



**SRMUN ATLANTA 2019**  
**SRMUN 30**  
**November 21 - 23, 2019**  
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Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Atlanta 2019 and the Security Council (SC). My name is Austen Brennan, and I will be serving as your Director for the SC. This will be my second conference as a SRMUN staff member. Previously, I served as the Assistant Director for the League of Arab States in SRMUN Atlanta 2018. I am currently a U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Master's candidate at the American University School of International Service and hold a Bachelor of Science in Homeland Security, with a minor in Political Science from Campbell University. Our committee's Assistant Director will be Kathleen Conow. Kathleen has participated in over eight MUN conferences and this will be her first time serving on SRMUN staff. Currently, she is studying Political Science at Santa Fe College and intends on applying to law school in the near future. Kathleen also works as a paralegal at an immigration law firm, and is a resident parent at a refugee center for children.

The SC's mission is to promote, maintain, and, when necessary, restore international peace and security. As one of the UN's six principal organs, SC is tasked with identifying and peacefully resolving disputes between Member States, as well as identifying and taking measures to address threats to international peace and security. Currently, 15 Member States comprise the SC, including five permanent members and ten others from five different regional blocs. The SC works toward its goals by encouraging parties to international disputes to seek methods of resolving them, and, should more coercive measures be required, deciding the most effective method to end conflict that threatens international order.

***For SRMUN Atlanta 2019, the Security Council and NATO will be presented with the unique scenario of participating in a joint crisis and challenged to work together towards a solution. In doing so, the delegates must simultaneously react to crisis developments and the actions of both bodies. The joint crisis committees are designed for experienced delegates who are prepared to move with a swiftly developing topic and high level of debate. More information regarding the crisis can be found in the Joint Crisis Addendum.***

To assist delegates in their research, we have produced three informational briefs on topics deemed most relevant to the SC and its mission. Although delegates are not required to debate these specific topics in committee, it is highly recommended that the briefs are carefully read and understood. Delegates are expected to go beyond the briefs and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. **These information briefs will be available and posted through October and November on [the SRMUN website](http://theSRMUNwebsite.com).**

Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of the Member State's chosen issues and their externalities. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies and recommendations on the **two topics** considered the most critical to your Member State. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit [srmun.org](http://srmun.org). **All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, November 1, 2019 by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.**

Kathleen and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for the SC. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you in the near future. Please feel free to contact Deputy Director-General Ryan Baerwalde, Kathleen, or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

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## History of the United Nations Security Council

On October 24, 1945, the United Nations Security Council (SC) was established with the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and Statute of the International Court of Justice.<sup>1</sup> As one of the six principal organs of the UN System, the SC is tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security and utilizes a plethora of mechanisms in the fulfillment of that mission.<sup>2</sup> Chapter VI Article 33 of the UN Charter gives the SC authority to adjudicate disputes between parties should they endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>3</sup> Under Chapter VII Article 41, the SC is the body overseeing the deliberation and application of economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic ties, while Article 42 of the same chapter grants the SC the authority to use force, should Article 41 measures prove fruitless.<sup>4,5</sup> The UN Charter also assigns the SC with the recommendation for admission of new members.<sup>6</sup>

The UN is composed of 15 Member States, five of which—the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic of China—are designated by Article 23 as permanent members (known as the “Permanent 5” or “P5”).<sup>7</sup> The remaining ten members are elected by the UN General Assembly for a two-year term and not eligible for immediate reelection.<sup>8</sup> Outlined in Article 27 of the UN Charter, decisions made in the SC are required to have nine affirmative votes to pass; once they do, Member States are compelled to carry them out under Article 25.<sup>9</sup> Should a P5 member vote in the negative, the SC decision does not pass, irrespective of whether the required number of votes was attained.<sup>10</sup> From 1996–2012, the veto has been exercised just 25 times, with the greatest number coming from the USA.<sup>11</sup>

The SC is funded through the UN regular budget, except for peacekeeping operations.<sup>12</sup> Article 17 of the UN Charter outlines peacekeeping efforts as the collective responsibility of all Member States.<sup>13</sup> Peacekeeping operations can include defense of civilians, support for the organization of elections, protection of human rights, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.<sup>14</sup> Based on a scale of valuations and a formulation defined by the General Assembly, funding for peacekeeping efforts is divided among the Member States.

