

Southern Regional Model United Nations
Ensuring Peace and Security in a Turbulent Global
Environment: Fostering Prosperity and Forward Movement
April 10-12, 2014
Charlotte, NC
Email: las_charlotte@srmun.org



Dear Delegates,

It is an honor to welcome you to the League of Arab States (LAS) for the 2014 Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) conference in Charlotte, North Carolina. My name is Michael Oleaga, and I have the privilege to serve as the Director for the LAS at SRMUN Charlotte 2014. With Assistant Director Angel Truesdale, we have collaborated and worked to provide a background guide that will serve as a great resource for delegates to utilize in preparation for committee. Angel and I have strong hopes for the delegates involved in the LAS, from comprehending the background guide, to writing position papers, and developing documents during committee.

The LAS was established in 1945 with the mission to represent a united Arab cooperation while respecting and supporting Member States' welfares financially, politically, and socially. The League, consisting of 22 delegations, has worked to protect Arab Member States' common interest despite pressures from the international community. Since its founding, the LAS has collaborated with the United Nations (UN) and its multiple organs such as the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Security Council to achieve an international or regional approach to numerous issues, whether alleviating poverty, improving education, or combatting violence, to name a few. With the aforementioned noted, and with the concept of the conference's theme of "Ensuring Peace and Security in a Turbulent Global Environment: Fostering Prosperity and Forward Movement," two topics have been developed for the LAS at SRMUN Charlotte 2014:

Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States;
Topic II: The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States.

Each delegation in the LAS committee is required to submit a position paper that addresses and outlines their Member State's policies based on the two aforementioned topics. The position papers should include insight to the respective Member State's policies and positions from the past, present, future, and recommendations. The position papers can serve as a critical document for delegations in preparation for the conference. Delegates should follow SRMUN's policies regarding position papers, which include format and style structure. For specific details on formatting or if you need help in shaping a position paper, please visit the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). **All Position papers MUST be submitted by 11:59 p.m. EST on Friday March 21, 2014, via the online submission system on the SRMUN website.**

Angel and I look forward to the prospects delegates have to offer in the LAS committee. We are eager to see each delegation's ideas and research come into reality for the Arab community. Angel and I also send the best regards as delegations prepare for the 2014 SRMUN Charlotte conference and look forward to meeting you all in April. Please feel free to contact Deputy-Director General Devin McRae, Angel, or myself if you have any questions.

Michael Oleaga
Director
las_charlotte@srmun.org

Angel Truesdale
Assistant Director
las_charlotte@srmun.org

Devin McRae
Deputy-Director General
ddg_charlotte@srmun.org

Committee History for the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (LAS) is one of the oldest regional and international organizations with the purpose of building relations among Member States with interests in cultural, financial, and national affairs.¹ While the Arab League was officially established on March 22, 1945 with the signing of the LAS Charter, the Alexandria Protocol served as the precursor to this significant organization.² In 1942, at the invitation of Egypt, six Arab Member States (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) along with a Palestinian delegation collaborated together in Alexandria, Egypt in a phase commonly known as the Arab Unity Consultations.³ While the Arab Heads of State agreed to respect sovereignty, the leaders created a cohesive body to combat non-Arab influences and an Israeli state.⁴ By October 22, 1944, the Alexandria Protocol was drafted and signed, representing a united Arab perspective and the foundation of the LAS.⁵

The structure of the LAS is outlined in the Arab League Charter.⁶ The primary body of the LAS is known as the Council and specific subcommittees to provide attention to detailed areas of focus include: economic and financial matters, communication infrastructure, cultural matters, and execution of international affairs, social welfare, and health concerns.⁷ As noted in Article I of the LAS Charter, any independent Arab State may submit a request to join the League, which must be delivered to the Permanent Secretariat General of the organization.⁸ Article II explicitly details that each Member State maintains and upholds their individual sovereignty, aligning with a common Arab sentiment.⁹

Decisions made within the League are determined by a majority ruling on Council matters, with each Member State receiving a single vote regardless of the number of representatives from the respective Member State.¹⁰ Member States who are a signatory to a decision are bound by that decree.¹¹ In order for a ruling to have binding force across all Arab Member States, decisions must be voted on unanimously.¹² The direct implementation of the ruling within the Arab State is to be determined by the governing body of that Member State in order to reflect the working structure of that government.¹³ Amendments made to the LAS Charter require a two-thirds majority vote, which if passed, are binding to all Member States regardless of their casted vote.¹⁴

¹ *Charter of the Arab League*, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html>

² “About the League of Arab States: Highlights in the LAS’ History,” Museum with No Frontiers, <http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php>

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Alexandria Protocol*, Council on Foreign Affairs. <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/alexandria-protocol/p9030>

⁵ *The Alexandria Protocol*, International Democracy Watch, www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/263_The%20Alexandria%20Protocol.pdf

⁶ *Charter of the Arab League*, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Leadership within the Arab League follows a similar structure as the United Nations (UN), including a permanent General Secretariat comprised of the Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretaries, and officials.¹⁵ The current Secretary General, Nabil Elaraby of Egypt, was appointed in May 2011 by a two-thirds majority vote of the Council.¹⁶ The Secretary General is responsible for appointing the Assistant Secretaries and officials with the approval of the Secretariat Council. Among the duties of the Secretary General, is the drafting of the LAS' budget, which is approved and distributed by the Council to Member States as appropriate.¹⁷

In 1950, just five years after its establishment, LAS made a monumental step toward greater cooperation. The Treaty for Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League declared that all Member States would come to the protection of another Member State either individually or as a collective.¹⁸ Additionally, the agreement sought to provide a "means of welfare and development in the said Member States."¹⁹ The collective security agreement promoted collaboration with the UN Security Council and created the Joint Defense Council body that would oversee a Permanent Military Commission of the League of Arab States.²⁰ Concurrently, the Economic Council (now termed The Economic and Social Council) was formed to propose actions that could impact Member States on those matters.²¹

The Arab League has been responsible for protecting the interests of Member States, not only among themselves, but also within the international realm. The protection of Member States included shielding domestic economics from the influence of European markets in the name of independent development within the Arab community.²² Increasingly, this protection meant promoting and defending the creation of Arab states in the midst of growing Israeli and European pressures.²³

The Arab League utilized the influence of the UN to move toward Palestinian statehood. In the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel launched an attack into Egypt and initiated conflicts resulting in the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, and Golan Heights, the Arab League passed the Khartoum Resolution, which dictated how the Member States would regard Israel.²⁴ The Arab Member States agreed to consolidate all efforts to "eliminate" effects caused by aggressors on occupied lands that are Arab land.²⁵ The Khartoum Resolution also built the framework for Arab States to abide by, which included no negotiation, recognition, and "no peace" with Israel based on the assertion that the Palestinian people have the rights to their own land.²⁶ The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 sought to build off from the 1996 Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit and normalize relations with Palestine and Israel as long

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Timeline: Arab League," BBC News, November 15, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm

¹⁷ *Charter of the Arab League*, League of Arab States, March 22, 1945. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ac6b3ab18.html>

¹⁸ "Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950," International Democracy Watch, June 1950, http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/265_Treaty%20of%20Joint%20Defense%20and%20Economic%20Cooperation%20Between%20the%20States%20of%20the%20Arab%20League.pdf

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text," The Guardian, March 28, 2002, www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "League of Arab States; Khartoum Resolutions," United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, September 1, 1967, <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1FF0BF3DDEB703A785257110007719E7>

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

as Israelis withdrew from the seized Palestinian lands.²⁷ The initiative sought to use the influence of the many Member States acting together under one opinion and utilizing their relationship with the UN to garner international support.²⁸

The LAS has endured its share of controversy and criticism. Egypt was suspended for signing a peace agreement with Israel resulting in the Arab League's headquarters being temporarily relocated to Tunis 1979-1990.²⁹ In 1987, the LAS supported Member States to have "diplomatic ties" with Egypt and was accepted back into the League amidst protest still surrounding the "peace" made with Israel in 1989.³⁰ In 2011, Libya was suspended from the LAS for reasons stemming from the use of armed force against Arab civilians during the Arab Spring uprising that began in February of that year.³¹ Libya's return to the Arab League came in August 2011 and meaningfully identified the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the true representation of the Libyan people.³² Furthermore in November 2011, the League voted to suspend Syria's seat on a similar basis of unwarranted attacks on individuals involved in another uprising and its civilians.³³ In March 2013, the Arab League gave the suspended Syrian seat to the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) after the LAS gave recognition to the SNC in November 2012.³⁵ The LAS recognizes that its purpose is to strengthen cooperation and relations among its Member States but current issues may be assessing the League's capabilities. Of the numerous challenges the LAS encountered, such as the situations in Libya and Syria, the League has prospered in maintaining and providing a voice for Member States to address affairs and concerns as noted in the organization's Charter.

The current members of the League of Arab States:

ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN.

Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States

²⁷ "Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text," The Guardian, March 28, 2002, www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7

²⁸ "Analysis of the Arab League 'Peace Plan,'" Jewish Virtual Library, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/arabplan1.html

²⁹ "Arab League," *The New Funk And Wagnalls Encyclopedia Year Book*, 1955, http://archive.org/stream/newfunkandwagnal011851mbp/newfunkandwagnal011851mbp_djvu.txt

³⁰ "Egypt Welcomed Back Into Fold On Eve of Arab Summit," Los Angeles Times, May 22, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-05-22/news/mn-456_1_egypt-s-return-arab-league-summit-arab-leaders

³¹ "Arab League, Egypt back rebels in Libyan endgame," Reuters, August 22, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-arabs-libya-idUSTRE77L6TZ20110822

³² "Arab League Recognizes Libya's NTC," France 24, August 25, 2011, <http://www.france24.com/en/20110825-arab-league-recognises-libya-national-transitional-council>

³³ "League of Arab States," Organization of American States, April 24, 2013, www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/institutional_relations/Documents/Profiles/League_of_Arab_States.pdf

³⁴ "Timeline: Arab League," BBC News, November 15, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm

³⁵ "Arab League recognizes new Syrian opposition coalition," CNN, November 13, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html>

³⁶ "Opposition takes Syria seat at Arab League Summit," BBC News, March 26, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21936731>

“The Arab spring didn’t only affect the Arab League but also abroad, they are now more interested in cooperating with the Arab League as an organization that does not only represent governments but people in the region as well, because without being close to the people nothing will change.”³⁷
- Ambassador Omnia Taha, Director of the European Department of the League of Arab States

Introduction

The Arab-Muslim incursion into southern Europe via the Ottoman Empire, and later after the European surrender of their colonial pursuits in the last century combined, left an apprehensive approach toward the Arab region.³⁸ In a 2006 survey, Arab perception of the West, notably the US, was not colored by religious terms but by a variety of issues such as innovations in technology, education, medical advancements, and professional development.³⁹ When it came to Arab sensitivity toward the West, it was simply a critical view of American foreign policy of the last century.⁴⁰ Western perceptions of Arabs have been negatively colored by a sense that the Arab community often protest or acquiesce based solely on Islam.⁴¹

Prior to the 1950s, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region experienced “socioeconomic” challenges such as industry diversification, low concentration in education, and quality of life assistance partially due to the lack of modernization in the region.⁴² The oil industry of the 1960s shaped a major investment by Arab governments in the region that continued throughout the 1970s.⁴³ Oil rich MENA States began to devote a considerable amount into welfare systems and concurrently other States experienced a boom in employment opportunities.⁴⁴ With the boom in the oil market following World War II, the MENA States invested heavily back into their citizenry, making governments more favorable.⁴⁵ As Western powers set up new political systems, or as Member States began to form, the goal was to empower the new “citizens” of Member States. Many MENA States, between the 1950s and 1970s, were experiencing a rise in government devotion to political, economic, educational, and social well being of civilians, therefore creating an environment of growth that instituted a sentiment of trust in governing bodies/structure.⁴⁶ Member States began to build up military power supported by the people and consequently gave more power to a more rigid authority.⁴⁷

The LAS was primarily created out of a sense of Arab Unity and the organization has upheld many of the original principles of its inception.⁴⁸ After an unsuccessful war with Israel and the subsequent signing of a peace treaty with Egypt, pan-Arab sentiments began to deteriorate significantly; directly preceding the

³⁷ “Citizens for the Mediterranean launch action on renewed Euro-Med Partnership” Anna Lindh Foundation, April, 2013.
<http://www.annalindhforum.org/news/citizens-mediterranean-launch-action-renewed-euro-med-partnership>

³⁸ Helmut Anheier and Yudhishtir Raj Isar, “The West Versus the Arab World: Deconstructing the Divide,” *Conflicts and Tensions, The Culture and Globalization Series* (2007),
http://www.upf.edu/iuhjvv/_pdf/arrels/dossier/corm/corm2.pdf

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Mohamed Zayani. “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public Diplomacy,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* (2008): 45-64.

⁴² Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, (2004), http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/JEP_ME_3.pdf

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “About the League of Arab States: Highlights in the LAS’ History” Museum with No Frontiers.
<http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php>

“Islamist” Movement.⁴⁹ The Arab League created a sense of non-interventionist action and developed a compromise: “As a result of the June War in 1967, the Arab Member States agreed to abandon their previous policies of exporting their national revolutions to the monarchies in exchange for the Gulf oil-exporting Member States’ readiness to support the budgets of the financially challenged republics.”⁵⁰ While the pan-Arab movement was nationalist in nature, and not inherently anti-West but simply anti-Interventionist, the foundation of the LAS was not defined by the involvement of the West.⁵¹ Therefore, the prevailing theme in the region is that Arab leaders will take care of Arab matters, whether the Arab League or a particular Member State has control over the situation or not. That is juxtaposed with the anti-West sentiment of the Islamist movement that has taken center stage since the 1970s where the West is seen as a “secular” imposing entity.⁵²

Current Arab League Secretary General Nabil Elaraby instituted a “responsibility to protect” initiative, based on his United Nations (UN) background and is focusing the organization on a more humanitarian approach.⁵³ A transitory spirit of “... democracy, human rights, and social justice” has developed in the Arab World recently and the call for the Arab League to correctly address them is increasing.⁵⁴ The current trend of the Arab League is to protect Arab interest and cautiously give up some control in order to seek diplomacy.

Politics and Diplomacy

The Arab political establishment has seen a great ebb and flow of reform throughout the last century with the fall of an Empire, the subsequent seizure of power by both Britain and France that later dissolved after World War II, and the wave of Arab Nationalism (predominantly secular and liberal in nature) in the first half of the twentieth century.⁵⁵ Once the ideals of the 1950s movement, Pan-Arabism began to shape Arab States into centers of political power with one central governing body and economy, reform swept again in the 80s and 90s of an economic, yet, Islamist nature.⁵⁶ In the post 2001 world, Arab States once again have committed to reforms within the Arab League and with external partners in regards to liberalization.⁵⁷

European Union

The Arab Spring ushered in a new era of relations between the LAS and the European Union (EU) that emphasized a serious discussion on political factors and a guarantee to meet consistently and work collaboratively.⁵⁸ The amplified interaction can be simplified by the fact that the LAS and EU are regional partners and neighbors.⁵⁹ The relationship was solidified with the Cairo Declaration in 2012, which focused on “... diplomatic training, election observation, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, and

⁴⁹ Mohamed Zayani. “Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public Diplomacy,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* (2008): 45-64.

⁵⁰ Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DDB0413.pdf>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Amy Hawthorne, “Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

⁵⁹ Ibid.

energy efficiency.”⁶⁰ A clear example of the new cooperation is the EUs creation and partial funding of an “Arab League Crisis Room,” which is subsequently tied to their “early warning system.”⁶¹ The EU’s prominent obstacle is the implementation of initiatives and reconciling with each Arab Member State as well as the current dominance of Saudi Arabia and Qatar.⁶² Through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Europe has allocated funds (through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument) to MENA States that have joined the agreement such as Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.⁶³

Arab Peace Initiative

The LAS came to prominence when it facilitated the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in 2002. The API was seen as “innovative” as it included the Arab leaders “explicitly and unrestrictedly” offering “normalization” to Israel.⁶⁴ The API, however, asked in exchange for Israel to end its occupation of Palestine.⁶⁵ The API was an effort to bring peace to the Palestinian and Israeli situation as well as normalize relations between Arab States and Israel.⁶⁶ The measure was initially an appeal to the Israeli people and not the government, primarily because the API included the UN Resolution on the Palestinian “right of return” but the initiative was declined.⁶⁷ The API mainly wanted to restore pre-1967 borders, including occupation in Syrian Golan Heights and South Lebanon, resolution of Palestinian refugees based on UN Resolution 194 - often termed “right of return” - and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as the recognized capital.⁶⁸ Countering the requests, Arab States would enter into peace with Israel with an agreement to assure security of the region, and normalize affairs.⁶⁹ Promises of fair negotiations with individual Arab States and international support, especially from the EU, UN, Russian Federation, and the US, were presented as a part of the peace process as well.⁷⁰ Israel’s consistent response is one of appreciation for the measure but complete rejection of the stated terms.⁷¹

The LAS has re-affirmed the API twice with Arab League summits in Khartoum in 2006 and Riyadh in 2007.⁷² The Qatari facilitated discussion between Fatah and Hamas in October 2006, and later actions taken

⁶⁰“EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf>

⁶⁴ Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DDB0413.pdf>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶Jerome Segal, “The Arab Peace Initiative under review.” *Foreign Policy*, December 2012 http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/12/the_arab_peace_initiative_under_review#sthash.cBSV7Mcg.dpbs

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ A/RES/194. "194 (III). Palestine -- Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator," United Nations General Assembly. December 11, 1948. <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A>

⁶⁹ Gawdat Bahgat, “The Arab Peace Initiative: An Assessment” *Middle East Policy Council*, Spring 2009, <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arab-peace-initiative-assessment>

