Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Atlanta 2021 and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). My name is Joshua Perry, and I will be serving as your Director for INTERPOL. This will be my third conference as a SRMUN staff member. Previously, I served as an Assistant Director for the Security Council at the SRMUN Atlanta 2018 conference, and as an Assistant Director for the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at SRMUN Atlanta 2019. I am an alum of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, having studied Political Science and History. I currently work as a Human Resources specialist, but I plan to attend graduate school at American University this coming fall. Our committee's Assistant Directors will be Andrew Wittmayer and Yanet Berakhi. This is Andrew's inaugural year serving as an Assistant Director at SRMUN Atlanta but has served as an Assistant Director for SRMUN Charlotte 2021. He is currently studying History and Political Science. This will also be Yanet's first year as an Assistant Director at SRMUN. She is currently a Junior studying Political Science.

Created in 1956 and having its General Secretariat head-quartered in Lyon, France, INTERPOL is an international organization dedicated to connecting the world's police for a safer future. With an Executive Committee consisting of 13 Member States, and a General Assembly currently composed of 194 Member States, INTERPOL is committed to connecting law-enforcement agencies from across the globe, in order to better implement security policies, and allow for greater data access on crimes and criminals between Member States. While it mainly deals with police and other security officials, it also works to directly counter a wide range of issues such as human trafficking, cyber and organized crime, and even environmental crimes.

By focusing on the mission of INTERPOL and the SRMUN Atlanta 2021 theme of "*Fostering Global Youth Empowerment and Leadership,"* we have developed the following topics for the delegates to discuss come conference:

     I. Combatting Radicalization and the Promotion of Extremist Violence on Social Media
   II. Assisting Member States in Combating Transnational Money Laundering Operations

The background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, the background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit srmun.org. ***All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, October 29, 2021 by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.***

Andrew, Yanet, and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for INTERPOL. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you soon. Please feel free to contact Yanet, Andrew, Rachael, or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

Joshua Perry	Andrew Wittmayer & Yanet Berakhi	Rachael Wnuk
Director	Assistant Directors	Director-General
Interpol_atlanta@srmun.org	Interpol_atlanta@srmun.org	dg_atlanta@srmun.org

Committee History of the International Criminal Police Organization

Among the United Nations' (UN) plenary size body committees is the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).[1] With a total of 194 Member States, INTERPOL creates a network of international police and law enforcement agencies.[2] INTERPOL is headquartered in Lyon, France, and is a part of the General Secretariat.[3] The need for INTERPOL emerged at the first International Crime Police Congress on April 14, 1914.[4] Held in Monaco, the participants of the first Congress expressed 12 wishes for the future of international police cooperation.[5] These wishes set the goals in which INTERPOL will be aiming to achieve.[6] Some of the 12 wishes expressed a desire to initiate training, use a single uniform language, improve contact between police from different parts of the world, and seek to establish an identification system to spot international criminals.[7] In 1923, INTERPOL became an official international organization under the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC).[8] With a goal of a safer world, it enables Member States to share and access data on crimes and criminals.[9]

INTERPOL deals with a range of issues such as human trafficking, cyber and organized crime, and environmental crimes.[10] The vision of INTERPOL is "connective police for a safer world," and the mission is "preventing and fighting crime through enhanced cooperation and innovation on police and security matters."[11] It works to achieve this mandate by aiding police and law enforcement agencies in its 194 Member States in their efforts to investigate and prevent crime as efficiently and effectively as possible.[12] It holds a global presence of 24-hour operations, 365 days a year, by an encrypted internet-based worldwide communications network.[13] Within each Member State, INTERPOL has a designated National Central Bureau (NCB). The NCB, which mainly contains the national police force, creates a connection between Member States and the General Secretariat to communicate and solve international crimes.[14]

Officials from several Member States decide INTERPOL's advancement and policies through the Executive Committee and the UN General Assembly (GA). The Executive Committee meets three times a year and sets organizational policy and direction for INTERPOL.[15] Elected by the GA, it has 13 members who represent all the regions of the world.[16] Meanwhile, the GA works on a "one Member State, one vote" basis, where a delegation from each Member State is represented.[17] They meet annually, and their decisions are overseen by the Executive Committee. The committee also has a President, which is elected every four years by the GA.[18] As mentioned in INTERPOL's Constitution, the President must meet and direct the discussions of the GA and Executive

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[1] "Member countries," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries (accessed April 18, 2021).

[2] "Member countries," INTERPOL.

[3] "Member countries," INTERPOL.

[4] "Key Dates," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our- accessed April 18, 2021).history/Key-dates (accessed April 18, 2021)

[5] "12 Wishes: Then and Now," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our-history/12-wishes-then-and-now (accessed April 18, 2021).

[6]"INTERPOL Launches Global Policing Goals," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2018/INTERPOL-launches-Global-Policing-Goals (accessed April 18, 2021).

[7] "INTERPOL Helps Law Enforcement Get Around Borders and Jurisdictions," The Balance Careers, https://www.thebalancecareers.com/interpol-international-policing-974516 (accessed April 18, 2021).

[8] "History," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/Our-history (accessed February 12, 2021)

[9] "What Is INTERPOL?," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL (accessed April 18, 2021).

[10]"What Is INTERPOL?," INTERPOL.

[11] "International Criminal Policy Organization (INTERPOL)," Points Project, https://www.points-project.com/consortium/international-criminal-policy-organisation-interpol/#:~:text=The%20vision%20of%20INTERPOL%20is,on%20police%20and%20security%20matters%E2%80%9D (accessed April 18, 2021).

[12] "INTERPOL," United Nations, https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/icpo_background-Information.pdf (accessed May 5, 2021).

[13] "Overview," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Who-we-are/What-is-INTERPOL (accessed February 12, 2021).

[14]"What Is INTERPOL?," INTERPOL.

[15] "Executive Committee," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Governance/Executive-Committee (accessed April 18, 2021).

[16] "Executive Committee," INTERPOL.

[17] "Executive Committee," INTERPOL.

[18] "Executive Committee," INTERPOL.

Committee.[19] The current leadership of INTERPOL includes its Secretary-General, Jürgen Stock, and President Kim Jong Yang.[20]

The organization has also evolved to meet terroristic threats and criminal enterprises that emerge in a rapidly changing world. One tactic that remains vital to INTERPOL is fostering collaboration with Member States and international organizations, as a communicative and fully cooperative group of institutions is a powerful block on the ambitions of malevolent figures globally.[21] One of the first efforts to follow this strategy was demonstrated in 1959, when INTERPOL participated in an international narcotics trafficking meeting with UN's drugs director Gilbert E. Yates, a landmark assembly that demonstrated the usefulness of INTERPOL to key international organizations.[22] Another aspect of this tactic included expanding INTERPOL's roster of Member States.[23] The Organization was incredibly successful in doing so, increasing its list of Member States to 50 in 1955, then 100 in 1967, and 150 in 1989.[24] As of 2021, INTERPOL counts 194 states as members.[25] INTERPOL further sought legitimacy from Member States and other international organizations and was afforded so in 1972.[26] In 2004 and 2005, INTERPOL opened a Special Representative office at the UN headquarters in New York Cityand published the first of many INTERPOL-UNSC Special Notices.[27]

In recent history, INTERPOL has further emerged as a key partner of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in addressing security threats across the globe.[28] The UNSC has passed a number of resolutions recognizing and affirming the role of INTERPOL in combatting terrorism.[29] Recent examples include S/RES/2178(2014) and S/RES/3396(2017), passed by the UNSC in 2014 and 2017.[30] Both resolutions recognize the role INTERPOL has to play in fighting foreign terrorists, with Resolution 3396 stating specifically that INTERPOL is vital in the successful implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy across Member States.[31] S/RES/2482 and S/RES/2462, both passed in 2019, stress that INTERPOL is an invaluable tool – with its databases and organizational capabilities – that should be utilized by Member States in order to combat the financing of terrorism and the links between terrorist groups and organized crime.[32]

