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ccpcj_atlanta@srmun.org

Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Atlanta 2019 and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). My name is Samuel Compagno and I will be serving as your Director for the CCPCJ. This will be my second conference as a SRMUN staff member. Previously, I served as the Assistant Director for the UN Environment Programme – Committee of Permanent Representative in SRMUN Atlanta 2018. I graduated from Kennesaw State University with a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice. Our committee's Assistant Director will be Joshua Perry. This will be Joshua's second time as a staff member, having served as Assistant Director for last year's Security Council. Joshua is a senior at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte currently studying both political science and history.

The CCPCJ was established in 1992 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to advise the committee on criminal justice policy. It serves as the governing body for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and assists in setting agenda topics for ECOSOC and the General Assembly.

By focusing on the mission of the CCPCJ, we have developed the following topics for the delegates to discuss and work together on developing meaningful and sustaining solutions:

- I. Developing Public-Private Partnerships to Prevent and Investigate Acts of Financial Cybercrime
- II. Improving Access to Social Service Programs for Incarcerated Juveniles

This background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, this background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on each of the two topics. Delegates should visit srmun.org for more detailed information about guidelines, formatting and how to write position papers. **All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, November 1, 2019 by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.**

Joshua and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for the CCPCJ. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you in the near future. Please feel free to contact Deputy Director-General Ryan Baerwalde, Joshua, or myself if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

Samuel Compagno
Director
ccpcj_atlanta@srmun.org

Joshua Perry
Assistant Director
ccpcj_atlanta@srmun.org

Ryan Baerwalde
Deputy Director-General
ddg1_atlanta@srmun.org

History of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) by passage of RES/1992/1.¹ This resolution was drafted in response to a request by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly to directly address issues relating to the prevention of crime within all Member States and the creation of fair domestic and international legal frameworks and systems.² The CCPCJ is meant to act as a primary lawmaking and policymaking body for the ECOSOC, focusing on “national and transnational crime and the efficiency and fairness of criminal justice administration systems.”³ The creation of this commission, however, was not unprecedented. Before 1992, a body meant to address broader issues pertaining to crime prevention already existed called the Committee on Crime Prevention and Crime Control (CCPCC). The CCPCC was established under the General Assembly in 1971, responding to a need for broader, technical criminal justice reform.⁴ The CCPCC was technically focused and meant to solve issues pertaining to international criminal justice policies. However, during a Ministerial meeting in Versailles, France in 1991, a “political agreement” was made upon which the CCPCJ was established and the CCPCC dissolved.⁵

ECOSOC passed RES/1991/22, in conjunction with RES/1992/1, to introduce the mandate of the CCPCJ, spelling out the areas in which it was meant to operate.⁶ Within this resolution, the CCPCJ was charged with the ability to assist Member States with a variety of legal and criminal justice-related initiatives.⁷ These initiatives include: assistance with peace-keeping operations in crime prevention and reformation of legal systems; the promotion of “policy-oriented research” in the interest of the CCPCJ; and the dissemination of information (such as crime trend surveys and national criminal justice frameworks) between participating Member States.⁸ Later, in 2006, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 61/252, which upgraded the status of the CCPCJ to that of a “governing body” of the Office on Drugs and Crime of the UN.⁹ This was a larger expansion to the original mandate of the CCPCJ, allowing for it to coordinate with other bodies whose mandates focus on crime prevention and criminal justice, as well as for the CCPCJ to serve as a key preparatory body within the UN Crime Congress and the Congress’ international crime prevention efforts.¹⁰ This shift brought on a new era of technical operation for the CCPCJ. The committee was given administrative power as a governing body of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to control the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Fund’s budget, noting that the Fund is responsible for providing resources and technical assistance with crime prevention and criminal justice reform.¹¹

Historically, the CCPCJ has discussed a large array of topics in relation to crime prevention and criminal justice. While the CCPCJ was established in 1992, its true work began in 1994 when it passed resolutions responding to numerous subjects including violence against women and children, international trafficking of minors, and even cases of state succession.¹² These varied areas of concern demonstrated to the UN the CCPCJ’s jurisdiction was far-reaching and diverse. Throughout the rest of the 1990s, the CCPCJ revisited many of the aforementioned topics in the form of follow-up recommendations and resolutions. For example, in 1995 the CCPCJ continued the debate on

¹ UN ECOSOC, Resolution 1, *Establishment of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, RES/1992/1, February 6, 1992, http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/ECOSOC_Resolution-1992-1_E.pdf.

² ECOSOC, *Establishment of the Commission... Justice*, 1992.

³ Mabubeke, “UN Office on Drugs and Crime.” *Integrity in the Criminal Justice System*, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/index.html>, (accessed February 21, 2019).

⁴ “Mandates and Functions,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Mandate-Functions.html, (accessed February 22, 2019).

⁵ “Mandates and Functions,” 2019.

⁶ Mabubeke, *Integrity in the Criminal Justice System*, 2019.

⁷ ECOSOC, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolution*, 1992.

⁸ UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 22, *Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 46/152 concerning operational activities and coordination in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice*, RES/1992/22, July 30, 1992, http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/ECOSOC_Resolution-1992-22_E.pdf.

⁹ Mabubeke, *Integrity in the Criminal Justice System*, 2019.

¹⁰ UN General Assembly, Resolution 252, *Questions relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2006–2007*, GA/RES/61/252, December 22, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/General_Assembly/CCPCJ/GA-61-252.pdf.

¹¹ “Mandates and Functions,” 2019.

¹² *Crime-related Resolutions and Decisions 1990 to 1999*, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/Resolutions_Decisions/Resolutions_1990-1999.html, (accessed February 23, 2019).

state succession in relation to international treaties. Subsequently, CCPCJ's RES/4/1, titled "Succession of States in Respect of International Treaties on Combatting Various Manifestations of Crime," urged new state governments to remain "bound by obligation" to international treaties agreed upon by the predecessor state/government in question.¹³ In other words, the CCPCJ set an international precedent by concluding a government which succeeds a dissolved or overthrown administration must uphold international treaties agreed upon by the previous administration. The relevance of CCPCJ/RES/4/1 lies in the fact the CCPCJ now played a direct role in guaranteeing consistency in inter-state relations, where the evolution of a government could threaten political agreements, economic arrangements, or even peace itself. Now Member States were upheld by the CCPCJ to defend these logistical consistencies over time and changing administrations, speaking to the growing reach of the CCPCJ.

In 2001, the CCPCJ held a symposium in response to an international uptick in terror attacks. Titled "Combating International Terrorism: The Contribution of the UN," the CCPCJ renewed its commitment to combatting terrorism, and all forms of crime which assist in its perpetration, such as arms sales and human trafficking.¹⁴ While nothing concrete came from the proceedings of the symposium, the event acted to redirect the work of both the CCPCJ as well as the Office of Drugs and Crime in their efforts to combat crime internationally, instead shifting focus to topics related to terrorism.¹⁵ For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime launched the "Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism" in 2003, focusing on providing assistance to Member States' criminal justice systems in the face of terrorist attacks.¹⁶

Moving forward into the latter part of the 2000s, the CCPCJ's work to address human trafficking cannot be understated. For example, in 2007 the CCPCJ launched the "Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking," or UN-GIFT, via CCPCJ Decision 16/2.¹⁷ This initiative was officially launched in February 2008 under the title "The Vienna Forums."¹⁸ UN-GIFT called upon the Vienna Forum to occur in 2008, giving it the mandate to "facilitate cooperation and partnerships" between those combating human trafficking, create a trust fund between the UNODC and UN-GIFT, and even urge the UNODC to help facilitate the implementation of the Vienna Forum's agenda.¹⁹

In more recent years, the CCPCJ has produced resolutions over a broad array of political topics. From 2010 to 2012, it passed numerous resolutions aimed at combatting piracy and smuggling.²⁰ Somali pirate operations were specifically addressed by the Commission multiple times this decade through RES/19/16 and RES/21/2.²¹ The CCPCJ has persistently focused on trafficking and transnational crime, leading to the passage of numerous resolutions on the matter since 2010. These include: "Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Organs and Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal" (2016) and "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective into Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Policies and Programmes and into Efforts to Prevent and Combat Transnational Organized Crime" (2017).²² During its most recent session in 2018, the CCPCJ passed multiple resolutions on different aspects of trafficking and organized crime, but also used one resolution to call attention to more progressive reform-related issues, such as restorative justice and its role in criminal justice system (Resolution 27/6).²³ This latest session seems to round off a decade of focus on human trafficking and pirating/smuggling crimes, with occasional digression in the form of resolutions on reform-related matters. In 2016 the Director of the

¹³ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 1, Succession of States in respect of international treaties on combatting various manifestations of crime, RES/4/1, 1995. http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/1990-1999/1995/CCPCJ/Resolution_4-1.pdf.

