



## SRMUN ATLANTA 2020

*Understanding and Combating Global Multidimensional Poverty and Inequality*

**October 23-25, 2020**

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Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to Virtual SRMUN Atlanta 2020 and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). My name is Chantel Hover and I am thrilled to be serving as your Director for the PBC. This will be my second conference as a SRMUN staff member, and my sixth SRMUN experience overall. Previously, I served as the Assistant Director for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at SRMUN Atlanta 2019. I received my Associate of Arts degree in Political Science at Santa Fe College, and am currently working towards a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and Slavic Studies at Columbia University. Our committee's Assistant Director will be Emily Bowen. This will be Emily's third conference as a SRMUN staff member, having served as the Assistant Director for the United Nations Children's Fund Executive Board (UNICEF) at SRMUN Atlanta 2019, and Research Assistant for the World Health Organization at SRMUN Atlanta 2018. Emily holds a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from the University of Montevallo and is currently pursuing her Master's degree in International Security from George Mason University. Our goal is to help create an atmosphere of learning, comradery and inspiration that makes SRMUN Atlanta such a memorable conference each and every year! The aim of the PBC is to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to bring together relevant actors, and to ensure necessary resources.

By focusing on the mission of the PBC and the SRMUN Atlanta 2020 theme of ***"Rethinking Poverty: Recognizing and Combating the Multidimensional Nature of Global Poverty and Inequality,"*** we have developed the following topics for the delegates to discuss come conference:

- I. Creating Opportunities for Youth Education and Involvement in the Peacebuilding Process
- II. Modernizing the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards

The background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, the background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit [srmun.org](http://srmun.org). All position papers **MUST be submitted no later than Friday, October 2, 2020 by 11:59pm EST** via the SRMUN website.

Emily and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for the PBC. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you in the near future. Please feel free to contact Michael Engelhardt, Emily, or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

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## History of the Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is composed of 31 Member States that serve renewable terms of two years.<sup>1</sup> The selection process of rotating Member States of the PBC are divided between committee elections and non-electable considerations.<sup>2</sup> Of the electable positions, seven are elected by the General Assembly (GA), seven by the Security Council, and seven by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).<sup>3</sup> Of the remaining ten seats, five are given to the top five providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations (UN) missions, and five to the top five providers of assessed contributions to UN budgets and of voluntary contributions to the UN fund, with no Member State holding more than one seat.<sup>4</sup> The PBC places a great emphasis on the benefits of working alongside government and non-governmental bodies, and in addition to the 31 Member States making up the PBC, the European Union, International Monetary Fund, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the World Bank are permanent invitees to all PBC meetings and discussions, though they are not afforded voting rights.<sup>5</sup> Like most UN committees, the PBC can also invite additional partners, both inside and outside of the UN system, to discuss, advise and recommend measures in initiatives related to their specific organizations.<sup>6</sup>

The PBC is a relatively new body within the UN, having only been founded in 2005.<sup>7</sup> The roots of its creation can be traced back to the findings by the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*, a small, ad-hoc group created by then-Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003.<sup>8</sup> The panel's ultimate analysis of the current UN approach to international peace and security was that it was lacking in a focus or subsidiary organ with the specific mission of preventing conflict before it erupted, and restructuring post-conflict recovery efforts with the long-term goals of sustainable peace through institution reconstruction.<sup>9</sup> Secretary General Annan highlighted this call for a peacebuilding focus in his March 2005 report "In Larger Freedom". In December 2005, the topic of furthering peacebuilding efforts through new UN roles and bodies made it to the agenda of both the GA and the Security Council.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the Peacebuilding Commission was jointly established by the GA and Security Council, through resolutions A/RES/60/180 and S/RES/1645, respectively.<sup>11</sup> The mandate of the PBC encompassed three objectives: to coordinate relevant actors and resources to ensure stable long-term financing and streamlined best practices in post-conflict recovery and stabilization, to develop and propose innovative peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery strategies, and to focus institution building as well as reconstruction as an opportunity to lay a foundation for sustainable development.<sup>12</sup>

In 2015 the GA and Security Council jointly held a review of peacebuilding architecture.<sup>13</sup> The outcome of which were resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, which further defined the functions of the PBC to bring attention to sustainable peace, provide support and advocacy to Member States with conflict areas, promote "an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding," bridge all parts of the UN by sharing relevant advice on peacebuilding, and to serve as the official platform on peacebuilding to communicate with all non UN actors as well in order to provide and share information, recommendations, institution building, and "ensure predictable financing to peacebuilding."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership," United Nations Peacebuilding, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/membership>. (Accessed February 29, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership."

<sup>3</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership."

<sup>4</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership."

<sup>5</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership."

<sup>6</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Membership."

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Security Council, "Peacebuilding Commission," United Nations, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacebuilding-commission>. (Accessed February 29, 2020).

<sup>8</sup> "The Peacebuilding Commission," Global Policy Forum, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-reform/un-reform-topics/the-peacebuilding-commission.html>. (Accessed February 28, 2020).

<sup>9</sup> "The Peacebuilding Commission," Global Policy Forum.

<sup>10</sup> "The Peacebuilding Commission," Global Policy Forum.

<sup>11</sup> "How Was the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Established?" United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, <http://ask.un.org/faq/22821>. (Accessed February 29, 2020).

<sup>12</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Mandate," United Nations Peacebuilding, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/mandate>. (Accessed February 29, 2020).

<sup>13</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Mandate."

<sup>14</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, "Mandate," United Nations Peacebuilding, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/mandate>. (Accessed February 29, 2020).

In January 2017, the President of the General Assembly held discussions on sustainable development and peace, in order to “promote coordination and coherence” in regards to relevant efforts between the General Assembly, Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Peacebuilding Commission for the first time.<sup>15</sup> The initiative taken in 2017 has led to regular exchanges held by the Peacebuilding Commission with the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.<sup>16</sup> In April 2018, at the High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, the President of the General Assembly stressed that “Again and again, we have reaffirmed the role for the PBC as one of the UN’s most valuable tools for Sustaining Peace. This was clear, during the review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, in 2015. It was clear, through the adoption of the twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace, a year later. And, it is clear, again, from the recent report of the Secretary-General.”<sup>17</sup>

In 2019 the PBC’s large body focuses were centered on: better implementing the initiatives outlined in the 2005, 2008, and 2018 Resolutions on the Peacebuilding Architecture; strengthening cooperation through both formal and informal dialogues between the Security Council, the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the PBC; deepening partnerships with global and regional stakeholders (such as the World Bank, IMF, and Regional Development Banks); developing better flexibility and adaptability to individual peacebuilding situations; and “strengthening the synergies between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund”.<sup>18</sup> One of the largest projects to come out of fulfilling the above goals was the Peacebuilding Commission’s Gender Strategy, further supported by the Peacebuilding Fund’s (PBF) 2019 Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative.<sup>19</sup> This strategy and project remain a primary focus of the PBC moving into 2020, with gender equality, women’s empowerment, and youth engagement continuing to inform committee decisions, agendas and future planning.<sup>20</sup>

While gender-related initiatives remain at the forefront of 2019-2020 PBC and PBF initiatives, regional concentrations and considerations are integral to the overarching agenda of global peacebuilding and peacekeeping success.<sup>21</sup> In January 2020 the PBC met to discuss financing for peacebuilding in Colombia, as well as addressing the ongoing conflicts and violence in Burundi.<sup>22</sup> In March 2020 the PBC revisited ongoing talks and negotiations in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Burkina Faso.<sup>23</sup> Focus on civil society engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding continues to grow as the PBC furthers outreach and partnerships with regional non-governmental organizations as well as those from the private sector, in the hopes to not only accomplish regional and global peace efforts, but to provide Member States with the tools for future autonomy in sustaining them.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, “Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace,” United Nations, January 18, 2018. <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/report-secretary-general-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace>. (Accessed March 9, 2020.)

