rulings against China, and sovereignty disputes rising over the territory, it has become an important topic for the UN. However, the UN spokesman for the Secretary-General has made several statements on the topic including not having “a position on the legal and procedural merits of the case [South China Sea Tribunal] or on the disputed claims.”⁸⁵ Furthermore, the former UN Secretary-General has called for all parties to resolve the disputes in a peaceful manner through dialogue while following international law and the UN Charter.⁸⁶

The USA has, for the past 70 years, a political and military presence in the region which has been affected by the tensions in the South China Sea.⁸⁷ China’s position has created tensions that have challenged USA’s position in the

⁷⁶ “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁷⁷ “South China Sea: China ‘has right to set up air defence zone,’” BBC News, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36781138> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean-idUSKCN1050F6> (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁸⁵ “Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/db160712.doc.htm> (accessed October 22, 2016).

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

region. The US government does not acknowledge China's claim, and the USA Pacific Fleet continues to sail regularly through the South China Sea. During the 2016 G20 Summit, the topic of the South China Sea was avoided, however, US President Barack Obama said the need for China to practice restraint despite its regional presence and power.⁸⁸ Other SC Member States, including the United Kingdom which has stated a stance of wanting China to respect the court rulings, and Japan, Australia, and Malaysia, have a strong interest on a peaceful resolution.⁸⁹ In 2016, New Zealand, a non-permanent member of the SC, recently had their Defence Minister call "on all parties to reduce tensions" and how important it is for New Zealand's "own economic and security interest" to reduce tensions during a defense forum in Beijing.⁹⁰

All involved claimants have a strong position to support their claims for territory in the South China Sea with the rest of the international community encouraging a peaceful resolution to the situation. With recent court rulings and many SC permanent and non-permanent members taking a stance, the South China Sea tensions have set itself as a topic of high importance with military, political, and economic implications. Gridlock has become prevalent as multilateral bodies, such as ASEAN, cannot find a solution to the disputed territories that provide at least a compromise. Despite the call from the Secretary-General for peaceful solutions on the issue, there has been little advancements and steps that have led to decreasing tensions.

⁸⁸ "G20: Obama warns Beijing against South China Sea aggression," The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/03/g20-obama-warns-beijing-against-south-china-sea-aggression> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁸⁹ "The South China Sea Crisis: Next Stop the UN Security Council?" The National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-south-china-sea-crisis-next-stop-the-un-security-council-16397> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁹⁰ "Interference increases tensions in South China Sea, Brownlee told," New Zealand Herald, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11727001 (accessed October 11, 2016).

Security Council Update III: **Iranian Nuclear Capabilities**

Introduction

Created in 1957 as a part of the United States of America's (USA) "Atoms for Peace" Program, Iran's nuclear program contains several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.^{91,92} Following this, in 1967, Iran created the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and was run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Equipped with a US-supplied five-megawatt research reactor, the program made many gains during this time, even signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in the 1970.⁹³ Signing the NPT opened Iran to verification and inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁹⁴

In the 1970s, the Shah of Iran approved plans to create up to 23 nuclear power stations inside Iran by the year 2000, and in March of 1974, fearing the world's oil supply would soon run out, said, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."⁹⁵ During this time, many businesses within the USA and Europe jumped into doing business with Iran.^{96,97} In 1976, the Ford Administration, in the USA, offered Tehran the chance to buy and operate a US-built reprocessing facility specifically meant for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel in order to complete a "nuclear fuel cycle."⁹⁸

Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah, most of the international community stopped cooperating with Iran on nuclear policy.⁹⁹ The USA quickly stopped the supplying the TNRC with highly enriched uranium (HEU), causing the shutdown of their only reactor.¹⁰⁰ In 1983, IAEA officials were assisting Iran in chemical aspects of uranium enrichment, but were quickly stopped by the US government, which discouraged IAEA assistance in the matter.¹⁰¹ In April 1984, intelligence from West Germany discovered and reported that Iran may have a nuclear bomb with uranium thanks to assistance from Pakistan.¹⁰² During the Iran-Iraqi war, two Bushehr reactors were damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes and the entire nuclear program came to a stand-still.¹⁰³

⁹¹ "An Atomic Threat Made in America," The Chicago Tribune, <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-061209atoms-day1-story-htmlstory.html> (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹² "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status," Congressional Research Service, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34544.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹³ "Contract between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran and the United States of America for the transfer of Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for a Research Reactor in Iran.," IAEA, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20614/volume-614-I-8866-English.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ "Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.parstimes.com/nuclear/crs_march04.pdf (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹⁶ "Chronology of Iran's Nuclear Program: (1957-present)," Oxford Research Group, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/oxford_research_group_chronology_irans_nuclear_programme_1957_2007 (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹⁷ "How Iran Plans to Fight America and Dominate the Middle East," Gabriel G. Taberani pp. 167, (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹⁸ "Past Arguments Don't Square with Current Iran Policy," The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-co/hotcontent/index.html?section=politics/administration> (accessed October 14, 2016).