¹⁴ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 1, Combating international terrorism: the contribution of the UN, RES/11/1, 2001. http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2000-2009/2002/CCPCJ/Resolution_11-1.pdf.

¹⁵ Combating international terrorism, 2001.

¹⁶ Samah.hassan. "United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime." TPB Work and Role, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/UNODC_Role.html, (accessed on May 25, 2019).

¹⁷ UN CCPCJ, Decision 2, Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, DEC/16/2, 2007. http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2000-2009/2007/CCPCJ/Decision_16-2.pdf.

¹⁸ Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, 2007.

¹⁹ Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, 2007.

²⁰ "Crime-related Resolutions and Decisions 2010 to 2019", UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CCPCJ/Resolutions_Decisions/Resolutions_2010-2019.html.

²¹ "Crime-related Resolutions and Decisions 2010 to 2019", UNODC.

²² "Crime-related Resolutions and Decisions 2010 to 2019", UNODC.

²³ "Crime-related Resolutions and Decisions 2010 to 2019", UNODC.

UNODC, Yury Fedotov, commented on the impressive recent work of the CCPCJ, highlighting recent efforts into transnational organized crime.²⁴ He states “the (CCPCJ’s) bold work provides a solid platform for UNODC’s own activities,” thus solidifying the CCPCJ as a fixture of the UN’s larger focus on crime and justice well into the 21st century.²⁵

²⁴ "UN Official Acclaims 2016 Crime Commission Session for Role in Sustainable Development | UN News." United Nations, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/530622-un-official-acclaims-2016-crime-commission-session-role-sustainable-development>, (Accessed on May 25th 2019).

²⁵ UN News, UN Official Acclaims, 2016.

I. Developing Public-Private Partnerships to Prevent and Investigate Acts of Financial Cybercrime

*“Organized criminal networks lurk on the dark web, profiting from encryption and near-anonymous cryptocurrency payments to traffic in people and illegal goods. Some reports estimate that cybercrime is now putting US \$1.5 trillion in the pockets of cybercriminals annually.”- Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General*²⁶

Introduction

Crime is a concept as old as mankind. The Code of Hammurabi, one of the first codifications of law, was created by the Babylonians over 4,000 years ago and had definitions, as well as punishments, for the theft of property.²⁷ While the basic concept of theft remains unchanged from that time, the means and methods by which theft is carried out have become vastly sophisticated with the dawn of the Digital Age. Banking, stock trading, and business transactions can be carried out with a few clicks of a mouse. In 2014, it was estimated that online businesses generated USD 1.2 million of revenue every 30 seconds.²⁸ Unfortunately, as new technologies are created in this Digital Age, so too are more means created for criminals to carry out nefarious acts. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres provided the startling estimate that cybercriminals earn over USD 1.5 trillion each year through malicious activities, and that figure will only grow without swift action taken on the international stage.²⁹ There are numerous public and private sector efforts being carried out to prevent and combat financial cybercrime, but the UN still lacks a cohesive, unified strategy to protect the financial interests of its Member States’ citizenry.

Defining “Financial Cybercrime”

While there is no official definition of cybercrime with the United Nations (UN), the UN’s Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders’ provided the following definitions for cybercrime during its tenth meeting:

a. Cybercrime in a narrow sense (computer crime): Any illegal behavior directed by means of electronic operations that targets the security of computer systems and the data processed by them.

b. Cybercrime in a broader sense (computer-related crime): Any illegal behavior committed by means of, or in relation to, a computer system or network, including such crimes as illegal possession [and] offering or distributing information by means of a computer system or network.”³⁰

While, at first glance, this appears to provide a comprehensive definition of cybercrime, “any illegal behavior” is a key phrase because only illegal actions are included.³¹ For example, if one Member State bans tampering with ATMs, but another does not, then the “cybercrime” of hacking ATMs only exists in the first Member State. This generalized definition makes creating concrete, international legislation extremely difficult.

There are many ill intentions behind cybercrime, but some of the most damaging involve the theft of monetary resources or manipulation of financial institutions.³² According to Murali Mohan, a cybercrime expert, “identity

²⁶ “Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly,” UN Secretary-General, last modified September 25, 2018, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-09-25/secretary-generals-address-general-assembly-delivered-trilingual>.

²⁷ Robert Harper, *The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon: About 2250 B.C.* (Union, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange, LTD, 1999).

²⁸ Shea Bennett, “How Much Online Business Is Done Every 30 Seconds? Incredible E-Commerce Statistics!,” *Adweek.com*, July 11, 2014, <https://www.adweek.com/digital/real-time-ecommerce/>.

²⁹ “Secretary-General’s Address,” September 25, 2018.

³⁰ Pedro Rivera, “United Nations’ Definition of Cybercrime,” *Innovative Dynamic Networks*, <https://idn-wi.com/united-nations-definition-cybercrime/>.

³¹ Rivera, “Definition of Cybercrime.”

³² Anil Budur Lulla, “UN Should Take Stronger Steps on Cybersecurity as Economic Crime and Data Theft Dominate Digital World,” *Yourstory*, October 24, 2016, <https://yourstory.com/2016/10/un-day-cybersecurity>.

theft and bank data thefts...can have international ramifications...[and] the number of financial crimes are very high.”³³ Furthermore, banks are usually unforgiving and tend to blame the victims of scams for their own mistakes.³⁴ Millions of people have been affected by credit card breaches, but credit card companies simply send new cards while frequently failing to solve the root of the problem.³⁵ There are many other vulnerabilities to the worldwide financial market.³⁶ The term “financial cybercrime” as utilized in this background guide may refer to the type of cybercrime meant to steal or negatively impact the monetary resources and/or institutions of individuals, governments, or businesses.

Current Situation

Many bodies within the United Nations (UN) have suggested parameters for cybercrime, but the UN has yet to adopt an official definition.³⁷ This partially stems from the fact that numerous Member States have yet to codify cybercrime in their judicial systems, and even those who have codified lack cohesiveness and standardization amongst each other.³⁸ For example, on national levels, less than one-third of Member States in Asia, Africa, and South America have legal codes that citizens feel effectively define and prosecute cybercrime.³⁹ 50 percent of those Member States are not working to improve their laws either.⁴⁰ Digital infrastructure, both public and private, can be lacking for Member States in these areas and the Global South which makes such legislation a low priority.⁴¹

However, there are international organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States (LAS), which have created binding and non-binding measures to address cybercrime.⁴² These organizations still lack a definition of cybercrime, but the LAS has “criminal provisions on the use of a computer system for forgery, threats, blackmail...unlawfully obtaining the numbers or particulars of a credit card...and transferring illicit funds or disguising their illicit origin.”⁴³ Regulations regarding copyright have been drafted by the EU but some lack criminalization.⁴⁴ While the EU and LAS policies were developed independent of each other, each organization can learn from and improve upon the work of the other.⁴⁵ Some progress is being made on both national and regional levels towards clarification. Member States are beginning to create legal definitions to distinguish between gaining illegal access to a computer system versus interfering with a computer system.⁴⁶ This is important for financial cybercrime matters because there is a difference between using computers to steal personal information or digital assets and carrying out a cyberattack to impede or shutdown an electronic system or process. For example, if a hacker stole credit card information, as was the case in 2013 when 40 million credit card accounts were illicitly obtained from the American retailer Target, this would be a financial cybercrime in which someone gained illegal access.⁴⁷ On the other hand, if someone interfered with traffic lights causing delays, this would be interfering with a computer system and not a financial cybercrime. While there are secondary financial consequences to this action (people are late to work, gas is wasted sitting in traffic, etc.), this is not the immediate goal of the hack. An exception to this would be if a company’s operations were interfered with via ransomware and a fee had to be paid. An example of a financial cybercrime which threatened the entire international shipping industry will be presented later in this guide.