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

by a joint Saudi and Egyptian lead unit in 2007 and 2011.⁷³ Recently, Doha and Cairo have tried to blend both sides cohesively to come to the table.⁷⁴ Qatar hosted the Arab League Ministerial Council to assess the Arab Peace Initiative, and the Qatari Prime Minister made a statement that the Arab Peace Initiative may be taken off the table, which was expressed to the Palestinian President's dismay.⁷⁵⁷⁶ The Arab Peace Initiative cannot be resolved between the two parties alone and the opportunity for another actor to mediate is necessary.⁷⁷ Moving forward the opportunity to include Egypt, as a key player could be considered because of the US facilitated peace treaty they hold with Israel.⁷⁸

Democracy

In a survey that measured Arab perceptions of the West, responses were positive toward democratic ideals often voiced by Western dignitaries.⁷⁹ While reform seems to be ever present in Arab States, established authoritarian rule presents the Arab World as "the least free and democratic region of the world."⁸⁰ Democratic institutions were considered and implemented in many Arab States, only to be modified to fit back into a rigid model of governance.⁸¹ Arab States began to feel the weight of international modernization with Western emphasis and domestic pressure on the involvement of citizens in the political process as well as economic reform; therefore by the 1990s, many elections, not necessarily democratic in nature but in appearance, took place across the region.⁸² Arab Democracy supporters maintain that the concept of "democracy" is not a new and foreign implant but rather a system that has always existed in the Arab community, but the recent embracing of democracy can be one of "...gradual change carried out in accordance with the circumstances and culture of each country," therefore, upholding a key foundation of the Arab League.⁸³

Since the 1950s, the Arab League often considered the idea of direct representation within Arab League matters and providing a targeted voice to the Arab population.⁸⁴ However, the measure would be in direct violation of the 'founding' Arab League Charter that implicitly excluded any mention of representation of

⁷³ Jacinta Leyden, Monica Matumoto, and Sevita Rama, "Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roles of the United States and Qatar" James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2013. http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/b3908f7c/pdgp_pub_houstonreport_080613_2.pdf

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Jerome Segal, "The Arab Peace Initiative under review." *Foreign Policy*, December 2012 http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/12/the_arab_peace_initiative_under_review#sthash.cBSV7Mcg.dpbs

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Fares Braizat, "How Do Arabs Perceive the West?," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (2006), <http://www.mafhoum.com/press10/290C31.pdf>

⁸⁰ Amy Hawthorne, "Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. http://carneгиеendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Mohamed Zayani. "Courting and Containing the Arab Street: Arab Public Opinion, the Middle East and U.S. Public Diplomacy," *Arab Studies Quarterly* (2008): 45-64.

⁸³ Amy Hawthorne, "Political Reform in the Arab World: A New Ferment?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. http://carneгиеendowment.org/files/CP_52%20Hawthorne.pdf

⁸⁴ "Background: The Arab Parliament" European Union, 2009, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/dv/5b_arabparliame/5b_arabparliament.pdf

citizens.⁸⁵ The Parliaments of several Arab States created a body that would address this very issue.⁸⁶ The Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) was created in 1977 with the primary function to coordinate efforts between Arab States.⁸⁷ The AIPU was not created within the Arab League parameters, but later in the 1980s, the two bodies agreed to merge and subsequently created the Arab Parliament as a new agency of the LAS (2005).⁸⁸ The Arab Parliament became a permanent function of the LAS in 2012, and the primary purpose of this new body is to “...give citizens of the Arab world a voice that complements that of Arab governments, thereby strengthening the democratic decision-making process.”⁸⁹ The Permanent Arab Parliament was officially created in the Baghdad Declaration in 2012.⁹⁰ Article 7 of the Baghdad Declaration created the body with democracy as a response to Arab citizen’s appeals to their government.⁹¹

In 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a point to devote US support and aid to any “democratic transitions that may occur as a result of Arab Spring Uprisings.”⁹² Further, the EU hopes to increase cooperation with the Parliaments of Arab States and the LAS that a future “Joint Euro-Arab parliamentary work programme” can be created.⁹³ Recently the EU has created the European Endowment for Democracy modeled after the US’s National Endowment for Democracy, and the EU has committed through the European Neighborhood Policy that funds will be allocated to States that promote democratic ideals.⁹⁴

Collective Security and the Arab Spring: The Acceleration of Reform

The Arab Spring officially began in 2010, and has brought about reform, primarily dealing with issues of Human Rights, political stability, and economic development.⁹⁵ The Arab League in the past has endured a low success rate of intrusion in domestic and regional conflicts.⁹⁶ While the Arab League has a collective security agreement and an understanding to aid Member States in crisis, the tradition has been to intervene only as mediator.⁹⁷ The LAS continues to be the prominent force for Member States “...to promote mutual understanding, resolve conflicts, negotiate policies, and enhance further cooperation.”⁹⁸ Further, the LAS

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation”, European Union, 2013, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ “The Arab Summit Conference: The Baghdad Declaration” European Union, 2012, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-iq/dv/d-iq20120529_05_/d-iq20120529_05_en.pdf

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² “Clinton Pledges Increased Support for Democratic Transitions” Wilson Center, 2012, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/clinton-pledges-increased-support-for-democratic-transitions>

⁹³ “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation”, European Union, 2013, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

⁹⁴Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, “The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa,” Congressional Research Service, June 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf>

⁹⁵ Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, “American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?,” Center for Strategic and International Study, *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2011, <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf>

⁹⁶ Farah Dakhllallah, “The Arab League in Lebanon: 2005-2008” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (March 2012): 53-74.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao, “The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, 2009, <http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-e4926734174c.pdf>

has turned its focus to the discussion of peace and security among other international entities when the matter involves Member States.⁹⁹

The Arab League has revealed a new stance on intervention in Member States through the endorsement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engagement in Libya and the appointment of sanctions on the Bashar al-Assad led Syrian regime offered a look at the “new” Arab League.¹⁰⁰ Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) offered a small force of their air forces to aid NATO.¹⁰¹

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc within the LAS has been identified as “pro-Western, oil-rich, tribally-based, geopolitically vulnerable monarchies,” referring to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, and they flexed considerable muscle, both politically and vocally, during the Arab Spring.¹⁰² After witnessing strong allies topple and unrest that began to stir in their respective borders, a lot of money was spent and focus shifted toward Bahraini, Libyan, and Yemeni Member States.¹⁰³ At one point during the Arab Spring, a clear majority did not support the GCC.¹⁰⁴ With an appeal to the UN Security Council for military aid to Bahrain, contribution to NATO forces, and calling the LAS meeting.¹⁰⁵ The GCC effectively brought the LAS into the forefront of the Arab Spring, and Arab League Member States began to ride the surge of international recognition during this time.¹⁰⁶ Iran expressed support for uprisings in neighboring Bahrain in an attempt to extend Tehrani power and that move effectively got Saudi Arabia’s attention.¹⁰⁷ Bahrain accepted help from fellow GCC States in order to suppress unrest and discounted advice from the US to listen to the dissent.¹⁰⁸ However, Yemeni Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi replaced President Ali Abdullah Saleh.¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰ Alternatively, the GCC States actively supported the Libyan unrest due the lack of respect and condescension from Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi.¹¹¹

Libya’s subsequent suspension from the LAS was the first time any action had been taken against a Member State that enacted force against civilians within their own borders.¹¹² It is substantial that using the primary issue of Human Rights as a reason to intervene in another Member State was lead by Arab League strongholds Saudi Arabia and Qatar, because both States are authoritarian.¹¹³ Saudi Arabia and Qatar have

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “The Arab League Comes Alive” Middle East Quarterly, 2012, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf>

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Laura Kasinof, “Yemen’s Election Ensures Leader’s Exit” *The New York Times*, February 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/world/middleeast/yemen-votes-to-remove-ali-abdullah-saleh.html?_r=0

¹¹¹ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “The Arab League Comes Alive” Middle East Quarterly, 2012, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf>

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DDB0413.pdf>

become the dominant Member States in the League and while the Arab Spring has been tumultuous for the region, the LAS has surfaced "...as an address for regional diplomacy with ... Western approval."¹¹⁴ "NATO's unified platform in addressing the Libyan conflict is an important model from which other nations can base future actions for similar conflicts."¹¹⁵

Early on during the Syrian protests, newly appointed LAS Secretary-General Elaraby condemned any interaction and warned that the US overstepped by criticizing Assad's "legitimacy."¹¹⁶ Assad presented a plan of reform and the Arab League wanted to see implementation before any further criticism was directed at Syria.¹¹⁷ LAS Member States quickly recognized that the crisis in Syria could potentially put in power a Sunni government that would be more favorable to Western influence and that therefore, Iran was now actively supplying the al-Assad regime with military forces and more aid.¹¹⁸ The Arab League's decision to act in Syria in an 18 of 21 vote, with Syria excluded, proved, "It is permissible now for Arab Member States to meddle in the internal affairs of other Arab states, when there is a clear moral or political reason to do so that reflects the sentiments of a majority of Arab public opinion."¹¹⁹ The LAS instituted economic sanctions that included a variety of trade bans but with little to no effect on the crisis.¹²⁰¹²¹