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, “Report of the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.”

<sup>17</sup> Miroslav Lajčák, “Address to the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Committee,” United Nations General Assembly. March 8, 2018. <https://www.un.org/pga/72/2018/03/08/organizational-committee-of-the-peacebuilding-commission/>. (Accessed March 9, 2020.)

<sup>18</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, “Provisional Annual Workplan of the Peacebuilding Commission,” Peacebuilding Commission, [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20190129\\_provisional\\_annual\\_workplan\\_of\\_the\\_peacebuilding\\_commission\\_-\\_adopted.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/20190129_provisional_annual_workplan_of_the_peacebuilding_commission_-_adopted.pdf). (Accessed March 10, 2020)

<sup>19</sup> Peacebuilding Committee, “Peacebuilding Commission’s Gender Strategy.”

<sup>20</sup> Peacebuilding Committee, “Peacebuilding Commission’s Gender Strategy.”

<sup>21</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, “Documents,” United Nations Peacebuilding. <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/documents>. (Accessed March 10, 2020).

<sup>22</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, “Documents,” United Nations Peacebuilding. <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/documents>.

<sup>23</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, “Documents.”

<sup>24</sup> Peacebuilding Commission, “Civil Society Engagement,” United Nations Peacebuilding. <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/civil-society-engagement>. (Accessed March 10, 2020)

# **I. Creating Opportunities for Youth Education and Involvement in the Peacebuilding Process**

## ***Introduction***

United Nations (UN) World Population Prospects estimates that there are 1.2 billion youth ranged from 15 to 24-years-old, accounting for 16 percent of the global population.<sup>25</sup> The social category “youth” is made up of a myriad of categories such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, political position as well as age.<sup>26</sup> However, youth are considered a fixed demographic and this limits not only youth efforts in peacebuilding, but limits leadership potential by excluding them from post-conflict talks.<sup>27</sup> One in four youth globally have been affected by violence or armed conflict.<sup>28</sup> In Member States experiencing conflict, youth are often neglected in conversations about conflict in their own Member States.<sup>29</sup> Youth tend to be excluded from peacebuilding practices and considerations when they could be leading in peacebuilding efforts to recover from conflict.<sup>30</sup> Once conflict has been settled, the youth involved in the conflict need to be reintegrated back into their home societies.<sup>31</sup> Failure to reintegrate youth back into society can cause the conflict to continue, creating a further unstable and unproductive society.<sup>32</sup> Reintegration is not just about stability of a person, but also the stability of the community.<sup>33</sup>

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has provided the UN with advice and framework on inclusive peacebuilding strategies. Inclusive peacebuilding must look at the value that youth have to contribute to the rebuilding of their communities.<sup>34</sup> The PBC looks for opportunities to build civil trust between Member States and the youth population through education and involvement in rebuilding, reintegration, and creating opportunities for youth voices to be heard.<sup>35</sup>

## ***History***

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has monitored the use of youth in conflict zones since the formation of the UN in 1945.<sup>36</sup> The Convention of the Rights of Children (CRC) was the first UN document to specifically address the rights and protections children have in their Member States.<sup>37</sup> Passed in 1989, the CRC defines childhood up to the age of 18 and that during that time, children must be assured time to develop, learn, and grow in peace.<sup>38</sup> However, the Convention on the Rights of Children only applied to those under the age of 18, excluding

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<sup>25</sup> UN World Population Prospects 2019. “Data Query: Population by age and sex (thousands). United Nations Population and Development, 2019, <https://population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/>. (Accessed July 02, 2020).

<sup>26</sup> Alpaslan Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities,” Oxford Research Group, October 26, 2016. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-role-of-youth-in-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities>. (Accessed April 14, 2020).

<sup>27</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>28</sup> United Nations Population Fund, “The Missing Peace: An Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security,” UNPFA, 2018, <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2018-10/youth-web-english.pdf>.

<sup>29</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>30</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Population Fund, “The Missing Peace... Ch 3.”

<sup>32</sup> “Child Recruitment and Use,” Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/> (accessed April 26, 2020).

<sup>33</sup> David Levy, Kairabek Jamanjulov, and Tologon Sartbay, “#JashStan: Youth as Agents of Peace and Stability in Kyrgyzstan,” Evidence Research Center, UN Peacebuilding, January 2019, [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/kyrgyzstan\\_2018\\_project\\_evaluation\\_eng.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/kyrgyzstan_2018_project_evaluation_eng.pdf). (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>34</sup> United Nations Population Fund, “The Missing Peace... Ch. 1”

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Population Fund, “The Missing Peace... Ch 3.”

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, Geneva Convention of 1949, August 12, 1949, Article 26, [https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.33\\_GC-IV-EN.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf) (accessed April 26, 2020).

<sup>37</sup> “What is the Convention on the Rights of the Child?” UNICEF, <https://www.unicef.org/child-rights-convention/what-is-the-convention> (accessed May 26, 2020).

<sup>38</sup> “What is the Convention on the Rights of the Child?” UNICEF.

large portions of the youth demographic.<sup>39</sup> While the UN defines youth as aged 15-24, there is no global standard definition of what ages define youth. Various cultures, regions, governments, and non-governmental organizations use different metrics to determine who falls into the youth category.

Young people have become important drivers of changes and development in their society.<sup>40</sup> For example, in the 1980's post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, the Youth for Justice and Reconciliation Project led by the young people living under the regime focused on providing a space for dialogue between generations to discuss Khmer history and the importance of transitional justice in Cambodia.<sup>41</sup> Young Cambodians were able to positively establish themselves as prominent players in the new political system and garner support from the older generation for their activism in their society.<sup>42</sup> By bringing young people to the discussion, there is a greater chance for continued peace and reconciliation as their needs are being heard.<sup>43</sup>

Created by the General Assembly in 1995, World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY) provides guidance to Member States on how to improve the lives of their youth through outreach and involvement.<sup>44</sup> Outreach can include vocational training, physical and mental health care, education opportunities, and community participation.<sup>45</sup> WPAY requests Member States create programs that promote peacemaking and conflict resolution, with an emphasis in cultural and religious diversity and respect for human rights.<sup>46</sup> Issues of rebuilding a war-torn Member State should include a focus on the issues that youth find most pertinent to their wellbeing and success.<sup>47</sup> In the spirit of the CRC and WPAY, the involvement of youth in peacebuilding has been an integral part of the PBC's peace strategies.<sup>48</sup>

### ***Current Situation***

In 2019, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reported that 138 million youth aged 15 to 17 were out of school worldwide.<sup>49</sup> As recently as 2013, UNESCO estimated that up to 50 percent of all out of school children and youth were in conflict-affected Member States.<sup>50</sup> Education can empower young women and girls to stand up for their human rights, provide employment to disenfranchised youth beyond armed conflict recruitment, teach students about the civic and political process to become more engaged in their

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<sup>39</sup> World Programme of Action for Youth, "Armed Conflict – WPAY."

<sup>40</sup> Peace Direct, Young People's Participation In Peacebuilding: A Practice Note," Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding, January 2016, <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2016-10/PRACTICE%20NOTE%20-%20Young%20People%27s%20Participation%20in%20Peacebuilding%20%282016%29.pdf>, (Accessed July 12, 2020).

<sup>41</sup> Peace Direct, Young People's Participation In Peacebuilding: A Practice Note,"

<sup>42</sup> Peace Direct, Young People's Participation In Peacebuilding: A Practice Note."

<sup>43</sup> Peace Direct, Young People's Participation In Peacebuilding: A Practice Note."

<sup>44</sup> Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "What is the Programme of Action for Youth?"

<sup>45</sup> Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "What is the Programme of Action for Youth?"

<sup>46</sup> World Programme of Action for Youth, "Education WPAY," Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/world-programme-of-action-for-youth/education-wpay.html>. (Accessed April 27, 2020).

