



SRMUN Charlotte 2016

The United Nations at 70: Addressing the Changing Landscape of Peace Security & Stability

March 31 - April 2, 2016

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Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Charlotte 2016 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). My name is Keith Brannum, and I will be serving as your Director for NATO. This will be my third conference as a SRMUN staff member. Previously, I served as the Assistant Director for the African Development Bank at Charlotte 2015 and Director for the Commission on Population and Development in Atlanta 2015. I currently manage an independent foreign affairs blog, Artemis - Foreign Policy, while working for candidates for public office in North Carolina and the southeast. My previous position was an organizer for the Democratic Party of Virginia in 2015. Our committee's Assistant Director will be Prix Berry. This will be Prix's first time as a staff member but she is not new to the SRMUN scene as she has previously been a delegate and later rapporteur at our 2015 Charlotte conference in the aforementioned African Development Bank.

NATO's mission is to provide regional and international security for members of the European and Atlantic communities, and has done so since its founding in 1948. The Alliance has been involved in important peacekeeping mission in countries such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and provided a forum for engagement on emerging security issues such as terrorism, cybersecurity, and conflict in Eastern Europe.

By focusing on the mission of NATO and the SRMUN Charlotte 2016 theme of "*The United Nations at 70: Addressing the Changing Landscape of Peace, Security and Stability*," we have developed the following topics for the delegates to discuss come conference:

- I. Addressing New Security Challenges with the Readiness Action Plan
- II. Exploring the Gender Gap within the Armed Forces

The background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, the background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit srmun.org. **All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, March 11, 2016 by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.**

Prix and myself are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for NATO. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you in the near future. Please feel free to contact Director-General, Maricruz Retana, Prix or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

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History for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was officially formed on 4 April 1949, with 12 Member States signing the North Atlantic Treaty.¹ The Treaty's original purposes were "deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe..., and encouraging European political integration for collective self-defense."² The Alliance is described by historian Norman Davies as the successor of the "Grand Alliance" of World War II powers that restored peace to Europe in the aftermath of 1945.³ From 1945 to 1991, the Alliance acted as the guardian for peace in Western Europe, embodying the post-war vision of European powers working towards cooperation on an economic and political basis.⁴ With the support of the United States of America (USA), NATO emerged as one of the unifying institutions behind peace and integration in Europe and the broader Atlantic community.⁵ Today, NATO includes 28 Member States, acted as the basis for economic integration in Europe, and has enforced United Nations (UN) sponsored naval embargos, no-fly zones, and deployed soldiers in conflict areas around the world.⁶

Two events, the breakdown of the Four Powers Commission Agreement and the Berlin Airlift (1947), and the detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union (1948), pushed the USA and its European allies to provide collective security from potential aggression by the Soviet Union.⁷ The decision to leave the Four Powers Commission by the Soviet delegation encouraged the remaining three Powers (France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), and the USA) to unify their constituent parts of Germany into the European Community (EC), creating West Germany.⁸ The Soviet blockade on West Berlin and resulting airlift created a need by the remaining powers to create alliance to oppose Soviet aggression.⁹ Joined by 11 other Member States, the Congress of the USA to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty and its accompanying funding bill, after a successful early test of the Soviet atomic bomb was confirmed.¹⁰ The members formed a consolidated military command structure based in France known as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and picked General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the USA to be the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).¹¹ NATO's first major change politically was when Greece and Turkey joined the organization in 1952 and shortly thereafter, West Germany in 1955.^{12 13} In response, the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact.¹⁴

In December 1967, Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, delivered a report entitled "The Future Tasks of the Alliance," this report encouraged NATO to "pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved."^{15 16} This study was undertaken due to the decision by France to withdraw its forces from NATO's integrated command structure, and the perception that the Communist Bloc was

¹ A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ Norman Davies, "Europe: A History." Harper Perrenial. New York, NY, 1996. 1070-1071

⁴ Walter LaFeber, "America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1992." pgs. 82-84

⁵ Ibid, p. 84.

⁶ A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

⁷ Ibid, p. 84.

⁸ Walter LaFeber, "America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-1992." pgs.74-76

⁹ Ibid, p. 80.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 81.

¹¹ A short history of NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120412_ShortHistory_en.pdf (accessed July 17, 2015).

¹² A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council – 'The Harmel Report,' 13-14 December 1967, Last updated: 2 December 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (accessed July 17, 2015).

¹⁶ Ibid.

not monolithic, where peaceful coexistence was possible.¹⁷ The report also put forth the idea of disarmament and practical arm control, the need of multilateral discussion of complex questions between East and West Europe, and defense problems.¹⁸ Several major concerns in the report included the exposed South-Eastern flank (namely the Middle East), where continued conflicts between Israel and the Arab bloc threatened the peace of the region.^{19 20} The other major concern noted by the report was German unification, where a grand coalition of the German parties in the *Bundestag* favored a policy of *detente* with Soviet Bloc.²¹

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, NATO Member States witnessed the gradual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Communist Bloc, the reunification of Germany, and the retreat of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.^{22 23} In 1994, the Soviet Union officially dissolved, and became 15 individual Member States, including Russia.²⁴ With the need to “[deter] Soviet expansionism” gone, NATO remained to fulfill two purposes in the post-Cold War World: to provide for the collective security of Europe, while also acting as a forum for Atlantic cooperation.²⁵ NATO established the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1991 (originally called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council), the NAC “brought the Allies together with their Central European, Eastern European, and Central Asian neighbors for joint consultations.”^{26 27} The Council helped emerging Member States in the former Soviet Bloc and around the Atlantic to build relationships with the Alliance.²⁸ Today, with 28 Member States and 22 partner States, the Council regularly exchanges information regarding current security and political issues affecting the Atlantic and Eurasian communities.²⁹

The Alliance also reached out to Member States in the Mediterranean through the creation of the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994.³⁰ The envisioned partnership with six Non-Member States: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, was designed to provide overall security to the region and achieve mutual understanding on core issues affecting all members.³¹ Also referred to as the NATO+7, the dialogue has provided a successful model for partners to develop a relationship with the Alliance that’s tailored to their needs on a bilateral basis, and provide for an exclusive arrangement of negotiating core issues at each individual member’s own pace.³² In total, NATO has formed other partnerships with 41 partner States across the globe through programs like the Defense and related Security Partnership Program, make a valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks and “deepen NATO’s security cooperation with [its] partners.”³³ The “Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme” helps Partner

¹⁷ Pierre Harmel, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance (1967)” ed. Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith. Routledge. New York, NY, 2007. 68-70

¹⁸ The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council – ‘The Harmel Report,’ 13-14 December 1967, Last updated: 2 December 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (accessed July 17, 2015).

¹⁹ “The Soviet Threat to the South Eastern Flank of NATO in the Middle East,” C-M (56) 139, 10 December 1956, North Atlantic Council, http://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/6/26263/C-M_56_139_ENG.pdf (accessed August 26, 2015).

²⁰ The Future Tasks of the Alliance: Report of the Council – ‘The Harmel Report,’ 13-14 December 1967, Last updated: 2 December 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (accessed July 17, 2015).

²¹ Pierre Harmel, “The Future Tasks of the Alliance (1967)” ed. Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith. Routledge. New York, NY, 2007. pgs. 70-72.

²² Berlin Wall, History.com, A+E Networks, 2009, <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/berlin-wall> (accessed July 20, 2015).

²³ A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm (accessed November 23, 2015).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ A short history of NATO, Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120412_ShortHistory_en.pdf (accessed July 17, 2015).