INTERPOL's budgetary and financial management rules are outlined in the organization's threefold legal framework in its Constitution, General Regulations, and Financial Regulations.[33] The latter document states that the INTERPOL Secretary General has authority over INTERPOL's financial management relating to its ordinary and special activities.[34] This authority further includes the power to decide on the required methods and procedures for INTERPOL's financial management, points outlined in Section 2, Regulation 1.3, and Clauses (1) and (3).[35] INTERPOL's budgetary rules further mandate that the Organization's monetary expenses be constituted of the Euro.[36] INTERPOL's total budget in 2019 was USD 162.4 Million, allocated to cover the Organization's general operational costs and activities.[37]

The organizations budget is made up of obligatory statutory payments made by Member States and voluntary contributions largely done by governmental agencies and international (IGOs) or non-governmental organizations

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[19] "President," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Governance/President (accessed February 12, 2021).
[20] "President," INTERPOL.
[21] "Key Dates," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our-history/Key-dates (accessed February 14, 2021).
[22] "Key Dates," INTERPOL.
[23] "Key Dates," INTERPOL.
[24] "Key Dates," INTERPOL.
[25] "Member countries," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries (accessed April 18, 2021).
[26] "Key Dates," INTERPOL.
[27] "Key Dates," INTERPOL.
[28] "UNGA and UNSC Resolutions on INTERPOL," INTERPOL.
[29] "UNGA and UNSC Resolutions on INTERPOL," INTERPOL.
[30] "UNGA and UNSC Resolutions on INTERPOL," INTERPOL.
[31] "UNGA and UNSC Resolutions on INTERPOL," INTERPOL.
[32] "UNGA and UNSC Resolutions on INTERPOL," INTERPOL.
[33] "Our Funding," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our-funding (accessed February 14, 2021).
[34] "Legal Documents," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Legal-framework/Legal-documents (accessed February 14, 2021).
[35] "Legal Documents," INTERPOL.
[36] "Legal Documents," INTERPOL.
[37] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.

(NGOs)[38]. Member State contributions are decided upon by the GA annually on the basis of individual Member States' UN contributions and overall economic weight.[39] In 2019, the statutory contributions made by Member States totaled USD 69 Million.[40] Statutory contributions generally cover the operating costs of the General Secretariat and various core support and training programs.[41] Regarding voluntary funding, 95 percent is sourced from Member States' governmental agencies, with the other five percent being contributions made by various sources including IGOs, NGOs, and private entities.[42] These contributions have the option of being earmarked for particular programs and initiatives or to be used at the discretion of INTERPOL.[43] Voluntary funding totaled USD 96.98 Million in 2019 and was allocated across activities in the Organization's counterterrorism, cybercrime, and organized and emerging crimes programs.[44] In 2020, INTERPOL's budget included voluntary contributions made by the European Union, the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Ministry of the Interior Public Security Department, the UN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), among other sources, to support various specific INTERPOL activities or programs.[45] These contributions amounted to USD 2,920,993.50.[46]

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[38] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[39] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[40] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[41] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[42] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[43] "Our Funding," INTERPOL.
[44] "Our Funding," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our-funding (accessed February 14, 2021).
[45] "External Contributions in 2020," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Our-funding/External-contributions-in-2020 (accessed February 14, 2021).
[46] "External Contributions in 2020," INTERPOL.

I. Combating Radicalization and the Promotion of Extremist Violence on Social Media

Introduction

From 2010 to 2017, the number of worldwide social media users skyrocketed from 0.97 billion to 3.02 billion.[47] Social media is noted for being a great medium for spreading information, be it truthful, false, helpful or harmful.[48] This information, often unfettered by fact-checking, can be easily accessed by the average social media user.[49] Socially and politically, social media is used as a tool to connect individuals to one another, access information freely, and even organize to demand change.[50] However, at its worst, this very tool is used to deliberately spread misinformation and even promote violence.[51]

According to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), violent extremism (VE) is defined as "the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals," noting that the term includes terrorism, sectarian violence, and politically motivated violence.[52] The drivers of violent extremism are "multiple and interrelated."[53] Global, regional, and national politics are important causes of violent extremism, as often a political, social, or economic conflict can easily destabilize a region, leading to radicalization and extremist violence on varying scales.[54] Other notable drivers of VE include, but are not limited to: multidimensional inequalities between groups, injustice/mistreatment of certain groups, individual rejection of standing political and/or socio-economic systems, and the degree of acceptance surrounding violence in media and entertainment.[55] Similarly, a "push-factor" is an individual's condition and/or experience that creates a desire to overcome said circumstances, making them susceptible to radicalization techniques.[56] Push-factors include, but are not limited to: socio-economic grievances and hardship, a sense of injustice or lack of faith in the democratic process, political frustration, discrimination/marginalization, and even personal issues (such as an identity crisis).[57]

Social Media and the internet serve as perfect tools for radicals due to their ubiquity and ease of access.[58] Research finds that social media and the internet are not only viable means for radicalization, but actually aid the process, leading to more VE.[59] Not only does the internet provide more opportunities for individuals to be radicalized, but it

[47] H. Tankovska, "Number of Social Media Users 2025," Statista, January 28, 2021, accessed June 23, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/) .

[48] Jason Riddle, "All Too Easy: Spreading Information Through Social Media," *The Arkansas Journal of Social Change and Public Service*, March 1, 2017, https://ualr.edu/socialchange/2017/03/01/blog-riddle-social-media.

[49] Jason Riddle, "All Too Easy: Spreading Information Through Social Media."

[50] Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, "The Rise of Social Media," Our World in Data, September 18, 2019, https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media.

[51] Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve, "Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online," (London, The Institute for Strategic Dialouge, 2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Countering%20the%20Appeal%20of%20Extremism%20Online_1.pdf .

[52] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Preventing violent extremism through education: a guide for policy-makers*, (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2017), 19.

[53] The United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity," (New York: United Nations, 2016), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf .

[54] The United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity."

[55] The United Nations Development Programme, "Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity."

[56] The European Commission, "Value the Difference – Preventing Youth Radicalisation," (Brussels, European Commission, 2017), https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/toolbox_tool_download-file-1798/Booklet%20VtD%20Volume%20I%20%26%20II.pdf .

[57] The European Commission, "Value the Difference – Preventing Youth Radicalisation."

[58] Robin Thompson, "Radicalization and the Use of Social Media," *Journal of Strategic Security 4*, no. 4 (2011): 167-190. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463917 .

[59] "Radicalization in the Digital Era," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/internet-and-radicalisation.html (accessed May 14, 2021).

serves as an echo-chamber where radical ideas are reinforced among like-minded people.[60] On top of the use of the internet as a tool to promote VE, it has become clear that extremist groups use the internet and social media as a recruitment platform and even a "training ground."[61] However, there are many methods, such as government messaging, community-based programs, religious teachings, and even anti-VE social media campaigns that can be used to counter the messaging of extremist groups; almost all of them can be deployed in one form or another on social media itself.[62]

History

In 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, motivated by far-right, extremist views, carried out a bombing on government buildings in Oslo, killing seven people.[63] Breivik then made his way to Utøya, where he proceeded to shoot 85 individuals.[64] Between the two attacks perpetrated by Breivik, 92 people were killed.[65] Research shows that not only did Breivik learn how to construct the bomb using internet sources, but that he spent a large quantity of time on extremist forums discussing his anti-Islam and anti-socialist views.[66] It is noted that Breivik used the internet and social media in "almost every thinkable way," and that the aforementioned forums and blogs strengthened Breivik's radical thinking leading up to the heinous display of VE.[67] Following the attack it was found that Breivik had not only expressed nationalistic ideas on the internet and social media, but that he even clashed online with anti-fascist groups over his beliefs, such as a disdain for multiculturalism and his support of the Progress Party, known for touting far-right, anti-Islam/anti-immigration views.[68]

The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests beginning in 2011, relied on social media to flourish.[69] Additionally, numerous extremist organizations in the Middle East and Northern Africa benefitted from social media and its ability to destabilize governments, leading to surges in recruitment, radicalization, and subsequent violence.[70] The 2011 protests in Egypt, for example, best demonstrate the role Twitter and Facebook played as a weapon for protesters.[71] Their importance is highlighted by the fact that the Egyptian government "cut-off" the internet following the beginning of protests for fear that social media would fuel them.[72] Social media and the internet were key players throughout the rest of the Arab Spring, especially when it came to mobilizing protesters and documenting government transgressions.[73] On the other hand, the failure of many Arab Spring uprisings fueled by

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[60] "Radicalization in the Digital Era," RAND Corporation.