<sup>47</sup> World Programme of Action for Youth, "Armed Conflict – WPAY."

<sup>48</sup> Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative, "Youth Promotion Initiative," Peacebuilding Fund's Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative. <https://www.pbfgypi.org/>. (Accessed May 26, 2020).

<sup>49</sup> UNESCO, "New Methodology Shows that 258 Million Children, Adolescents and Youth are out of School," UNESCO Fact Sheet no. 56, September 2019, <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/new-methodology-shows-258-million-children-adolescents-and-youth-are-out-school.pdf> (Accessed August 20, 2020).

<sup>50</sup> UNESCO, "UNESCO: Half of all out-of-school Children live in Conflict-Affected Countries," UNESCO, July 2013, <https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-half-all-out-school-children-live-conflict-affected-countries> (Accessed August 20, 2020)



communities, and address underlying social tensions that created these conflicts.<sup>51</sup> However, schools also tend to be a target for forces in conflict, jeopardizing access to education in conflict-affected Member States.<sup>52</sup>

Youth are often the largest population involved in conflict as combatants whilst simultaneously being seen as vulnerable and powerless sects of the population.<sup>53</sup> Both ends of this spectrum stigmatize youth from being asked to participate in peacebuilding processes in their homelands.<sup>54</sup> Young people, however, play the largest roles in their community as family members, social leaders, and economic breadwinners.<sup>55</sup> Youth are often targets of the social and political marginalization which causes conflict, and therefore have the knowledge of what is needed to end the conflict and what strategies will cause more unrest.<sup>56</sup>

The successful inclusion of youth in peacebuilding can be difficult in post-conflict areas where considerable youth integration is not occurring.<sup>57</sup> Factors that can hinder youth reintegration include individual experiences during conflict, recruitment tactics of armed groups, life before the conflict, and the lifestyle these youths will attempt to reintegrate into.<sup>58</sup> Youth cannot actively be engaged in peacebuilding without considering psychological and socio-economic challenges, such as educational deficiencies, lack of employable skills, and an unstable family environment.<sup>59</sup> A peacebuilding transition should be viewed not solely as a transition into nonviolent politics, but also a broader change into peace-oriented roles with long-term opportunities and perspectives for a diverse and inclusive society.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Actions Taken by the UN***

*The World Youth Report: Youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* discusses the importance of youth advancement in achieving the UN's 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.<sup>61</sup> *The World Youth Report* lays out how Member States could aid in providing youth with opportunities to lead their communities through education.<sup>62</sup> Education provides opportunities for youth engagement in policies specifically regarding them, such as youth involvement in dispute resolution and society rebuilding.<sup>63</sup> From previous reports, Member States have been valuable in providing education on youth involvement in peacebuilding and promoting community strength to create a sense of belonging.<sup>64</sup> UN Peacebuilding report on youth involvement in post-conflict Kyrgyzstan, “#JashStan: Youth as Agents of Peace and Stability in Kyrgyzstan,” shows that when the Kyrgyzstani youth felt included in post-conflict society through peacebuilding and leadership training, they were powerful influences against extremist recruitment.<sup>65</sup>

To youth involvement in peacebuilding, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the S/RES/2250 (2015) on Youth, Peace, and Security, which focused solely on youth and the role that young people can play in international

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<sup>51</sup> UNICEF, “Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education,” UNICEF, October 2011, [https://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/UNICEF\\_Proposals\\_-\\_PEACE\\_-\\_final.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/UNICEF_Proposals_-_PEACE_-_final.pdf). (Accessed April 26, 2020).

<sup>52</sup> UNICEF, “Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education.”

<sup>53</sup> Alpaslan Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities,” Oxford Research Group, October 26, 2016. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-role-of-youth-in-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities>. (Accessed April 14, 2020).

<sup>54</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>55</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>56</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>57</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>58</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>59</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>60</sup> Ozerdem, “The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding...”

<sup>61</sup> Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World Youth Report.”

<sup>62</sup> Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World Youth Report.”

<sup>63</sup> Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “The World Youth Report.”

<sup>64</sup> David Levy, Kairabek Jamanjulov, and Tologon Sartbay, “#JashStan: Youth as Agents of Peace and Stability in Kyrgyzstan,” Evidence Research Center, UN Peacebuilding, January 2019, [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/kyrgyzstan\\_2018\\_project\\_evaluation\\_eng.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/kyrgyzstan_2018_project_evaluation_eng.pdf). (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>65</sup> David Levy, Kairabek Jamanjulov, and Tologon Sartbay, “#JashStan.”

peace and security.<sup>66</sup> This resolution directly asked the UN Secretary-General “to carry out a progress study on the youth’s positive contribution to peace processes and conflict resolution, in order to recommend effective responses at local, national, regional and international levels...”<sup>67</sup> In response to S/RES/2250 (2015), the Security-General requested “The Missing Peace: An Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security.”<sup>68</sup> Published in 2018 by the UN Population Fund, “The Missing Peace...” looks at the importance of including youth in the peacebuilding in their communities.<sup>69</sup> The report surveyed almost 400 youth-led peacebuilding organizations actively trying to rebuild their communities by reestablishing trust within their communities.<sup>70</sup> These youth organizations operate using diverse methods to prevent and deescalate violence, such as traditional education, debates and dialogue, religious dialogue, civic duty education, mass media, and entertainment festivals.<sup>71</sup> For example, Nansen Dialogue Network in former Yugoslavia brought ethnically diverse students together to dismantle cultural stereotypes and work towards reconciliation.<sup>72</sup>

Created with the PBC, the UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is where peace operation processes begin.<sup>73</sup> The PBF is designed to provide quick funding to projects focused on preventing a Member State from relapsing into conflict.<sup>74</sup> The PBF has begun to answer questions on inclusion in the peacebuilding process through the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI).<sup>75</sup> The Youth Promotion Initiative under the GYPI includes support for projects focused on youth empowerment and participation, the creation of youth civil organizations active in their Member State, and contributions to collective learning on youth-inclusive programs.<sup>76</sup> Since 2016, over USD \$57 million has been invested in 48 Youth Promotion Initiative projects in 18 Member States.<sup>77</sup> UN agencies, funds, and programs, as well as civil society organizations, can apply for investment aid through GYPI.<sup>78</sup> Through donations made by the PBF, Kyrgyzstan was able to implement their #JashStan initiative on youth-led engagement against violent extremism.<sup>79</sup>

### ***Case Study: UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)***

South Sudan is the newest Member State in the United Nations, gaining independence in 2011.<sup>80</sup> S/RES/1996 (2011) created the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to help transition the wartime government into a functional state.<sup>81</sup> By 2013, South Sudan had broken out into civil war between the official South Sudanese

<sup>66</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2250 (2015), December 09, 2015, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015)).

<sup>67</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2250 (2015).

<sup>68</sup> United Nation’s Population Fund, “The Missing Peace: An Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security,” UNPFA, 2018, <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2018-10/youth-web-english.pdf>.

<sup>69</sup> United Nation’s Population Fund, “The Missing Peace...Ch. 1.”

<sup>70</sup> United Nation’s Population Fund, “The Missing Peace...Ch. 2.”

<sup>71</sup> United Nation’s Population Fund, “The Missing Peace...Ch. 2.”

<sup>72</sup> United Nation’s Population Fund, “The Missing Peace...Ch. 2.”