³² Ibid.

³³ Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm (accessed July 15, 2015).

Member States to “build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation.”³⁴ NATO’s comprehensive partnership program makes sure that NATO can face the “multifaceted nature of 21st century security challenges.”³⁵ A major milestone of the PfP was achieved when “three former partners, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary” became full Alliance members.³⁶ NATO quickly expanded, adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the Alliance between 2002 and 2004, followed by Albania and Croatia in 2009.³⁷

NATO missions include Operation Active Endeavour and The Kosovo Force (KFOR). Operation Active Endeavour is a NATO mission to monitor the Mediterranean Sea.³⁸ NATO ships “[patrol] the Mediterranean... to help deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorist activity.”³⁹ KFOR entered Kosovo after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999.⁴⁰ KFOR’s objectives include “detering hostilities, establishing secure environment, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, [and] support International humanitarian effort.”⁴¹ NATO helped the European Union (EU) facilitate the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.⁴² The agreement and NATO’s continued presence is paving the way for a more stable Kosovo.

The Global War on Terror has marked a new era of opportunities and challenges for the Alliance in working with Member States in the Atlantic and around the world. After Al Qaeda’s airborne assault on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the USA invoked Article V calling for collective response through multilateral, intervention in Afghanistan.⁴³ This was the first time Article V had been invoked in the nearly 50 year history of the alliance, which received the UN Security Council’s endorsement through Resolution 1386, calling for the creation of an “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)” in December 2001.⁴⁴ NATO took over command of the ISAF in August 2003.⁴⁵ ISAF’s “mission was to enable the Afghan authorities to provide... security across the country.”⁴⁶ The ISAF was responsible for “[conducting] security operations and [helping] build up the Afghan security forces”⁴⁷ Transition to an Afghan lead security force started in 2011 and was completed in December 2014.⁴⁸ In total, 51 Member States (NATO members and partners) took part in ISAF.⁴⁹ NATO continues to provide support for Afghanistan with the start of the “non-combat Resolute Support Mission.”⁵⁰

In 2011, in response to civil war and deteriorating conditions in Libya, NATO intervened on behalf of rebel forces fighting to overthrow Muammar Al Qaddafi.⁵¹ Encouraged by the USA’s actions to freeze Libyan assets and carry

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

³⁷ Member countries, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated 20 August 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm (accessed August 20, 2015).

³⁸ Operation Active Endeavour, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated March 26, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm (accessed August 15, 2015).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ NATO’s role in Kosovo, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated 30 November 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed August 18, 2015).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ A short history of NATO, History, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html> (accessed July 15, 2015).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated 01 September 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm (accessed August 18, 2015).

⁴⁶ NATO and Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated 8 December 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/69772.htm> (accessed August 20, 2015).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ NATO and Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated 8 December 2015, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/69772.htm> (accessed August 20, 2015).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya.” March/April 2012 issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2012-02-02/natos-victory-libya> (accessed November 23, 2015).

out the Security Council's mandate to protect civilians, NATO established a no-fly zone and launched air attacks against government forces.⁵² NATO took over command and control from USA forces and continued the mission, known as "Unified Protector" until the Libyan Transnational Council took power in Tripoli and killed Qaddafi.⁵³ While Libya was hailed as model for Alliance intervention by some, others have called on the Alliance to address both its role in the aftermath of such conflicts, and the level of unity among its Member States to act on crucial challenges to the Alliance's legitimacy.⁵⁴ The Libyan Intervention is a strong case study for the Alliance's capacity for collective defense at a time when diffuse priorities economically, socially, and among individual Member States will divide it.⁵⁵

The bedrock of NATO is the relationships between its North American and European members.⁵⁶ "NATO remains an inter-governmental organization in which each [Member State] retains its sovereignty, but bound by mutual self defense."⁵⁷ Therefore, the principle of consensus is used when issues of strategic importance are considered. Decisions are made jointly by Member States on the basis of consensus through the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Alliance's legislative body.⁵⁸ Consensus is the only form of decision-making in NATO, where Member States work to find a decision acceptable to all.⁵⁹ They do so in consultation with SACEUR, the highest ranking executing body, and the Military Committee, the highest advisory committee to the NAC.⁶⁰ When planners contemplate NATO operations, a plan of concepts is introduced to the Military Committee, which is then given feedback by the NAC and Military Committee for reconsideration.⁶¹ Afterwards, the final plan is presented to the Council for approval. NATO's Secretary General is the main facilitator in the process of consultation.⁶² The Secretary General is NATO's chief spokesperson and "[ensures] that decisions are implemented."⁶³

The following NATO Member States will be represented at SRMUN Charlotte 2016:

BULGARIA, CANADA, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, ITALY, LITHUANIA, NETHERLANDS NORWAY, POLAND, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SPAIN, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.⁶⁴

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ "NATO's Intervention in Libya: A New Model?" NPR. September 13, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/140292920/natos-intervention-in-libya-a-new-model> (accessed November 23, 2015).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ NATO Handbook, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2015).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Consensus decision-making at NATO: A fundamental principle, NATO http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm (accessed August 20, 2015).

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ The NATO Secretary General, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50094.htm (accessed August 27, 2015).

⁶⁴ SRMUN Charlotte – Nations, SRMUN Inc., <http://www.srmun.org/charlotte/nations.php> (accessed November 23, 2015).

I. Addressing New Security Challenges with the Readiness Action Plan

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”
-Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁶⁵

Introduction

The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) official policy of organizing collective security towards protection of its Member States in Eastern and Central Europe.⁶⁶ Affirmed in its latest iteration at the Wales Summit in 2014, it represents the strongest stance by the alliance regarding emerging security challenges since the end of the Cold War, more specifically, towards aggression from an outside state or non-state actor.⁶⁷ While creating broad objectives for the alliance in the wake of the Ukrainian and Syrian crises, the RAP also addresses the strategic objectives for the use of the Alliance’s military forces against an external threat to the collective security of Europe.⁶⁸ Member States created the RAP to reassure the legitimacy of collective defense, while adapting to new methods of waging war, including cyberwarfare and proxy-wars with internal dissidents.⁶⁹

NATO’s Response: The Readiness Action Plan

NATO representatives met at the Wales Summit on 4-5 September 2014 to approve the RAP, ironically coinciding with the ongoing Syrian Crisis and the major effort in the Baltic Sea spearheaded by the United States of America’s (USA) maritime forces in the region.⁷⁰ The RAP contains several components focused on strengthening the alliance’s commitment to collective defense in the face of uncertain security environments in the post-Cold War world, including: reassurance measures to Central and Eastern European states that joined the alliance in the wake of the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution and the fall of the Soviet Union, adaptation measures that ensure the alliance’s long-term growth, and military measures to strengthen conventional and naval forces allocated by alliance Members.⁷¹

Reassurance Measures

The principle product of a strengthened commitment to collective defense is the NATO Response Force (NRF), a multinational force that is capable of intervention to any area threatening an alliance member.⁷² The NRF consists of land, maritime, air, and special force units designated for rapid deployment in crisis situations.⁷³ The Supreme Allied Commander (SUACER) determines when, where, and how the NRF is used under authority granted by the North Atlantic Treaty, with resources given to them by Member States, and with advice by European and member defense ministers.⁷⁴ Decision making authority over deploying the NRFs are taken by the NAC.⁷⁵ The 2014 RAP designated special reassurance measures that have largely shifted the Alliance’s focus on security of its “Eastern Flank,” which encompasses the Baltic region, Poland, and Romania.⁷⁶ Also known as reassurance measures, NATO is working to raise its presence in the region through a variety of methods, including but not limited to, establishing logistical infrastructure to Poland and the Baltic, launching large-scale military exercises, and stationing troops in key Member States.⁷⁷ Swift Exercise-15 was the largest airborne exercise conducted by NATO since the Cold War,

⁶⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Six Crises*.ed. Richard Nixon, 1962

⁶⁶ Readiness Action Plan, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm (accessed November 7, 2015).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Annual Report of NATO.” 2013. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_106247.htm (accessed November 6, 2015).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² NATO. “NATO Response Force,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm# (accessed October 9, 2015).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Douglass Lute. *From Wales to Warsaw: NATO Readiness Action Plan*, The Ambassadors REVIEW, Spring 2015, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27655/uploads> (accessed October 14, 2015).