The West and the Arab Spring

While Western powers have had a considerably different approach to the crises in Syria and Libya, the Arab League has had the most consistent response.¹²² In both cases, negotiations were tested and when the League assessed the threat to the Arab people with the Member States of Libya and Syria, the opposition was quickly favored (with special note that the process with Syria was a longer timeline).¹²³ Western States, especially European Member States have taken special interests in the outcome of the Arab Spring. The potential fallout and risks that could result from one, or sometimes more, MENA States diminishing into ruin would affect regional, or even global, political stability, security, energy exchanges, and create a vigorous immigration stream to Europe.¹²⁴

Twenty-one EU Member States are a part of NATO and France along with the UK were the primary providers of air support while Germany abstained from the UN Security Council vote and subsequently did

¹¹⁴ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Arab League Comes Alive" Middle East Quarterly, 2012, <http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/3309.pdf>

¹¹⁵ Jacinta Leyden, Monica Matumoto, and Sevita Rama, "Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roles of the United States and Qatar" James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, 2013. http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/b3908f7c/pdgp_pub_houstonreport_080613_2.pdf

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Rami Khouri, "The Arab League Awakening," *Agence Global*, November 6, 2011 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21511/arab_league_awakening.html

¹²⁰ Martin Beck, "The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?," Center for Middle East Studies (Center for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/E/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DDB0413.pdf>

¹²¹ "Syria Unrest: Arab League adopts Sanctions in Cairo." *BBC News*, November 27, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360>

¹²² Charles Simpson, "Assessing the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria: A Compilation of Varying Statements from Key Actors," *The Quarterly Journal*, (Winter 2011): 56-68.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Danya Greenfield, "A US-EU Action Plan for Supporting Democratization: Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia," The Polish Institute for International Affairs, 2011 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdf/403/112111_ACUS_USEUAction.PDF

not join the military effort to oust Gaddafi in Libya.¹²⁵ The EU provided more than 150 million euros in humanitarian aid and established a cooperative office to endorse Libya's Transitional National Council (TNC).¹²⁶ Western States, prominently France, the UK, and the US, were more hesitant in the case of Syrian aid based on politics and domestic spending viewpoints.¹²⁷ In 2011, top leaders in France and the US were considering re-election costs, and all the Western States that were involved were worried about spending more money on the Arab Spring conflicts since the world economic crisis affected a lot of business decisions at the time.¹²⁸

The US assisted in the Arab Spring uprisings through its State Department's existing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the US Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID-OTI) with hopes of providing "...diplomatic outreach, political engagement, and foreign aid."¹²⁹ Further, the US created the Office for Middle East Transitions through the State Department as well to coordinate the different efforts made by the US and with allies in the particular Member States that have had a change in government (or significant regime reforms).¹³⁰ "Common US and European concerns in the region include: countering terrorism, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime; curtailing Islamist extremism; ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and commercial transit; and ensuring Israel's security and advancing peace negotiations with the Palestinians."¹³¹

¹²⁵ Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, "The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa," Congressional Research Service, June 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf>

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Charles Simpson, "Assessing the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria: A Compilation of Varying Statements from Key Actors," *The Quarterly Journal*, (Winter 2011): 56-68.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Kristin Archick Derek E. Mix, "The United States and Europe: Responding to Change in the Middle East and North Africa," Congressional Research Service, June 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43105.pdf>

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Economics and Trade Relations: Reform Desired

Many of the Middle East economies that emerged in the last half of the twentieth century were heavily dependent upon the State only. A sense of internal cooperation was upheld as opposed to acclimating to the modern international system of international cooperation.¹³² By the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the MENA governments were compromising their governments with the downturn of oil expenditures.¹³³ Therefore many State-owned economic entities began to privatize and economic reform instituted the creation of the private sector with markets.¹³⁴ The West has made many economic deals with Arab Member States, strengthening particular regimes, and later denouncing the actions of those particular governments.¹³⁵ This standard of business continues throughout the region mainly because government officials behave as businessmen rather than as representatives.¹³⁶ “In other words, the connection between democracy, improving public spending transparency, enhancing good governance, foreign aid, and investment became relevant only when spotted by the media, or when used to discredit and weaken governments or leaders.”¹³⁷ Western powers are consistently urged to advance “...enhanced trade agreements that not only promote market access, but even more importantly maximize competitiveness enhancing and job-promoting reforms...” in Arab States.¹³⁸

The Role of the United Nations

The LAS, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), and other interested parties such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Council of Europe (COE), to name a few, united in an effort to build upon the *Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation for the Mediterranean*, in 2010.¹³⁹ The primary goals include five objectives and ten priority domains for action that include “...protection and respect of cultural diversity; religious freedom and pluralism; promotion of dialogue; and fight against intolerance.”¹⁴⁰ Engagement items that they hope to address by 2015 are “human rights, gender equality, regime alliances in respect to education and culture, cross cultural education, international exchanges among the youth (teaching tolerance), increase interaction of non-state actors, independence of media outlets, cultural

¹³² Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004, http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/JEP_ME_3.pdf

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibrahim Saif, “Arab Leaders and Western Countries: Swapping Democracy for Business Interests,” The Heinrich Böll Foundation, http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Perspectives_02-16_Ibrahim_Saif2.pdf

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibrahim Saif, “Arab Leaders and Western Countries: Swapping Democracy for Business Interests,” The Heinrich Böll Foundation, http://www.ps.boell.org/downloads/Perspectives_02-16_Ibrahim_Saif2.pdf

¹³⁸ Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, “American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the Big Idea?,” Center for Strategic and International Study, *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2011, <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf>

¹³⁹ “The Alliance of Civilizations’ Regional Strategy on Intercultural Dialogue and Cooperation for the Mediterranean,” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, <http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/MALTA-REGIONAL-STRATEGY-FOR-THE-MEDITERRANEAN-6-nov-Final-document-2010.pdf>

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

diplomacy with an arts emphasis, city diplomacy, and last sports diplomacy.”¹⁴¹¹⁴² The conciliatory agreement anticipates more “transparency” and to advance new social, political, and humanitarian norms.¹⁴³

Conclusion

The Arab League has been faulted for not truly committing to implement and assimilate the ideals that fall in line with an international organization. While Member States continually strive to promote the concepts of the LAS, there have been tensions between Member States and within their borders.¹⁴⁴ Arab League Member States practice of “commonality” supersedes necessity and that model is not sustainable for future entanglements, which is ever present with the different outcomes of the Arab Spring.¹⁴⁵

Previously, Member States were the “actors”, as opposed to the League itself, becoming the dominant actor in situations; different Member States were highlighted instead of the League as a unit, especially in Economic and Security matters.¹⁴⁶ Moving forward the LAS could attempt to create a structured response to security measures where there are regular invitations to “dominant” powers but caution must be raised to those powers, so that the LAS will handle the level of intrusion.¹⁴⁷ LAS Secretary General Elaraby’s “responsibility to protect” approach has been criticized for not being employed in every Member State that has humanitarian concerns especially where governments have been the major culprits of the atrocities committed.¹⁴⁸

The EU has shown that it considers the Arab League the principal regional body, willing and ready to make reforms that will enhance the region.¹⁴⁹ The creation of the Arab Parliament presents the Arab region with a new promise of a democratic future; the members are not directly elected but rather nominated from Member States parliaments.¹⁵⁰ The situation in Syria changed the international game for the Arab League moving forward.¹⁵¹ The actions during the Arab Spring constitute a major shift in focus to the Human Rights and the well being of Arab citizens with little hesitation to intervene. These new Arab League measures were only previously directed at Israel.¹⁵² The successful engagement of Europe and the US could

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² “A new era for Arab-West relations: social transformations, media freedom, and bridging the gap in mutual perceptions,” United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, http://www.unaoc.org/wp-content/uploads/Dr_Sampaio-CairoApril-2011-def-6-april.pdf

¹⁴³ “A Forum Discusses Bridging the Gap in Mutual Perceptions” *Egypt Daily News*, April 6, 2011, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/04/06/forum-discusses-bridging-the-gap-in-mutual-perceptions/>

¹⁴⁴ Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao, “The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, 2009, <http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-e4926734174c.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao, “The Arab League’s Decision-making System and Arab Integration” *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, 2009, <http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-e4926734174c.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ “EU-League of Arab State Relations: Prospects for closer parliamentary cooperation,” European Union, 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=93190>

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Martin Beck, “The Arab League: A New Policy Approach in the Making?,” Center for Middle East Studies (Center for Mellemøststudier) University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet), 2013. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/F/4/3/%7BF43B7F61-D629-4378-BBE0-9F6450510585%7DDB0413.pdf>

¹⁵² Ibid.

usher in a new cooperation model for Arab-Western relations and provide key support to MENA States that are transitioning now and may transition in the future.¹⁵³

Committee Directive

The Arab League, as a regional and international institution, has a very unique position in world politics today. Arab States continue to become prominent actors on the international stage allowing the League to accomplish the bridge that is necessary for successful completion. Issues of security, political transitions, economic reform, and humanitarian advances have become even more central because of the Arab Spring. Reforms, agreements with the West, and regional cooperation between Arab States have already begun to come to fruition. What the Arab League must now consider is how to shape the scope of reform and create a model for future incidents.