³³ Lulla, “UN Should Take Stronger Steps on Cybersecurity.”

³⁴ Lulla, “UN Should Take Stronger Steps on Cybersecurity.”

³⁵ Max Eddy, “SecurityWatch: Make Corporations, Not Customers, Suffer for Data Breaches,” *PCMag.com*, last modified April 17, 2019, <https://www.pcmag.com/commentary/367808/securitywatch-make-corporations-not-customers-suffer-for>.

³⁶ Lulla, “UN Should Take Stronger Steps on Cybersecurity.”

³⁷ Rivera, “Definition of Cybercrime.”

³⁸ Rivera, “Definition of Cybercrime.”

³⁹ Steven Malby, Robyn Mace, Anika Holterhof, Cameron Brown, Stefan Kascherus, and Eva Ignatuschtschenko, “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime: Draft, February 2013,” UNODC, last modified February 2013, https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf.

⁴⁰ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴¹ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴² Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴³ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴⁴ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴⁵ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴⁶ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴⁷ Gregory Wallace, “Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know,” *CNNBusiness.com*, last modified December 23, 2013, <https://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/index.html>.

Adoption of criminal codes for cybercrime may be slow, but public-private partnerships (PPPs) are already becoming more prevalent to curb the rise of cybercrime.⁴⁸ PPPs are agreements between government entities and private companies which aim “to exploit synergies in the joint innovative use of resources and in the application of management knowledge, with optimal attainment of the goals of all parties involved, where these goals could not be attained to the same extent without the other parties.”⁴⁹ In 2016, the European Commission and European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO) signed a contractual public-private partnership (PPP) agreement “to foster cooperation between public and private actors at early stages of the research and innovation process in order to allow people in Europe to access innovative and trustworthy European solutions.”⁵⁰ Prior to this PPP, a survey found that over 75 percent of European companies had experienced a cybersecurity incident within the previous 12 months.⁵¹ This statistic, in part, led to the adoption of this first PPP on cybersecurity.⁵² As part of this PPP, the EU agreed to invest over USD 500 million for innovation and research.⁵³ Additionally, members of the EU are working to standardize the certificates and licenses required for information and communication technologies (ICTs).⁵⁴

At the same time this precedent-setting agreement was reached, the EU also passed the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive.⁵⁵ As the first cybersecurity legislation adopted by the EU, the NIS Directive had three components: national capabilities, cross-border collaboration, and national supervision of critical sectors.⁵⁶ Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) were also created “in order to rapidly react to cyber threats and incidents.”⁵⁷ Individually, EU Member States were required to reach minimum levels of cybersecurity protection capabilities and to establish at least one CSIRT.⁵⁸ They were also required to develop a national strategy to respond to cybersecurity threats.⁵⁹ In order to foster the cross-border collaboration, a Cooperation Group was established to establish and maintain a Work Programme, assist CSIRTs, and share information.⁶⁰ Finally, the critical sectors the NIS identified, including financial market infrastructures, are given high priority for protection by both individual Member States and the EU as a whole.⁶¹ In May of 2021, an assessment of the Directive is scheduled and will evaluate Member States and the EU on adoption and implementation.⁶² Digitaleurope.org has a tracker which allows the public to see the progress being made by each Member State towards compliance with the NIS Directive.⁶³ The EU’s work with the ECSO contractual PPP and the NIS Directive are excellent examples of the cooperation that is possible to combat cybercrime threats.

Another step towards establishing successful PPPs occurred when the World Economic Forum (WEF) published “Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership against Cybercrime” as part of its Cybercrime Project.⁶⁴ Five recommendations were made for PPPs:

⁴⁸ Malby et al., “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime.”

⁴⁹ Jomo KS, Anis Chowdhury, Krishnan Sharma, and Daniel Platz, “Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Fit for purpose?” Department of Economic & Social Affairs, February 2016, https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2016/wp148_2016.pdf.

⁵⁰ “Cybersecurity Industry,” European Commission, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cybersecurity-industry>.

⁵¹ “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity and Steps up Efforts to Tackle Cyber-threats,” European Commission, last modified July 5, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2321_en.htm.

⁵² “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity,” European Commission.

⁵³ “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity,” European Commission.

⁵⁴ “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity,” European Commission.

⁵⁵ “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity,” European Commission.

⁵⁶ “NIS Directive,” EU Agency for Network and Information Security, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/nis-directive>.

⁵⁷ “Commission Signs Agreement with Industry on Cybersecurity,” European Commission.

⁵⁸ “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems: European Commission – Fact Sheet,” European Commission Press Release Database, July 6, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2422_en.htm.

⁵⁹ “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems,” European Commission.

⁶⁰ “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems,” European Commission.

⁶¹ “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems,” European Commission.

⁶² “Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems,” European Commission.

⁶³ “NIS Implementation Tracker,” DigitalEurope.org, last modified March 25, 2019, <https://www.digitaleurope.org/resources/nis-implementation-tracker/>.

⁶⁴ Jean-Luc Vez and Ushang Damachi, “Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership against Cybercrime,” World Economic Forum, last modified January 2016, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cybercrime_Principles.pdf.

1. *Public and private sectors should share more information related to cyber threats, vulnerability and consequences[.]*
2. *Public and private sectors should work to create new platforms, strengthen existing platforms, and coordinate these platforms to increase information-sharing and improve investigations and prosecutions[.]*
3. *Public and private sectors should cooperate to encourage and advance wider adoption of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, or, of the principles it promotes.*
4. *Public and private sectors should work to build trust and discuss contentious topics related to cybercrime, such as encryption, cloud servers, data access and protection of privacy, to find appropriate solutions.*
5. *Public and private sectors can engage in other initiatives aimed at reducing cybercrime.*⁶⁵

While these recommendations are not specific to financial cybercrime, there are several clauses in the report that deal with prevention and investigation. For example, Recommendation 1 clause C suggests “[t]he sharing of experiences from investigations and prosecutions, and clause D suggests “[t]he sharing of technical prevention and protection measures.”⁶⁶ When discussing how to prevent cyberattacks and enable law enforcement investigations, it is crucial to remember that many successful tools and methods have already been developed. In the United States, cyber investigators are becoming more widespread in police departments.⁶⁷ The National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI) was established in 2008 to provide police departments and prosecutors training for investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes.⁶⁸ National agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Secret Service, and Department of Defense, are constantly developing defensive and investigative tools to prevent and track cybercrime both nationally and globally.⁶⁹ However, not all governments and companies have access to these tools and methods. Therefore, finding efficient means to share developments on an international level will bring significant aid to defeating cybercrime threats.

Unfortunately, the CCPCJ has not done much work with regards to PPPs or financial cybercrime, and the last time a CCPCJ resolution addressed cybercrime was 2017.⁷⁰ However, there are three resolutions worth noting. First, Resolution 22/7 calls attention to a study the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conducted on cybercrime and how Member States can strengthen international cooperation to prevent cybercrime.⁷¹ Next, Resolution 22/8 calls on the UNODC to provide technical assistance in preventing cybercrime, including creating a collection of cybercrime laws for Member States to reference.⁷² Lastly, the most recent resolution, 26/4, called on an open-ended Expert Group to conduct a study on cybercrime and to report the findings back to the CCPCJ.⁷³ As evidenced in these resolutions, the CCPCJ And the UNODC have studied the problem of cybercrime at length, but little legislative action has been taken in the interest of investigating or preventing the cybercrime which is being studied.

⁶⁵ Vez and Damachi, “Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership.”

⁶⁶ Vez and Damachi, “Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership.”

⁶⁷ David Griffith, “Fighting Cybercrime at the Local Level,” *Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine*, November 3, 2017, <https://www.policemag.com/342353/fighting-cybercrime-at-the-local-level>.

⁶⁸ Griffith, “Fighting Cybercrime.”

⁶⁹ Griffith, “Fighting Cybercrime.”

⁷⁰ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 26/4, Strengthening international cooperation to combat cybercrime, 2017, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_26/CCCPI_Res_Dec/CCPCJ-RES-26-4.pdf.