[61] William Rodger Avis, *The role of online/social media in countering violent extremism in East Africa,* (Birmingham, UK, GSDRC: University of Birmingham, 2016), 4.

[62] Radicalisation Awareness Network, "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Delivering Counter - or Alternative Narratives," (Brussels, European Commission, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/delivering_alternative_narratives_en.pdf .

[63] Peter Beaumont, "Norway attacks: at least 92 killed in Oslo and Utøya island," *The Guardian*, July 23, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks .

[64] Peter Beaumont, "Norway attacks: at least 92 killed in Oslo and Utøya island."

[65] Peter Beaumont, "Norway attacks: at least 92 killed in Oslo and Utøya island."

[66] Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Anders Behring Breivik's use of the Internet and social media," *Journal EXIT-Deutschland,* no. 2 (2013): 172 – 185. https://journals.sfu.ca/jed/index.php/jex/article/view/28/45 .

[67] Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Anders Behring Breivik's use of the Internet and social media."

[68] Wolfgang Kapust, "'Right-wing extremism' behind massacre in Norway," *DW News*, July 23, 2011, https://www.dw.com/en/right-wing-extremism-behind-massacre-in-norway/a-15262208 .

[69] Antonia Ward, "ISIS's Use of Social Media Still Poses a Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Africa," *The Rand Blog, Rand Corporation*, December 11, 2018. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/12/isiss-use-of-social-media-still-poses-a-threat-to-stability.html .

[70] Antonia Ward, "ISIS's Use of Social Media Still Poses a Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Africa," *The Rand Blog, Rand Corporation*, December 11, 2018. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/12/isiss-use-of-social-media-still-poses-a-threat-to-stability.html.

[71] "Arab Spring anniversary: When Egypt cut the internet," *Al Jazeera*, January 25, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/1/25/arab-spring-anniversary-when-egypt-cut-the-internet.

[72] "Arab Spring anniversary: When Egypt cut the internet," *Al Jazeera*."

[73] Kali Robinson, "The Arab Spring at Ten Years: What's the Legacy of the Uprisings?" *The Council of Foreign Relations*, December 3, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings .

social media and the internet ended up leading to ISIS' growth, recruitment success, and promotion of violence.[74] This strategy is not new, as groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban have used social media, such as Twitter and Telegram, to propagandize and radicalize individuals before ISIS picked up the technique.[75] The use of this nefarious tactic has only grown as both Africa and the Middle East saw a large surge in cell phone use, internet access, and computer literacy in recent years.[76]

Actions Taken by the United Nations

The United Nations (UN) has addressed the subject of social media as it pertains to VE and radicalization on multiple occasions. In 2014, the Security Council passed S/RES/2178, acknowledging the role played by the internet and social media in promoting VE, as well as a determination to "consider" preventing terrorist actors from exploiting said technologies for their gain.[77] The resolution, however, stopped short of committing to any measures to prevent VE specifically related to the internet and social media, instead calling upon signatories to commit to decreasing the risk of radicalization by working with local communities, empowering certain groups within civil society, and adopting tailored approaches to decrease recruitment.[78] UNESCO, however, has played a larger role in combating VE and preventing radicalization.[79]

In 2015, during its 197th session, UNESCO adopted the landmark decision 197EX/46, deepening its commitment to combating VE and preventing the radicalization that perpetuates it.[80] The decision expressed concern for the rise in VE and terrorism, as well as the challenge media presents by being a tool for the radicalization and recruitment of malicious actors.[81] Additionally, the decision promoted the use of strategic partnerships between policy-makers, the private sector, and the media to use educational strategies to combat VE, but social media was not emphasized.[82] Thankfully, the role social media plays in violent extremism and radicalization was emphasized by UNESCO via its commitment to UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in 2016.[83] The plan of action notes the misuse of social media in perpetuating VE and terrorism and calls for Member States to focus on policy that promotes civic literacy and diversity, funds projects designed to combat VE, and encourages social media companies to participate in anti-VE messaging.[84]

The Secretary-General's Plan of Action, originally passed in 2015, occurred concurrently with the passage of General Assembly resolution A/70/675.[85] The resolution, coined "Culture of Peace - The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy," encouraged the use of social media as part of an "all of society" approach to combat radicalization and prevent violent extremism.[86] The resolution went further to address the part youth actors have in VE, highlighting the need to empower youth through education, community engagement, and using the internet and social media to facilitate the prevention of VE.[87] The work UNESCO has done regarding social media and its

[74] Fawaz A. Gerges, *ISIS: A History* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), 18.

[75] Antonia Ward, "ISIS's Use of Social Media Still Poses a Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Africa."

[76] Antonia Ward, "ISIS's Use of Social Media Still Poses a Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Africa."

[77] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178, S/RES/2178, September 24, 2014,
   http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2178.pdf .

[78] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178.

[79] "Preventing Violent Extremism," The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
   https://en.unesco.org/preventingviolentextremism (accessed May 18, 2021).

[80] "Preventing Violent Extremism," The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

[81] The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Decisions Adopted by the Executive Board at its 197th Session,* 197EX/46, 2015.

[82] The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Decisions Adopted by...".*

[83] "Preventing Violent Extremism," The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

[84] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 674, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, A/RES/70/674, December 24, 2015, https://undocs.org/A/70/674 .

[85] "Preventing Violent Extremism," The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

[86] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 675, *Culture of Peace: The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, A/RES/70/675, December 24, 2015, https://undocs.org/A/70/675.

[87] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 675.

relationship to VE and the radicalization process did not end with decision 197EX/46 and their commitment to UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.[88]

INTERPOL launched Project Trace in 2017, aimed at equipping Southeast Asian Member States with strategies surrounding the use of the internet and social media in countering terrorism and VE.[89] The project aimed to highlight how social media, as well as other open-source platforms, can be utilized as intelligence in ongoing investigations into terrorist activities.[90] Additionally, INTERPOL, in partnership with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), ran workshops aimed at teaching methods to detect terrorist activities online, collect e-records for investigations, and cooperate with their Member State's private sector to combat foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).[91] Alongside the workshops, INTERPOL published an extensive handbook encompassing the aforementioned curricula, entitled "Using the Internet and Social Media for Counter-Terrorism Investigations."[92] In 2019 the Group of 7 (G7) highlighted INTERPOL as crucial in combatting terrorism and VE globally.[93] Because INTERPOL has the largest repository of pertinent information regarding over 50,000 FTFs, the G7 felt it should play a much greater role in combating the upward trend of social media radicalization, with its repository being used as a "warning system" to give front-line actors the information they need to better combat VE.[94]

Current Situation

With the COVID-19 pandemic, social media found new positive purposes as a tool to bring physically distanced individuals together.[95] It was also used by violent non-state actors, militia groups, and terrorist organizations to spread disinformation, sow seeds of mistrust, and even cause violence against minority groups.[96] In Somalia, for instance, Al Shabaab used false claims that non-Muslims were purposely spreading COVID-19 to encourage violence against them.[97] The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) published a report concluding that terrorists and violent extremists have capitalized on the increased use of social media during the pandemic to spread propaganda/misinformation and continue recruiting individuals.[98] Data obtained by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) suggests that youths have been particularly at risk of radicalization during the pandemic due to their time away from school, much of which has been spent online.[99]

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is defined as an effort to "prevent people from engaging in ideologically motivated violence, or to support the disengagement of those already so engaged."[100] CVE strategies range from sweeping projects to smaller actions, including, but not limited to: mentoring and counseling, youth empowerment curricula, community-building programs, counter-narrative initiatives, religious literacy courses, democratization schemes, and even post-conflict reconciliation.[101] For example, the Philippines' nationwide CVE program, titled

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[88] "UNESCO addresses youth radicalization and online hate speech at Nice conference," The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2017/02/unesco-addresses-youth-radicalization-online-hate-speech-nice-conference/ (accessed May 19, 2021).

[89] "Project Trace," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/Project-Trace2 (accessed July 1, 2021).

[90] "Project Trace," INTERPOL.

[91] "Analysing Social Media," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Analysing-social-media (accessed July 1, 2021).

[92] "Analysing Social Media," INTERPOL.