<sup>73</sup> UN Peacebuilding, “United Nations Peacebuilding Fund,” United Nations, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund/>, (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>74</sup> UNICEF, “Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education,”

<sup>75</sup> Peacebuilding Fund, “Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative: Calls for Proposals and Guidance Note,” UN Peacebuilding, [https://up-pbf-gypi-2020.cdn.prismic.io/up-pbf-gypi-2019/a02588f8-c311-4488-9bcc-e2c952e179f8\\_PBF+GYPI+2020+Call+for+Proposals+and+Guidance+Note+%28ENG\\_FINAL%29.pdf](https://up-pbf-gypi-2020.cdn.prismic.io/up-pbf-gypi-2019/a02588f8-c311-4488-9bcc-e2c952e179f8_PBF+GYPI+2020+Call+for+Proposals+and+Guidance+Note+%28ENG_FINAL%29.pdf), (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>76</sup> Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative, “Youth Promotion Initiative,” Peacebuilding Fund’s Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative. <https://www.pbfgypi.org/>. (Accessed April 26, 2020).

<sup>77</sup> Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative, “Youth Promotion Initiative.”

<sup>78</sup> Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund, “Gender and Youth Promotion initiative: Call for Proposals and Guidance Notes,” United Nations Peacebuilding, 2020. [https://up-pbf-gypi-2019.cdn.prismic.io/up-pbf-gypi-2019/a02588f8-c311-4488-9bcc-e2c952e179f8\\_PBF+GYPI+2020+Call+for+Proposals+and+Guidance+Note+%28ENG\\_FINAL%29.pdf](https://up-pbf-gypi-2019.cdn.prismic.io/up-pbf-gypi-2019/a02588f8-c311-4488-9bcc-e2c952e179f8_PBF+GYPI+2020+Call+for+Proposals+and+Guidance+Note+%28ENG_FINAL%29.pdf), (Accessed April 27, 2020).

<sup>79</sup> United Nations Peacebuilding, “Secretary-General Peacebuilding Fund: 2020-2024 Strategy,” United Nations, [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf\\_strategy\\_2020-2024\\_final.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_strategy_2020-2024_final.pdf), (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>80</sup> “South Sudan country profile,” BBC, *BBC*, August 6, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082>. (Accessed May 18, 2020).

<sup>81</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1996 (2011)*, July 8, 2011. [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1996\(2011\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1996(2011))

government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO).<sup>82</sup> The Revitalized Agreement of Resolution of the Conflict South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed on 13 September 2018 by South Sudan President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar ended the civil war by creating a coalition government between the two leaders.<sup>83</sup> In February 2020, Kiir and Machar formed the official coalition government of the two conflicting groups and began an attempt to reform South Sudan under a single regime focused on peace.<sup>84</sup>

The R-ARCSS agreement to create a coalition government includes a clause on the involvement of youth in the government as vital to the stability of the state.<sup>85</sup> The R-ARCSS clause 1.4.5. claims the new South Sudanese government shall establish diversity quotas for young people in the new government to gain this valuable insight from the people who experienced the worst of the civil war.<sup>86</sup> Despite the legal texts calling for inclusion, the youth of South Sudan have been ignored and excluded from important political discussions without alternative avenues to voice their concerns.<sup>87</sup> In South Sudan, 73.7 percent of the population is under the age of 30.<sup>88</sup> There are not many ways for young people to participate in the political rebuilding of their homeland beyond violence.<sup>89</sup> For most youth in South Sudan, they have only seen conflict, both interstate war and localized violence.<sup>90</sup> Due to this, young people have been restricted in their civic opportunities to organize publicly and demand inclusion.<sup>91</sup> There is a deep sense of disillusionment in South Sudanese youth where political leaders have never provided them with peace and have not allocated avenues for youth to involve themselves in peacebuilding.<sup>92</sup>

In the creation of the new South Sudanese government, despite the quota clause, young people felt they were not represented well and had little options to voice their concerns.<sup>93</sup> In response, the South Sudan Young Leaders Forum (SSYLF) was created to give youth opportunities to have their voices heard on political, economic, humanitarian, and security concerns.<sup>94</sup> The goal of SSYLF is to mobilize a well-informed youth movement to make the positive changes they want to see in their communities ravaged by the civil war.<sup>95</sup> SSYLF published their "Roadmap to Peace and Stability in South Sudan" in August 2017.<sup>96</sup> The guide, created by a forum of 70 young and diverse South Sudanese leaders, argues for more youth representation in peace processes and political transitions, as youth are the ones on the frontlines of the conflict.<sup>97</sup> SSYLF calls on elders in the South Sudanese government to help youth integrate into leadership positions within their homeland.<sup>98</sup> The Youth Caucus of the South Sudanese Parliament is the government's response to calls for youth participation.<sup>99</sup> This caucus focuses on the challenges of the role of youth in peace processes and national security.<sup>100</sup> The South Sudanese government, however, has often openly

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<sup>82</sup> "South Sudan: What is the fighting about?" British Broadcasting Corporation, May 10, 2014.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25427965>. (Accessed April 21, 2020)

<sup>83</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), Peace Agreement Database, September 12, 2018,

<https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2112>. (Accessed April 21, 2020).

<sup>84</sup> "South Sudan's rival leaders form coalition government," Al Jazeera, February 22, 2020,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/south-sudan-rival-leaders-form-coalition-government-200222121043672.html>. (Accessed April 28, 2020).

<sup>85</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development, R-ARCSS.

<sup>86</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development, R-ARCSS.

<sup>87</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace... Ch 3."

<sup>88</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, February 2020.

<https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2020/02/un-secretary-generals-envoy-on-youth-visits-south-sudan/>. (Accessed May 30, 2020)

<sup>89</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace... Ch. 1."

<sup>90</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace... Ch 2."

<sup>91</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace... Ch 2."

<sup>92</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace... Ch 2."

<sup>93</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "Who We Are," SSYLF, <https://www.ssyf.org/who-we-are>. (Accessed April 28, 2020).

<sup>94</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "Who We Are."

<sup>95</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "Our Goal," SSYLF, <https://www.ssyf.org/our-vision>, (Accessed April 28, 2020).

<sup>96</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "A Roadmap to Peace and Stability in South Sudan." [https://f56625f6-1c8a-48a1-b2a6-05635f6893f9.filesusr.com/ugd/13097c\\_88955484a3ff48af953adedf5923592a.pdf](https://f56625f6-1c8a-48a1-b2a6-05635f6893f9.filesusr.com/ugd/13097c_88955484a3ff48af953adedf5923592a.pdf), (Accessed May 30, 2020).

<sup>97</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "A Roadmap to Peace and Stability in South Sudan."

<sup>98</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "A Roadmap to Peace and Stability in South Sudan."

<sup>99</sup> UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, February 2020.

<https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2020/02/un-secretary-generals-envoy-on-youth-visits-south-sudan/>. (Accessed May 30, 2020)

<sup>100</sup> UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth.



dismissed youth involvement in any other political matters not specifically tailored to youth problems, with current high-level officials in the Ministry of Youth and Sports calling for young South Sudanese people to leave political concerns to senior officials.<sup>101</sup>

What has been effective for young South Sudanese has been the community organizations focused on providing aid and involvement from the ground up.<sup>102</sup> The Youth and Adolescent Training Centre in Juba offers displaced youth training in employable skills like sewing and information technology to provide young people with economic options other than violence.<sup>103</sup> The UN Secretary-General Envoy on Youth helped a conflict-prone rural community start a new Vocational Training Centre for Vulnerable Youth.<sup>104</sup> Centers like these are providing young people with alternative ways to earn an income, gain an education, and learn how to make their voices heard through peaceful avenues.<sup>105</sup> South Sudanese youth groups have made large contributions towards strengthening community cohesion and bringing about reconciliation amongst conflicting parties in their communities.<sup>106</sup> The UN Secretary-General Envoy on Youth is working with all levels of South Sudanese government and society to bring the voices and plight of young people to the forefront of peace conversations.<sup>107</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

Youth play many roles that are important to understanding the needs of different communities involved in conflict.<sup>108</sup> When trying to reform a society post-conflict, it is important to include the youngest generations of society into the discussion. Youth are often the ones from combat zones and know what their Member State needs to prevent conflict from arising again.<sup>109</sup> When young people are not involved in peacebuilding processes, Member States lose the valuable insight from those who grew up in conflict, whose only options for security may have been to engage in the fighting.<sup>110</sup> For young people to make a difference in their Member States, they need to be equipped with the proper education and training for peacebuilding.<sup>111</sup> With appropriate avenues for communication and opportunities to learn the peacebuilding process, youth can provide critical peace developments needed to prevent or end violence in their homeland, community, and Member State.