⁷¹ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 22/7, Strengthening international cooperation to combat cybercrime, 2013, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2010-2019/2013/CCPCJ/Resolution_22-7.pdf.

⁷² UN CCPCJ, Resolution 22/8, Promoting technical assistance and capacity-building to strengthen national measures and international cooperation against cybercrime, 2013, https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2010-2019/2013/CCPCJ/Resolution_22-8.pdf.

⁷³ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 26/4.

Case Study: NotPetya & Maersk

A.P. Møller-Maersk (Maersk) is the leading commercial shipper in the world.⁷⁴ Their headquarters are in Copenhagen, Denmark, but their ships carry freight to all corners of the globe.⁷⁵ Any food, clothes, cars, machine parts, medicine, or raw materials shipped internationally are highly likely to touch a Maersk ship at some point along their journey.⁷⁶ On June 27, 2017, the entire company's computer network was compromised by a ransomware virus called "NotPetya."⁷⁷ It was developed by combining two previous viruses, EternalBlue and Mimikatz.⁷⁸ EternalBlue was a skeleton key developed by the United States government to allow unrestricted backdoor access to any computer utilizing a Windows operating system.⁷⁹ Users of EternalBlue could access a computer's complete hard drive and run operations in the background without the owner of the machine knowing anything was going on.⁸⁰ Mimikatz found passwords stored in Windows computers' short-term memory.⁸¹ Combined together, NotPetya made it possible to infiltrate and takeover an entire network before anyone knew what was happening. As Craig Williams, Cisco's Talos Division Director of Outreach, put it, "By the second you saw it, your data center was already gone."⁸² Ironically, the virus was spread via a cyberattack by Russia aimed at Ukraine, but a Maersk terminal in Ukraine became infected and spread the virus across the global network in minutes.⁸³

When all of the computer screens across Maersk went dark on that Tuesday, most employees were sent home because there was literally no work to be done.⁸⁴ All of Maersk's shipments and records were digital, so the company's shipping operations came to a complete halt.⁸⁵ Thousands of containers of freight had to be held on ships, at ports, or stored because there was no way to know where they were supposed to go.⁸⁶ Thousands of truckers sat in lines outside ports with no way to collect their cargo.⁸⁷ These idle containers represented over USD 1 million of product and revenue for companies that was lost on a daily basis.⁸⁸ The full scope of the impact this one virus had on the international market is unknown, but it is estimated to have cost Maersk customers at least USD 2 billion, and it was all caused by the interconnectedness and lack of protection millions of computer networks have.⁸⁹

Because the ransomware was not directed at Maersk, there was no one the company could pay the fine to in order to regain control of their systems. It appeared that everyone one of the company's servers had been compromised and they would need to rebuild their entire operating system from scratch.⁹⁰ But then three days after the cyberattack, it was discovered that one server had remained uncompromised because a station in Ghana had lost power before the virus spread.⁹¹ Luck was the only measure that saved Maersk and the millions of tons of freight it was responsible for. Ten days after the attack, Maersk had rebuilt its network of 4,000 servers and 45,000 computers.⁹² However, complete recovery took approximately two months and cost Maersk USD 250-300 million, both in lost revenue, repairs, and new equipment.⁹³

⁷⁴ Andy Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack in History," *Wired.com*, last modified August 22, 2018, <https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/>.

⁷⁵ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁷⁶ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁷⁷ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁷⁸ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁷⁹ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁰ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸¹ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸² Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸³ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁴ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁵ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁶ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁷ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁸ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁸⁹ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁹⁰ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁹¹ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁹² Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

⁹³ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

Despite the overwhelming losses of digital infrastructure and revenue, Maersk did not reach out to government agencies for assistance.⁹⁴ Protecting the company's integrity and corporate secrets was more important than allowing government agencies access to Maersk.⁹⁵ Information regarding the amount of devastation NotPetya wreaked only comes from tightly controlled press releases and data provided by Maersk.⁹⁶ In the United States, other companies were affected by the NotPetya virus as well, but failed to cooperate with government agencies requesting information about the attacks.⁹⁷ One cybersecurity firm, Symantec, had ten to twenty times the reported number of NotPetya attacks the government was aware of.⁹⁸ The information these companies denied the government "could have been used to inform policymakers about the perpetrator of the attack and potential responses."⁹⁹ Had a PPP been in place for these companies and their respective governments, the attack might have been prevented or resolved more quickly saving time, money, and resources. More importantly, government agencies would be able to prepare for future instances similar to NotPetya and help private companies prevent similar attacks from occurring again.

Since this incident, companies and governments have worked hard to improve security so as to prevent another NotPetya-like attack. Backup servers with clean operating systems are stored offline so a virus cannot be automatically uploaded.¹⁰⁰ Measures like the EU's NIS Directive are working to protect vital economic functions and have plans in place to quickly respond to instances of cyberattacks.¹⁰¹ But Maersk's most important lesson is that cyberwarfare can have collateral damage, and international regulation and protection are needed to prevent cyber aggressions by Member States from damaging vital economic processes.¹⁰² Additionally, PPPs are needed so that if an incident such as NotPetya occurs again, a company will not have to stand alone against the threat, and a Member State's chosen government officials will have an active role in protecting citizens from the attack.

Conclusion

Financial cybercrime represents a significant threat to Member States and their citizens and there is currently significant work in progress on national and regional levels. The EU and LAS are continuously working towards defining and criminalizing cybercrime, while many committees and conferences within the UN are also working towards those same goals.¹⁰³ But the international cyber community needs centralized, standardized direction that the UN is poised to provide. Member States still need to define cybercrime on national levels, but a standard UN definition would be of great assistance towards this goal.¹⁰⁴

Coordination of protective and investigative tools between the public and private sectors are crucial to impeding the efforts of those who would profit from the vulnerable. The NIS Directive implemented within the EU is exceptional PPP legislation which works to improve national and international levels of cybersecurity which, in part, helps protect financial institutions and systems.¹⁰⁵ Since the directive is still being implemented, it is hard to measure its effectiveness, but the progress towards full implementation is available to the public.¹⁰⁶

As demonstrated in the case study, one virus on one computer can have devastating consequences of international proportions. To date, cybercrime has already cost the world trillions of dollars, and this amount is only growing.¹⁰⁷ Bringing this topic to the forefront of the UN, and providing an global framework for governments, companies, and other stakeholders to stand together against cybercrime, will spur development and progress towards reducing

⁹⁴ Chris Bing, "U.S. Official: American Companies Avoided Government Help When WannaCry, NotPetya hit," *Cyberscoop*, September 13, 2017, <https://www.cyberscoop.com/wannacry-notpetya-dhs-chris-krebs/>.

⁹⁵ Bing, "American Companies Avoided Government Help."

⁹⁶ Bing, "American Companies Avoided Government Help."

⁹⁷ Bing, "American Companies Avoided Government Help."

⁹⁸ Bing, "American Companies Avoided Government Help."

⁹⁹ Bing, "American Companies Avoided Government Help."

¹⁰⁰ Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

¹⁰¹ "Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems," European Commission.

¹⁰² Greenberg, "The Untold Story of NotPetya."

¹⁰³ Malby et al., "Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime."

¹⁰⁴ Rivera, "Definition of Cybercrime."

¹⁰⁵ "Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems," European Commission.

¹⁰⁶ "NIS Implementation Tracker," DigitalEurope.org.

¹⁰⁷ "Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly," UN Secretary-General.

instances of theft of any form in cyberspace. Member States also need to consider forming their own PPPs with both domestic and international businesses in order to protect those affected by financial cybercrime within their own borders. Partnerships between companies and government agencies can help organize a faster response to a cyberattack as well as share key data required for future protective measures.

Committee Directive

Delegates must work diligently to remember the specifics of this topic, particularly the “financial cybercrime” aspect. For this topic, the CCCPJ’s responsibility is to provide recommendations to ECOSOC on how to promote PPPs which will help prevent financial cybercrime. While the CCPCJ is always examining cybercrime as a whole, it has not narrowed its focus to financial cybercrime and the benefits of PPPs, so delegates will be provide the opportunity set new precedent for the CCPCJ.