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<sup>1</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Chapter V, (accessed February 25, 2019).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, 2011, *Basic Facts About the United Nations*, Vol. Rev. ed. New York: United Nations Publications, <http://proxygsu-sav1.galileo.usg.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=387571&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Chapter VI, Article 33.

<sup>4</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Chapter VII, Article 41.

<sup>5</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Article 42.

<sup>6</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Chapter V, Article 23.

<sup>7</sup> The United Nations, 1945, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter V.

<sup>8</sup> The United Nations, 1945, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter V.

<sup>9</sup> The United Nations, 1945, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter V.

<sup>10</sup> The United Nations, 1945, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter V.

<sup>11</sup> “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in The Security Council,” Global Policy Forum, [https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Changing\\_Patterns\\_in\\_the\\_Use\\_of\\_the\\_Veto\\_as\\_of\\_August\\_2012.pdf](https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Changing_Patterns_in_the_Use_of_the_Veto_as_of_August_2012.pdf) (accessed February 25, 2019).

<sup>12</sup> United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 235, *Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, A/RES/55/235, December 23, 2000, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/235](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/235)

<sup>13</sup> The United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, October 24, 1945, Article 17.

<sup>14</sup> “What Is Peacekeeping,” United Nations Peacekeeping, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping> (accessed June 25, 2019).

To execute its mission of maintaining international peace and security, the SC adopts resolutions such as S/RES/83, which in 1950 authorized the use of force to resolve the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and was one of the earliest uses of such powers.<sup>15</sup> After this resolution passed with a vote of seven to one, with one abstention, the SC recommended the creation of a coalition of under the UN Command to preserve the peace and security of the people of the ROK.<sup>16</sup> This coalition successfully brought an end to the invasion launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1953, culminating the conflict with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement.<sup>17</sup> At the time the Armistice was signed, 17 Member States from six continents had contributed troops to the nearly 933,000 serving with the United Nations Command in Korea.<sup>18</sup> The SC revisited the Korean peninsula to recommend UN membership for both the ROK and the DPRK to the UN General Assembly in 1991.<sup>19</sup> Following failed ballistic missile and nuclear tests in 2006, the SC exercised its power to impose sanctions on the DPRK for pursuing nuclear capabilities and added additional sanctions three subsequent times.<sup>20</sup>

Another example of the SC upholding its mission is S/RES/678, which authorized the use of force to end the occupation of the State of Kuwait by the Iraqi Republic.<sup>21</sup> In 1990, the Iraqi Republic invaded and annexed Kuwait, with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein citing claims of British imperialism and an unjust splitting off of Kuwait from Iraq to justify his government's actions.<sup>22</sup> After multilateral diplomatic negotiations failed to sway Iraq, the SC adopted S/RES/678; this resolution called for a multi-state coalition to assist Kuwait in regaining its sovereignty.<sup>23</sup> This alliance successfully rid Kuwait of Iraqi troops and restored peace.

Initially formed to arbitrate security matters between Member States, the SC has recently begun addressing topics such as women's rights, organized crime, and interconnectedness were subsequently added to the agenda of the SC.<sup>24</sup> The addition of these topics to the SC agenda not only reflect their impacts on international peace and security, but also how the SC has become a more flexible body, willing to address matters that may not have been attributed to its purview at its founding. Throughout its history, the SC has taken on the gravest threats to international peace and security, and so long as the body maintains its unique powers and role within the UN, the duty of addressing these matters of utmost importance will continue to fall to it.

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<sup>15</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 83, *Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force in The Context of The Korean War*, June 27, 1950, S/RES/83, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%2083.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 84, *Resolution Authorizing Members to Assist the Republic of Korea from North Korean Attacks*, July 7, 1950 S/RES/84, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%2083.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> "147 Radio and Television Address to the American People Announcing the Signing of the Korean Armistice. July 26, 1953." 2001. *American Reference Library - Primary Source Documents*, January, 1.