[93] "G7 Recognizes INTERPOL's Role," INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/es/Noticias-y-acontecimientos/Noticias/2019/G7-ministers-recognize-INTERPOL-s-role (accessed July 1, 2021).

[94] "G7 Recognizes INTERPOL's Role," INTERPOL.

[95] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), "Stop the Virus of Disinformation: the Risk of Malicious Use of Social Media during COVID-19 and the Technology Options to Fight It," (Torino, Italy: UNICRI, 2020), 4 http://www.unicri.it/sites/default/files/2020-11/SM%20misuse.pdf.

[96] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), *Stop the Virus of Disinformation*, 2.

[97] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), *Stop the Virus of Disinformation*, 10.

[98] United Nations Institute for Training and Research, *Impact of COVID-19 on Violent Extremism and Terrorism,* (Geneva: United Nations, 2020), https://unitar.org/sites/default/files/media/file/Factsheet%20CT%20Printed.pdf.

[99] United Nations Institute for Training and Research, *Impact of COVID-19 on Violent Extremism and Terrorism.*

[100] Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, *Introductory Guide: Countering Violent Extremism* (Birmingham, United Kingdom: Crest Research, 2017), 1.

[101] Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, *Introductory Guide: Countering Violent Extremism*, 4.

"The Resilient Communities in Conflict-Affected Communities," aims to eliminate push-factors towards VE and radicalization at both local and national levels.[102] The program seeks to reinforce governance within the state, reduce poverty, deliver social services, and to mediate conflicts between communities within the Member State.[103] Counter-narratives, a constructed narrative meant to "resist, reframe, divert, subvert, or disable other stories and other voices that vie for or already command discursive power," are another form of CVE.[104] Counter-narratives can be meticulously designed to apply to specific groups of individuals, such as those who are less radicalized (upstream) or those who are more radicalized (downstream).[105] Counter-narrative measures can and have easily been carried out using social media. One such example is the United Kingdom-based YouTube show "Abdullah-X Project," aimed at discouraging VE and radicalization amongst youth.[106]

Another way to prevent and combat VE is for a Member States to ensure their populations are digitally literate.[107] Digital literacy is defined as "the ability to use information and communication technologies to find, evaluate, create and communicate..." online, and it allows an individual to distinguish facts from misinformation, as well as seek out a trustworthy source.[108] Digital literacy is important for younger individuals and vulnerable populations so they are able to resist the narratives of extremists/terrorists.[109] Research completed by the Commonwealth of Nations suggests the government should play a role in bolstering digital literacy programs, which should aim to achieve two core outcomes: teaching individuals how to spot propaganda techniques easily, and building a person's skill at verifying source legitimacy, both of which ensuring someone can respond to violent/radical narratives with their own narrative based in fact.[110]

Research conducted by the Transnational Institute has found numerous issues surrounding CVE, all of which hinder the approach's overall effectiveness and success-rate.[111] The 2018 report found that vague definitions of what constitutes violent extremism, potential to undermine civil society through attempts to change cultural, religious, and political attitudes, as well as a general concern for the risk of expanded surveillance by those attempting to carry out CVE.[112] Looking to the role social media and the internet play in CVE, the Transnational Institute found that censorship in the course of countering violent extremism is a real and pressing issue.[113] Many CVE strategies involve ad-hoc agreements between police agencies, internet service providers, and/or social media platforms, meaning a Member State's government would have the means to carry out extra-judicial censorship of its opponents.[114] Facebook, for example, approves 95 percent of the Israeli government's requests to deactivate Palestinian accounts, causing disruption to civil society organizations, such as the Palestinian Information Centre.[115]

Case Study

[102] Ashley Rhoades, and Todd C. Helmus, "Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: A Snapshot of Current Challenges and Responses," (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA233-2.html.

[103] Ashley Rhoades, and Todd C. Helmus, "Countering Violent Extremism."

[104] Janjaap van Eerten, Bertjan Doosje, Elly Konijn, Beatrice Graaf, and Marielle Goede, *"Developing a social media response to radicalization: The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization"* (Amsterdam/Utrecht: The University of Amsterdam/Utrecht University, 2017), 27.

[105] Janjaap van Eerten, et al., *"Developing a social media response to radicalization,"* 27.

[106] Radicalisation Awareness Network, "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism."

[107] Assan Ali, Mark Albon, and Patricia Crosby, "Counter Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism," (London, United Kingdom: The Commonwealth of Nations, 2019) https://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/ComSec%20CVE%20Counter%20Narratives%20Presentation.pdf.

[108] "What is digital literacy and why does it matter?," Renaissance.

[109] Assan Ali, et al., *Counter Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism,* 14.

[110] Assan Ali, et al., *Counter Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism,* 14.

[111] "The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies," Transnational Institute, https://www.tni.org/en/publication/the-globalisation-of-countering-violent-extremism-policies (accessed on May 15, 2021).

[112] Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies: Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society* (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Transnational Institute, 2018), 3.

[113] Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies,* 3.

[114] Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies,* 3.

[115] Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies,* 3.

ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has made successful use of the internet and social media to spread its message. Their online efforts are aimed at encouraging support for the "Islamic caliphate" and radicalizing individuals into engaging in violence on the group's behalf.[116] The group is known for exploiting social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, with compelling messaging, high quality video content, and calls to violent action.[117] The content, created by the organization's own Media Council, takes the form of regular battlefield updates, religious messages, and threats issued against the group's enemies.[118]

Western Millennials are a group that ISIS has been particularly successful in radicalizing on social media for a variety of reasons.[119] ISIS provides a sense of "purpose of belonging" to disillusioned Westerners with a highly effective propaganda machine that is strategically tailored to social media functionality.[120] According to a 2015 report, ISIS-related Twitter accounts posted an average of seven times daily, with a total of over 130,000 tweets total among all identified accounts.[121] Additionally, ISIS uses its platforms to frame its actions and edicts in religious terms designed to ensnare individuals, in particular younger Muslims.[122] After his declaration of ISIS as "the caliphate" in 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the first putative caliph of the caliphate, declared "hijra" to "the land of Islam" as a religious cornerstone for Muslims worldwide, a message that found particular resonance with "disaffected" and "aimless" youth.[123]

A first line of response to combat ISIS' social media presence had been using traditional forms of media, such as broadcast news, especially "pan-Arab" networks in the region.[124] Some notable critics of ISIS in the Middle East and North Africa are Al Jazeera Television and Al Arabiya Television, who have dedicated years of reporting and content to discrediting ISIS.[125] Another common tool to combat ISIS's social media success has been anti-ISIS messaging and programs via Member States' government and high-ranking clergy within the Member State itself, with the hope that their narrative is more legitimate than that of ISIS.[126] Unfortunately, research suggests that these regimes have fallen short of the virtual onslaught by ISIS to recruit, disseminate information, and spread violence.[127]

Outside of the region, attempts have been made by other parties to combat ISIS's narrative, with varying degrees of success.[128] For example, distrust of the US in the Middle East means many of its attempts to combat ISIS's digital operations have and will continue to "fall flat."[129] RAND Corporation research has shown that if the US wants to see greater success in countering ISIS' narrative, it needs to work more closely with influential organizations and parties within the region, in order to gain greater perspective and legitimacy.[130] For example, the US State Department should partner closely with ISIS's opponents to provide social media training, in order to enhance the effectiveness

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[116] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media," *Military Cyber* Affairs 1 no. 1 (2016) https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol1/iss1/4/ .

[117] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media."

[118] Daniel Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Robert Schroeder, "Social Media and the ISIS Narrative," (Monterey, California: Dudley Knox Library, 2015), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/53059 .

[119] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media."

[120] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media."

[121] J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, *The ISIS Twitter Census Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf .

[122] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media."

[123] Lisa Blaker, "The Islamic State's Use of Online Social Media."

[124] Alberto M. Fernandez, *Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda networks* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IS-Propaganda_Web_English.pdf .

[125] Alberto M. Fernandez, *Here to stay and growing.*

[126] Alberto M. Fernandez, *Here to stay and growing.*

[127] Alberto M. Fernandez, *Here to stay and growing.*

[128] Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, "Fighting the Islamic State on Social Media," *The Rand Blog, Rand Corporation,* October 11, 2016, https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/10/fighting-the-islamic-state-on-social-media.html .