There are several questions delegates should ask themselves when working on position papers and preparing for committee. What definitions of cybercrime do Member States or their allies already have in place? How often and to what financial damages does financial cybercrime takes place within or near the Member States or their neighbors? Are there any PPPs that CCPCJ Member States had already founded or joined? What is already being done by Member States to prevent and investigate financial cybercrime, and how can these measures be implemented globally?

While in committee, delegates should use examples of individual and regional PPPs, both provided in the background guide as well as those found during research for position papers, to create a framework for PPPs that ECOSOC, as well as other UN organizations, can use to form PPPs with companies to work with the UN. Delegates should also explore Member State partnerships, such as treaties, which could help achieve the goal of preventing and investigating cybercrime. However, delegates should avoid “reinventing the wheel” when it comes to drafting new committees or agreements. As demonstrated in this background guide, there a foundation already set regarding individual and regional PPPs, so apply the established work towards international PPPs which can address financial cybercrime on a global scale.

II. Improving Access to Social Service Programs for Incarcerated Juveniles

"I think it's important for us as a society to remember that the youth within juvenile justice systems are, most of the time, youths who simply haven't had the right mentors and supporters around them - because of circumstances beyond their control." - Q'orianka Kilcher¹⁰⁸

Introduction

Incarceration, in any shape or form, is a life changing experience for all individuals whether they are an adult or juvenile entering the prison system. As of 2016, the UN Children's Fund predicted that over two million juveniles are incarcerated globally.¹⁰⁹ However, the previous figure may not accurately reflect the true number of juveniles in incarceration due to poor record keeping and an overall lack of institutional transparency regarding imprisonment worldwide.¹¹⁰ It is important to note that, according to the United Nations (UN), a juvenile is any person between ages seven and 18.¹¹¹ Numerous resolutions, conventions, and international agreements work to protect the basic rights of juveniles, but these guidelines are largely related to the basic rights of all individuals, and not the specific social services necessary to rehabilitate a juvenile placed in confinement, allowing them to be more likely to find success after serving his/her sentence.¹¹²

Actions Taken by the UN

The Beijing Rules, passed in 1985 by the General Assembly, set minimum requirements for the treatment of juveniles during periods of incarceration.¹¹³ This includes social services, such as "court diversion" tactics, social inquiry reports into the sociological condition of the juvenile, as well as educational/vocational services.¹¹⁴ Article 26.1 of the Beijing Rules framework states that juvenile institutions must ensure the implementation of services aimed at "assisting them [juveniles] to assume socially constructive and productive roles in society."¹¹⁵ Article 26.2 follows by stating that all juvenile offenders are to receive assistance while incarcerated on the basis of education, vocation, medical, and social need.¹¹⁶ While the "social needs" of offenders are explicitly mentioned within this clause, the protections end there.

Moving into the 1990s, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/45/113 and the accompanying Annex "Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty" were passed.¹¹⁷ This Resolution and its Annex spelled out the specific requirements Member States must meet regarding juvenile imprisonment and the treatment of juvenile offenders.¹¹⁸ However, the social services necessary to properly maintain, rehabilitate, and ensure each child will exit the prison system as a reformed, productive teenager or adult are still overlooked within this document. The aforementioned annex is extremely specific regarding the basic needs of juveniles such as: compulsory education, access to sources of knowledge (including libraries), the right to vocational training, free expression of religious beliefs, and proper medical care, among other "fundamental rights."¹¹⁹ However, it is crucial to note that extended

¹⁰⁸ Hernandez, Lee, "Firelight' Star On Juvenile Delinquents," HuffPost, HuffPost, 23 Apr. 2012,

www.huffpost.com/entry/qorianka-kilcher-portrays-juvenile-delinquent_n_1444358?guccounter=1.

¹⁰⁹ "Children Behind Bars: The Global Overuse of Detention of Children," Human Rights Watch, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/children-behind-bars>.

¹¹⁰ Children Behind Bars, Human Rights Watch, 2018.

¹¹¹ UN General Assembly, Resolution 40, UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules"), A/RES/40/33, November 29, 1985, <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/beijingrules.pdf>.

¹¹² Rosemary C. Sarri, "Juvenile Justice: Overview," *Encyclopedia of Social Work*, accessed May 22, 2019, <https://oxfordre.com/socialwork/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.001.0001/acrefore-9780199975839-e-572>.

¹¹³ "What is the Convention on the Rights of the Child?," International Juvenile Justice Observatory, accessed May 22, 2019, www.oiji.org/en/preguntas-frecuentes#152479-0.

¹¹⁴ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

¹¹⁵ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

¹¹⁶ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

¹¹⁷ UN General Assembly, Resolution 45, UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, A/RES/45/113, December 14, 1990, <https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r113.htm>.

¹¹⁸ UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/113, 1990.

¹¹⁹ UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/113, 1990.

health services, substance abuse workshops, conflict-mediation exercises, and numerous other social services are not directly mentioned by A/RES/45/113 or its annex.

Looking at both the Beijing Rules of 1985 and A/RES/45/113 of 1990, there is a broader focus on education and vocational training, rather than health services for juvenile offenders within detention centers. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, incarcerated juveniles are two to three times more likely to commit suicide than juveniles not in incarceration, and it is important to note the already high suicide rates among this age group, of 10.5 per 100,000.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, the rate of incarcerated juveniles who committed suicide is estimated to be 21.9 per 100,000.¹²¹

In 2014, the CCPCJ recommended the passage and adoption of resolution 69/194 by the General Assembly. Titled “United Nations Model Strategies and Practical Measures on the Elimination of Violence against Children in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,” the resolution emphasized that all juveniles to come into contact with the justice system, including victims, witnesses, and offenders, be treated in a “child-sensitive manner.”¹²² Additionally, to address the specific needs of juvenile offenders, the CCPCJ further recommended General Assembly Member States to adopt the “United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,” better known as the “Riyadh Rules” of 1990.¹²³ While the “Riyadh Rules” focus largely on the prevention of juvenile delinquency, the document highlights the need for substantial mental and physical health services, quality education, and vocational training in order to prevent future delinquency, and also states that the institutionalization of juveniles should be considered a “last resort.”¹²⁴

Current Situation

The rate of mental health issues among juvenile offenders is significantly higher than rates found in other children.¹²⁵ Approximately two-thirds of all male juvenile offenders meet the criteria to qualify for at least one mental disorder.¹²⁶ With an estimated global incarcerated juvenile population of roughly two million, this statistic would suggest around 1.4 million juveniles exhibit at least one diagnosable mental illness.¹²⁷ Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is one of the most common mental health issues among juvenile offenders with rates running from 20 to 23 percent of all juvenile offenders meeting the criteria for clinical diagnosis, according to a study completed by the 2009 NSW Young People in Custody Health Survey.¹²⁸ Research via Child Abuse, and Neglect: International Journal, published in 2013, shows that PTSD often originates from abuse and/or neglect by the parent, with around 60 percent of respondents reporting neglect and/or abuse during their childhood.¹²⁹

¹²⁰ “Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors among Detained Youth,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, <https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/243891.pdf>, (accessed May 22, 2019).

¹²¹ Stokes, Marquita L., Kathleen P. McCoy, Karen M. Abram, Gayle R. Byck, and Linda A. Teplin. “Suicidal Ideation and Behavior in Youth in the Juvenile Justice System,” *Journal of Correctional Health Care* 21, no. 3 (2015): 222-42. doi:10.1177/1078345815587001.

¹²² “Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,” Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. United Nations. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=30022&nr=210&menu=3170>, (Assessed August 20, 2019).

¹²³ Commission, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2019.

¹²⁴ “United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,” Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. United Nations. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/PreventionOfJuvenileDelinquency.aspx>, (Accessed August 20, 2019).

¹²⁵ Thomas Grisso and Lee A. Underwood, “Screening and Assessing Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders Among Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: A Resource Guide for Practitioners,” *PsycEXTRA Dataset*, 2004, doi:10.1037/e311052005-001.

¹²⁶ Susan Young, Ben Greer, and Richard Church, “Juvenile Delinquency, Welfare, Justice and Therapeutic Interventions: A Global Perspective,” *BJPsych Bull* [41] no. 1 (2017): 21-29, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5288089/>.

¹²⁷ Grisso and Underwood, Screening and Assessing Mental Health Issues, 2004.