## ***Committee Directive***

While in committee, delegates should be mindful of how their Member State addresses the role of peacebuilding in ending conflict and violence around the world. Delegates should consider their Member State's own youth involvement in leadership positions at all levels of government, and how that has contributed or hindered the prosperity of their Member State. In doing so, delegates should ask themselves: What social, political, economic, and cultural issues prevent youth voices from being heard in peace processes? What information can youth provide to peacebuilding processes? What incentives, if any, can be made to convince Member States to include youth in their peacebuilding dialogue? What initiatives in current peacebuilding programs have seen positive change for youth involvement, and which have not? Are there current international agreements on the topic that could be

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<sup>101</sup> Wek Atak Lacjang, "Youth Urged to Leave Politics to Senior People," Juba Monitor, March 20, 2020, <https://www.jubamonitor.com/youth-urged-to-leave-politics-to-senior-people/>, (Accessed May 30, 2020)

<sup>102</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, February 2020. <https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2020/02/un-secretary-generals-envoy-on-youth-visits-south-sudan/>. (Accessed May 30, 2020)

<sup>103</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth.

<sup>104</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, February 2020. <https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2020/02/un-secretary-generals-envoy-on-youth-visits-south-sudan/>. (Accessed May 30, 2020)

<sup>105</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth.

<sup>106</sup> Alpaslan Ozerdem, "The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities," Oxford Research Group, October 26, 2016. <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-role-of-youth-in-peacebuilding-challenges-and-opportunities/>. (Accessed April 14, 2020).

<sup>107</sup> "UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth Visits South Sudan," UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth

<sup>108</sup> Alpaslan Ozerdem, "The Role of Youth in Peacebuilding."

<sup>109</sup> South Sudan Young Leaders Forum, "A Roadmap to Peace and Stability in South Sudan."

<sup>110</sup> Brandon A. Kohrt, et al., "Social Ecology of Child Soldiers," Transcult Psychiatry, November 19, 2013, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3833694/>

<sup>111</sup> United Nation's Population Fund, "The Missing Peace: An Independent Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security," UNPFA, 2018, <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2018-10/youth-web-english.pdf>.

improved upon? Overall, delegates should address these questions with realistic solutions for implementing their goals. Delegates should focus on building upon what the current UN-established bodies are already working on rather than creating new bodies within PBC. Delegates should also focus on the issue as a whole and not specific situations of any single Member State.

## II. Integrating Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Standards into Community-Based Organizations

### *Introduction*

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (DDR; sometimes referred to as the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, or IDDRS) were established in 2006 as a product of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG-DDR).<sup>112</sup> The IAWG-DDR was comprised of 22 United Nations (UN) entities whose sole purpose was to assemble one comprehensive set of policies, guidelines and procedures that would be adaptable to any situation in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives were taking place.<sup>113</sup> The policies and procedures produced were grouped under three major actions: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in post-conflict zones and areas experiencing high community violence due to the reintegration of large numbers of ex-combatants, as well as other factors.<sup>114</sup>

In DDR programs, each set of policies should be accomplished in the specific order in which they are listed, beginning with disarmament.<sup>115</sup> Disarmament includes policies and guidelines in the handling of the collection of weapons from combatants, as well as determining the necessity of disarming members or groups of people within the civilian population.<sup>116</sup> As outlined by the UN, demobilization includes “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups,” and is broken down into two stages.<sup>117</sup> The first stage encompasses the identification and processing of combatants, assessing the needs of each in the transition from combatant to civilian life.<sup>118</sup> The second stage comprises building and providing a short-term “support package”, designed to meet the immediate material needs of the demobilized individuals or conflict-affected community.<sup>119</sup> This often comes in the form of food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.<sup>120</sup> The last pillar, reintegration, is a long-term process in which ex-combatants acquire long-term employment with sustainable income and permanent lodging.<sup>121</sup> As opposed to the demobilization stage, which focuses on immediate material needs, reintegration is a broader “social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level”.<sup>122</sup>

Reintegration is usually found to be the most difficult step in the DDR process, with the lowest success rate among the DDR stages.<sup>123</sup> Successful reintegration is difficult to measure, as it does not produce tangible goods or products, but focuses on the intangible shift of social dynamics, biases, and terms of acceptance of those within the community ex-combatants will return to.<sup>124</sup> In the last 20 years, international and national programs alike have begun to recognize and call for the local ownership of peacebuilding design and community-level reintegration programs.<sup>125</sup> This has been called the “local turn” in peacebuilding policy, and was recognized in 2018 by UN

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<sup>112</sup> “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Integration Standards,” The United Nations Development Programme, <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/geneva/docs/16-07-11%20Onepager%20on%20IDDRS%20four%20products.pdf> (Accessed May 2, 2020)

<sup>113</sup> “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Integration Standards,” The United Nations Development Programme

<sup>114</sup> “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” United Nations Peacekeeping <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration> (Accessed May 2, 2020)

<sup>115</sup> “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>116</sup> “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>117</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>118</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>119</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>120</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>121</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>122</sup> “What is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre

<sup>123</sup> United States Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan* (Arlington, Virginia; September 2019)

<sup>124</sup> United States Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan* (Arlington, Virginia; September 2019)

<sup>125</sup> Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver P Richmond (2013) The Local Turn in Peace Building: a Critical Agenda for Peace, *Third World Quarterly*, 34:5, 763-783, [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750?casa\\_token=iYAAbDVVvk8kAAAAA:KN5GX](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750?casa_token=iYAAbDVVvk8kAAAAA:KN5GX)

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres as invaluable to peacebuilding initiatives, with the need for a “systematic” integration of civil society and community participation in all UN peacebuilding projects.<sup>126</sup>

## *History*

In 1948, the first deployment of UN Peacekeepers were sent to the Middle East in order to observe and monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.<sup>127</sup> At its inception, UN Peacekeeping efforts were limited to that of post-conflict support, with troops remaining primarily unarmed until 1956, when the deployment of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) authorized armed troops to Egypt in response to the Suez crisis.<sup>128</sup> Peacekeeping troops then remained armed observers and monitors of conflict, engaging distantly in post-conflict negotiations, receiving no orders to engage in complex disarmament, demobilization or reintegration missions within civilian populations and communities.<sup>129</sup>

During the 1990s, the UN’s approach to peacekeeping changed dramatically.<sup>130</sup> Focus began to shift from a distanced “monitor and report” aim to a focus on engaged participation in laying the foundations for the peacebuilding process.<sup>131</sup> In March 1990, the UN Security Council voted to expand peacekeeping operations in Nicaragua and Honduras, which included the new goal of “the demobilization of anti-government elements” in the midst of ongoing conflict.<sup>132</sup> As UN peacekeeping began expanding to actively take part in political, social, and economic reforms, involvement by various UN bodies, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) began to rise.<sup>133</sup>

Faced with new challenges but without any trans-committee guidelines, these different UN bodies became innovative in their individual approaches, each constructing different sets of policies and guidelines for achieving overlapping goals within Member States or regions of conflict.<sup>134</sup> This left multi-UN body approaches to be carried out “in a disjointed, unintegrated way due to poor coordination, planning and support”.<sup>135</sup> This lack of cohesion was highlighted as a major factor for the utter failing of the UN to prevent or effectively help mitigate the conflict and following genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to assist in the security of the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995.<sup>136</sup> Recognizing this, Secretary-General Kofi Annan created a Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, which was specifically tasked with identifying and assessing “the shortcomings of the existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change”.<sup>137</sup> In 2000, the Panel produced the report A/55/305-S/2000/809 (commonly referred to as the “Brahimi Report”), which called for solutions that