⁷⁷ Wojciech Lorenz, “NATO Narrows It’s Military Gap.” The Polish Institute for International Affairs. No. 20 (55), September 2014. https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=18080 (Accessed November 11, 2015).

mobilizing 5,000 troops from 11 Member States.⁷⁸ Another similar exercise conducted in the Estonian city of Narva, on the Russian border consisted of over 1,100 armored vehicles and 5,000 troops, sending what commanders and leaders believed was a clear message of deterrence to Russian aggression against the Baltic region.^{79 80}

While land force exercises have played a critical piece of NATO's overall strategy, Member States are emphasizing increased air and sea actions in the Baltic and Eastern Mediterranean Seas, including increased submarine patrols in the region.⁸¹ To strengthen NATO's maritime forces for both regions, the alliance introduced a total of four standing fleets, two which support combat operations and assist in removing mines from international waters.⁸² These additional fleets are coordinated from NATO's Maritime Fleet Headquarters, based in Northwood in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), under the command of a three-star British Admiral.⁸³ Air policing, while not new to the 2014 RAP and its 2015 revisions, has been significantly increased due to Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.⁸⁴ With this in mind, Arctic Challenge Exercise, a major NATO air training drill held in Norway, took place and involved 100 aircraft and support crew, practicing air policing in the Baltic.⁸⁵ These exercises, whether overt or covert, are an attempt to reassure Member States that the alliance as a whole will exercise collective defense against any aggressor.

Expansion of NRF

A variant of the NRF, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VRJTF), was created in response to the unrest and destabilizing conflict in Ukraine, following the collapse of Ukrainian President Yanukovich's government and the sweeping pro-democratic movement in 2014.⁸⁶ The VRJTF is an advance, brigade-size tactical unit, whose purpose is to respond to crisis situations on the borders of a Member State.⁸⁷ The taskforce provides an opportunity for Member States to test the logistical, tactical, command and control, and response effect of Alliance actions, all essential in the event of conflict and war against a rival state or non-state entity.⁸⁸ Individual governments contribute members of their armed forces on a voluntary basis, while others provide equipment, training, facilities and housing, and other necessities.⁸⁹ Currently, six Member States, called the "Framework States," have provided support for the VRJTF: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK.⁹⁰

The VRJTF is also supported by a newly established command and control infrastructure to coordinate responses to crises, divided into six regions.⁹¹ NATO officers are in charge of each region's response force, and report directly to NATO's command center in western Poland.⁹² The central command center coordinates the response teams, organizes defense planning for Eastern Europe, and acts as the host for the NATO Command in the event of major crisis in the region.⁹³ The establishment of VRJTF implements the promise of the RAP by placing combat troops in conflict zones as necessary, and coordinating their actions with local and national military forces.⁹⁴ By establishing the communication infrastructure to coordinate their deployment, NATO is providing the framework for expanded

⁷⁸ Vladimir Kozin, "NATO's Military on Russia's Doorstep: Who is Doing the Saber Rattling in Eastern Europe." Centre for Research on Globalization. August 25, 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-military-buildup-on-russias-doorstep-who-is-doing-the-saber-rattling-in-eastern-europe/5471860> (accessed November 7, 2015).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Louisa Brooke-Holland, *NATO's Military Response to Russia*. House of Common's Library. September 9, 2015. P. 10.

⁸² Ibid. p. 10.

⁸³ Ibid. p. 10.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁸⁵ Vladimir Kozin, "NATO's Military on Russia's Doorstep: Who is Doing the Saber Rattling in Eastern Europe." Centre for Research on Globalization. August 25, 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-military-buildup-on-russias-doorstep-who-is-doing-the-saber-rattling-in-eastern-europe/5471860> (accessed November 7, 2015).

⁸⁶ Douglass Lute. From Wales to Warsaw: NATO Readiness Action Plan, The Ambassadors REVIEW, Spring 2015, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27655/uploads> (accessed October 14, 2015).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

military involvement in Eastern and Central Europe as part of reassurance measures implemented in the Baltic.⁹⁵ Ultimately, the challenge of expanding on the foundation set by RAP is determined by the individual contributions of Member States, noted above by UK's contribution of naval forces to both maritime theatres of action.⁹⁶ Ongoing debates in Brussels and in national capitals about funding existing and future NATO force deployments will have a major impact on military measures to expand NRF and VRJTF to address emerging challenges.⁹⁷

Post-Cold War NATO

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO confronted new security threats that fell outside of the conventional framework of continent-wide warfare. The collapse of Yugoslavia (1994), the 9/11 Attacks on the USA in 2001 and subsequent intervention in Afghanistan (2001), and rise of terror attacks are non-traditional security threats that the alliance was not designed to address.⁹⁸ The Russian Federation's resurgence, marked by the 2008 intervention in Georgia and the 2013 invasion of Crimea, which has destabilized much of eastern Ukraine, forced NATO to review security commitments in Eastern Europe.⁹⁹ The fundamental shift of power in Eastern Europe has, according to a research fellow at the Polish International Affairs Institute, "forced defense ministers to reevaluate their promise to alliance security that lacked the infrastructure and feasibility to carry out those promises."¹⁰⁰

Conventional Warfare: Resurgent Russia

After 1994, NATO's core mission of containing Russian expansionism changed when the Soviet Union collapsed. Furthermore, the alliance welcomed several of the former Soviet satellites, including the Baltic States.¹⁰¹ The relationship between Russia and the alliance also became more cooperative, leading to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Pact and helped to establish the NAO Russia Council, allowing all Member States, plus Russia, to make decisions about European security.¹⁰² The Founding Pact was an important part of the post-1994 status quo, as the alliance promised to withhold stationing troops in the territory of new Member States, reducing the probability of remilitarization and escalation, in return for upholding the sovereignty of and territorial integrity of all states.¹⁰³ The treaty also set in place mechanisms for bilateral cooperation between NATO and Russia.¹⁰⁴ Russian policy post-1994 has been characterized as interventionist within its Eurasian sphere of influence, intervening directly in local conflicts to preserve its international influence.¹⁰⁵ Examples of Russian foreign policy towards breakaway states include the military airlift in Transnistria (a breakaway region of Moldova along the Dniestr river), and Nagorno-Karabakh in southwestern Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁶ Neither such conflicts have altered the geographical or political integrity of either state, especially while the breakup of the Soviet Union was a gradual and often unorganized reordering of the international community in Eurasia. NATO's steady expansion or membership, and the prospect of Georgia's membership advocated by the administration of USA President George W. Bush, prompted Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008.¹⁰⁷ The intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia forced Georgia to withdraw overtures of

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Louisa Brooke-Holland, *NATO's Military Response to Russia*. House of Common's Library. September 9, 2015. P. 5.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Douglass Lute. From Wales to Warsaw: NATO Readiness Action Plan. The Ambassadors REVIEW, Spring 2015, <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27655/uploads> (accessed October 14, 2015).