[129] Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, "Fighting the Islamic State on Social Media."

[130] Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, "Fighting the Islamic State on Social Media."

of their messaging, as well as tailoring anti-ISIS messaging to specific communities as the organization's online presence is fragmented.[131]

Conclusion

Violent Extremism, or VE, and the radicalization that perpetuates it, are not necessarily a new problem for the international community. However, the role social media plays in these processes is a newer phenomenon that makes radicalization far easier.[132] As noted by the G7 in 2019, INTERPOL has the tools necessary to better combat VE and radicalization, wielding a database capable of providing Member States with the means to capture actors responsible for VE and the radicalization of other individuals.[133] Their analysis would suggest INTERPOL could potentially play a larger role in combatting VE and radicalization in virtual spaces, such as social media and the internet. INTERPOL has already attempted to address the role social media can play in CVE in a cursory fashion, by holding workshops and publishing materials on how the internet can be used as a tool to detect and prevent terrorism and other forms of VE.[134] However, given the ability social media possesses to facilitate VE and radicalization, INTERPOL must consider how it can address the issue more directly and meaningfully.[135]

Committee Directive

Combating violent extremism and radicalization, as previously mentioned, is not effective as a one-size-fits-all solution. Therefore, proposals must consider multi-leveled, multipronged, and specific policies and suggestions to target communities of all sorts, individuals of differing ideologies, and with a variety of socio-political situations at hand. On top of this challenge, delegates must consider the way social media and the internet interacts with those who are at risk of being radicalized and/or committing violent extremist actions. One must consider the forms of CVE employed locally, nationally, or globally, such as counter-messaging extremist propaganda, strategic communications via a Member States' government, or even more creative/unique forms of CVE. Delegates should ask themselves what role over-arching international frameworks play in countering radicalization/violent extremism on social media. To what extent does social media facilitate radicalization and violence? What can be done to ensure that countering violent extremism on social media does not abuse the right to speech, freedom of information, etc.? What role does a Member States' government have in preventing extremism and radicalization, or are communal programs more responsible? Delegates must ponder these questions when debating and creating solutions in committee to ensure a safer world free from violent extremism.

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[131] "Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter," The Rand Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1328.html (accessed May 21, 2021).

[132] William Rodger Avis, *The role of online/social media in countering violent extremism,* 4.

[133] "G7 Recognizes INTERPOL's Role," INTERPOL.

[134] "Analysing Social Media," INTERPOL.

[135] Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism...*"

II. Assisting Member States in Combating Transnational Money Laundering Operations

Introduction

The emergence of a global integrated economy has had many benefits, among them a reduction in the costs of trade, market expansion, technology sharing, and cross-border investment.[136] However, these developments have had the unintended effect of giving rise to globalized organized crime.[137] Transnational organized crime is often driven by profit incentives, necessitating that criminals devise strategies and institutions to circumvent police organizations' and financial regulators' efforts to enforce international law and the commercial rules of individual Member States.[138] A key tactic of organized crime groups is laundering money to conceal or disguise "the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources."[139] Money laundering (ML) services further underpin organized criminal operations by ensuring that illegal businesses remain profitable, even under governmental scrutiny and enforcement.[140] If Member States are unable to disrupt the profit incentives driving organized crime, then it will continue to grow both nationally and internationally.[141]

ML operations are performed through multiple sophisticated techniques and abetted by weak financial regulations. Common techniques include the utilization of mis-invoicing, transferring illicit funds across borders in increments, the exchanging of criminally acquired goods for legally acquired goods, cash smuggling, gambling, and investments through stock and security purchases.[142] The aforementioned challenges to the global financial system have spurred the creation of the global anti-money laundering regime (AML) wholly devoted to countering the employment of ML services by organized criminal operations.[143] The key institutions underpinning the AML regime include the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Group of 7 (G7), Group of 20 (G20), INTERPOL, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).[144] Much of the efforts on the part of these IGOs are based on recommendations to Member States.[145] Further, these institutions' efforts to combat transnational ML operations tend to forgo integration and collaboration with one another, weakening and hindering the enforcement strategies and mechanisms of the AML regime's policing and regulatory bodies.[146]

History

The international AML regime first emerged during the 1970s, largely at the behest of the United States (US) and its efforts to combat the international drug trade and organized crime.[147] Of particular concern to the US was how financial secrecy provisions within foreign tax havens fostered white collar crime, especially as practiced by organized criminal operations involved chiefly in the trafficking of illicit substances, such as the Cali and Medellin

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[136] Killian McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, Newcastle Upon Tyne, (UK: Agenda Publishing, 2018), p3.

[137] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 3.

[138] Nikola Dujovski, and Snezana Mojsoska, "The Role of the Police in Anti-Money Laundering." Journal of Money Laundering Control 22, no. 1 (January 7, 2019): p145–57.

[139] "Money Laundering." Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Financial-crime/Money-laundering.

[140] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 11.

[141] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 11-12.

[142] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 15.

[143] Truman Butler, Gerardo Calderon-Villegas, Emily Christiansen, and Kayla McGee, "International Anti-Money Laundering." International Lawyer 48 (2014): 409–20. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edshol&AN=edshol.hein.journals.intlyr48.51&site=eds-live&scope=site.

[144] Truman Butler, Gerardo Calderon-Villegas, Emily Christiansen, and Kayla McGee. "International Anti-Money Laundering.," 409–20.

[145] Le Nguyen, "National Criminal Jurisdiction over Transnational Financial Crimes," 1361–77.

[146] Truman Butler, Gerardo Calderon-Villegas, Emily Christiansen, and Kayla McGee. "International Anti-Money Laundering," 409–20.

[147] Mary Alice Young and Michael Woodiwiss, "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control," Trends in Organized Crime 24, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): p70.

cartels.[148] Consequently, the US passed the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, also referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act, in 1970.[149] This act required banks and other financial entities within the US – which had the largest financial sector out of any Member State during this period – to "maintain records, and file currency transaction/suspicious activity reports."[150] The intention was to track capital outflows and the proliferation of illicit money throughout the burgeoning global financial system.[151] However, following the United Kingdom's non-compliance with the law's enforcement, the Bank Secrecy Act was deemed a failure by policymakers in 1983.[152] Lengthy negotiations took place between the US and UK, and a new host of AML policies that were more accommodating to the UK and US' financial and banking sectors were instituted.[153] The effect of these policies was especially pernicious; international AML enforcement mechanisms were weakened, and new rules reinstituted many of the regulations hindering the practice of financial secrecy.[154]

In the wake of the 55th INTERPOL General Assembly, held in 1986 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, INTERPOL established a Working Group on ML following the passage of AGN/55/RES/18.[155] The resolution called for improved cooperation between Member States, their banking and financial institutions, and law enforcement bodies.[156] In 1987, INTERPOL began deliberation on five additional points put forth by the United States to bolster AML strategies and practices.[157] These points included the criminalization of ML within Member States, the vetting of banking personnel through INTERPOL facilities, the adoption of codes of conduct requiring Member States' banking institutions to work closely with law enforcement agencies regarding internal regulations, and for INTERPOL to collaborate with bank regulators to institute regulations requiring Member States' banks to report suspected criminal activity.[158] These regulations were significantly amended and largely ineffective, in part due to the non-compliance of Member States.[159]

The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) introduced the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, also referred to as the Vienna Convention.[160] The Vienna Convention produced several clauses calling for Member States to institute supervisory and regulatory regimes in order to detect and deter ML employed by international drug traffickers.[161] In 1989, the G7 Member States expanded upon the effort to combat transnational ML through the creation of FATF, a task force enshrined with the purpose of monitoring ML techniques and trends, reviewing international and national AML practices employed by Member

[148] Douglas Farah and Steve Coll, "COCAINE DOLLARS FLOW VIA UNIQUE NETWORK." Washington Post, September 19, 1993. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/09/19/cocaine-dollars-flow-via-unique-network/6f48d7a8-ed01-493c-9826-1af9b4297faa/.

[149] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[150] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[151] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[152] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[153] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[154] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[155] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[156] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[157] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[158] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[159] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[160] "UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1988," n.d., 31.

[161] "UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1988," n.d., 31.