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<sup>126</sup> International Peace Institute, Local Networks for Peace: Lessons from Community-Led Peacebuilding (New York:

International Peace Institute, September 2018). [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/1809\\_Local-Networks-for-Peace2.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/1809_Local-Networks-for-Peace2.pdf) (Accessed August 9, 2020)

<sup>127</sup> “Our History” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>128</sup> “Our History” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>129</sup> “Our History” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>130</sup> “Our History” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>131</sup> “Our History” United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>132</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

<sup>133</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective

<sup>134</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective

<sup>135</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective

<sup>136</sup> “‘Brahimi Report’ Report of the Panel on United Peace Operations (2000)” Past Conferences, Meetings and Events, United Nations, [https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi\\_report.shtml](https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml) (Accessed May 4, 2020)

<sup>137</sup> “‘Brahimi Report’ Report of the Panel on United Peace Operations (2000)” Past Conferences, Meetings and Events, United Nations

would later be reflected in the future IDDRS.<sup>138</sup> Specific changes on how different aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be addressed included:

“a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve a national reconciliation; consolidation for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase”.<sup>139</sup>

The Brahimi report, provided the impetus for a consolidated and universally recognized set of policies for DDR implementation and focused on the breadth and scope of international intervention in support of peacebuilding.<sup>140</sup> While the consent of Member States and local communities in areas of peacebuilding was deemed critical, little else was written as to the need for active participation of local communities and community-based programs or leadership therein.<sup>141</sup> However, the Brahimi Report informed the UN DDR guidelines that would be established in 2006, laying a common, inter-agency foundation for more nuanced conversations about methods and focuses within reintegration initiatives for the future.<sup>142</sup>

The DDR is seen as a living document to be updated, revised and re-envisioned as needed.<sup>143</sup> In January 2010, the DDR Section within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations produced a report on which revisions and added practices were needed to address the increasingly complex situations faced during DDR-centered missions around the world.<sup>144</sup> This revised set of policies expanded on the importance of community involvement in peacebuilding strategies.<sup>145</sup> It introduced guidelines for Community Violence Reduction programs, pre-arrival assessments of the local dynamics and social structures within conflict and post-conflict areas, and a shift in primary focus from military structures to a holistic, community framework approach.<sup>146</sup> In 2017, the DDR Standards again went through an extensive revision to meet the updated challenges presented throughout new DDR missions.<sup>147</sup> The launch of the revised IDDRS was celebrated on November 19, 2019 at an event entitled “Journey for Peace and Development”, held simultaneously in Geneva and New York in two divided segments.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, “Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council”, August 21, 2000, <https://undocs.org/A/55/305> (Accessed May 4, 2020)

<sup>139</sup> “Executive Summary” Report of the Panel On United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations, [https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Brahimi\\_Report\\_Exec\\_Summary.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Brahimi_Report_Exec_Summary.pdf) (Accessed May 4, 2020)

<sup>140</sup> The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809, “Identical letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council”, August 21, 2000, <https://undocs.org/A/55/305> (Accessed August 9, 2020)

<sup>141</sup> The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809

<sup>142</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

<sup>143</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

<sup>144</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, (New York: United Nations, 2010). [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr\\_eng\\_with\\_cover.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr_eng_with_cover.pdf)

<sup>145</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations

<sup>146</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations

<sup>147</sup> “Secretary-General’s remarks at launch of the Revised United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards”, United Nations Secretary-General, November 19, 2019. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-11-19/secretary-generals-remarks-launch-of-the-revised-united-nations-integrated-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-standards>

<sup>148</sup> “Official Launch of the Revised UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)”, United Nations Peacekeeping, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/official-launch-of-revised-un-integrated-ddr-standards-iddrs> (Accessed May



## *Successes and Challenges*

DDR programs have now been implemented in over 20 Member States, both as part of peacekeeping missions as well as in separate social and economic development programs within the UN.<sup>149</sup> Crucial to the successes of peacebuilding missions have been the clear communication and cooperation between and among community leaders and their local government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.<sup>150</sup> Establishing this level of cooperation among organizations and communities fosters a climate of confidence and security that is integral to every stage of DDR- from negotiating voluntary disarmament of soon to be ex-combatants, to absorbing those involved in conflict back into a community that was once wracked by violence.<sup>151</sup> Cooperation within community programs and the local population are integral to rebuilding an infrastructure, economy, government and social apparatus that the population of a region feels they can trust.<sup>152</sup>

At the forefront of these measures are Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programs, which work to reduce tensions at the grassroots level and provide avenues of social cohesion.<sup>153</sup> These programs range from “labor-intensive projects, business incubation and community dialogue forums, to direct engagement with members of armed groups, as well as youth-at-risk, to prevent further recruitment”.<sup>154</sup> The first CVR program was implemented in 2006 during the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to address unprecedented levels of gun-violence by politically instrumentalized criminal gangs operating in urban neighborhoods.<sup>155</sup> The MINUSTAH helped local community leaders organize labor intensive community projects and temporary work programs to divert possible recruits to local gangs.<sup>156</sup> The CVR program then established legal aid centers, promoted community-based policing, and led social reinsertion projects for former inmates.<sup>157</sup> CVR projects are designed, implemented, and sustained by local individuals with the aid and resource expertise provided by UN Peacekeeping officials.<sup>158</sup> After the successes seen by the CVR program in Haiti, CVR programs have since been employed in UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire.<sup>159</sup>

While peacebuilding missions around the world have secured a range of successes through the implementation of the Integrated DDR Standards, gaining the trust of those involved often proves to be a deciding factor in the success or failure of DDR implementation. Often the factions that have agreed to an armistice or peace agreement remain highly distrustful of one another, complicating voluntary disarmament negotiations and the process of easing military or militia personnel into civilian life and peaceful community involvement.<sup>160</sup> An example of this can be found in the challenge to disarmament in Cote d’Ivoire in 2005, where confidence in the strength of DDR, and the accountability it was supposed to engender dwindled due to a lack of community integration programs where

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<sup>149</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014)

<sup>150</sup> “Civil Society Engagement”, United Nations Peacebuilding, <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission/civil-society-engagement> (Accessed May 29, 2020)

<sup>151</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

<sup>152</sup> The United Nations, Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

<sup>153</sup> “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”, United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>154</sup> “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”, United Nations Peacekeeping

<sup>155</sup> “Top UN peacekeeping officials hail success of community violence reduction programmes” UN News, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/545512-top-un-peacekeeping-officials-hail-success-community-violence-reduction> (Accessed August 9, 2020)

<sup>156</sup> Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations, DDR Community Violence Reduction: Creating Space for Peace (New York: United Nations) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr-and-cvr-creating-space-for-peace.pdf>

<sup>157</sup> Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations, DDR Community Violence Reduction: Creating Space for Peace

<sup>158</sup> Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations, DDR Community Violence Reduction: Creating Space for Peace

<sup>159</sup> Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Department of Peace Operations at the United Nations, *DDR Community Violence Reduction: Creating Space for Peace* (New York: United Nations) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr-and-cvr-creating-space-for-peace.pdf>

<sup>160</sup> The United Nations, *The UN Approach to DDR*, <https://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>

combatants and their local communities could have any sort of dialogue with one another.<sup>161</sup> This left the National Armed Forces of Cote d'Ivoire and the Forces Nouvelle in a standoff that prolonged and deepened the mental and physical damages done to the communities caught in the middle of the conflict.<sup>162</sup>