The LAS is in a state of flux and many of the initiatives to increase diplomatic relations have primarily come from the West. What can the Arab League devise that will be distinctly Arab in nature as well as address the impact from Western States? Delegates must go further in their research to determine what Arab League Member States are doing individually or within alliance blocs. What level of cooperation will the Arab League allow in order to involve the US, EU, UN, and external State actors? What inter-Member State based policies can be used as a cooperation model? Can the Arab League mold a model from the preeminent body such as the EU with the understanding that the EU has effectively inspired a sacrifice of sovereignty in order to produce an International Organization that has considerable authority in the international arena?¹⁵⁴ Delegates should be steady to keep in mind measures in the region that can foster innovative measures in culture, economics, security, and political inclusion.

II: The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States

*"[Terrorism] completely violates Islam, which holds human life in high regard, while terrorism treats it cheaply."*¹⁵⁵

- Saudi Interior Minister Nayif ibn Abdulaziz

Introduction

Terrorism is a threat in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, and the League of Arab States recognizes the difficulty of confronting the problem. Although established in 1945 with the mission to improve collaboration among Arab Member States, it would be approximately 53 years until the topic of terrorism was discussed in-depth.¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁷ On 22 April 1998, the 22 Member States agreed to define terrorism as any act or threat of violence regardless of the intention or purpose by the person committing the

¹⁵³ Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, "American and European Responses to the Arab Spring: What's the Big Idea?," Center for Strategic and International Study, *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2011, <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumndadushdunne.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ Wanli Chen & Jun Zhao, "The Arab League's Decision-making System and Arab Integration" *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, 2009, <http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/d9/c8/f5ff0a8943d3af3ce9d4046f2171/5c3648aa-a7fc-476b-8480-e4926734174c.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times*, April 23, 1998. <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254>

¹⁵⁶ "The Arab League," Council on Foreign Relations, January 26, 2012. www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/arab-league/p25967

¹⁵⁷ John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," *Los Angeles Times*, April 23, 1998. <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254>

action.¹⁵⁸ The League further noted terrorism could occur due to an individual or group's mission to progress an agenda.¹⁵⁹ Additionally, terrorism causes fear to people, and "[places] their lives, liberty or security in danger."¹⁶⁰

The LAS definition of terrorism was detailed in the 42-point Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.¹⁶¹ This marked the first time interior and justice ministers gathered to combat terrorism and its related forms, specifically radical and fundamentalist terrorism.¹⁶² The Egyptian government initiated the development of the accord in 1996.¹⁶³ Member States were cautious that the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism would not infringe on Islamic Sharia Law, Member State's sovereignty, or human rights.¹⁶⁴ In addition, they adhered to the rules set forth by the LAS and United Nations (UN) charters in effort to bring peace and security.¹⁶⁵

Based on the 1998 convention to suppress terrorism, members of the LAS noted they should refrain from allotting their land as a dwelling to plan, organize, and fulfill crimes.¹⁶⁶ The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism also strengthened communication among Member States as the accord called for exchanging information, conducting training courses, and addressing arrests while upholding national laws.¹⁶⁷ The convention called on Arab States to coordinate plans with a fellow Member State that shares a common border.¹⁶⁸

The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism had to differentiate between combatting terrorism and classifying the struggles against foreign occupation, case in point, the situation between Israel and Palestine.¹⁶⁹ Israel and Palestine have been in conflict since the UN General Assembly voted on the original partition of land for Israel in 1947.¹⁷⁰ Since the establishment of the partition, Israel rejects to recognize Palestine as a State while surrounding Arab States deny Israel's validity as a Member State.¹⁷¹ With Israel occupying Palestinian territory, notably from the 1967 Six-Day War, the Arab League dealt with the issue and how it related to terrorism.¹⁷²

¹⁵⁸ "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998. www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ "Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998. www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html

¹⁶² "Arab League States sign an accord to fight Terrorism and Extremism," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 23, 1998. <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=29>

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ "Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998. www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ "Arab League States sign an accord to fight Terrorism and Extremism," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 23, 1998. <http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=29>

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ "Israel, Palestine and the Occupied Territories," Global Policy Forum. www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/israel-palestine-and-the-occupied-territories.html

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism's definition of terrorist offenses is lifted when a struggle occurs by "foreign occupation and aggression" and the "liberation and self-determination" of an Arab Member State is threatened.¹⁷³ The aforementioned provision's reference of "foreign occupation and aggression" is associated to Israel while the Arab Member State that has their "liberation and self-determination" at risk insinuates Palestine. The accord's provision would not be applied if the "territorial integrity" of an Arab League Member State were at risk.¹⁷⁴

The proponents of the accord have reportedly hoped the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism would halt Western Member States giving asylum status to suspected terrorists who are either funding or planning such activities.¹⁷⁵ Arab ministers have also stated the convention should counter Western media's negative depictions of Islam and terrorism.¹⁷⁶ Arab media have reported the accord wanted to pursue Western governments from barring exiled Islamic extremists from using their land in order to recruit or propagandize terrorism.¹⁷⁷ The pan-Arab newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi wrote, "there are no terrorist training camps in Britain as there are in so many Arab countries."¹⁷⁸

With the 1998 accord, six international conventions were highlighted, including The Tokyo Convention on offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 1973, and The Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.¹⁷⁹ The six international conventions served as precursors for the established of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.¹⁸⁰

The March 2010 summit saw the Council of the League adopt resolution No. 525, which addressed international terrorism and efforts to suppress it.¹⁸¹ The LAS continued to call for international cooperation as the resolution included collaboration with the UN Security Council's counterterrorism committees.¹⁸² The LAS Council of Arab Ministers of Justice adopted resolution No. 788, which aimed to strengthen existing works in counterterrorism between the Council's technical secretariat and fellow international and regional organizations such as the UN's counterterrorism committees and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).¹⁸³

Current Situation

Al-Qaida

¹⁷³ "Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998. www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html [accessed 24 July 2013]

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ John Daniszewski, "Arab League States Sign Treaty to Combat Terrorism," Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1998. <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/apr/23/news/mn-42254>

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Hillary Mann, "Arab Anti-Terror Efforts: Assessing an Arab League Initiative," Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/arab-anti-terror-efforts-assessing-an-arab-league-initiative

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998. www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html [accessed 24 July 2013]

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202010/1st%20Cttee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-%202010/League%20of%20Arab%20States%20-%20English%20-%20post.pdf.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

The LAS has denounced terrorism and all its forms, but it has not eradicated such acts from taking place in numerous Arab Member States.¹⁸⁴ According to the Arab Convention of the Suppression of Terrorism, LAS recognizes the moral and religious principles, as represented in the Islamic Sharia Law, to reject terrorism.¹⁸⁵ Despite acknowledging the role of Islamic Sharia Law, militant groups such as al-Qaeda have maintained a presence in the MENA Member States. Affiliates of the al-Qaida franchise have been recognized in a number of MENA Member States, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, to name a few.¹⁸⁶

The conflicts within Arab Member States have raised new alarms regarding to role of al-Qaida in the region. The UN has condemned the violence caused by the terror organization on a number of occasions.¹⁸⁷ In Afghanistan, an attack in the Faryab and Uruzgan provinces resulted in nine development workers' death.¹⁸⁸ With the nine deaths, 237 humanitarian assets, facilities, and personnel have been attacked in Afghanistan during 2013.¹⁸⁹ The UN Security Council addressed the attack by reiterating their concerns by threats by al-Qaida.¹⁹⁰

Al-Qaida issued their support of the Syrian rebels in order to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.¹⁹¹ The Syrian government has blamed the revolts on terrorists.¹⁹² An al-Qaida leader has called on Arabs in Member States, such as Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon - which share borders with Syria - to assist rebels and overthrow al-Assad.¹⁹³ According to an Iraqi security official, intelligence information has located al-Qaida-linked members in the Iraqi city of Mosul.¹⁹⁴ Local leaders of al-Qaida have been killed in Syria. According to a Syrian state-run news agency, troops killed a leader of an al-Qaida affiliate with a base in Iraq.¹⁹⁵ Al-Qaida's Ayman al-Zawahri has called Syrians to oppose assistance from the LAS.¹⁹⁶ The announcement of al-Qaida's support of the Syrian rebels created new obstacles as the Arab League had suspended Syria and later allocated its representation to a new coalition.¹⁹⁷

Hezbollah

¹⁸⁴ "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998. www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ "The state of al-Qaeda: The unquenchable fire," The Economist, September 28, 2013, www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586834-adaptable-and-resilient-al-qaeda-and-its-allies-keep-bouncing-back-unquenchable-fire

¹⁸⁷ "Security Council strongly condemns recent attacks on aid workers in Afghanistan," UN News Centre, December 3, 2013, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?realfile/story.asp?NewsID=46660&Cr=afghan&Cr1=#.UqtdnZH3E_4

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ "Arab League wants UN peacekeepers in Syria," CBS News, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/arab-league-wants-un-peacekeepers-in-syria/

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ "Al Qaeda urges Muslims to help Syria rebels," Associated Press, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-urges-muslims-to-help-syria-rebels/

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ "Syrian opposition leader meets with Arab League chief," CTV News, November 2, 2013, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/syrian-opposition-leader-meets-with-arab-league-chief-1.1525309#ixzz2nO3REOkn>

¹⁹⁶ Al Qaeda urges Muslims to help Syria rebels," Associated Press, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-urges-muslims-to-help-syria-rebels/.