<sup>18</sup> "United Nations Command." United States Forces Korea. Accessed June 25, 2019. <https://www.usfk.mil/About/United-Nations-Command/>.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 702, *Recommendation of UN Membership to the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, August 8, 1991, S/RES/702, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/702\(1991\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/702(1991))

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1695, *Condemnation of North Korean Nuclear Activity*, August 8, 1991, S/RES/1695, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1695\(2006\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1695(2006))

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 *Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force in The Context of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait*. August 8, 1991, S/RES/702, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20678.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Zahan, Rosemarie Said. "Shades of the Past: The Iraq-Kuwait Dispute, 1961." *Journal of Social Affairs* 22, no. 87 (Fall 2005): 47–80. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=21558941&site=eds-live&scope=site>.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 *Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force in The Context of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait*. August 8, 1991, S/RES/702, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20678.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Jansson, Maria. "The Logic of Protection: Narratives of HIV/AIDS in the UN Security Council," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 19, no. 1 (March 2017): 71. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edb&AN=122298196&site=eds-live&scope=site>

## **Security Council Addendum** (rev. Aug. 2019)

### **I. Overview of Agenda**

#### **Adoption of Agenda**

The Security Council (SC) annual agenda can be generated from the following five sources: the previous year's agenda, the President of the Security Council, any United Nations (UN) Member State, the UN Secretary-General, and/or other UN bodies. Regarding the previous year's agenda, the SC may decide to keep certain items on its agenda if more discussion is deemed necessary by the body. For example, a universal yet timeless topic that re-appears on the agenda nearly every year is Women, Peace, and Security.

Additionally, the Office of the Security Council President plays a crucial role in determining the agenda, as it has the ability to place items on the agenda. For example, in January 2000, the United States of America, which held the Office of the Presidency at the time, placed AIDS as a threat to international security on the agenda.

Furthermore, Article 35 of the UN Charter grants UN Member States the right to refer disputes to the SC. In 1948, India used this mechanism to refer the situation in Kashmir to the SC. Likewise, under Article 99, the UN Secretary-General may bring items to the attention of the Security Council, as seen when Former Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cueller asked the SC to investigate violations of the Geneva Convention in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

Finally, other UN bodies may refer items to the SC. The General Assembly, for instance, is afforded this right under Article 11 of the UN Charter. General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948, for example, requested the SC discuss the demilitarization of Jerusalem.

In preparation of the formal agenda for the year, the President of the SC and the Secretary-General prepare a provisional agenda based on all sources of potential items. The provisional agenda is provided to the members of the SC, who then discuss and adopt the agenda. The SC may choose to discuss or not to discuss any agenda item referred to it by another body or Member State.

#### **How the SRMUN Security Council Will Set the Agenda**

SRMUN's SC will operate differently than other committees held at SRMUN conferences. As opposed to providing delegates with pre-selected topics to consider, the SC, in line with how the real committee operates at the UN, will have an open agenda. The committee is charged with setting the agenda based on current issues of importance to the SC by means of a majority vote. Each delegate will be responsible for presenting two potential topics within their position papers that they will later defend before the SC to be considered as agenda items. These two topics should reflect the most important issues or crisis affecting your Member State. Additionally, these topics do not need to reflect the topics presented to the delegates in the three updates that you will be provided as the conference approaches. The three updates provided prior to conference are simply tools to inspire delegates to think about current events from an international lens.

The SC will operate independently of the other organs at SRMUN due to the possibility of a crisis scenario. Therefore, other UN organs represented at SRMUN will not refer items to the SC. The Secretary-General and the President of the SC are staff members and will not impact substantive debate, except when necessary. This leaves the agenda in the hands of the SC delegates and therefore should be prepared for a range of likely topics.

At the first committee session and after roll call, the President of the SC will open discussion of the agenda. Delegates may make formal speeches and utilize caucuses to discuss potential topics and negotiate how to proceed. After some discussion and negotiation, delegates may make motions to set the agenda. An example

of such a motion is:

*“The Delegate from Jordan moves for a discussion of the Situation in the Middle East.”*

Note that the naming of the topic will affect the breadth of the topic. For instance, the issue of “Israeli practices concerning the human rights of the Palestinian people” is much narrower and more focused than “the situation in the Middle East.”