⁹⁹ Luis Simon, "NATO's Rebirth: Assessing NATO's Eastern European 'Flank'" The Strategi Studies Institute. 2014. 2 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2014/10_SimonLuis_Addressing%20NATO's%20Eastern%20European%20Flank.pdf (accessed October 14, 2015).

¹⁰⁰ Beata Gorka-Winter, "Strengthening NATO's Eastern Flank." European Leadership Network.

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank_2216.html (accessed October 14, 2015).

¹⁰¹ Louisa Brooke-Holland, *NATO's Military Response to Russia*. House of Common's Library. September 9, 2015. P. 4.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ "The NATO-Russia Founding Pact." 1994. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed November 5, 2015).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Jeffrey Mankoff, "Russia's Latest Land Grab." *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2014.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-04-17/russias-latest-land-grab> (accessed October 28, 2015).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

joining NATO, preventing what Vladimir Putin, President of Russian, and political leaders feared as a USA or western encirclement of Russia.¹⁰⁸

The 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, and subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine shifted Russo-Western relations back to pre-1994.¹⁰⁹ Drawing from lessons in the Kosovo and South Ossetia interventions, Putin acted to counter the collapse of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine by destabilizing the forming pro-EU government, through funding local pro-Russian groups in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine and Crimea.¹¹⁰ The subsequent annexation of Crimea has helped inspire Russian-backed separatists to vie for independence from Kiev in favor of a closer relationship with Moscow, if not outright union.¹¹¹ Furthermore, Putin has used other non-military means to challenge NATO on the issue of Ukraine, such as the 2015 shutdown of natural gas supplies from Russia to Europe via the government-owned utilities and energy conglomerate Gazprom.¹¹² This shutdown also affected Europe as a whole, since more than half of European natural gas comes from Russia via Ukraine.¹¹³ Russia has reemerged as a security threat more eminent to European security as opposed to the current conflict being waged in the Middle East. Russia's Syrian intervention in October 2015 bolstered the morale of Bashar Al-Assad's regime by striking at those rebel groups most directly threatening the regime's strongholds and Russian facilities along the coast.¹¹⁴ Russian intervention complicates a crisis where NATO action, much like Ukraine, would threaten a proxy war should it arm the rebels groups looking to overthrow Assad. NATO would also be hard-pressed to join Russia against the Islamic State (interchangeably known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)) since likely targets include those groups supported by the USA and Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁵

Furthermore, while NATO has made progress to close the military gap between itself and Russia to address conventional and asymmetric threats, it does not address the broader, strategic challenges created by Crimea's annexation and Ukraine's dismemberment.¹¹⁶ Russia's territorial gains not only undercut the post-war guarantee of borders, but increased their ability to project power on the Balkans, Poland, and the Baltic states, the latter via Kaliningrad.¹¹⁷ For example, Putin has nurtured pro-Russian groups in the Baltic States to stage rallies and local acts of protest against their governments, citing persecution of their Russian identity, particularly language.¹¹⁸ On a broader scale, the Kremlin encourages the rise of anti-EU or "Euroskeptic" parties that challenge the legitimacy of EU and NATO institutions.¹¹⁹ The use of nationalism to dismember fragile states like Ukraine and Moldova has set a strong precedent for further aggression, and will require both political and militaristic reassurance measures.¹²⁰

Non-Conventional Threats: Terrorism

While NATO was prepared for a conventional conflict throughout the Cold War, conflict between states has shifted towards non-conventional means of warfare, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, cyberwarfare, economic war, and

¹⁰⁸ "Putin's War on the West." The Economist. Feb. 14, 2015. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter> (accessed November 4, 2015).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ George Friedman. "The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power." Stratfor Global Intelligence. https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power (accessed November 8, 2015).

¹¹² "Gazprom Halts Natural Gas Deliveries to Ukraine." Andrew Roth, New York Times. July 1, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/business/international/gazprom-ukraine-natural-gas-deliveries-russia.html?_r=0 (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Michel Kofman, "The Russian Intervention in Syria: Policy Options and Exit Strategies" October 21, 2015. <http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/the-russian-intervention-in-syria-policy-options-and-exit-strategies/> (accessed November, 7, 2015).

¹¹⁵ "U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria Into Proxy War With Russia" Anne Barnard and Karam Shoumali. October 12, 2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes.html> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹¹⁶ Wojciech Lorenz, "NATO Narrows It's Military Gap." The Polish Institute for International Affairs. No. 20 (55), September 2014. https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=18080 (Accessed November 11, 2015).

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ "Putin's War on the West." <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter> (accessed November 4, 2015).

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

political subversion through propaganda and state-sponsored messaging.¹²¹ Defined as “asymmetric warfare,” strategies used by enemies seek to erode power, expressed as political, military, economic, or social, by avoiding direct conflict in favor of “other means.”¹²² Applying these definitions from studies provided by the USA Army, individual NATO states have engaged in wars where conflict was relegated to non-conventional status, especially during the break-up of the colonial empires, but more recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹²³ France fought against the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) in Algeria between 1954 and 1962, while NATO bombed Serbian cities in retaliation for the Bosnian genocide between 1994 and 1996.¹²⁴ These situations have become the norm, rather than the exception, to a new security environment that the alliance has been slow to respond to, especially in lieu of few conflicts directly affecting the security of Europe.¹²⁵

The ongoing civil war in Syria has complicated the security situation in Europe, and brought conflict the closest to the continent since the Bosnian War (1994-1996). The Islamic State emerged in 2013 as the most direct threat to stability in the Middle East through its conquest of eastern Syria and western Iraq. The creation of a proto-state, with access to funding, its own infrastructure, its ideology with global appeal, and a communication system that spreads this message to constituency allows it to wage a truly global terror campaign against the West and its allies.¹²⁶ The increase in attacks and subsequent casualties among Europeans across the Mediterranean has been attributed to ISIS’s use of the Internet and social media to disseminate core policy goals, utilizing the utopian view of the “Caliphate” while issuing threats and calls to action against its enemies.¹²⁷ The escalating conflict has led to an increased forced migration of refugees coming to Europe, and the crisis has threatened to create domestic instability and, potentially, proliferation of terrorist agents among them.¹²⁸

The attack on *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris, France on 9 January 2015 and the recent coordinated terror campaign on 13 November 2015 have been the largest terror attacks waged by the group on European soil against a NATO member.¹²⁹ The November 13th assault demonstrated that 1) European members were highly vulnerable to a sophisticated assault by ISIS (which claimed responsibility for this attack on November 15th), and 2) the group’s messaging has radicalized an entire segment of young Muslims and untold numbers of supporters who are able to carry out these attacks.¹³⁰ Furthermore, the response to the threat by the French government has been to close its borders and declare martial law, adding further complications to Europe’s refugee crisis that many fear bring opportunities for radicalized terrorists to enter the continent.¹³¹

¹²¹ David L Buffaloe, “Defining Asymmetric Warfare.” The Land Warfare Papers, The Institute of Land Warfare, Army of the United States. No.58, September 2006, Arlington, VA. Pgs. 8-10.
https://www.ansa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_58.pdf (accessed November 16, 2015).