⁹⁹ "ElBaradei Isn't Perfect," Anti War, <http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=8308> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁰ "Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges," U.S. Committee on the Internationalization of the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle, (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰¹ "US in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF₆," Nuclear Fuel, August 4, 2003. (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰² "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 7, 2000. (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰³ "Correspondence between the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and

Iran notified the IAEA about the blasts, and criticized the international community's lack of action. In 1986, it was discovered that Iranian intelligence services were responsible for the assassination of Eurodif manager Georges Besse's assassination.¹⁰⁴ Eurodif was one of the companies that had contracts with the Iranian government.

Beginning in the 1990s, the Russian Federation and Iran joined together to create a research organization called *Persepolis*, which provided both Member States with nuclear experts and technical information. Russian agencies like the Russian Federal Space Agency helped Tehran improve its missiles.¹⁰⁵ In 1992, Iran invited inspectors from the IAEA to visit all of their nuclear sites and facilities and the Director-General, Hans Blix, reported that Iran's facilities were consistent with using atomic energy peacefully.¹⁰⁶ During this time, the USA pressured Argentina to cancel a sale of nuclear equipment worth USD 18 Million with Iran and pressured the People's Republic of China to drop a contract that was going to help construct a uranium conversion plant. Despite this, China still provided blueprints for the facility to the Iranians, who advised the IAEA they would be continue to work on the program.¹⁰⁷ It wasn't until 2003 that the IAEA first reported that Iran had not declared activities that involved sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities. This was the first major sign that Iran may be using their nuclear program for non-peaceful means, as enrichment can be used to produce uranium that then can be used for reactor fuel for weapons.¹⁰⁸

Current Situation

Iran claimed that it has enriched uranium to less than five percent -- the percent used for fuel in a civilian plant and peaceful measures.¹⁰⁹ The government of Iran also claimed that the reason for its secrecy lies in the fact that the US government pressured many Member States to back out of nuclear contracts with them.¹¹⁰ The SC even demanded that Iran suspend its programs once the IAEA reported that Iran failed to comply with its safeguard.

Currently, Iran's ability to refine uranium has grown exponentially. Iran quintupled the amount of advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facility to over 1,000. The Member State also equipped a once secret facility, Fordo, with 3,000 older models of centrifuges.¹¹¹ Many experts in the field of non-proliferation have expressed concern over the construction of a thermal heavy-water research reactor in Arak as this could become a source of plutonium, another ingredient in creating a weapon.¹¹² Because Iran is skeptical to show the IAEA inspectors what they've requested to see, Israel, along with other Member States, are extremely suspicious of Iran's nuclear program, and Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been the most vocal critic of the program.¹¹³ Iran continues to point out that it has indeed signed the NPT, a treaty that Israel has failed to sign.¹¹⁴

the Director General (September 1984)," International Atomic Energy Agency, (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁴ "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft." Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 7, 2000. (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁵ "Through the Eyes of the Enemy: The Autobiography of Stanislav Lunev" Stanislav Lunev. (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁶ "Atomic Team Reports on Iran Probe: No Weapons Research Found by Inspectors," The Washington Post, <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-990775.html> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁷ "U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran; China, Argentina Agreed to Cancel Technology Transfers," The Washington Post, <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1035214.html> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁸ "HEU as weapons material – a technical background," NTI, https://web.archive.org/web/20090327013221/http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/norway/HEU_as_Weapons_Material.pdf (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹⁰⁹ "Iran's Nuclear Program," Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811> (accessed on October 14, 2016).