¹²⁸ Elizabeth Moore, Claire Gaskin, and Devon Indig, “Childhood Maltreatment and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder among Incarcerated Young Offenders,” *Child Abuse & Neglect* [37], no. 10 (2013): 861-70, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23978574>.

¹²⁹ Moore, et al., Childhood Maltreatment, 2013.

High rates of neurotic disorders, such as mood and anxiety disorders, are commonly found among juvenile offenders, as well.¹³⁰ These disorders include, but are not limited to: mixed anxiety and depressive disorders, generalized anxiety disorders, depressive episodes, phobias, and obsessive compulsive disorders.¹³¹ For example, in a study of young men and women incarcerated in the United Kingdom, 42 percent of sentenced males and 68 percent of sentenced females experienced neurotic disorders while incarcerated.¹³² A similar study was also conducted in the United States and produced similar outcomes.¹³³ According to the International Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ), in 2011 European Union Member States saw about of 40 percent of their juveniles experience a mental health disorder during incarceration.¹³⁴ Moving outside of the western world, other Member States see similar, or even higher, numbers. For example, in 2014 the Federal University of Sao Paulo in Brazil conducted a study which concluded that around 69 percent of all juvenile offenders exhibited at least one mental or behavioral disorder listed in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Manual.¹³⁵

Aside from mental health, the Beijing Rules and A/RES/45/113 accounted for other social services available to juvenile offenders.¹³⁶ For example, quality physical health is important to all people, and especially to children and teenagers, whose physicality is in flux at these ages. In 1990, a study in the United States reveals that 46 percent of all juvenile offenders had a health issue upon entering a correctional facility, with 90 percent having a dental issue, and 10 percent of offenders having a “serious medical issue” such as drug use or a STD infection.¹³⁷ Juvenile offenders are often found to be estranged from their medical community, and in some cases only have the opportunity to receive medical treatment when placed in a correctional institution.¹³⁸

The medical information surrounding juvenile offenders is elusive in nature, so the exact extent of health services and treatment results worldwide are difficult to determine. Regarding developing Member States, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, stated in the 2011 report on the status of The Convention on the Rights of the Child, that data for mental and physical disorders among incarcerated juveniles was difficult to ascertain, leaving the international community unsure of the actual statistics.¹³⁹ Conditions such as poor standardized healthcare and record keeping are to blame for said uncertainties.¹⁴⁰ A 2011 Comparative report by the IIPJ between the European Union and African United Nations Member States reveals a large portion of the incarcerated juvenile population suffer from health issues, suggesting universal prevalence.¹⁴¹ Meanwhile, a lack of resources, ongoing conflict, and social stigma leave large swathes of the population unassisted while incarcerated.¹⁴²

Additionally, The Beijing Rules urge correctional facilities to provide both education and vocational training to juvenile offenders.¹⁴³ These programs aim to prepare juveniles for life after incarceration. Research suggests that quality education and vocational services reduce recidivism rates and ease the transition back into society for

¹³⁰ Deborah Lader, Nicola Singleton, and Howard Meltzer, “Psychiatric Morbidity among Young Offenders in England and Wales,” *International Review of Psychology* (February 2003), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nicola_Singleton/publication/10762017_Psychiatric_Morbidity_Among_Young_Offenders_in_England_and_Wales/links/0912f50926d830d188000000/Psychiatric-Morbidity-Among-Young-Offenders-in-England-and-Wales.pdf.

¹³¹ Lader, *Psychiatric Morbidity*, 2003.

¹³² Lader, *Psychiatric Morbidity*, 2003.

¹³³ Lader, *Psychiatric Morbidity*, 2003.

¹³⁴ The International Panel on Juvenile Justice, *Mental Health Resources for Young Offenders: European Comparative Analysis and Transfer of Knowledge* (Belgium: 2011), <https://bit.ly/2MIutCB>.

¹³⁵ Dias, Álvaro Machado, Antonio De Pádua Serafim, and Daniel Martins De Barros. "Prevalence of Mental Disorders and Recidivism in Young Offenders." *Psicologia: Reflexão E Crítica* 27, no. 2 (2014): 317-22. doi:10.1590/1678-7153.201427212.

¹³⁶ UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/113, 1990.

¹³⁷ "Health Care for Children and Adolescents in the Juvenile Correctional Care System," *Pediatrics* [107], no. 4 (2001): 799-803, accessed May 27, 2019, doi:10.1542/peds.107.4.799.

¹³⁸ "Health Care for Children," *Pediatrics*, 2001.

¹³⁹ The International Panel on Juvenile Justice, *Mental Health Resources*, 2011.

¹⁴⁰ The International Panel on Juvenile Justice, *Mental Health Resources*, 2011.

¹⁴¹ The International Panel on Juvenile Justice, *Mental Health Resources*, 2011.

¹⁴² The International Panel on Juvenile Justice, *Mental Health Resources*, 2011.

¹⁴³ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

juvenile offenders.¹⁴⁴ These programs are known more broadly as “reentry” programs.¹⁴⁵ For instance, the state of Ohio in the United States implemented an “innovative” juvenile justice framework which focused on offering robust social services to their incarcerated population. The state saw juveniles with improvement in functioning post-sentence, overall lower recidivism rates, and even higher grades in school post-sentence.¹⁴⁶

In some cases, appropriate detention centers for juvenile offenders are completely absent from the equation.¹⁴⁷ According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs many developing Member States lack the appropriate detention centers for juvenile offenders, who need the numerous aforementioned special services.¹⁴⁸ In such developing Member States, juveniles are often housed in adult facilities, and this can have many negative externalities.¹⁴⁹ For example, adult offenders often use violence, including sexual violence, against juvenile offenders.¹⁵⁰ Bullying and extortion are commonplace in these scenarios as well.¹⁵¹ Overall, these conditions often leave juvenile offenders unable to reintegrate into society successfully post-sentence.¹⁵²

Potential Cognitive Services for Juvenile Offenders in Incarceration

Numerous forms of mental health services can be provided in-house at detention centers to reduce rates of mental disorder among juvenile offenders.¹⁵³ Research suggests that psychoeducational group activities and interventions are beneficial to juveniles in incarceration to alleviate the negative consequences of trauma and stress-related disorders.¹⁵⁴ “Psychoeducational group activities” are best described as a series of activities intended to mentally stimulate juvenile inmates, both logically and emotionally, with these activities including cognitive workshops, cognitive bibliotherapy, group counseling, and group interventions.¹⁵⁵ The intended outcome of these activities is to reduce levels of depression, anxiety, and other negative externalities associated with trauma related disorders.¹⁵⁶

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is another treatment option for incarcerated juvenile offenders should mental health services be implemented in detention centers. The aim of this form of therapy is to move the subject’s attention away from the negative situation itself, and to instead focus on the individual’s reaction to said situation, and how that reaction shapes the individual’s reality.¹⁵⁷ CBT helps alter the client’s unhealthy behavior in order to produce positive outcomes for the individual.¹⁵⁸ The results of CBT, according to the Beck Institute, are meant to be longstanding and enduring.¹⁵⁹ Research suggests that CBT has a large, positive effect on juvenile offenders by correcting dysfunctional thinking and behaviors associated with distorted cognitive function.¹⁶⁰

¹⁴⁴ “Reentry,” Youth.gov, <https://youth.gov/youth-topics/juvenile-justice/reentry>, (accessed May 27, 2019).

¹⁴⁵ “Reentry,” Youth.gov, 2019.

¹⁴⁶ “Social Work and the Juvenile Justice System,” Online Master of Science in Social Administration, January 16, 2019, accessed May 26, 2019, <https://onlinesocialwork.case.edu/blog/social-work-and-the-juvenile-justice-system/>.

¹⁴⁷ “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs. Archive, Accessed July 6, 2019, <https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr11/FactSheetonYouthandJuvenileJustice.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations.

¹⁴⁹ “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations.

¹⁵⁰ “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations.

¹⁵¹ “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations.

¹⁵² “Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet,” The United Nations.

¹⁵³ Elizabeth C. Pomeroy, Diane L. Green, and Risa Kiam, “Female Juvenile Offenders Incarcerated as Adults,” *Journal of Social Work* [1], no. 1 (2001): 101-15, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/146801730100100107>.