States and IGOs, and proposing new measures to be utilized by Member States in light of dynamic changes in the ML market.[162]

Similarly, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) passed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, popularly referred to as the Palermo Convention in November 2000.[163] Adopted by the General Assembly, the Palermo Convention criminalized ML by expanding the practice's definitional scope to cover the accrual of proceeds from all types of criminal activities, including human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, and smuggling.[164] In light of the US' post-September 11, 2001, efforts to combat the ML operations of terrorist organizations, the FATF issued its Eight Special Recommendations in 2011, which included calls for Member States to "ratify and implement" UN instruments, criminalize the financing of terrorism and associated ML, freeze and confiscate terrorist assets, and report suspicious transactions related to terrorism.[165]

Actions Taken by the United Nations

Much of the international framework for combating ML operations is based on recommendations, which might make the long-term success of AML operations difficult to achieve.[166] IGOs involved in combating transnational ML operations are unconnected and are not integrated in the same fashion that money launderers are within their networks and markets.[167] However, it is important to mention the efforts that were made. In addition to the Vienna Convention (1988), the Palermo Convention (2000), and the UN Convention against Corruption (2003), the United Nations has made some progress.[168] The IMF has intensified its AML efforts and aided in combating financial terrorism by responding to calls from the international community to expand its work.[169] In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the IMF extended their AML activities to include combating the financing of terrorism (CFT).[170] The inclusion of CFT allowed for the IMF to launch a donor-supported trust fund to finance AML capacity development in Member States.[171] The IMF is a key player in the effort against ML because of its "universal membership, surveillance functions, and financial sector expertise."[172]

INTERPOL's daily work has an important role in tackling financial crime. In coordination with the Egmont Group's 159 Financial Intelligence Units, the FATF, and FATF-linked Regional Anti-Money Laundering bodies, INTERPOL has been able to intensify its actions.[173] In 2012, FATF adopted the FATF Recommendations, which set out a framework that Member States can follow and implement in order to prevent ML, terrorist financing, and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[174] Some elements of the FATF Recommendations include an outline of AML policies and coordination, assessing risks and developing risk management, identifying targeted financial sanctions related to terrorist financing, international cooperation, and preventative measures.[175] A few of

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[162] "History of the FATF - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)." Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/#d.en.3157.

[163] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. "United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime." Accessed May 16, 2021. //www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html.

[164] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 25-26.

[165] "IX Special Recommendations." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html.

[166] Le Nguyen, "National Criminal Jurisdiction over Transnational Financial Crimes," 1361–77.

[167] Le Nguyen, "National Criminal Jurisdiction over Transnational Financial Crimes," 1361–77.

[168] "Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Assistance." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml3.htm.

[169] International Monetary Fund,, "IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism.

[170] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 15.

[171] "The FATF Recommendations." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html.

[172] IMF, "IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism."

[173] "The FATF Recommendations."

[174] "The FATF Recommendations."

[175] "The FATF Recommendations."

the recommended preventative measures are: record keeping, incorporating new technologies, assessing money or value transfer services, identifying higher-risk Member States, and correspondent banking.[176]

The 2020 Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies, which included about 2,000 participants from 132 countries, was co-organized by Basel Institute on Governance, The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), and INTERPOL.[177] The conference was an effort to explore trends in existing cryptocurrency-facilitated crimes, dark markets, and AML investigations and compliance.[178] The participants were representatives of leading law enforcement agencies, experts, and ML investigators, and said participants exchanged knowledge and discussed the ways in which these crimes can be better detected.[179] Similarly, UN Global Programme Against Money Laundering and UN International Money Laundering Information Network (IMOLIN), both founded in 1998, are organizations created to specifically target ML crimes and are concerned with improving laws and regulations for it.[180]

Current Situation

As Member States have become more integrated in global financial markets and institutions, transnational ML operations have become increasingly sophisticated.[181] Money launderers have come to utilize new methods to conceal illicit gains in the form of sports betting, online gambling, and investment into the burgeoning cryptocurrency market.[182] Sports betting and online gambling occur largely outside the normal flow of international financial markets, as much of their operation occurs offshore and outside of multinational regulatory oversight.[183] Digital currencies, otherwise referred to as cryptocurrencies, provide several benefits for sophisticated money launderers in the form of increased anonymity and freedom from the regulatory oversight of central banks.[184] Further, illicit funds can be moved cheaply, quickly, and with an increased degree of anonymity not typically afforded in traditional methods of fund placement.[185]

Money launderers are careful to mask the flow and placement of illicit funds into the digital currency market. Among their most successful tactics is to mirror the practices of legitimate businesses and banks.[186] Money launderers have diversified to using many different forms of currency, seeking effective supply chains, and managing supply chains to reduce risk of getting caught.[187] Consequently, ML operations can exploit a legal gray

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[176] "The FATF Recommendations."

[177] Basel Institute on Governance. "Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies Closes with 7 Key Recommendations for Fighting Crypto-Enabled Crime." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://baselgovernance.org/news/global-conference-criminal-finances-and-cryptocurrencies-closes-7-key-recommendations-fighting.

[178] Basel Institute on Governance. "Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies Closes with 7 Key Recommendations for Fighting Crypto-Enabled Crime." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://baselgovernance.org/news/global-conference-criminal-finances-and-cryptocurrencies-closes-7-key-recommendations-fighting.

[179] Basel Institute on Governance, "Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies Closes with 7 Key Recommendations for Fighting Crypto-Enabled Crime."

[180] International Money Laundering Information Network, "About Us," Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/about_us.html.

[181] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 15.

[182] Global Legal Insights, "Blockchain Laws and Regulations," Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/blockchain-laws-and-regulations/usa.

[183] "Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/vulnerabilitiesofcasinosandgamingsector.html.

[184] "THE PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPACT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113shrg87095/html/CHRG-113shrg87095.htm.

[185] "Money Laundering Through the Physical Transportation of Cash." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/ml-through-physical-transportation-of-cash.html.

[186] Louise I. Shelley, "Illicit Trade and Terrorism," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 14, no. 4 (2020): 7-20. Accessed June 28, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26927661.

[187] Louise I. Shelley, "Illicit Trade and Terrorism," 7-20.

area in the investment structure of cryptocurrency market.[188] To combat this, the UNODC launched the Cryptocurrency Investigation Train-the-Trainers training course to tackle cryptocurrency-enabled organized crime in May of 2017.[189] The training included the UNODC regional staff and law enforcement experts from 22 Member States.[190] The program helped participants understand the conceptual framework of cryptocurrency and highlighted ongoing criminal activities.[191] Additionally, the course focused on assisting law enforcement officers and analysts to track illegal financial flows by partnering with actors from the regulatory technology (RegTech) and financial technology (FinTech) sectors, as well as collaborating with cryptocurrency industry leaders.[192]

Illicit money further flows to and through the financial markets of the US and UK.[193] As previously alluded to, much of the world's regulatory capacity in the fight against transnational ML operations was shaped by attempts to balance the financial interests of both Member States.[194] These Member States have strong financial secrecy laws that inhibit any attempts to regulate illicit fund placement and flows with intra-Member State regulatory enforcement.[195] Inter-Member State regulatory frameworks by international financial regulatory bodies in the form of the World Bank, INTERPOL, and FATF are primarily structured based on recommendations to Member States.[196] AML operations are likely to not see success in the future if these measures are not supported and enforced by Member States.[197] As mentioned earlier, the US and UK see large quantities of ML their financial markets. They set an example for Member States who took recommendations from the FATF and employed tougher laws and regulations.[198] For instance, the US' Kleptocracy Initiative, founded by the USAID, aims to fight corruption by working with attorneys tasked to investigate and prosecute cases that are illicit in foreign regions.[199]

Money launderers also exploit a transnational shadow banking system that is often tacitly supported by Member States.[200] Shadow banking is a form of taking deposits, extending credit, and making payments that do not use traditional banking methods.[201] As alluded to previously, an international AML regime cannot be established if Member States approach this issue by sustaining lax regulations of their domestic financial markets in the form of low-tax regimes with looser enforcement of tax laws and strong financial secrecy policies.[202] While illicit fund flow and placement has evolved and become more sophisticated with the rise of integrated international financial

[188] McCarthy, *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*, 15.

[189] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Launches Training to Tackle Cryptocurrency-Enabled Organized Crime." Accessed June 27, 2021. //www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2017/May/unodc-launches-training-to-tackle-money-laundering-and-bitcoin-banking-fraud.html.