¹⁹⁷ "Arab League wants UN peacekeepers in Syria," CBS News, February 12, 2012, www.cbsnews.com/news/arab-league-wants-un-peacekeepers-in-syria/.

The role of the Lebanon-based political group Hezbollah has brought various concerns to the Arab region and international community. Hezbollah has viewed itself as a resistance group opposed to Western involvement and Israeli claims in the Arab region.¹⁹⁸ Hezbollah was established during the Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1989, notably following the Israeli invasion of 1982.¹⁹⁹ Along with the end of Israel, Hezbollah published its manifesto in 1985, which called for the removal of Western Member States such as France and the US from Lebanese land.²⁰⁰ Periodically, Hezbollah and Israeli forces have clashed and resulted in the month-long war during the summer of 2006 when thousands of rockets were launched into Israeli territory.²⁰¹ The UN issued a cease-fire in August 2006, ending the violence although tension still remains.²⁰²

In 2013, Hezbollah leaders have pledged to support the Syrian government led by al-Bashir.²⁰³ Towns near the Lebanese border have reported "heavy bombardment" by Hezbollah combatants during the Syrian Civil War.²⁰⁴ According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, the Lebanese-based political group will not align with Syrian rebels who are supported by Israel and the US²⁰⁵ According to US Secretary of State John Kerry, thousands of Hezbollah militants have contributed to the violence in Syria.²⁰⁶

Numerous Member States and international organizations have classified Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, with the United States adding Hezbollah to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 1997 believing the group facilitates terrorist cells in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.²⁰⁷²⁰⁸ The European Union (EU) to label the militant wing of the Hezbollah in July 2013, which was a decision based on the Lebanese organization's role in the Syrian war and a bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which killed five Israelis.²⁰⁹²¹⁰ Hezbollah has denied involvement in the bus bombing.²¹¹ According to the United Kingdom (UK) government, the military wing of Hezbollah "supports terrorism in Iraq and the Palestinian territories."²¹² As a result, the UK government has also labeled Hezbollah's militant wing as a terrorist organization. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) unanimously declared Hezbollah as a terrorist

¹⁹⁸ "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2013, www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ "Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows victory in Syria," BBC News, May 25, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22669230

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)," United States Department of State, October 11, 2005, <http://web.archive.org/web/20060712173350/http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>

²⁰⁸ "Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)," Council on Foreign Relations, July 22, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155>

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ "EU adds Hezbollah's military wing to terrorism list," Reuters, July 22, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/22/us-eu-hezbollah-idUSBRE96K0DA20130722

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² "Proscribed Terrorist Organisations," Gov.UK, November 4, 2013, www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254860/List_of_proscribed_organisations_Nov_2013.pdf

organization.²¹³ The GCC stated its Member States have tried to improve diplomatic relations with Member States that have ties with Hezbollah but claimed internal affairs in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were infringed during the process.²¹⁴

The UN Security Council has called on "Lebanese parties" to cease involvement in Syria.²¹⁵ The Security Council did not explicitly name Hezbollah in the statement due to objections by other Member States, but reports stated it was a clear message for Hezbollah.²¹⁶ The Security Council continued to note Lebanese parties should focus on national affairs that have to be addressed such as support for its judicial and security authorities.²¹⁷ The UN organ did commend Lebanon's "generous efforts" in assisting refugees from ongoing conflicts in Palestine and Syria.²¹⁸

Hezbollah's presence in the international community could eradicate peaceful progress as intended by the unanimously supported Arab Peace Initiative by the LAS.²¹⁹ The Arab League has addressed the actions committed by Hezbollah. According to LAS Secretary General Nabil Elaraby, the League expressed a "strong condemnation" of all forms of foreign intervention in Syria, notably by Hezbollah.²²⁰ Unlike the Arab League, Bahrain has categorized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.²²¹ Bahrain's Foreign Minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed al-Khalifa has further addressed the role of Hezbollah and named the Lebanese-based organization's Nasrallah as a "terrorist."²²²

Actions Taken by the United Nations

Definition of Terrorism Disputes in the UN

Following a series of bombings in Egypt and the UK, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pushed for the UN Member States to issue a definition for terrorism.²²³ Defining terrorism within the UN, however, has been considered as a "sensitive" issue since 2000 when the organization began to develop the Comprehensive Convention Against Terrorism.²²⁴ Delegations have stated that until all Member States

²¹³ "GCC: Hezbollah terror group," Arab News, June 3, 2013, www.arabnews.com/news/453834

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ SC/11056, "Increasingly Concerned at Impact of Syrian Crisis on Lebanon, Security Council seeks Recommitment to Dissociation Policy to Avoid 'Slide Into Conflict,'" United Nations Security Council, July 10, 2013, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11056.doc.htm

²¹⁶ "U.N. calls on Lebanon's Hezbollah to stop involvement in Syria," Reuters, July 20, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/10/us-lebanon-syria-un-idUSBRE9690UG20130710

²¹⁷ SC/11056, "Increasingly Concerned at Impact of Syrian Crisis on Lebanon, Security Council seeks Recommitment to Dissociation Policy to Avoid 'Slide Into Conflict,'" United Nations Security Council, July 10, 2013, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11056.doc.htm

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ "Assessing the Strength of Hizballah," United States Department of State, June 8, 2010. www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm

²²⁰ "Arab League condemns Hezbollah's role in Syria," Reuters, June 5, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/05/us-syria-crisis-arabs-idUSBRE9541A320130605

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² "Bahrain calls Hezbollah head a terrorist, says must be stopped," Reuters, May 26, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/26/us-syria-crisis-bahrain-idUSBRE94P08G20130526>

²²³ Thalif Deen, "POLITICS: U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism," Inter Press Service, July 25, 2005. www.ipsnews.net/2005/07/politics-un-member-states-struggle-to-define-terrorism/

²²⁴ Ibid.

agree on the UN's definition, the convention cannot get passed.²²⁵ Member States claimed the proposed UN definition of terrorism must not be associated to a particular religion and recognize the right to self-determination.²²⁶

The text of the proposed UN definition on terrorism include, "We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."²²⁷ The proposed definition continued:

²²⁵ GA/L/3276. *Agreed Definition Of Term 'Terrorism' Said To Be Needed For Consensus on Completing Comprehensive Convention Against It*. United Nations General Assembly. www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gal3276.doc.htm

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ "Text: UN proposals on terrorism," BBC News, July 26, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4717687.stm>

*"We recognise that international co-operation to fight terrorism should be conducted in conformity with international law, including the United Nations charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States should adhere to the principles of good governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism."*²²⁸

The LAS have disputed the suggested definition in the UN.²²⁹ The Arab League believes the UN has to distinguish "terrorist organization" and "liberation movement," as well as what composes "state terrorism" and self-determination, which is a matter the LAS addressed in the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in 1998.²³⁰ The LAS and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) stated the proposed UN definition has to exempt Member States in conflict against "foreign occupation," which is a reference on Israel. The LAS and OIC identified themselves and liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, both who have fought against Israeli occupation, ought to be exempt from the proposed definition.²³¹ Annan has made it clear that terrorism is not linked to any religion.

Although Arab States voiced their concerns about the proposed UN definition, then-Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa endorsed the UN definition on terrorism.²³² According to Moussa, the proposed UN definition on terrorism can serve as the "basis for consensus" among Member States.²³³ He continued to state that "resisting occupation is a different issue altogether."²³⁴

The OIC submitted a proposal for the UN definition on terrorism to an ad hoc committee established by a General Assembly resolution (A/51/210).²³⁵ The proposal by the OIC included:

*"The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign occupation, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by [the Comprehensive Convention Against Terrorism (Convention)]."*²³⁶

*"The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law, are not governed by this Convention."*²³⁷

The UN and the Arab League have yet to come to terms on a final definition on terrorism.