¹⁵⁴ Pomeroy et al, Female Juvenile Offenders, 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Rocío Casañas, Rosa Catalán, Jose Luis Del Val, Jordi Real, Sergi Valero, and Miquel Casas, “Effectiveness of a Psycho-educational Group Program for Major Depression in Primary Care: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” *BMC Psychiatry* [12], no. 1 (2012), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3551665>.

¹⁵⁶ Pomeroy et al, Female Juvenile Offenders, 2001.

¹⁵⁷ “What is Cognitive Behavior Therapy?,” Beck Institute, <https://beckinstitute.org/get-informed/what-is-cognitive-therapy/>, (accessed April 5, 2019).

¹⁵⁸ What is Cognitive Behavior Therapy?, Beck Institute.

¹⁵⁹ What is Cognitive Behavior Therapy?, Beck Institute.

¹⁶⁰ “Cognitive Behavioral Treatment: Literature Review,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Cognitive_Behavioral_Treatment.pdf, (accessed April 5, 2019).

Moral Recognition Therapy, a form of CBT, is often used in settings such as schools, residential juvenile facilities, boot camps, and job-training programs.¹⁶¹ In a review conducted by BMC Health Services Research of 65 programs employing Moral Recognition Therapy, the technique reduced 12-month recidivism rates by 50 percent.¹⁶² Aside from the efficacy of CBT, this form of treatment is cost-effective when treating mood disorders, such as depression and anxiety in juvenile offenders for shorter time frames not longer than two years.¹⁶³ Additionally, CBT is often performed in group settings, which speaks both to cost-efficiency and ease of administration,¹⁶⁴ meaning it is theoretically sound for juvenile detention centers.

Case Study: Female Juvenile Offenders

Article 26.4 of the Beijing Rules states, “Young female offenders placed in an institution deserve special attention as to their personal needs and problems.”¹⁶⁵ While this is an early and straightforward attempt to address the disparities between the female and male offenders, it makes no reference to the specific divergences between female and male offenders, and the types of unique services female offenders require. Meanwhile, A/RES/45/113 does not address the special considerations necessary to correctly rehabilitate them via programs related to their specific social needs, either.¹⁶⁶ In 2010, the General Assembly passed A/RES/65/229, also known as Bangkok Rules, which addressed the treatment of female prisoners of all ages, including female juvenile offenders, in a more detailed fashion.¹⁶⁷ The resolution calls for entry health screenings, counseling for abuse victims, as well as accommodation for children who accompany their mothers into incarceration.¹⁶⁸ Some sources indicate that application of this policy is varied. For example, a report shows that the Bangkok Rules are only adhered to as a “last resort” in Australia, as most court systems focus on expediency.¹⁶⁹

To this day, female offenders experience far higher rates of mental disorder than male offenders.¹⁷⁰ Despite this discrepancy, only 51 percent of the female juvenile offender population used “specialty mental health services” related directly to their gender during periods of incarceration.¹⁷¹ Substance abuse issues are also more common among female offenders than in their male counterparts.¹⁷² While 69.3 percent of male offenders reported having any substance abuse issues prior to incarceration, 73.6 percent of female offenders reported having at least one substance abuse issue as well.¹⁷³ In some cases even the housing of female juveniles differs from their male counterparts, as some Member States house female juvenile offenders with incarcerated adult females, instead of in

¹⁶¹ “Cognitive Behavioral Treatment,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

¹⁶² Daniel M. Blonigen, Michael A. Cucciare, Christine Timko, Jennifer S. Smith, Autumn Harnish, Lakiesha Kemp, Joel Rosenthal, and David Smelson, “Study Protocol: A Hybrid Effectiveness-implementation Trial of Moral Recognition Therapy in the US Veterans Health Administration,” *BMC Health Services Research* [18], no. 1 (2018), doi:10.1186/s12913-018-2967-3.

¹⁶³ Dickerson, John F., Frances L. Lynch, Michael C. Leo, Lynn L. Debar, John Pearson, and Gregory N. Clarke. “Cost-effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Depressed Youth Declining Antidepressants,” *Pediatrics* 141, no. 2 (2018). doi:10.1542/peds.2017-1969.

¹⁶⁴ Dickerson et al, Cost-effectiveness, 2018.

¹⁶⁵ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

¹⁶⁶ UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/113, 1990.

¹⁶⁷ UN General Assembly, Resolution 65, “The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders,” A/RES/65/229, December 21, 2010, https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Bangkok_Rules_ENG_22032015.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ UN General Assembly, A/RES/65/229, December 21, 2010.

¹⁶⁹ Susan Chenery, “Women in Prison: It Took Six Months of Anguish to Get My Child,” *The Guardian*, February 24, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/feb/24/women-in-prison-it-took-six-months-of-anguish-to-get-my-child>, (accessed May 26, 2019).

¹⁷⁰ Lader, *Psychiatric Morbidity*, 2003.

¹⁷¹ Sheryl H. Kataoka, Bonnie T. Zima, Deirdre A. Dupre, Kathleen A. Moreno, Xiaowei Yang, and James T. McCracken, “Mental Health Problems and Service Use Among Female Juvenile Offenders: Their Relationship to Criminal History,” *Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry* [40], no. 5 (2001): 549-55, doi:10.1097/00004583-200105000-00014.

¹⁷² Karen L. Cropsey, Harry K. Wexler, Gerald Melnick, Faye S. Taxman, and Douglas W. Young. “Specialized Prisons and Services: Results From a National Survey,” *The Prison Journal* 81 (2007), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2350234/>.

¹⁷³ Cropsey et al, *Specialized Prisons*, 2007.

separate facilities.¹⁷⁴ Afghanistan, for instance, passed the 2005 Juvenile Code in an attempt to adhere to UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (1994), which led to the construction of new, separate facilities for juvenile offenders.¹⁷⁵ However, in most cases, female offenders were instead housed in separate wings of adult facilities, as opposed to receiving a place at the newly constructed facilities.¹⁷⁶

Conclusion

In the Beijing Rules and A/RES/45/113 the international community took cursory steps towards improving the services that are available to juvenile offenders, such as the guarantee of basic social services, educational initiatives, vocational training, and even access to specialty services.^{177 178} Further research into the mental condition of juvenile offenders reveals a deep need for the implementation of mental health-focused programs in juvenile detention centers. This unfortunate reality may be indicative of the inability to construct and administer successful, cost-efficient social resources within institutions. Physical health is also a major concern for juvenile delinquents in all Member States, especially considering substance abuse issues, sexual health concerns, and other physical ailments.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, education and vocational training are areas of concern for juvenile offender populations, as preparation for life post-sentence ensures future success.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, developing Member States sometimes lack facilities to house juvenile offenders, creating a host of problems for the child whilst incarcerated and post-sentence, creating a truly international issue.¹⁸¹

Together, from healthcare to job training, these social services work to maintain a juvenile's health whilst incarcerated, as well as prepare them for life after their sentence. There are issues of access to services, gaps between research and the application of said research, and an overall need for a larger focus on sex-related, sex-specific health services available to all inmates within each Member States' prison system.

Committee Directive

Delegates must address the access all juvenile offenders have to a range of social services and whether or not they serve as a solution to mental and physical issues occurring among the population while also considering financial, technological, and infrastructural barriers.¹⁸² Services must also account for the inmate's physical health, education, future career aptitude, and even their connection to the outside community. Moreover, the international community must craft solutions feasible for developing and developed Member States alike, as some Member States must start by simply creating separate, sustainable facilities for juvenile offenders.¹⁸³ Delegates may consider using the guiding power of the CCPCJ to ensure separate facilities for juvenile offenders worldwide.

Additionally, aside from the issue of access illustrated above, the quality of services must come into question. Despite cooperation from the global community on the subject of juvenile detention standards, gaps exist on the subject of the quality of social services available to offenders. An encompassing resolution should also discuss the treatment options available to female juvenile offenders in a way that pays deference to the economic and social barriers Member States face in the implementation of such policies. The mandate of the CCPCJ states that the body is to ensure effective criminal justice administration in participating Member States, and this assistance may come in the form of research into the betterment of justice systems, policymaking, and even direct financial support.¹⁸⁴ Given

¹⁷⁴ The United Nations Children's Fund, Justice for Children: The situation of children in conflict with the law in Afghanistan, (New York, 2010), <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/47fdfae50.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ The United Nations Children's Fund, Justice for Children, 2010.