¹²² Ibid, p. 4.

¹²³ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “Annual Report of NATO.” 2013. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_106247.htm (accessed November 16, 2015).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ David L Buffaloe, “Defining Asymmetric Warfare.” The Land Warfare Papers, The Institute of Land Warfare, Army of the United States. No.58, September 2006, Arlington, VA. Pgs. 8-11.
https://www.ansa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20WebExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_58.pdf (accessed November 16, 2015).

¹²⁶ Erin Saltman and Charlie Winter, “Islamic State: the Changing Face of Jihadism.” The Quilliam Foundation. 2014. Pgs. 31-33
<http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf> (accessed November 16, 2015).

¹²⁷ Ibid, p. 38.

¹²⁸ Leo Cendrowicz, “Syria conflict: Nato raises response force to 40,000 troops in face of Russia’s ‘aggressive and dangerous’ actions.” The Independent. 8 October 2015. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-conflict-nato-raises-response-force-to-40000-troops-in-face-of-russia-s-aggressive-and-a6687046.html> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹²⁹ “Terror in France: What Paris’ Night of Horror Means for Europe.” The Economist. November 14, 2015,
<http://www.economist.com/news/21678511-how-europe-has-become-more-vulnerable-terrorist-attacks-what-parisu2019s-night-horror> (accessed November 30, 2015).

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Lastly, alliance planners and leaders have created a very narrow focus for the usage of forces that are designed to fight a more conventional style war, which addresses only Russian actions in Eastern Europe.¹³² The continued conflict with ISIS and the refugee crisis, created by the civil wars in Syria and Libya, have placed serious security pressures on Member States.¹³³ While the alliance has institutional mechanisms, such as the Civil Emergency Planning Board, to meet such problems, very little response has been forthcoming.¹³⁴ The RAP does not address this issue, nor the possible movement of refugees from destabilized areas of Ukraine.¹³⁵ According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, presented through Euronews, over 800,000 Ukrainians have been scattered due to the war.¹³⁶ This year alone, 81,000 Ukrainians were seeking asylum in Belarus and neighboring states, all considered in the RAP for military security reassurances.¹³⁷ Local security coordination within Member States, however, is absent from the document and subsequent briefings by alliance Member States leaving out an important point of cooperation necessary for maintaining internal stability against political subversion or warfare. While the VRJTF can be deployed to conflict zones, the RAP does not emphasize response to the ongoing refugee crisis across Europe, nor coordination with sister bodies, like the European Union.

Governance and Economic Stability

The RAP is designed to address traditional military and security issues facing Member States, including emerging issues like weapons of mass destruction, conventional conflicts, terrorism, etc. However, the RAP does not include measures to improve internal governance among those Member States' political and economic institutions that are weaker, whether from war, corruption, social unrest, and other disturbances that deter peaceful civic and economic engagement by citizens. NATO's commitment to strengthened support for Member States was outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept which recognized that military means alone could not solve the complex challenges that the Euro-Atlantic Alliance faced in the post-9/11 era.¹³⁸ Alliance Member States agreed at the Chicago Summit (2012) to establish a small civilian crisis management unit at the alliance headquarters to coordinate related activities where Alliance military units were involved.¹³⁹ Finally, in 2012, the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan was established, creating a military-civilian task force to coordinate all relevant agencies and partners in implementing the common vision laid out in the Strategic Concept, and integrate it as part of the force doctrines for future operations, drawing in part from experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya.¹⁴⁰

Conclusion

The RAP builds upon an existing foundation of the Alliance's principle of collective security, which has been exercised in the post-Cold War era on two occasions: Kosovo and 9/11. The plan agreed to in Wales in 2014 and reaffirmed in 2015 now establishes the logistical and strategic framework from which to organize collective defense in Eastern and Central Europe. The plan encompasses a wide variety of different security threats, from small scale military incursions to local insurrections, and other non-traditional security threats like those used in Crimea. However, as we have seen, it does not go far enough to encompass the security threats evident in eastern Ukraine, Syria and the Paris attacks. The RAP does not coordinate a higher strategy of accommodating these challenges in a context beyond the Eastern Flank of Europe, in spite of maritime naval presence in the Mediterranean.¹⁴¹ Being one year old, much work is necessary for the RAP to coordinate the military command of NATO with the local military, political, and security institutions of Member States when addressing multiple levels of regional and national

¹³² Judy Dempsey "NATO's Absence from Syrian Refugee Crisis" Carnegie Europe. October 22, 2015. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=61710> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ "Ukraine crisis has created more than 2 million refugees, UN reports" Euronews. April 23, 2015. <http://www.euronews.com/2015/04/22/ukraine-crisis-has-created-more-than-2-million-refugees-un-reports/> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹³⁸ NATO. "A "comprehensive approach" to crises" http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (accessed November 17, 2015).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ "Putin's War on the West." <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21643189-ukraine-suffers-it-time-recognise-gravity-russian-threatand-counter> (accessed November 4, 2015).

security. Without the confidence building goals, objectives, and tools that were used in treaties like the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO's military planning will follow in line similar to other failed national building policies used in Iraq (2004) and Libya (2014). Ultimately, such planning has taken place in a security environment that is ever changing, raising the threats of non-traditional security threats, while Member States struggle to balance domestic priorities with funding NATO.¹⁴²

Committee Directive

The committee's task is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the RAP, and its effectiveness in steering the alliance towards objectives that align with its goal of collective European security. Can the RAP have a greater relevance for issues separate from the Russian aggression against its Eastern European members? Does this create a more antagonistic relationship with Russia? If so, how should the committee restructure the alliance to address these issues? How can the alliance make active use of existing treaties, such as the NATO Russia Founding Pact as part of its strategy moving forward? One of the principal challenges is the economic and social stability of certain states, like Ukraine, that are not addressed. How can these aspects be incorporated more strongly in the alliance framework for Eastern Europe? Non-state actors have become more prominent and more pronounced since the fall of the Berlin Wall. One such actor, Al-Qaeda, carried out the 9/11 attacks and triggered the Article 5-intervention in Afghanistan. Does the RAP address this kind of event, or similar events, caused by a non-state actor? Furthermore, in light of the Paris attacks, should the alliance extend its planning for a stronger commitment to security in the Eastern Mediterranean region? How should the Alliance address the growing challenges of greater involvement in the Middle East, in light of Turkey's downing of a Russian jet, or individual support for rebel and non-state actor groups involved in Syria or Iraq? While these are important questions for the body to consider, all Member States need to look for deeper answers regarding logistical and budgetary challenges as individual states, and how this can be incorporated into the larger picture of RAP.

¹⁴² Jan Techau, "The Politics of 2 Percent and the Security Vacuum in Europe." Carnegie Europe. September 2, 2015. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/08/31/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-in-europe/fig> (accessed November 30, 2015).