An issue faced in the reintegration of combatants into civilian life can also be found in the often prolonged gaps between stages in the DDR process.<sup>163</sup> After examining previous missions, the DDR Section in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations found that in cases where there was a gap between the end of disarmament and demobilization and the beginning of reintegration, frustration among the unsupported ex-combatants heightened the chances of a relapse into violence considerably.<sup>164</sup> While many Member States lack the infrastructure and expertise to implement DDR guidelines individually, infusing some responsibility and authority to local community organizations on the ground may serve to fill the gaps and as a byproduct, reflect civilian trust in the international organizations that have arrived in their communities back to the inhabitants that remain distrustful of outsiders.<sup>165</sup>

### *Case Study: Afghanistan*

The first internationally-funded DDR program in Afghanistan began in 2003, two years after the fall of the Taliban.<sup>166</sup> The Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was developed primarily by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), following UN DDR guidelines and remaining in cooperation and communication with multiple UN peacebuilding advisory bodies, such as the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).<sup>167</sup> The ANBP sought to reduce the power of the semi-formal military units of the Afghan Militia Forces (AFM) by demobilizing and reintegrating 100,000 combatants back into civil society.<sup>168</sup> Voluntary disarmament of combatants was incentivized with a reward of short-term supplies of food and clothing packages, vocational training with promises of varied opportunities of employment, multiple workshops throughout the DDR process, and highly decorated parades honoring all those who relinquished their weapons to the program.<sup>169</sup> By 2006, 62,326 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized, and 11,000 children had participated in a youth-focused reintegration program that provided basic education and vocational training in an effort to prepare them for gainful employment instead of militia recruitment.<sup>170</sup> While these numbers were below the desired goal, the disarmament and demobilization of combatants was still initially seen as a program success.<sup>171</sup>

The implementation of the last stage of DDR, reintegration of combatants to civilian life, posed the most challenges to the ANBP, particularly due to the lack of communication between ANBP, the Afghan government, and Afghan communities where ex-combatants would settle.<sup>172</sup> The ANBP had partnered primarily with the Afghan government

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<sup>161</sup> The United Nations, *The UN Approach to DDR*,

<https://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>

<sup>162</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, *DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective*, (New York: United Nations, September 2010), [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr\\_retrospective102010.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr_retrospective102010.pdf)

<sup>163</sup> The DDR Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, *DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective*

<sup>164</sup> The United Nations, *The UN Approach to DDR*,

<https://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>

<sup>165</sup> The United Nations, *The UN Approach to DDR*,

<https://unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>

<sup>166</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>167</sup> “Case Study: DDR Afghanistan: War and Peace.” *Case Study: DDR Afghanistan / War and Peace*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, <http://warpp.info/en/m2/articles/case-study-ddr-afghanistan>

<sup>168</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>169</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>170</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>171</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan*

<sup>172</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12361.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aad7aa55895262b69ed495d50210d393e> (Accessed 16 July 2020).

during the DDR process, and together the program officials and Afghan government agreed on the employment opportunities that would be offered to ex-combatants.<sup>173</sup> While types of peaceful employment opportunities were developed, neither the Afghan government nor the UN gathered baseline data on what vocations were needed or what resources were available in the communities ex-combatants would be assigned to.<sup>174</sup> For example, 43.3 percent of participants opted into the agriculture industry, and 23.7 percent into specific skilled-labor vocations such as carpentry, masonry, and auto mechanics.<sup>175</sup> This amounted to an influx of over 37,000 new workers into these industries.<sup>176</sup> There was little to no analysis done of where or how to distribute these new workers across Afghanistan, and the result was ex-combatants often reintegrating into communities that did not have the land nor capacity to employ them.<sup>177</sup> In the agricultural industry, those who were able to successfully farm the land would then flood the local markets with identical products, leading to a decline in expected income for the ex-combatants and resentment from the local agricultural workers who also had to endure steep declines in revenue.<sup>178</sup> In the vocational industries, it became common to see groups of ex-combatants unable to settle down in one place, constantly migrating from different communities in search of work.<sup>179</sup>

Another obstacle to community acceptance of the reintegration process came from members of traumatized communities that saw the transfer of ex-combatant occupations from informal armies to formal ones.<sup>180</sup> The Afghan government had provided ex-combatants with the choice to apply to join the Afghan army or police force, as well as some rare opportunities of employment in low-level government security posts.<sup>181</sup><sup>182</sup> The intention behind this strategy was to simultaneously weaken informal military structures while strengthening national ones, that would in turn re-establish the authority and rule-of-law of the Afghan government.<sup>183</sup> While seemingly practical, this plan was devised with no input from Afghan civilians, and little information released to Afghan communities, who watched as many of the combatants that had previously terrorized their communities took up positions of armed authority over their communities.<sup>184</sup>

The lack of communication between participatory entities and Afghan communities, the absence of industry and agricultural assessment before vocational training, and the absence of community-staffed social reinsertion programs for ex-combatants played key roles in the fracturing of any long-term reintegration gains in the Afghan peacebuilding process. The ANBP officially ended its reintegration program in March 2011, and the lessons learned were communicated into a new reintegration program, in which the Afghan government would be given a leading role with resource support from Member States of the UNDP. This program, entitled the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) was established in August 2010 and ended in March 2016.<sup>185</sup> The program found success in implementing labor intensive work activities and vocational training and work programs, which in turn benefitted communities with improved building and road construction and a canal infrastructure that brought irrigation to 9,710 more hectares of land.<sup>186</sup> Unfortunately, the program left little sustainable social infrastructure or social programs in place, citing waning support from the Afghan government which in turn procured less enthusiasm

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<sup>173</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>174</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>175</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>176</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>177</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>178</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>179</sup> Hartzell, Caroline A. *Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan*. US Institute of Peace, 2011

<sup>180</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>181</sup> The International Center for Transitional Justice, *Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Afghanistan* (June 2009) <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Afghanistan-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf>

<sup>182</sup> “Case Study: DDR Afghanistan: War and Peace.” *Case Study: DDR Afghanistan / War and Peace*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, <http://warpp.info/en/m2/articles/case-study-ddr-afghanistan>

<sup>183</sup> “Case Study: DDR Afghanistan: War and Peace.” *Case Study: DDR Afghanistan / War and Peace*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, <http://warpp.info/en/m2/articles/case-study-ddr-afghanistan> (Accessed July 17, 2020)

<sup>184</sup> “Case Study: DDR Afghanistan: War and Peace.” *Case Study: DDR Afghanistan / War and Peace*, Bonn International Center for Conversion

<sup>185</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (UNDP Support): Project Completion Report* (UNDP, April 2017)

<sup>186</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (UNDP Support): Project Completion Report*

and funds from donor Member States. While there remains a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan stationed until September 2020, the focus has shifted further from reintegration efforts to mediation efforts between conflicting forces on the ground, addressing health crises across conflict and post-conflict areas, and encouraging the Afghan government to further national youth initiatives.<sup>187</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

UN involvement in the peacebuilding process within Member States has evolved since its first peacekeeping mission. With the advent of the DDR Standards, the PBC is charged with taking these universal standards and tailoring their strategies to the social, economic, and military dynamics of individual Member States.<sup>188</sup> It is vital to the success of each DDR mission that when applied, the unique conditions of a Member State's law, key government and non-governmental actors, and culture and environment of the communities and civilians affected are addressed. The PBC must continue to advocate for the importance of building civilian trust with those aiding in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, and help devise strategies in which the community and its local organizations can contribute to ensuring long-term peace post-conflict.