Countering Illicit Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism

The Arab League collaborated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for a regional program framework in 2010 regarding drug control, crime prevention, and criminal justice

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Thalif Deen, "POLITICS: U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terrorism," Inter Press Service, July 25, 2005. www.ipsnews.net/2005/07/politics-un-member-states-struggle-to-define-terrorism/

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² "Arab chief clears terrorism definition," Al Jazeera, July 25, 2005. www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/07/200841011182583302.html

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ "UN seeks definition of terrorism," BBC News, July 26, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4716957.stm>

²³⁵ A/57/37. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 (Annex IV). United Nations www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/57/a5737.pdf

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

reform.²³⁸ The partnership with the UNODC was also made to respond to threats within Arab States while "promoting the rule of law and sustainable development."²³⁹ The regional framework was developed based on "extensive consultations" with national and regional groups during a meeting between April 27 and 29, 2010.²⁴⁰ Arab League Member States sent their delegates from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Health to participate at the Cairo meeting.²⁴¹

The result of the Cairo meeting is the five-year program known as the Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States 2011-2015. The regional program composes of three pillars, which includes the promotion of integrity and building justice, drug prevention and health, and combat organized crime and terrorism.²⁴² The UNODC and LAS, with the support of the latter's special councils - Arab Ministers of Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, officially launched the regional framework on 8 December 2010.²⁴³ NODC Executive Director Yuri Fedotov stated the cooperation with the LAS is a "major step forward" for the Arab Member States as the region made a starting pledge US\$35 million to fund the program.²⁴⁴ In return, the UNODC increased its operations in the Arab region by setting two sub-regional offices in Tripoli, Libya for the Maghreb region and in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates for Member States along the Gulf.²⁴⁵ The UNODC has existing offices in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, and Sudan.²⁴⁶ The indicative budget for all five years is estimated to be USD \$100 million.²⁴⁷

The regional framework's pillar on countering illicit trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism has a six-steps such as building capacity to counter transnational organized crime, combatting money laundering and the financing of terrorism as a regional approach, and strengthening the Arab States' approach to prevent terrorism, to name a few.²⁴⁸ According to the UNODC, Arab League Member States need to promote international cooperation especially on criminal matters.²⁴⁹ With improved cooperation on dealing with crime, Member States can encounter "successful prosecutions" of "complex and serious" cases ranging from corruption, firearms and human trafficking, organized crime, and notably terrorism.²⁵⁰

²³⁸ "Regional Programme Framework," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/regional-programme-framework/regional-programme-framework.html

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² "UNODC and League of Arab States launch US \$ 100 million five-year regional programme," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/December/unodc-and-league-of-arab-states-launch-us-100-million-dollar-regional-programme.html

²⁴³ "Regional Programme Framework," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/regional-programme-framework/regional-programme-framework.html

²⁴⁴ "UNODC and League of Arab States launch US \$ 100 million five-year regional programme," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2010/December/unodc-and-league-of-arab-states-launch-us-100-million-dollar-regional-programme.html

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The League of Arab States, www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/Regional_Programme_for_the_Arab_States.pdf

²⁴⁸ "Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The League of Arab States, www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/Regional_Programme_for_the_Arab_States.pdf

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

The five-year framework outlined that a comprehensive and effective method of anti-money laundering across the MENA region would hinder the growing threat of terrorism for Member States in the LAS.²⁵¹ Based on conferences and workshops held across several Arab States, the need to enhance the efforts to combat the financing of terrorism was evident.²⁵² According to the LAS and UNODC's Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States, legislation and regulatory channels were "not in full compliance" set by international standards.²⁵³ The UNODC has volunteered in drafting national projects based on specific Member State's needs in order to help meet relevant international requirements pertaining to anti-money laundering and financing terror.²⁵⁴

The five-year regional framework is not the first time the Arab League collaborated with the UNODC. A regional workshop was held from 18-20 November 2008, on new international instruments on the prevention and suppression of terrorism.²⁵⁵ The legal instruments to combat terrorism were developed since 1963 and have increased in number based on specific terrorist incidents or threats, such as aircraft hijacking, maritime navigation safety, hostage taking, terrorism funding, and terrorist bombings, to name a few.²⁵⁶ The implementation of the instruments has been recognized as an "urgent priority," and the UN Security Council called on all Member States to ratify the instruments.²⁵⁷

Case Studies

Syrian Civil War

The crisis in Syria has been an issue of concern within the Arab League as terrorists have attacked Syrian homes, military checkpoints, and government buildings.²⁵⁸ Government officials in Damascus had originally rejected the Arab League's solutions such as denying international peacekeepers from entering Syria in hopes to "oversee the implementation of a ceasefire."²⁵⁹ The Syrian government had also rejected calls for an immediate ceasefire and start of negotiations proposed by the People's Republic of China.²⁶⁰ By late March 2012, Syrian President al-Assad accepted a joint plan by the Arab League and UN.²⁶¹ Al-Assad welcomed the joint plan but said "terrorism" must stop in Syria as well.²⁶²

Al-Assad's welcome of the joint plans came a few months after the LAS issued its first sanctions against a fellow Arab State. The LAS held a meeting at the ministerial level on 27 November 2011, to further address

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ "Delivering Counter-Terrorism Assistance," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 2009, www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica//terrorism/DELIVERING_COUNTER-TERRORISM_ASSISTANCE_-_March_2009.pdf

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ "Syria rejects new Arab League resolutions," RT, February 13, 2013, <http://rt.com/news/syria-rejects-arab-league-resolution-139/>

²⁵⁹ "Ibid.

²⁶⁰ "Who supports state terrorism in Syria?," Al Arabiya News, March 12, 2012, <http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/03/12/200166.html>

²⁶¹ "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431

²⁶² Ibid.

the situation in Syria, and passed Resolution 7442.²⁶³ The Arab League's sanctions include a travelling ban for top Syrian officials to other Arab Member States and freezing their finances.²⁶⁴

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan assisted in the idea of the joint plan with the LAS and UN.²⁶⁵ Annan served as the UN-LAS Joint Special Envoy for Syria, but resigned from the position in August 2012.²⁶⁶ Before his resignation, Annan helped advise a six-point plan that would include the UN monitoring the conclusion of the fighting, have troops removed from opposition areas, and access for humanitarian services.^{267,268}

The Arab League and the UN appointed a joint special representative to determine the scope of the Syrian crisis after Annan's departure.²⁶⁹ According to new Joint Special Representative Lakdar Brahimi, he believes al-Assad is "more aware" than the representative on the "seriousness" of the crisis.²⁷⁰ Brahimi stated he informed al-Assad that the UN and LAS will "exert every effort, present ideas and mobile capacities and potentials" needed in order to provide the best for the Syrian population.²⁷¹ According to state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), despite the presence of the LAS and UN, al-Assad wants to hold terrorists accountable for the violence on Syrians.²⁷² SANA added that while al-Assad supports the efforts of the LAS and UN whilst "respecting Syria's sovereignty and rejecting any foreign interference," initiatives to solve the crises should be based on the "principle to halt terrorism" and the Member States arming and supporting terrorists in Syria.²⁷³

The Arab League and UN envoy, however, has not held direct talks with al-Assad since December 2012.²⁷⁴ Brahimi and al-Assad resumed face-to-face talks in Damascus on 29 October 2013, nearly 10 months after their previous direct contact.²⁷⁵ Brahimi has been putting efforts to advise an international peace conference in Geneva in regards to the violence in Syria.²⁷⁶ The Syrian opposition is reportedly "divided" on attending the peace conference while the Syrian government "refuses" to be in the company of the armed opposition.²⁷⁷

²⁶³ "Full text of Arab League resolution against Syria," Open Briefing, November 28, 2011, www.openbriefing.org/regionaldesks/middleeast/resolution7442/

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431

²⁶⁶ "New York, 2 August 2012 - Statement by the Secretary-General on the Joint Special Envoy for Syria," United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, August 2, 2012, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=6223

²⁶⁷ "Arab League backs Annan's Syria plan at Baghdad summit," BBC News, March 29, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17544431

²⁶⁸ "Kofi Annan's six-point plan for Syria," Al Jazeera, March 27, 2012, www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/03/2012327153111767387.html

²⁶⁹ "Joint UN-Arab League envoy and Syrian President discuss worsening crisis," UN News Centre, September 15, 2012, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42898#.UnNKQJH3E_5

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² "Syrian president tells envoy that support of 'terrorists' must stop," CNN, October 21, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/10/21/world/meast/syria-brahimi-assad-meeting/

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ "Arab League-UN Envoy Meets With Syria's Assad," Associated Press, October 29, 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/envoy-meets-syrian-opposition-figure-20711684>

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Al-Assad has continued to claim opposition as "terrorists" and being supported by terror-affiliated groups.²⁷⁸ According to al-Assad, a solution in Syria can only take place by the Syrian people and not foreign intervention.²⁷⁹ The Russian Federation and the United States of America (US) have supported the idea of the peace conference, but it has been postponed on numerous occasions over which parties and Member States should participate.²⁸⁰ Since March 2011, the conflict in Syria has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths and more than two million forced to flee their homes.²⁸¹

Unrest in Iraq

The Arab League has welcomed Iraq to the regional organization despite the ongoing terrorism and violence.²⁸² Iraq has made the effort to present itself outside of the violence by hosting an Arab League summit in Baghdad in March 2012.²⁸³ With the Arab League summit, more than 100,000 security forces were deployed with airspace closed across the city.²⁸⁴ The purpose of the Baghdad meeting was to address Syria, but it was also seen to test how the Iraqi government responds to the increasing number of terror attacks in recent years and after the US withdrew their troops in December 2011.²⁸⁵ Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari described the Arab League summit in Baghdad as "the most important event for Iraq," however; terrorism still lingered for the Member State.²⁸⁶ The Arab League summit was scheduled for 2011, but was postponed due to unrest in Iraq.²⁸⁷ Militant groups with links to al-Qaeda have claimed responsibility on several bombings aimed to undermine the summit.²⁸⁸ Despite the summit, terrorism has claimed more lives in Iraq. The LAS has issued condemnation statements on terror attacks in Iraq regardless of the number of deaths and injured.^{289,290}