[190] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Launches Training to Tackle Cryptocurrency-Enabled Organized Crime."

[191] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Launches Training to Tackle Cryptocurrency-Enabled Organized Crime."

[192] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Launches Training to Tackle Cryptocurrency-Enabled Organized Crime."

[193] "London's Financial Flows Are Polluted by Laundered Money." *The Economist*, October 11, 2018. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/11/londons-financial-flows-are-polluted-by-laundered-money.

[194] Council on Foreign Relations, "The Global Regime for Transnational Crime." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/report/global-regime-transnational-crime.

[195] "London's Financial Flows Are Polluted by Laundered Money." *The Economist*, October 11, 2018. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/11/londons-financial-flows-are-polluted-by-laundered-money.

[196] "The FATF Recommendations."

[197] Young and Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control, 70.

[198] "New Anti-Money Laundering Standards Released - OECD." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/newanti-moneylaunderingstandardsreleased.htm.

[199] U.S. Embassy & Consulates in South Africa. "Asset Recovery Guide Adds to U.S. Tools to Support International Anti-Corruption Efforts," April 11, 2018. https://za.usembassy.gov/asset-recovery-guide-adds-to-u-s-tools-to-support-international-anti-corruption-efforts/.

[200] "The Danger of Driving Both Illicit Markets and Financial Exclusion." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/danger-illicit-markets-financial-exclusion.html.

[201] "The Danger of Driving Both Illicit Markets and Financial Exclusion."

[202] "Offshore Activities and Money Laundering: Recent Findings and Challenges - Think Tank." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)595371.

markets, offshore accounts continue to be the destination of illicit fund flows.[203] Money launderers further utilize parallel financial systems to circumvent the formal global economy's regulatory oversight.[204]

Case Study

Operation SOGA

The sports sector is particularly vulnerable to ML operations, largely due to its financial structure as a cash business where normal revenue flows and cash investments have a high potentiality to mask the movements of money launderers.[205] One facet of the sports sector that is exploited by ML operations is sports betting.[206] The globalization of sports, an increase in the number of offshore actors, and the emergence of online gambling services have encouraged ML operations to employ gambling services and operations to assist in masking the flow and placement of illicit funds.[207] These efforts tend to be undertaken during periods of high sports betting activity, notably during regional and international soccer tournaments.[208] The rationale employed by money launderers is that an increase in the overall number of bets placed by individuals or groups across the period of a football tournament will mask the placement of their illicit funds into sports gambling operations.[209] Since much of the placement efforts performed by ML operations involve the trafficking of illicit funds through illegal gambling dens, a key underpinning of the AML strategy to combat illicit sports betting involves the utilization of global police institutions and operations and the jurisdictional authority afforded to them by Member States.[210]

INTERPOL has been highly successful in executing operations combating illegal sports betting and ML operations through Operation SOGA (Soccer Gambling).[211] They have performed seven SOGA operations from 2007 to 2018, resulting in 30,000 arrests, the seizure of nearly USD 57 Million in cash, and the closure of 3,700 gambling dens which handled nearly USD 8 Billion in bets.[212] INTERPOL identifies ML operations through investigation and intelligence exchange between regional and national police organizations.[213] INTERPOL subsequently performs coordinated raids on gambling dens and ML operations during highly visible football tournaments.[214] Operation SOGA VI was performed during the Euro 2016 tournament and involved the execution of nearly 4,000 raids across China, France, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam on illegal gambling dens.[215] SOGA VI further saw INTERPOL close three offices running illegal online gambling sites in Thailand.[216] A second operation, titled Aces, was performed simultaneously with SOGA VI and targeted transnational organized crime and ML networks in illicit betting websites and call center operations run in Cambodia, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.[217] Operation SOGA VII was performed during the 2018 Fédération Internationale de

[203] "Offshore Activities and Money Laundering: Recent Findings and Challenges - Think Tank."
[204] "Offshore Activities and Money Laundering: Recent Findings and Challenges - Think Tank."
[205] Cindori, Sonja, and Ana Manola. 2020. "Particularities of Anti-Money Laundering Methods in Football." Journal of Money Laundering Control 23 (4): 885–97.
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edb&AN=147519194&site=eds-live&scope=site.
[206] Cindori, Sonja, and Ana Manola, "Particularities of Anti-Money Laundering Methods in Football."
[207] Cindori, Sonja, and Ana Manola, "Particularities of Anti-Money Laundering Methods in Football."
[208] "Money Laundering through the Football Sector." Accessed June 27, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/moneylaunderingthroughthefootballsector.html.
[209] "Money Laundering through the Football Sector."
[210] Cindori, Sonja, and Ana Manola, "Particularities of Anti-Money Laundering Methods in Football."
[211] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[212] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[213] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[214] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[215] "More than 4,100 arrests in INTERPOL-led operation targeting Asian illegal gambling networks." Accessed May 17, 2021.
https://www.interpol.int/fr/Actualites-et-evenements/Actualites/2016/More-than-4-100-arrests-in-INTERPOL-led-operation-targeting-Asian-illegal-gambling-networks.
[216] "More than 4,100 arrests in INTERPOL-led operation targeting Asian illegal gambling networks."
[217] Simon Goodley, "More than 4,000 Arrested over Illegal Gambling on Euro 2016." The Guardian, July 18, 2016.
http://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jul/18/arrested-betting-euro-2016.

Football Association (FIFA) World Cup and resulted in 14,000 raids worldwide, 19,000 arrests, and the seizure of USD 142 Million.[218]

Conclusion

Money laundering, or ML, is a massive business run by unknown faces that threatens many vulnerable people. The advent of cryptocurrency has only exacerbated this phenomenon.[219] UNODC conducted a study to determine the magnitude of ML that has been generated by financial criminals.[220] The report estimates that in 2009 the amount of money being laundered by criminals amounted to 3.6 percent of the global GDP.[221] ML can take several forms and can succeed through different means. Many financial criminals use cyber intrusions to insert illicit funds into legitimate institutions; through structuring, bulk cash smuggling, trade-based laundering, and cyber-laundering, ML is rapidly increasing.[222] Now more than ever, there is a need to ensure global cooperation between Member States. The development and integration of regulations, policies, and procedures are necessary. International anti-money laundering, or AML, efforts have been intensive and aided by INTERPOL and many other UN organizations.[223] INTERPOL has also worked with civil society organizations, such as FATF and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units to prevent ML.[224] To help international governments exercise effective AML regimes, the FATF issued a list of recommendations that are universally applicable.[225] With that, Member States have a template to create and enforce strong policies that best suit their particular national environments. Although the fight to stop financial crime is far from over, by working together, Member States have the power to win it.

Committee Directive

INTERPOL must act as the glue that connects the multiple transnational regulatory and enforcement bodies attempting to combat worldwide ML operations. Past and present efforts lack connectivity and integration. Missing these key elements allows money launderers to become more sophisticated as technology develops and markets expand. The roles of FATF and the IMF are going to be crucial to the achievement of INTERPOL's goals. A line needs to be drawn between respecting sovereignty and coordinating with uncooperative Member States. As delegates complete their research, they should keep in mind the complexity of the matter, and work to create or improve frameworks that would lead to a safer financial future. Questions delegates should consider are: What are INTERPOL's options and how can the committee work with already existing organizations to combat ML operations? What civil society, non-profit, and inter-governmental organizations are needed to solve this problem? To what degree are Member States willing to coordinate to confront the issue? How has the increased use of Information Communication Technology (ICT) affected the frequency of financial crime? How does this topic fit in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals? Delegates should be mindful of the effects of AML and how they are only going to worsen as the digital age progresses. How can delegates work together to plan a fight against ML and protect high risk Member States?

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[218] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[219] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[220] "Money Laundering - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)." Accessed June 28, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/.
[221] "Money Laundering - Financial Action Task Force (FATF)."
[222] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[223] "Our Role in Fighting Financial Crime."
[224] "United States' Measures to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing." Accessed June 28, 2021. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-united-states-2016.html.
[225] International Monetary Fund, "IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism."