¹⁷⁶ The United Nations Children's Fund, Justice for Children, 2010.

¹⁷⁷ UN General Assembly, A/RES/40/33, 1985.

¹⁷⁸ UN General Assembly, A/RES/45/113, 1990.

¹⁷⁹ "Health Care for Children," Pediatrics, 2001.

¹⁸⁰ "Social Work and the Juvenile Justice System," Master of Science in Social Administration, 2019.

¹⁸¹ "Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet," The United Nations.

¹⁸² Pomeroy et al., Female Juvenile Offenders, 2001.

¹⁸³ "Juvenile Justice – Fact Sheet," The United Nations.

¹⁸⁴ UN CCPCJ, Resolution 1, Combating international terrorism: the contribution of the UN, RES/11/1, 2001, http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2000-2009/2002/CCPCJ/Resolution_11-1.pdf.

this information, delegates may use the powers of the CCPCJ to guarantee adequate social services in a variety of ways. Can research into emerging practices and techniques, such as CBT, be a solution to ensuring that robust and cost-efficient social services are available at all juvenile detention centers? Or should the CCPCJ focus more on policymaking and financial support to strengthen infrastructure and staffing at juvenile detention centers? A comprehensive resolution may include all of these facets and more.

Annotated Bibliography

Topic I: Developing Public-Private Partnerships to Prevent and Investigate Acts of Financial Cybercrime

“Recommendations for Public-Private Partnership against Cybercrime.” World Economic Forum, 2016. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Cybercrime_Principles.pdf.

While no official definition of cybercrime exists, this document does provide the definition used at the 2016 World Economic Forum. The main focus of this paper, however, is the implementation of five recommendations to combat cybercrime. The recommendations suggest both creating new platforms to increase information-sharing systems while also improving existing frameworks such as the Budapest Convention of Cybercrime.

“Public and Private Entities Face Challenges in Addressing Cyber Threats.” United States Government Accountability Office, 2007. <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07705.pdf>.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) details its findings on the impact of cybercrime, identifies federal, non-federal and private sector entities responsible for addressing cybercrime, and recognizes challenges faced when attempting to combat cybercrime. The document bases its findings on reports, studies, surveys and interviews discussed within and applies the data to provide recommendations to be adopted by the U.S. government.

“Cybercrime.” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017. https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/cyber-affairs/aices/chapters/part_3_cybercrime.html.

This article focuses on Australia’s role in preventing and combating cybercrime both nationally and regionally. Australia defines cybercrime in the article according to its own terms and recognizes the national economic threat. The article addresses the Indo-Pacific Member States as the “weakest link” of its region and proposes recommendations to assist its neighbors, stop cybercriminals, and ensure regional safety. Australia offers to assist the Indo-Pacific Member States and strengthen legislation regarding cybercrime and “advocates harmonization of legal frameworks to facilitate international cooperation on cybercrime,” preventing criminals from crossing the border to evade punishment.

“Public-Private Security Cooperation from Cyber to Financial Crime.” Royal United Service Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI), 2016. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_201608_rosemont_public-private_security_cooperation1.pdf.

This paper provides a novel approach to public-private cooperation on money laundering and cybersecurity. RUSI’s Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies (CFCS) offers three general recommendations to be implemented to the UK’s Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT): (1) All relevant stakeholders should collaborate when creating, delivering, monitoring and reviewing objectives regarding public-private security, (2) appropriate considerations for adapting and connecting new initiatives to existing methods should be determined from the outset of the process; and, (3) whilst designing security-related partnership initiatives, stakeholders should focus on joint consideration of each parties expectations to increase efficiency and cooperation.

“Public-Private Partnerships Against Cybercrime.” Microsoft EMEA, 2009. <https://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/42534994.pdf>.

The presentation breaks down the role of public-private partnerships in cybersecurity. The slideshow provides examples of both informal and formal cooperation among various Member States such as Zotob Virus and European Financial Coalition. It further addresses challenges of cooperation and methods of addressing those challenges. Among the strategies are the 2Centre network which provides joint cyber-forensics training focused on education and research between European Member States, and the guidelines set for law enforcement and Internet service providers by the Council of Europe.

“Public-Private Partnership Takes Down Global Cybercriminal.” The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, 2018. <https://www.ncfta.net/1810-2/>

This recent article discusses how two cybercriminal entities practicing digital advertising fraud were taken down with the help of global public-private collaboration. White Ops and Google, among thirteen others, proved to be valuable assets throughout the investigation, as well as during the eventual take down of the cybercriminals. It is particularly impressive that a total of nine Member States provided the resources necessary to bring the eight criminals to justice. Furthermore, the United States has taken on the responsibility of arresting, prosecuting and extraditing the criminals who are citizens of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Topic II: Improving Access to Social Service Programs for Incarcerated Juveniles

“Access to Mental Health Care and Incarceration.” Mental Health America, 2015. <http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/issues/access-mental-health-care-and-incarceration>.

This article highlights a U.S. study comparing rates of incarceration with access to mental healthcare between states. The study shows a positive correlation between rates of adults who are in the criminal justice system and lack of access to mental health care. Six of the ten states providing the least amount of access to mental health care in prison also have the highest incarceration rates. The article also provides solutions to incarceration including investing in diversion programs such as health and drug courts, investing in services such as Assertive Community Treatment and Multisystemic Therapy, and ensuring that incarcerated individuals are connected with community-based services and insurance coverage upon reintegration into the community.

“Juvenile delinquency, welfare, justice and therapeutic interventions: a global perspective.” U.S. Center for Biotechnology Information, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 2017. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5288089/>.

This review provides an international perspective of juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice. The author addresses the complexity of the needs of incarcerated juveniles who are both offenders and victims and discusses a public health approach to adequately meet their needs. Further, the paper includes successful systems that provide psychiatric care for both children and adolescents among other services to reduce recidivism rates. For trauma-induced juveniles, both Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Cognitive-Processing Therapy are considered two of the most effective intervention services offered.

“Overview of European forensic youth care: toward an integrative mission for preventing and intervention strategies for juvenile offenders.” BioMed Central, 2019. <https://capmh.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13034-019-0265-4>.

This article includes an overview of statistics for juveniles incarcerated in all European Member States from 2016 and the mission statement formulated at the sixth biennial congress of the European Association for Forensic Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychology and other involved professions (EFCAP). It should be noted that a majority of the listed Member States hold children as criminally responsible at the age of fourteen or fifteen with a few outliers. For example, England & Wales, Northern Ireland, and Switzerland all set ten as the age of criminal responsibility, while Luxemburg and Romania both listed sixteen. Additionally, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Northern Ireland all had no juveniles incarcerated at the time the statistics were collected.

“Highest to Lowest-Prison Population Total.” World Prison Brief, 2019. http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All

The World Prison Brief is an excellent source of data providing statistics on the prison populations of 223 Member States and nations. Additionally, individual Member States or nations can be selected to view the

juvenile incarceration rates of that particular Member State or nation in comparison to its overall prison population. The U.S. leads the rankings in prison population with 2,121,600 prisoners. In comparison, San Marino hold the lowest prison population with only three prisoners. Of the three prisoners, none are female or juveniles. While the U.S. contains 4,445 detention establishments/institutions, San Marino only has one.

Yoon, Jong-won. "Overview Paper: Introducing the Korean Correctional System." United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 2012.

https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No88/No88_18-2PA_Yoon_Overview_Korea.pdf

This concise paper provides a synopsis of the seven divisions of the Correctional Service of the Ministry of Justice in The Republic of Korea. Offender treatment programs consist of vocational training, acquisition of technician's qualifications, education, and rehabilitative activities. South Korea's acquisition of technician's qualifications program encourages prisoners fourteen years of age or older who have completed the training courses to participate in technical skill competitions at the local or national level. Prisoners are sponsored by the Korea Committee of the International Vocational Skill Contests and compete with skilled workers not in the prison system. The winners receive gold medals, occupational guidance, and may even be granted priority of release on parole.