### ***Committee Directive***

Prior to committee, delegates should become familiar with the Integrated DDR Standards and their specific role in the peacebuilding process. Delegates should gain an understanding of the PBC mandate and how, as a non-operational body, the PBC interacts with UN Peacekeeping missions and other UN operational bodies working in preventative measures against potential conflict, as well as in post-conflict arenas. During committee, delegates should seek solutions to some of the current challenges facing integration and acceptance of the DDR stages in communities and community organizations. How might community organizations partner with UN peacekeeping missions in accomplishing each of the three stages of DDR? How might the UN and other international organizations work to build trust between civilians and returning ex-combatants? Could community organizations play a role in this endeavor? How might Community Violence Reduction programs be strengthened and expanded? What training do members of local community organizations have in Member States currently undergoing post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation? How might partnerships and training be strengthened between local and international organizations?

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<sup>187</sup> "United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan" United Nations <https://unama.unmissions.org/> (Accessed August 9, 2020)

<sup>188</sup> "Meet the Team" United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, [https://www.unddr.org/meet-the-team/introduction\\_14.aspx](https://www.unddr.org/meet-the-team/introduction_14.aspx) (Accessed May 4, 2020)

## Annotated Bibliography

### Topic I: Creating Opportunities for Youth Education and Involvement in the Peacebuilding Process

Akau, Samuel Garang. "Peace-building in South Sudan through the Design and Implementation of Coherent and Integrated Youth Development Policy." *Sudd Institute* (2015).  
[www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11037](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11037)

This policy evaluation and recommendation by the Sudd Institute of South Sudan is easily differentiated from many other sources as it is policy from within a Member State involved in conflict and shows how at least some of the local populace believes they can leverage youth in peacebuilding. Within it, Akau argues that the South Sudanese government has ignored the needs and wishes of the youth, leading to a disillusionment in the demographic. He argues that this disillusionment is partially responsible for the state of destabilization that South Sudan found itself in at the time. To solve this, Akau argues that a youth development fund should be established to fund, among other things, the creation of STEM education programs and entrepreneurship training. Further, he recommends creating a National Youth Service organization to help instill a sense of national pride and unity as a way to fight against the aforementioned disillusionment. Delegates looking to encourage Member States to create institutional change will find this article particularly helpful.

Felice, Celina D. and Andria Wisler. "The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-builders" *Journal of Peace Conflict and Development* 11 (2007): 1-29.  
[http://creducation.net/resources/Power\\_and\\_Potential\\_of\\_Youth\\_as\\_Peace-Builders.pdf](http://creducation.net/resources/Power_and_Potential_of_Youth_as_Peace-Builders.pdf).

This journal article by Celina Felice and Andria Wisler of the University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands focuses on the opportunity available to governments and organizations to harness youth in the aim of peacebuilding. The authors list out several organizations that have formerly or currently used the ingenuity and vigor of youth to accomplish their goals, and also discusses the problems that occur when youth are not engaged. By seeing youth as an obstacle to overcome or as an unproductive demographic, policy makers risk losing youth support and the ensuing opportunities their involvement would have presented in peacebuilding measures. Despite the year of publication, this article remains a solid argument for the social good of engaging young people.

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 74/121, *Policies and programmes involving youth*, A/RES/74/121 (18 December 2019). <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/121>.

This UN General Assembly (GA) resolution covers a broad range of policy recommendations that address youth in particular. Operative clause 14 discusses education and the policies recommended to increase quality of life for youth through education. It stresses the importance of providing technical education to people without a formal education, so as to allow them better prospects in job markets and the potential of entrepreneurship. It further stresses for Member States to ensure these services are available to pregnant adolescents and young mothers. This resource is useful to reinforce arguments by appealing to the authority of the General Assembly.

"World Youth Report: Youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development." United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2018/12/WorldYouthReport-2030Agenda.pdf>

The 2018 World Youth Report is an invaluable resource for this topic. The report includes data and extrapolations covering numerous topics surrounding youth development including education, employment, financing, and more. It states that by increasing the amount of youth involvement, there exist numerous opportunities for development, but also states that youth involvement is not a replacement to government action. To achieve increased levels of youth engagement in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals', more political commitment, financing, data collection, and



targeted intervention is needed. Any writings on the topic should look into this source, as it is highly detailed on numerous topics.

“Youth Education, Employment and Empowerment Key to Global Progress.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/youth-education-employment-and-empowerment-key-to-global-progress.html>

This article covers the keynote address entitled “From Youth Explosion to Global Transformation: Unleashing the Power of Youth People” that former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon gave at Columbia University during the Global Colloquium of University Presidents in 2012. The Secretary-General discusses the ways in which he believes youth education should be developed, particularly focusing on women’s education. He also discusses the “Arab Awakening” alluding to how the failure of new governments in North Africa and the Middle East to provide opportunity for their youth aided in the further destabilization of the region.

## **Topic II: Integrating Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Standards into Community-Based Organizations**

Banholzer, Lilli. “When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Succeed?” SSRN (November 13, 2013). [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2367307](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2367307).

This article by Lilli Banholzer from the German Development Institute asks the question: “What factors influence how effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs are?” Banholzer’s main points are divided into three parts. DDR programs must be adaptable to local levels, when context is ignored DDR programs are much more likely to fail. DDR also must be part of a larger recovery program, as many DDR programs are subject to short sightedness. Next, she argues that how the program is designed matters. When considering career integration, the technical training must be relevant to local skills and market demands. Finally, she states that “high-risk” groups, like young combatants, must be paid more attention to. These groups are more likely to not participate in DDR programs, and when they do may have harder times integrating. This article is a good resource for understanding the basic arguments on why the Integrated DDR Standards need to be modernized.

“Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards.” United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/SMN-FINAL.pdf>

This briefing note from the United Nations Working Group on DDR advises high-level officials on best practices to operate DDR programs. It advocates for integrating UN DDR into the programs through being people-centered, transparent, and flexible, among other values. Specifically, it recommends DDR programs be aimed at long term stability, amicable to the political will, and owned by the state. It offers questions for officials to consider when making decisions, thus aiding in the ease of operation. Notably, it advises planning and implementation of DDR programs at the earliest opportunity.

Knight, W. Andy. “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview.” *African Security* 1, no. 1 (2008): 24-52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19362200802285757>.

This article published in the journal “African Security” presents the role that DDR had in Africa from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. Knight offers six case studies to review how the process worked in several states, including Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. He argues that generally DDR fails to recognize the struggles of women and children in peacebuilding. Children, he says, are both the victims and often the instruments of war, and like women they are often ignored in the reintegration process. Specifically, he mentions how Mozambique had a significant level of female combatants yet only men were given resettlement

allowances. These oversights are significant because they can lead to a lack of opportunities for some combatants, which in turn can lead to renewed insurgency groups. Delegates will find this resource useful to support arguments in favor of increasing DDR efforts involving women and children, as the author includes numerous statistics in the case studies.

Naik, Ameya Ashok. “‘Taking the Gun out of Politics’: Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration” *International Peace Institute: Global Issues* (May 27, 2017).

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/05/disarmament-demobilization-reintegration-cote-divoire/>

This article by Ashok Naik is valuable in the criticisms it raises on traditional DDR programs. Naik begins by explaining the ending of DDR programs in Côte d’Ivoire but continues by looking into the ongoing issues with DDR. She brings up familiar critiques on how DDR programs are often too short sighted and neglects the realities of combatants that are not grown men but expands upon those critiques as well. Combatants are often hesitant to demobilize in the face of a continually mobilized national military, a factor that slows the acceptance of DDR programs. She concludes that DDR programs must focus on long term stability moving forward. This article is useful to delegates when considering the role that Member States’ governments should play in reducing military capacity.

“Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards.” United Nations (2014). <https://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf>

This is the original manual regarding DDR that this topic focuses on modernizing. It was originally compiled from DDR practitioners from the United Nations, Member States, non-governmental organizations, and the World Bank. The manual covers a wide range of topics in just over 300 pages, and divides them down into 7 parts, called levels. It goes into extensive detail on the recommended policies and methods of DDR, covering everything from the role of police to gender issues. Ultimately, this is the base point for all research on this topic, as a clear understanding of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) is necessary to modernize them.