Annotated Bibliography:

Topic I: Combating Radicalization and the Promotion of Extremist Violence on Social Media

Waldman, Suzanne and Simona Verga. "Countering Violent Extremism on Social Media." *Centre for Security Science, Ottawa.* (2016). https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc262/p805091_A1b.pdf.

> Combating radicalization on social media begins by defining violent extremism (VE) and countering violent extremism (CVE). This study focuses on VE and CVE in the context of social media, as the authors assert that social media has become an important tool for violent extremists and terrorists. The study focuses on determining the effectiveness of social media as a tool to counter VE, specifically which forms of social media interventions should be pursued in Canada. The researchers are able to garner some key recommendations for the Canadian government, such as: using positive messages oriented against behavior and not ideals, ensuring that target audiences for messaging are specific and not too general, and that messengers are credible/influential to the target audience for the counter-messaging is well-received. All in all, the piece concludes that, alongside implementing these approaches, further qualitative/quantitative research into appropriate CVE strategies is needed in order to increase their effectiveness.

Ganesh, Bharath and Jonathan Bright. "Countering Extremists on Social Media: Challenges for Strategic Communication and Content Moderation." *Policy & Internet* 12, no. 1 (2020): 6-19. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.236.

> The article focuses on the policy response to violent extremism on social media, arguing that extremist exploitation of social media is a "regulatory question" that must be considered by the government and civil society. It categorizes possible responses as either content moderation or strategic communication but contends that content moderation does not qualify as CVE due to its preventative rather than combative nature. Starting with strategic communication, the study finds that informal actors promoting certain norms that reject extremism is characteristic of the CVE method. The article then refocuses on content moderation, discovering that, while a blunter tool, auditing and criticism of the moderation itself is necessary to keep the practice effective. Lastly, the research reveals that alternative/extremist media often chips away at the norms set through strategic communication and content moderation. In short, the piece concludes that more interdisciplinary research must occur into which tools are most effective at countering violent extremism on social media.

Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, Nassir. "Media and Information Literacy as a Means of Preventing Violent Extremism." *The United Nations Chronicle*. Accessed May 23, 2021. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/media-and-information-literacy-means-preventing-violent-extremism.

> "Media and Information Literacy as a Means of Preventing Violent Extremism" begins by recognizing the extent that social media and the internet are present in the average individual's daily life, as well as the competency needed to responsibly use said platforms. The author acknowledges that for many it is hard to decipher between truth and lie, fact and opinion, and so forth. He continues by highlighting the potential use of social media literacy courses to teach people how to combat/discredit hate speech, misconceptions, etc., an approach supported by the United Nations. The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have worked to research how media literacy can be used to combat violence, such as how the outright censoring of "harmful" media may not actually curtail extremist narratives. The article concludes by highlighting the UNAOC's continued research into using media literacy as a tool to peace-build and combat VE.

"75 for UN75: A Conversation on Rethinking Radicalization." The United Nations. Accessed May 23, 2021. https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/75-un75-conversation-rethinking-radicalization.

> The United Nations (UN) addresses the radicalization of youth and the promotion of violent extremism, particularly as it relates to it happening on an online setting. The piece begins by reiterating the UN's longstanding efforts to combat VE and prevent the radicalization of youth but introduces a new concern: the COVID-19 pandemic. The article notes that with increased amounts of time spent online and at home,

the risk of social media radicalization is greatly increased. Internet usage has doubled since the pandemic, and some radical groups have attempted to exploit this larger audience to further their message, increase their numbers, and carry out VE. The article continues by emphasizing, in the face of the media frenzy, that schools and universities have a responsibility to prevent radicalization using exposure to new ideas, and by providing a safe space to debate and discuss said ideas. In sum, the UN notes the expanded use of the internet/social media in the radicalization process, especially during the pandemic, and the role civil society must play in combatting VE.

Topic II: Assisting Member States in Combating Transnational Money Laundering Operations

Young, Mary Alice, and Michael Woodiwiss. "A World Fit for Money Laundering: The Atlantic Alliance's Undermining of Organized Crime Control." *Trends in Organized Crime* 24, no. 1 (2020): 70–95. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=lgs&AN=148658419&site=eds-live&scope=site.

> Mary Alice Young and Michael Woodiwiss delve into the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding efforts to control transnational money laundering operations from the 1980s to the present. Important to recognize in this analysis is that much of the current anti-money laundering (AML) regime is based on practices - legal, diplomatic, and financial - established by the U.S. and the U.K. in the 1980s. These practices were intended to protect the states' respective national trading interests rather than curb bank secrecy or fight drug money laundering, the context in which the United States' initial AML efforts emerged. The decisions to ensure the protection of each state's respective financial industries - the United States' already well-established banking and finance sector, and the United Kingdom's burgeoning offshore banking practice during the global economic boom of the late 1980s, presently colors the international AML effort in a fashion that hinders attempts at enforcement.

Killian McCarthy, ed. *The Money Laundering Market: Regulating the Criminal Economy*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Agenda Publishing, 2018. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=e000xna&AN=2143935&site=eds-live&scope=site.

> Professor Killian McCarthy, along with several contributors, reviews the current state of the international money laundering market and anti-money laundering efforts on the part of multiple international organizations, including but not limited to the Financial Action Task Force, International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL. McCarthy, along with his contributors, analyzes the weaknesses in current AML practices, specifically the lack of integration and coordination between the multiple international bodies seeking to address the problem. They further address the effect of technological development on the sophistication of money launderers' operations and the vulnerabilities inherent in the global banking system and international sports sector. They conclude by highlighting the emergence of digital currencies and their role in bolstering transnational money laundering operations.

Campbell-Verduyn, Malcom. "Bitcoin, Crypto-Coins, and Global Anti-Money Laundering Governance." *Crime, Law & Social Change* 69, no. 2 (March 2018): 283–305. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=sih&AN=128747049&site=eds-live&scope=site.

> Malcom Campbell-Verduyn analyzes the rise of crypto-currencies and their implication for global anti-money laundering efforts. He addresses challenges posed by the security and anonymity of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin. Campbell-Verduyn states that crypto-currencies should be less understood as money and more as technologies that help foster the flow of traditional currencies. The real challenge lies in the blockchain technology underpinning the overall proliferation of cryptocurrency. He concludes that AML efforts have struggled to address these points, though the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has formulated an effective strategy in their "risk-based approach" that prioritizes the establishment of

coordination mechanisms for regulators and the proactive targeting of institutions likely to engage in money laundering operations.

Reider-Gordon, Mikhail, Joanna Ritcey-Donohue, and Truman Butler. "International Anti-Money-Laundering." *The International Lawyer* 46, no. 1 (2012): 375-88. Accessed May 17, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23827372.

This article analyzes new developments in anti-money laundering efforts in the United States, as well as at the international level. The authors provide an overview of U.S. financial regulators' prosecution of the board members and executives of multiple financial institutions and banks for failing to maintain adequate anti-money laundering controls. The banks and institutions charged were the Hasie Financial Group, Zions First National Bank, Pacific National Bank, and Lebanese Canadian Bank. The article further studies the cases of individuals charged with performing money laundering services. The authors also analyze new regulatory developments within the United States, and at the international level, as instituted by FinCEN. The regulations studied include the implementation of the *Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act* rules, which require prepaid access subject providers and sellers to follow Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements, and clarifications of the definition of Money Services Business. The piece further performs an overview of international AML developments in multiple Member States in the form of new legislation and initiatives.

Senanu Mekpor, Emmanuel, Anthony Aboagye, and Jonathan Welbeck. "The Determinants of Anti-Money Laundering Compliance among the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Member States." *Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance* 26, no. 3 (2018): 442–59. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=edsemr&AN=edsemr.10.1108.JFRC.11.2017.0103&site=eds-live&scope=site

This article measures anti-money laundering compliance among Financial Action Task Force Member States and investigates the determinants driving said Member States' compliance or non-compliance. Their findings indicate that AML compliance has slightly improved when compared to previous years largely due to improved technology, regulatory quality, bank concentration, trade openness, and the institution and growth of financial intelligence centers. The implications of their findings indicate that Member States are seeking to improve their compliance with the global AML regime. The authors suggest that should the Financial Action Task Force wish to further encourage AML compliance, efforts should be undertaken to improve regulatory quality, the structure of Member States' banking sector, the bolstering of economic growth within Member States, and the institutionalization of financial intelligence centers.