II. Exploring the Gender Gap within the Armed Forces

Introduction

Closing the gender gap within the armed forces has been a top priority for NATO.¹⁴³ Since women play a vital role in maintaining peace and security, there is a need for the representation of women at all decision-making levels (national, regional, and international).¹⁴⁴ Currently, women remain underrepresented within the armed forces. NATO's operations expand across three continents, involving almost 70,000 troops from 28 Member States as well as 17 non-NATO countries.¹⁴⁵ Women represent less than 20 percent of the combatants within the armed forces and are also excluded from the peace process creating major obstacles on building sustainable peace.¹⁴⁶ "According to the United Nations, before the Second World War, 90 percent of casualties in conflicts were combatants. Today, the majority of casualties are civilians, especially women and children. Not only are their needs ignored during times of conflict, women are often excluded from efforts to make and keep the peace despite representing half the population."¹⁴⁷ Conflict affects all groups of people, and yet, Member States should be aware of the groups it affects the most, which are women and children. Following the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325), NATO pushed to implement its own policies to effectively increase female representation, while understanding that both male and female personnel are essential for NATO's operational effectiveness.¹⁴⁸

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have introduced and implemented several measures in order to close the gender gap within the armed forces. NATO has worked with several international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) in order to ensure the inclusion of women are involved in peace and security efforts at all levels as well as the "potential that women offer in the political and military ranks."¹⁴⁹ Female representation varies throughout NATO Member States and ranges between three to 18 percent.¹⁵⁰ There is also an absence of gender specialists, male or female, to fulfill all current and potential requirements for NATO-led missions and operations.¹⁵¹ Female recruitment, retention and the inclusion of women in the peace process is a goal for NATO Member States where they have sought to introduce national policies through the use of National Action Plans that are geared towards increasing and retaining female representation within the armed forces.¹⁵²

UN Actions

In 2000, the Security Council (SC) adopted S/RES/1325 that addressed the need for women's roles in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian response.¹⁵³ This resolution provided the foundation for NATO to look to when implementing gender gap policies, and it was created in response to the changing nature of conflicts where innocent civilians were increasingly becoming the victim. The SC stressed the importance of equal participation, as well as full involvement of women regarding the promotion of peace and security.¹⁵⁴ Following the adoption of S/RES/1325, the SC adopted additional resolutions regarding the issue of gender and conflict. S/RES/1820 (2008) focuses on sexual violence as a war crime during conflict and

¹⁴³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Women, peace, and security: NATO, UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm? (accessed October 19, 2015).

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Boosting women's role in peace and security." [NATO - News: Boosting women's role in peace and security, 14-Aug.-2009.](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news/114811.htm) (accessed December 23, 2015).

¹⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Women in the NATO armed forces." [http://www.nato.int/ims/1999/win/report99.pdf.](http://www.nato.int/ims/1999/win/report99.pdf) (accessed December 23, 2015).

¹⁴⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Women, peace, and security: NATO, UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm? (accessed October 19, 2015).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI). "Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security." <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps> (accessed October 18, 2015).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

recognizes that sexual violence can hinder international peace and security, while reaffirming the need for full female participation in the peace-building process.¹⁵⁵ S/RES/1888 (2009) calls for peacekeeping missions in order to protect women and children from sexual violence during conflicts, while giving the international community tools to create concrete measures at the national level by working with national leaders.¹⁵⁶ It also requires peacekeeping mandates to include provisions on the prevention and response to sexual violence as well as provisions regarding the protection of women and children, which will be led by women's protection advisors.¹⁵⁷ Lastly, S/RES/1889 (2009) calls for additional support of women's participation in all stages of the peace-and decision-making process, most notably in conflict resolution as well as post-conflict planning and peace-building.¹⁵⁸

NATO Actions

NATO's policies are based on the key pillars of S/RES/1325: participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, women's participation in peace building, protection of women and girls' rights and prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁵⁹ These pillars highlight:

...the complementary skills of both male and female personnel are essential for the operational effectiveness of NATO operations, especially in light of the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations, and intelligence gathering. NATO's operational effectiveness includes making a contribution to sustainable and lasting peace, within which gender equality is a decisive factor.¹⁶⁰

The skills of both men and women are seen as essential elements for NATO's effectiveness regarding military operations.¹⁶¹ With this acknowledgement, NATO urges all Member States to close the gender gap at all levels as well as expand the gender balance within the armed forces.¹⁶²

In 2007, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) adopted its own policy that later became known as the NATO/EAPC policy.¹⁶³ Every two years the policy is reviewed and updated where it was last updated in 2014.¹⁶⁴ Non-NATO partners have also participated in the development of this policy such as Afghanistan, Japan, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁶⁵ NATO and its partners recognize the importance of "ensuring women's active and meaningful participation in decision making and in security institutions and remain committed to contribute to the full implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda."¹⁶⁶ Training and education is important an aspect within this policy, and NATO seeks to develop appropriate educational and training programs that focus on gender issues prior to deployment. NATO and its partners seek to ensure that gender advisors are deployed as part of the Command Group and that women are deployed at all levels of NATO-led operations and that troops and commanders will have undergone gender training necessary for their role and level.¹⁶⁷

¹⁵⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping. "Women, peace and security." <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml> (accessed October 18, 2015).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Schjølset, Anita. "NATO and the women exploring the Gender Gap in the Armed Forces." International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). [http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20\(2010\)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20\(PRIO%20Paper\).pdf](http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20(2010)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20(PRIO%20Paper).pdf). (accessed October 18, 2015)

¹⁶⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "CWINF Guidance For NATO Gender Mainstreaming." http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf (accessed November 29, 2015).

¹⁶¹ Schjølset, Anita. "NATO and the women exploring the Gender Gap in the Armed Forces." International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). [http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20\(2010\)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20\(PRIO%20Paper\).pdf](http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20(2010)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20(PRIO%20Paper).pdf). (accessed October 18, 2015)

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Comprehensive report on the NATO/EAPC policy on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and related resolutions." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68578.htm. (accessed December 23, 2015).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Based on NATO's fundamental and continuing purpose to safeguard the freedom and security of all its Member States by political and military means, its policy aims to ensure that a gender perspective is mainstreamed into its procedures, activities, and efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts.¹⁶⁸ In 2009, NATO introduced the Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), which is a special committee that focuses on gender related issues.¹⁶⁹ NATO acknowledges that the NCGP plays a vital role in the integration of gender perspective as well as its role in the contributions to operational effectiveness.¹⁷⁰ NCGP is responsible for facilitating the exchange of information amongst NATO Member States on gender related policies and gender mainstreaming, and it promotes collaboration with international organizations concerned with the integration of gender perspectives into military operations as well as with gender related issues. It also provides advice to NATO Member States on gender issues and collaborates with other international organizations such as the EU, AU, and OSEC on the integration of gender perspectives into military operations as well as with gender related issues.¹⁷¹

In 2012, NATO released its Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, where NATO introduced additional policies from the NATO/EAPC policy that focused on the integration of gender perspective within NATO-led operations.¹⁷² One of NATO's concepts of integration aims to "strive for gender equality in the NATO Force Structure (NFS) in order to conduct credible and trustworthy external work and activities on women and gender in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)."¹⁷³ This directive provides a mandate and guidance on how to integrate S/RES/1325 into NATO-led operations, but it also calls for the establishment of a gender advisor.¹⁷⁴ One of the elements of this directive lies within education and training.¹⁷⁵ It requires that all personnel in NATO-led missions to be provided with education and training on gender mainstreaming, international law concerning the rights and protection of women, the importance of involving women in operations, and training on cultural awareness concerning gender context in NATO's areas of operations.¹⁷⁶

NATO had successfully increased the participation of women in the armed forces of most Member States such as Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, and Spain, just to name a few.¹⁷⁷ However, by the mid 2000's the growth had slowed down significantly.¹⁷⁸ In order to increase the recruitment and participation of women several Member States such as the aforementioned have developed national initiatives in the form of National Action Plans (NAPs).¹⁷⁹ Each NAP responds to the recommendations outlined in several NATO policies and committees such as the NATO/EAPC policy and the NCGP and has led some Member States to specify the recruitment of women as a strategy in their NAPs.¹⁸⁰ Not only are NAPs a positive step towards closing the gender gap, it also signifies NATO Member States' awareness of the gender gap issue as well as awareness of "the roles women may play in peace-building and conflict resolution."¹⁸¹

Recruitment and Retention

¹⁶⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "CWINF Guidance For NATO Gender Mainstreaming."

http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf (accessed November 29, 2015).