There can be multiple motions for different agenda items, but each motion can only name one potential agenda item. Motions for agenda items will be voted on in the order in which they are received. The first motion to receive nine or more affirmative votes will become the agenda item. At the conclusion of discussion of that agenda item (either through voting or adjournment of the agenda item), the SC will again move back into a discussion of setting the agenda, and the process will proceed until the next agenda item passes by nine or more votes. Delegates may choose to negotiate more than one agenda item at a time, but they can only vote on one item at a time. For example, delegates may decide amongst themselves to discuss “the Situation regarding Iran’s atomic energy program” and then “Children in Armed Conflict.” However, only one agenda item may be adopted at a time. Thus, delegates would move to set the agenda as the first topic. Once the topic regarding Iran has been discussed and resolutions have been voted on or discussion on the topic has been adjourned, then the SC will move to discuss the agenda again, and delegates would have to move to discuss “Children in Armed Conflict.”

## **II. Voting**

The SC will adhere to the voting rules set forward in the UN Charter. All votes (both procedural and substantive) in the Security Council require a minimum of nine affirmative votes to pass, as outlined in the UN Charter. For instance, a vote of eight in favor, with zero opposed and seven abstentions would fail. Substantive votes (draft resolutions, amendments, and the second vote on division of question) additionally require the “concurring votes” of the Permanent 5 (P5) members of the SC (China, France, Russia, UK, and US). The UN interprets that an abstention by a member of the P5 does not represent a veto. Therefore, for a resolution to pass, all members of the P5 must either vote yes or abstain, and the resolution must receive a minimum of nine affirmative votes. Note that the P5 have rarely utilized the veto in the past eight years; only 12 vetoes have been cast in that time, and in 1996, 1998, and 2000, no vetoes were cast.<sup>25</sup>

## **III. Position Papers**

Due to the open agenda of the Security Council, delegates will be asked to write position papers that are different from all other SRMUN committees. In the place of two topics in the Background Guide, delegates will be presented with three relevant topic updates in the weeks leading up to conference. These topic updates are intended to help prepare delegates with awareness of real-world events that may impact debate in committee. Please note that topics chosen by delegates do not need to reflect those topics presented in the Committee updates.

For their position papers, delegates should identify two issues related to international peace and security that best reflect the interests of their Member State. Position papers should present the significance of the two issues in the order in which their Member State wishes to see them addressed. For instance, the delegate for Chad may propose the following two topics in order: 1) UN Efforts to Remove Landmines; and 2) Eliminating the Small Arms trade in Africa, whereas the delegate for the United Kingdom may propose: 1) UN Participation in the Rebuilding of Iraq; and 2) Terrorism.

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<sup>25</sup> This chart breaks down use of the veto by decade/year. “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council.” Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm>

#### **IV. Crisis Background**

The UN Charter of the United Nations states that the Security Council should be able to function continuously, and that the Security Council is the primary UN organ for dealing with crises that could impact international peace and security. Delegates to the SC must be prepared to handle an international crisis at any time.

##### **SRMUN Security Council**

Addressing a crisis situation is often a piece of the work of the SC. If a crisis situation arises, the Secretariat will provide delegates with pertinent briefing materials and periodic updates. The Secretariat will also forward communications from the governments of SC Member States to their representatives, likely in the form of reports and communiqués. Other committees at SRMUN may or may not become involved; however, if such a situation arises, the SC will be notified. If other SRMUN committees are not involved, then SC delegates **SHOULD NOT** interfere with the work of delegates in other committees. It is up to SC delegates to decide a course of action to attempt to resolve a crisis. The primary tools for delegates to resolve a crisis are diplomacy and negotiation. Delegates should be prepared to represent the interests of their Member State in any potential crisis.