Conclusion

²⁷⁸ "Assad: backing rebels must stop for peace to take place," AL Arabiya, October 30, 2013, english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/30/U-N-Arab-league-envoy-Brahimi-to-meet-Assad-.html

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ "Arab League-UN Envoy Meets With Syria's Assad," Associated Press, October 29, 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/envoy-meets-syrian-opposition-figure-20711684>

²⁸² "What the Arab League can learn from Iraq," BBC News, March 28, 2012. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17526102

²⁸³ Shashank Joshi, "Can Arab League bridge its divisions?," BBC News, March 27, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17522695

²⁸⁴ "Huge security operation in Baghdad for Arab summit," BBC News, March 26, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17510663

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ "Arab League summit aims to showcase 'the new Iraq,'" CNN, March 26, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/03/26/world/meast/iraq-arab-summit/

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ "Arab League denounces terrorist attacks in Iraq," All Iraq News, April 16, 2013, www.alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32236:arab-league-denounces-terrorist-attacks-in-iraq-&catid=35:political&Itemid=2

²⁹⁰ "Arab Parliament denounces terrorism in Iraq," Egypt Independent, September 25, 2013, www.egyptindependent.com/news/arab-parliament-denounces-terrorism-iraq

The LAS has agreed terrorism can take many forms such as an act or threat of violence.²⁹¹ The Arab League recognizes terrorism can occur to an individual or group with the premise to advance an agenda.²⁹² The 22 Arab League Member States have specified people's "lives, liberty, or security" may be put in danger due to terrorist acts.²⁹³ While the UN has not provided a definition for "terrorism" the LAS has acted and defined the term in 1998 with the 42-point Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism²⁹⁴

Terrorism, however, still remains on across the MENA for various reasons ranging from human rights, the role of Israel, and nationalism, to name a few. The Arab League has been on point when tackling terrorism and how it may be defined. An example is the role of "foreign occupation" and "self-determination" in an Arab Member State.²⁹⁵ The LAS has detailed when aggression may be accepted, highlighting Israel's "foreign occupation" in Palestine, which the latter has the right to act if "territorial integrity" is at risk.²⁹⁶

Within recognized Arab Member States, groups linked to terror-affiliated acts have brought concern from the LAS. The Arab League has addressed numerous acts of violence inflicted on Arab citizens across the MENA by either documented terror organizations or local-known affiliates. Such terror organizations have resulted in collaboration with the UN, either for the entire Arab region or specific Member States within the LAS, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. While the topic of terrorism was not discussed until decades after its establishment, the LAS has concentrated on identifying and preventing terrorism amidst growing conflicts, or springs, occurring in the past decade.

Committee Directive

In order to thoroughly collaborate and convey the impact of terrorism with the LAS, delegates should be familiar with their Member State's assessment, achievements, and response in combating terrorism. It may also be beneficial for delegates to understand their Member State's approach to counterterrorism in both domestic and international fronts. The delegations within the LAS committee are expected to grasp the policies their Member State ratified within the Arab League regarding all forms of terrorism. The effects of terrorism against the Arab League among various fields such as economical, medical, political, and social, to name a few, should be comprehended by the delegates. The positions of groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah by the Member State should be familiarized as well as any additional terror-affiliated organizations. Has the Member State independently enacted on eradicating terrorism, and if so, how? Could such actions be implemented with fellow LAS Member States in order to foster prosperity and ensure security? In addition, delegates should have an understanding of any bilateral or multilateral efforts, notably with fellow Arab League Member States.

Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)

Topic I: Bridging the Gap: New Horizons for Arab and Western States

Citino, Nathan J, *The 'crush' of ideologies: The United States, the Arab world, and Cold War modernization*, Cold War History, 2012.

When discussing heavy concepts between the United States (US) and Arab population, there are many factors that have effected relations over the years. Historian Nathan Citino gives the Cold War perspective and a really insightful view on the subject. Issues of Arab modernization, the politics of Islam, and cultural

²⁹¹ "The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," The League of Arab States, April 22, 1998. www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ "Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism," League of Arab States," April 22, 1998. www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e4984.html

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

sensitivity are explored and provides great context to the relationship between the US and Arab Member States.

Khader, Bichara, *The European Union and the Arab World: From the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring*, European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2013.

<http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/sites/default/files/attachments/papersiemed17.pdf>

Bridging the Gap between the West and the League of Arab States (LAS) heavily delves into the involvement of the European Union (EU) as a major player in Western affairs. This paper explores many aspects of the EU's involvement with Arab Member States and the geopolitical status that this unique relationship has endured over the years. The Mediterranean region is a vast mix of cultures and historically the EU has pursued human rights as a priority in agreements. However true political reform through policy alliances has been fleeting and Professor Khader offers a detailed background on the subject.

Khatib, Lina, *Qatar's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism*, International Affairs, 2013.

http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24060/INTA89_2_10_Khatib.pdf

One of the key players in the Arab League is Qatar and the relationship between Qatar and the US provides a great framework. Dr. Khatib offers much more detail on Qatar and the distinct role that this Arab country maintains in the region. The significance of Qatar's claim to strength and the consequence that has had on both the LAS and US is an important factor in this discussion.

Lewis, Bernard, *Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East*. Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Affairs. 2005.

http://www.ndu.edu/nesa/nesanetwork/documents/seminar_guides/ES0208/readings/ss38_governance_changing_world/ss38_03_Lewis_freedom_justice.pdf

The issue of democracy in the Middle East has long been a debate of whether the political system is an external force or intrinsically internal. Noted Historian Bernard Lewis, provides a cultural and religious argument towards political reform through Islam. Because Islam colors Arab society in a general sense, this text can give a perspective on an approach to embrace democracy.

Travis, Hannibal, *Wargaming the "Arab Spring": Predicting Likely Outcomes and Planning U.N.*

Responses, Cornell International Law Journal, 2013. <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Travis-final.pdf>

The Arab Spring encompassing so many levels of diplomacy and politics, that the scope can be reach very wide. Professor of Law Hannibal Travis presents an overview of both the United Nations (UN) and US response (and a possible approach). Reconciling the governments of the Arab world with the ambitions of the US, as well as the UN, is a lofty attempt, which Hannibal approaches in detail.

II. The Impact of Terrorism in the League of Arab States

"Arab League discusses Syria crisis," Al Jazeera, September 1, 2013. www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/2013831225922651174.html

With the Syrian Civil War still ongoing, the LAS held a closed-door meeting in Cairo, Egypt to address the topic. The meeting was said to include a speech by the head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), who are representing Syria within the League instead of the Bashar al-Assad-led government. The SNC called for military intervention in Syria, which is a move correspondents stated the US government favored. Some Arab League Member States, however, expressed their opposition to military intervention in Syria.

"Background Briefing By Senior Administration Officials on Iran, the IRGC, and Hezbollah's Increased Terrorist Activity Worldwide," United States Department of State, May 31, 2013. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210145.htm

A senior administrative official with the US Department of State issued a special briefing that referenced the Lebanese-based political group Hezbollah as the US released its annual Country Reports on Terrorism. The senior administrative official noted a "marketing resurgence of terrorist activity" by Hezbollah. The briefing included statements of how and the results of Hezbollah in Syria has caused. The Arab League is noted in the US Department of State's briefing, and its stance on Hezbollah during the Syrian Civil War.

"Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States 2011-2015: Steering and Follow Up Committee Meeting," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, May

2012. https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica//arab-league-steering-committee/Steering_Committee_Masood_Karimipour_Opening_Statement.pdf

Regional Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Masood Karimipour delivered a speech to the organization, which was hosted by the LAS. According to Karimipour, the UNODC and its regional office in the MENA has aimed to adapt challenges set forth by the UN such as helping Member States prevent terrorism and the threat of transnational organized crime. The representative acknowledged how efforts to eradicate terrorism have been proposed while upholding the rule of law and promote accepted criminal justice practices. The regional program was adopted by the councils of the LAS and launched by the Arab League Secretary General and UNODC Executive Director on December 8, 2010.

“Summary of the most important efforts made by the League of Arab States to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction,” United Nations. www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/Docs%202010/1st%20Cttee%20-%20IO%20replies%20-%202010/League%20of%20Arab%20States%20-%20English%20%20-%20post.pdf

The LAS' counterterrorism efforts continued in March 28, 2010, as the Council of the Arab League confronted nuclear weapons. During the council meeting, the LAS reaffirmed their stance on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which all Members States of the LAS signed. The reaffirmation requested for the international community to immediately eliminate their nuclear weapons as a method to prevent terrorists from obtaining the weapons of mass destruction.

"Syria crisis: Kofi Annan resigns as peace envoy," The Guardian, August 2, 2012. www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2012/aug/02/syria-crisis-damascus-massacres-live

A timeline of the crisis in Syria was outlined by The Guardian newspaper highlighting the steps leading up to and after former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan resigned as a mediator of conflict in the Arab Member State. The timeline features statements by Annan, current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, and reactions from the international community and organizations. The article also noted developments and events that have taken place in Syria including local news reports and video.