¹¹⁰ "Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons." Le Monde diplomatique, November 2005. (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹¹¹ "Examining the Status of Iran's Nuclear Program and Talks," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/world/middleeast/examining-the-status-of-irans-nuclear-program-and-talks.html> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Deal, is an agreement between Iran, the USA, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and has been in the works for years. This agreement decreases many of the sanctions that has been imposed on Iran in exchange for Iran putting an end to its creation of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁵ By the year 2035, Iran is required to reduce its stockpiles of uranium along with the number of centrifuges it produced uranium.¹¹⁶ The sanctions that have been lifted can be imposed again if Iran violates any aspect of the deal and would be in place for ten years, with a possible five-year extension.¹¹⁷

By January 2016, per the deal, Iran had significantly reduced the number of centrifuges installed in two of their plants as well as shipped tons of uranium to Russia.¹¹⁸ As per the deal, Iran's stockpile of uranium must be reduced by 98 percent in the next 15 years as well as keep its levels of enrichment at a low 3.67 percent. Additionally, the plant of Natanz is limited to only conducting research and looking into development for the next eight years, while the plant at Fordo is not allowed to enrich any uranium for 15 years. Fordo is also to be converted into a nuclear, physics, and technology center and the location's centrifuges must be used for medicine, agriculture, industry, and science.¹¹⁹

In September 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani accused the USA at failing to comply with the deal. When speaking at the UN General Assembly, Rouhani described acts by the USA as "illegal actions," referring to the US Supreme Court decision from April of the same year that allowed American victims of terror to claim over USD 2 Billion in compensation from Iran's central bank.¹²⁰ The USA denied these accusations, stating, "The United States has and will continue to implement its commitments under the deal with good faith and without exception."¹²¹

As warned, the SC imposed sanctions against the state of Iran and Iranian individuals deemed to be supporting Iran's proliferation-related activities.¹²² It required all states to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods to Iran. It also states that Member States are not to provide any sort of technical or financial assistance, training, or resources related to certain nuclear and ballistic-missile related goods.¹²³ The SC encouraged Member States to be wary of allowing individuals to engage with Iran's nuclear/ballistic missile activities. The SC also directed states to freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of designated individuals involved with the program as well as prevent the "specialized training or teaching of Iranian nationals" of subjects related to Iran's nuclear goals.¹²⁴

SC Resolutions 1747 and 1803 continued to impose sanctions upon Iran and were adopted after Iran. Some of the sanctions included in these resolutions include calling on states to "exercise vigilance and restraint" when it came to the supply, sale, or transfer of major military weapons systems, financial assistance, or other service related to the provisions of these times, and called on major international financial institutions "not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans" with the Iranian government unless for humanitarian or

¹¹⁵ "What you need to know about the Iran deal," USA Today, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/09/10/what-you-need-know-iran-deal/72036704/> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ "Iran nuclear deal: Key details," BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ "Iran's President Rouhani slams US 'lack of compliance' with nuclear deal," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/22/politics/rouhani-iran-attacks-us-over-nuclear-deal/> (accessed October 14, 2016).

¹²² UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran, Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran> (accessed on October 14, 2016).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

developmental purposes.¹²⁵ Another sanction called on states to inspect any cargo going to and from Iran via aircraft and vessels owned or operated by the Iranian companies Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line.¹²⁶ Resolution 1835, passed on 27 September 2008, simply reaffirms the previous four resolutions.¹²⁷

On 8 June 2010, the SC adopted Resolution 1929 against Iran, with Brazil and Turkey voting against it, and Lebanon abstaining.¹²⁸ This resolution created additional sanctions on Iran, such as banning Iran from investing in any sort of nuclear and missile technology abroad. The resolution also created a complete arms embargo on Iran, preventing any sort of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems” from entering Iran.¹²⁹ The resolution also created a new inspection regime to detect and stop Iranian smuggling. Finally, the resolution included sanctions that targeted Iran’s ability to finance any sort of proliferation activities.¹³⁰ The latest resolution, Resolution 2231, adopted on 20 July 2015, endorsed the JCPOA that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 on 14 July 2015, and outlines the guidelines Iran needs to follow for the SC to lift sanction. It encouraged Member States planning to engage in the dual-use material sales with Iran to use the procurement channel set up the JCPOA. Lastly, the resolution requested the IAEA undertake the necessary monitoring and verification to help implement the nuclear deal.¹³¹

Security Implications

The global community must remain apprehensive and cautious when dealing with Iran’s current nuclear program. Under the JCPOA, Iran has the ability to once again conduct matters without public acknowledgement, as it has done in the past. The JCPOA could provide an adequate cover for illegal nuclear development. In the coming months, it is pertinent that the SC and the IAEA remain vigilant in ensuring that Iran does not gain the ability to create nuclear weapons and that they continue to comply with the NPT. Excess nuclear weapons is far from ideal and as the world moves towards increased globalization it is pertinent that no more Member States obtain the ability to create nuclear weapons.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.