*More information on the specific rules of the Joint Crisis can be found in the Joint Crisis Addendum.*

#### **V. Outside Parties**

##### **Background**

The UN Charter gives the SC the option to invite non-Member States of the SC to participate, without vote, in discussions that affect the non-Member States.

##### **SRMUN Security Council**

The resources of SRMUN are limited, so logistically, it may not be possible to honor all requests. If a potential crisis requires it, SRMUN may seek ways to accommodate such a request. To invite a non-Member State, delegates must first advise the committee Director and Assistant Director of the request. If it is cleared, a delegate should make a motion such as: “Under Article 32, the delegate from Argentina moves for the invitation of representatives from Cameroon to participate in a discussion of the agenda item under discussion.” The motion requires a vote of nine in favor to pass.

#### **VI. The Double Veto**

##### **Background**

When the UN was created, the ultimate decisions on whether a vote in the Security Council was procedural or substantive was left up to the SC itself. On rare occasions, P5 members are able to question whether an item is procedural or substantive. This motion which requires nine affirmative votes and a yay or abstention from each of the P5 members. For instance, a P5 member may challenge the Security Council President’s ruling that an issue is procedural. The Security Council then has a substantive vote on whether the issue is procedural or not. The P5 member can veto this vote, making the issue substantive, then veto the original motion. This is known as the double veto. The double veto is rarely used.

## **SRMUN Security Council**

The SRMUN Security Council has limited meeting time, and the desire of the committee is to maximize the available time. The Security Council Director has the right to limit the use of the double veto on procedural issues that have minor impacts on debate such as suspension of the meeting and setting the speaker's time. However, procedural motions such as agenda setting or inviting a party to a dispute could be subject to a potential double veto.

To call for the double veto, a member of the P5 should raise their placard after a motion has been made, but before a vote has been taken and make the following motion:

*"The delegate from the UK moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."*

For Example:

*"The Delegate from Romania moves for a discussion of the Use of Pre-Emptive Force."*

The Delegate from the UK raises their placard in their left hand and is recognized:

*"The Delegate from the UK moves to declare this motion a procedural motion."*

Once the President accepts this motion, the Security Council moves to a substantive vote on whether or not the motion to set the agenda is procedural. A "yes" vote means that it is procedural; a "no" vote means that it is substantive. If the UK votes no, then the motion to set the agenda is considered substantive. At this point, the Security Council votes substantively on the motion to set the agenda. A no vote from any member of the P5 will veto the motion.

If you have any questions about these issues or any other Security Council related question, please do not hesitate to consult your Director, Assistant Director, the Director-General or Deputy Director-General.

## The Double Veto

The Dais has ruled a vote procedural, and a member of the Committee does not agree. The delegate then raises their placard in their left hand to motion for a vote to challenge the procedural nature of the vote.

The Committee then votes on whether or not the vote is procedural.

If the vote receives nine or more “yeas” AND all of the P5 vote in the affirmative or abstain, the vote remains procedural and the Committee retakes the vote.

If the vote does not receive nine or more “yeas” AND an affirmative vote or abstention from all P5 members, the vote becomes substantive and the Committee retakes the vote as a substantive vote.



## **SRMUN Atlanta 2019 Joint Crisis Addendum**

SRMUN Atlanta 2019 will provide the delegates of the Security Council and NATO and the Security Council the unique experience of participating in a Joint Crisis. After years of Security Councils involved in crisis scenarios, requesting information and action from NATO, SRMUN has elected to allow both committees to participate and affect the same crisis scenario. This decision has greatly increased the scale and scope of the potential scenario and its outcomes. All SRMUN staff members who have worked diligently on this project are confident that it will provide greater engagement for delegates and are eager to see how they will respond to this challenging scenario.

### **Joint Crisis 101**

#### **I. Behind the Scenes**

The dais has worked to structure your committees in a balanced, paralleled way to be sure neither committee has an advantage over the other. Both committees will have equal time and opportunity to negotiate a peaceful, effective solution. Delegates will receive the very same intelligence at the very same time. The only information deemed to be legitimate is that which is delivered by your dais. Delegates will be challenged to participate in committee-wide caucuses, sometimes involving members of both NATO and the Security Council.