¹⁶⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Annual Conference of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives 2015."

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121351.htm. (accessed December 4, 2015)

¹⁷⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives."

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_101372.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed October 20, 2015).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective into the NATO command structure."

http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_04/20150414_20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf.

(accessed October 18, 2015).

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Schjølset, Anita. "NATO and the women exploring the Gender Gap in the Armed Forces." International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

[http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20\(2010\)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20\(PRIO%20Paper\).pdf](http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20(2010)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20(PRIO%20Paper).pdf). (accessed October 18, 2015)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

One of the key components for closing the gender gap lies within recruitment and retention. The number of women within the armed forces has increased significantly from 30,000 in 1961 to over 290,000 today.¹⁸² Recruitment has increased in the past few years for most of the NATO Member States and is the first step for joining the military service.

NATO has recommended Member States adopt different policies geared towards increasing the recruitment of women. Some of those policies can include promotion of equal opportunities for women by reserving available positions for qualified women, and adjusting physical fitness tests for women, but maintaining equal criteria for all other selection tests. They should also employ information campaigns that promote military career options for women while demonstrating how it can be combined with family life, and they should postpone physical tests in the enlistment call due to pregnancy or childbirth.¹⁸³ The implementation of these policies is an important step in the recruitment of women as it brings awareness of the options that are available for women within the armed forces.¹⁸⁴ Individual Member States have implemented national policies in order to increase the recruitment of women through public awareness. As an example, Canada's success in women's recruitment relates back to the short time period between the enrollment and application.¹⁸⁵ "Chief of Defense Staff demands that 70 percent of applicants must be enrolled within 30 days. As a consequence, potential recruits can be pursued to choose a military career early on, without wasting time waiting or terminating an already started civilian education."¹⁸⁶

In order to stabilize their numbers and retain women in the armed forces, Member States should first look at the reasons why there is a low retention rate amongst women. Family life, unequal pay, and unequal job duties are some of the primary reasons for low retention.¹⁸⁷ The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme conducted an analysis of annual national reports to the NCGP from 1999 to 2013, and the findings reported that many women leave the armed forces during child bearing and rearing years because they cannot balance their work and family commitments.¹⁸⁸ Women are often faced with a choice of work or family and, more often than not, they choose the latter.¹⁸⁹ NATO, however, has urged Member States to implement measures and ensure that Member States are providing support for families, as well as providing initiatives to aid the combination of competing priorities between work and personal life.¹⁹⁰ Not only is the support for and prioritizing of families seen as a vital component in ensuring female retention within the armed forces, the establishment of a diversity policy where everyone is equally encouraged and given professional opportunities is also important.¹⁹¹ The recruitment and assignment of women in large numbers provides some level of security and comfort for female personnel by creating a support system, which can also be seen as a way to retain women in the armed forces.¹⁹²

Recently NATO Member States have begun to adopt measures that focus on incentives to increase female participation and representation at all levels within the armed forces.¹⁹³ Some Member States, such as Canada,

¹⁸² Nielsen, Vicki. "Women in uniform." NATO Review. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/Peacekeeping-Challenge/Women-uniform/EN/index.htm>. (accessed October 18, 2015).

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Science for Peace and Security Programme. "UNSCR 1325 Reload An Analysis of Annual National Reports to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives from 1999-2013: Policies, Recruitment, Retention & Operation." http://www.nato.int/issues/nogp/meeting-records/2015/UNSCR1325-Reload_Report.pdf (accessed December 27, 2015).

¹⁸⁹ Schjølset, Anita. "NATO and the women exploring the Gender Gap in the Armed Forces." International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). [http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20\(2010\)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20\(PRIO%20Paper\).pdf](http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Schjolset%20(2010)%20NATO%20and%20the%20Women%20(PRIO%20Paper).pdf). (accessed October 18, 2015).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Recruiting and Retention of military personnel." http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/Recruiting%20&%20Retention%20of%20Mil%20Personnel.pdf. (accessed October 18, 2015).

successfully increased female recruitment within their armed forces.¹⁹⁴ Arguably, securing equal opportunities for women should be the first step in closing the gender gap within the armed forces, and Canada used incentives such as removing barriers to women's recruitment in order to increase female representation, some of those barriers were family/work balance.¹⁹⁵ Each Member State has its own unique national proposal for both the recruitment and retention of women. The Netherlands, for example, recently adopted an action plan called the Orientation Year.¹⁹⁶ Orientation Year focuses on "civilian Upper Secondary Vocational Education at regional training centers across the country, it targets those under the age of 18, who wish to gain additional training and information about the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). The year consists of regular civilian courses with 20 percent of the curriculum consisting of extra sports, military bivouacs, and information about the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA)."¹⁹⁷ Since the implementation Orientation Year, the program has managed to increase the recruitment of women by 30 percent.¹⁹⁸ In addition, the retention of women is significantly higher than those without the Orientation Year background.¹⁹⁹ According to the RNLA, Orientation Year is a success where 90 percent of youngsters who start the program also finish it, the turnover rate for both men and women who train under this program is lower compared to those who do not have the Orientation Year background.²⁰⁰ Since the turnover rate is lower for those who have the Orientation Year background, the RNLA aims to recruit 75 percent of the soldiers both men and women from the Orientation Year program.²⁰¹

Peace-building and Women's Rights

Warfare has continued to change in the last few decades due to faster communications and closer international networks to advanced technological weaponry. Not only have warfare strategies changed, but the actors engaged in warfare have also changed from state to non-state actors.²⁰² Member States recognize the importance of female representation within the armed forces and are aware that women play a vital role in the peace process as well as the prevention and resolution of conflicts.²⁰³ As a result of war, women and children are often the vulnerable 90 percent of the casualties in conflicts are civilians and nearly 70 percent are women and children.²⁰⁴

Peace-building and the increase of women's participation in conflict resolution is a priority for not only NATO, but also for other governmental organizations.²⁰⁵ "At the July 2001 G-8 meeting in Rome, the G-8 emphasized the importance of the involvement of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, as well as women's full and equal participation in all phases of conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building."²⁰⁶ For NATO, one of the first steps in achieving peace-building is through increasing its operational and crisis management capacity, and by allocating additional resources that utilize the full potential of human resources that are available in making NATO operations more effective.²⁰⁷ Nonetheless, the peace process also signifies the end of a conflict, but it also lays the foundation for a society to reconstruct for its future, and per the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation women are often excluded from this peace process.²⁰⁸ Almost 98 percent of all signatories to peace agreements are men and nearly 93 percent of all participants in peace negotiations are men.²⁰⁹ "When women are excluded from

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Turitto, James. "Understanding Warfare in the 21st Century." *International Affairs Review* 18, no. 3 (2010). <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/145>. (accessed December 28, 2015).

²⁰³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Women, peace and security: NATO's implementation of UNSCR 1325." http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_91106.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed December 27, 2015).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "CWINF Guidance For NATO Gender Mainstreaming." http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/cwinf_guidance.pdf (accessed November 29, 2015).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation. "Women are important in peace process." <http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/wp-content/uploads/qbank/81ca0262c82e712e50c580c032d99b60.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2015).