#### **II. What to Expect**

Once the crisis begins within each committee at the very same time, Member States should attempt to gather information, formulate a plan, and begin working on a viable solution. A viable solution considers the policy of the acting Member State and bearing in mind the purview of their committee's mandate. Successful delegates will strive to collaborate with their allies, while also working to find common ground with Member States they are typically at odds with. However, delegates should be aware that the crisis will likely develop rapidly, and often create a necessity for altering or even abandoning plans. Due to actions of opposing committees being unfavorable to the developments of one's strategy, it is essential that delegates remain in character throughout the duration of simulation and practice diplomacy with respectful negotiation tactics to reflect the caliber of this challenge.

Although both NATO and the Security Council are separate bodies, independent of each other, both are capable of impacting the crisis scenario, and therefore, *collaboration and communication between the two committees will be vital to the success of this concurrent crisis*. It should be noted, however, that for the sake of realistic simulation, neither committee will have any over-arching powers within the other. Should the two bodies find themselves with opposing solutions to the crisis, it will be up to the delegates to resolve the differences, or see two of the world's most impactful organizations act upon a crisis without proper coordination. If such a scenario occurs, the results will likely be unfavorable for all involved.

It is important to keep in mind that although the Joint Crisis allows for various tools to be used during simulation, ultimately the SRMUN Rules of Procedure are still in effect and delegates should familiarize themselves with it before starting session.

#### **III. Preparation**

The joint crisis will require every delegate to possess a great deal of knowledge regarding their Member State's capabilities, policies, and politics. The following are specific areas that deserve extra attention during preparation:

- **Military:** Each delegate should be aware of their Member State's military capabilities. Force size (human capital), locations, range, and capabilities will all be important.
- **Economy:** Crucial imports, exports, and trade deals should be prioritized. Trade partners and current embargoes or sanctions should be considered.
- **Politics:** Military alliances, historical relations, potential partners, and general dispositions should be well known.

A thorough understanding of your Member State's policies will give you greater authority and awareness of key issues. It is up to you to find ways to leverage your Member State's objectives.

## **Tools for Delegate Interaction and Committee Simulation**

### **IV. Updates**

Updates are the committees' primary source of information regarding the development of the crisis scenario. They often come in the form of news articles, press releases, government reports, and military briefings. Updates are written by conference staff and the information within them should be considered accurate. However, depending on the source, they may include comments, assertions, or even propaganda from other Member States, which may not necessarily be an accurate portrayal of events.

Following the presentation of each update, committees will be allotted five to ten minutes to receive any needed clarifications from the conference staff. After the five to ten minutes, delegates will need to use their best judgement to ascertain what they believe to be the truth.

### **V. Home Government Action Request (HGAR)**

#### **A. Description**

During the crisis simulation, delegates will have the opportunity to directly influence their Member State's response to the developing scenario through the use of a Home Government Action Request (HGAR). HGARs allow delegates to create changes, and take actions that normally would be outside the realistic powers of a UN or NATO representative. Such actions could include mobilization and utilization of military forces, espionage and intelligence operations, press releases, communiques, economic support or sanctions, and more.

HGARs come in three levels of visibility: **Covert, Overt, and Normal:**

- **Covert** actions are taken with the goal of not being discovered by other Member States. However, it should be noted that a HGAR requested to be Covert may not necessarily remain hidden, depending on the requested action, other Member States' actions, and the developments of the crisis scenario.
- **Overt** actions are conducted with the explicit intent of being observed by other Member States. Overt actions will likely be included in an update for both committees.
- **Normal** actions are taken with no regard for whether or not they are observed. Depending on the action, it may be included in a committee update, or may go unannounced to the other Member States.

## **B. Procedure**

All HGARs must be submitted on the HGAR template, which will be provided both electronically and hard copy to all delegates prior to the crisis starting. At the end of each session, delegates will have an opportunity to submit **one** HGAR to the committee staff per committee session (submissions are in hard copy format). HGARs will be accepted no later than ten minutes following the suspension of the committee session, so it is recommended that delegates utilize strong time management in order to submit a HGAR that is marked on time.

Please note - Member States with delegations in both NATO and Security Council can only submit a joint HGAR. These delegations are: Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, and United States of America. Member States with representation in both committees wishing to submit HGARs must have **joint approval** by both delegates, which will be proven by both delegates signing the HGAR form prior to submission. This is intended to balance the fact that some Member States do not have representation in both committees, and would be at a disadvantage if this rule were not in place.

*A sample HGAR has been included at the end of this guide.*

Following the end of the committee session, properly submitted HGARs will be reviewed by crisis staff for realism, feasibility, and appropriateness. HGARs deemed impossible, too far from a Member State's policies or capabilities, and/or otherwise inappropriate will be denied. Any Member State that submits a HGAR will be notified of their outcome during the following session, either privately or with the rest of the committee via updates.

Please remember that many actions will take time to complete. Moving a carrier strike group across the ocean, mobilizing thousands of soldiers, and ratifying trade deals are all actions that take time. To account for this, an amount of simulated time ranging from hours to days will pass between each committee session. This passage of time will be included in updates presented at the start of each session.

*Ultimate authority of all actions taken by all Member States lie with the crisis staff, who may approve, deny, and/or abandon any action for any reason they deem appropriate.*

## **VI. Speaker Requests**

During the course of the crisis simulation, it will be possible for committees to request an interview with a Member State of the other crisis committee (e.g. NATO wishes to formally interview the Chinese delegate to the Security Council). The purpose of these interviews is to gain information regarding the position of other Member States, working papers in a committee, or the disposition of a committee as a whole.

Delegates wishing to request an interview must first approach their dais with the request. The requesting committee's Director will then notify their counterpart, who will then ask the requested delegate if they wish to participate in this interview. Throughout this request process, if either Director denies the request, or the requested speaker declines the invitation, the interview will not happen. Once approved, the interview will last no longer than 15 minutes, and the requested speaker may choose to leave at any time.

## **VII. Joint Caucuses**

Throughout the crisis, there will be opportunities for both committees to hold informal caucuses together, for the purpose of collaborating, and updating each other on progress being made within each committee. Committee Directors will determine when such a time is appropriate or if necessary, and request a motion for a suspension of the meeting be made. Should the committees' informal caucuses overlap, delegates are welcome to intermingling for the sake of inter-committee collaboration. Although it is recommended that

delegates interact with their counterparts, it is in no way required. Moderated caucuses involving both committees will not be allowed.

The goal of these joint unmoderated caucuses is to assist both committees' efforts to produce resolutions that will provide coordinated solutions to the crisis. Although the resolutions do not have to be identical, nor are they expected to be, it would be in the interest of all involved if they proved to be complimentary, or at least avoided conflicting answers to the issue.

### **VIII. Voting**

For the purposes of voting, SRMUN Rules of Procedure will remain in place to be consistent across the conference's committees and to ensure transparency. When voting on a draft resolution, both bodies will vote in the traditional way that their committees do (all *NATO* decisions are made by *consensus*, after discussion and consultation among member countries so, delegates should strive to pass draft resolutions in this same manner. Somewhat similar, the Security Council requires nine affirmative votes total, and no veto from any of the five permanent members). Ideally, if there is opposition to a draft resolution, delegates will coordinate discussion to facilitate a positive outcome prior to moving to a vote.

### **IX. Awards**

Position paper, delegate and delegation awards are based on the same criteria as all other committees at SRMUN Atlanta. Please refer to the Delegate Resource Guide for additional information on awards.

**SRMUN ATLANTA 2019**  
**Home Government Action Request**

Member State:

United States of America

Requested Action:

Relocate US 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet to 25 Nautical Miles off the coast of Syria and begin conducting airstrikes on strategic ISIL targets in support of friendly forces in Syria. Simultaneously begin monitoring air and ground operations of Russian and Syrian Arab Army (SAA) forces.

Covert, Overt, or Normal (Please note that covert actions may or may not remain hidden):

Overt

If covert, please list countries you would like to inform of this action, if any:

N/A

Delegate Signature: John Q. Delegate\_\_\_\_\_