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

peace processes, the new society is constructed without the benefit of half of the population's knowledge. And since the peace agreement often forms the basis of new Constitution women's rights might not be taken into account."²¹⁰ When women are included in the peace process and negotiations there is a higher likelihood that the outcome of the agreements will hold and prevent a relapse into conflict, but it can also enhance the legitimacy and fairness of the agreement.²¹¹ Not only will the inclusion of women help prevent a relapse, women also have an impact on the language of the text in the agreement, because women are mostly likely to include provisions for women's rights.²¹²

One of the key roles women can play in the peace-building process is outlined in S/RES/1889, which suggests that "the key role women can play is re-establishing the fabric of recovering society and stressing their need for their involvement in the development and implementation of post-conflict strategies in order to take into account their perspectives and needs."²¹³ The resolution further outlines that women are underrepresented in the formal roles in the mediation process while stressing the need to ensure that women are appointed to the decision-making levels as well as maintaining roles as high level mediators.²¹⁴

Conclusion

As conflicts continue to increase throughout the world, it is important to incorporate and increase female participation within the armed forces. Since the adoption of S/RES/1325, NATO has introduced several policies such as the NATO/EAPC policy, and the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 for the effective implementation of gender integration. In addition, NATO Member States have been successful in increasing female representation through the use of national policies within the armed forces in several Member States such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway. Recruitment and retention are key components for closing the gender gap, Member States have been successful in recruiting more women but have not been as successful in retaining women within the armed forces. Women often face challenges of family/work balance and must choose between a family life and a career; as a result, NATO has urged Member States to introduce measures to provide support for families as well as remove barriers that women face when having to choose between family and work.

The creation of NCGP was a positive step regarding the integration of gender perspectives where the committee aims to ensure that gender perspectives is mainstreamed into NATO activities in efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts. The inclusion of women in the peace-building process is an important step in the reconstruction of a society, because the inclusion helps prevent a relapse of conflict and it also legitimizes the agreement.²¹⁵ Although all of these strides have been done there is still work that needs to continuously be done to close the gender gap within the armed forces.

Committee Directive

NATO Member States should be prepared to discuss ways to close the gender gap as well as ways to increase female participation at all levels of the armed forces. Member States should utilize S/RES/1325 and related resolutions as a foundation when discussing gender integration and gender mainstreaming. What are measures Member States can implement in order to ensure equal job opportunities for women within the armed forces? What are ways Member States can reduce the challenges that women face regarding family life and work life? What are ways Member States can incorporate women in the peace process and negotiations? Member States are encouraged to examine the current female participation rates within their armed forces and collaborate collectively in order to increase women's roles over time.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Diaz, Pablo C. "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections Between Presence and Influence." United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.
<http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2012/10/wpssourcebook-03a-womenpeacenegotiations-en.pdf>. (accessed December 30, 2015).

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ United Nations Peacekeeping. "Women, peace and security."
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml> (accessed October 18, 2015).

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Technical Appendix Guide

I. Addressing New Security Challenges with the Readiness Action Plan

Bendiek, Annegret and Markus Kaim. "New European Security Strategy - The Transatlantic Factor." German Institute for International Security Affairs. Berlin, GR. June 2015. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C34_bdk_kim.pdf

This study by the German Institute for International Security analyzes the major challenges to the European Union on regional and international security in the wake of ongoing discussions by Union members on how to address them. The article provides an independent analysis, outside of the EU, on emerging challenges. It also provides a German context to the issue of regional security, as Germany plays a strong role in EU leadership.

Kramer, Franklin D., Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton. "NATO's New Strategy: Stability Generation." Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft Center. Washington DC. September 2015. http://transatlanticrelations.org/sites/default/files/NATOs_new_strategy_web.pdf

The Transatlantic Relations site provides an overview of NATO strategies to address current and emerging security issues in the East and South regions of Europe and NATO's Member States in those regions. The report breaks down challenges and provides different solutions to meet them, providing political, economic, and military context for engaging in these policy prescriptions.

Mix, Derek. "The United States and Europe: Current Issues." Congressional Research Service. February 2, 2015 <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf>

The brief looks at a wide array of current issues and challenges to NATO and Europe to USA foreign policy. It surveys these issues and provides context for how they affect global security from a USA perspective, especially issues such as energy security, ISIS, and Russia and the Ukrainian Conflict.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Wales Summit Declaration." 5 September 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

Text of the original Readiness Action Plan, outlining NATO's strategic objectives in Eastern Europe regarding the Ukrainian Crisis and Russian aggression in the region. The declaration itself provides political context for the consensus among Member States and how they believe NATO best serves their collective security interests and the allocation of resources for such objectives.

"The European Agenda on Security." European Commission. Strasbourg, FR. 28 April, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf

Submitted to the Parliament, European Council and other principal policymaking institutions of the EU, the Agenda on Security is the stated public objective of the Commission to address security concerns to Europe. It is unique, because it presents the first high level discussion on the issue since the Bosnia War and the Madrid Train Bombings (2004). Alongside traditional military conflict, it looks at refugee, immigration, cybersecurity policies, etc. and how Member States can collaborate on these issues.

II. Exploring the Gender Gap within the Armed Forces

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "10 years on, the promises to women need to be kept." 13 October 2010. <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2010/Women-Security/Women-resolution-1325/EN/index.htm>.

10 years after the adoption of S/RES/1325, there is a continued need for women to be included at the peace talks table. The article explains that although the framework is in place women are still unrecognized and unacknowledged regarding peace talks. It emphasizes the need for the inclusion of women as well as creating structures so that there is no recurrence of war and conflict.

Van Creveld, Martin. "The great illusion: women in the military." *MILLENNIUM-LONDON-LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS*- 29, no. 2 (2000): 429-442
<http://www.libreriamilitareares.it/BIBLIOTECA/BIBLIOTECA%20MILITARE%20DIGITALE/I.%20TRATTATI%20MILITARI/TRATTATI%20ARTE%20DELLA%20GUERRA/VAN%20CREVELD/Great%20Illusion%20Women%20in%20Military.pdf>

VanCreveld argues that with the arrival of women into the armed forces it has caused militaries of some of the most developed nations to decline. He notes that militaries have been in a steady decline over the last 50 years, which correlates precisely with the influx of women into the armed forces. He acknowledges that although these militaries were once strong, they are no longer warfighting machines. War still goes on however severe wars have decreased, but women do not take part in the fighting.

Whitman, Tobie, and Jacqueline O'Neill. "Attention to gender increases security in operations: Examples from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)." *The Institute for Inclusive Security*, April 2012, 1-16
https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/NATO-Report_8.pdf.

Whitman and O'Neill explain that based on empirical evidence, combatants are more likely to accomplish their mission when they communicate and consider the perspectives of both men and women. Citing NATO's Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, the scholars note that when greater attention is given to gender issues it results in much greater situational awareness. The scholars look at different studies of peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Liberia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan and conclude that the operations benefited more when there was communication between both men and women.

Mulrine, Anna. "8 Other Nations That Send Women to Combat." *National Geographic News*. 25 January 2013.
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130125-women-combat-world-australia-israel-canada-norway/>.

This article provides a brief overview of eight nations that send women to combat. These nations are both NATO and non-NATO allied partners and it explains the duties of women within their specified militaries as well as provides a brief overview of when women were allowed to join the military. It also gives numbers and the percentage makeup of the women within the military.