



SRMUN ATLANTA 2016

*The United Nations Post-2015 Agenda:
Peace, Security and Development for a Sustainable Future*
November 17 - 19, 2016
hsc_atlanta@srmun.org

Greetings Delegates,

Welcome to SRMUN Atlanta 2016 and the Historical Security Council (HSC). My name is Chase Kelly, and I will be serving as your Director for the HSC. This will be my second conference as a SRMUN staff member. Previously, I served as the Director of the Commission on the Status of Women at SRMUN Atlanta 2015. I am currently applying to graduate school where I plan to study International Relations and hold a Bachelors of Arts in Political Science with a concentration in International Relations and a Bachelors of Arts in History with an emphasis in Modern American History from Valdosta State University. Similar to many specialized committees, the HSC will not have a traditional committee structure. Our committee will not have an Assistant Director. However, Mr. Ryan Baerwalde will be serving as the Assistant Deputy Director-General of Crises. This will be Ryan's third time as a SRMUN staff member, having previously served as the Director of the Security Council for SRMUN Charlotte 2016 and as the Assistant Director of the Security Council in SRMUN Atlanta 2015. Ryan is currently a graduate student at the University of Denver, where he is pursuing a Master's Degree in International Security and holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Valdosta State University.

The HSC a simulation of the Security Council will begin during a specific date, which is October of 1962. Since the HSC is a highly specialized, application based committee which allows delegates to reenact the events of a certain date, I expect this to be replicated in the work and conduct of the delegates.

By focusing on the mission of the HSC and the SRMUN Atlanta 2016 theme of "*The United Nations Post-2015 Agenda: Peace, Security and Development for a Sustainable Future*," we have developed the following topic for the delegates to discuss during the conference:

I. The Security Council of 1962

The background guide provides a strong introduction to the committee and the topics and should be utilized as a foundation for the delegate's independent research. While we have attempted to provide a holistic analysis of the issues, the background guide should not be used as the single mode of analysis for the topics. Delegates are expected to go beyond the background guide and engage in the intellectual inquiry of their own. The position papers for the committee should reflect the complexity of these issues and their externalities. Delegations are expected to submit a position paper and be prepared for a vigorous discussion at the conference. Position papers should be no longer than two pages in length (single-spaced) and demonstrate your Member State's position, policies, and recommendations on each of the two topics. For more detailed information about formatting and how to write position papers, delegates can visit srmun.org. *All position papers MUST be submitted no later than Friday, October 28, 2016, by 11:59pm EST via the SRMUN website.*

Ryan and I are enthusiastic about serving as your dais for the HSC. We wish you all the best of luck in your conference preparation and look forward to working with you in the near future. Please feel free to contact J.B Desselle, Ryan, or me if you have any questions while preparing for the conference.

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The Committee History of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council (SC) was created under Article V of the United Nations Charter in 1945 with the unique ability to pass resolutions that are binding on the Member States of the United Nations (UN)¹. The SC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It must be ready at a moment's notice to take action and protect the international community from harm that may come from conflict or perceived threats around the world.² Many bodies within the UN can make recommendations and suggest actions. However, only the Security Council has the power to enforce decisions and demand actions from the Member States to prevent or react to an international crisis.³

Membership

As defined in the Charter, there are fifteen Member States on the Security Council at one time, consisting of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly every two years.⁴ Each member of the Security Council has one representative and is expected to be available at all times in case of an international crisis.⁵ In specific instances, Member States that are not on the SC have been invited to speak to the council and participate in discussions that “specifically affect” their interests.⁶

Special Procedures/Rules

The SC determines and operates under its own set of rules of procedure.⁷ Additionally, the Presidency of the SC rotates monthly with each Member State taking a turn as chosen alphabetically.⁸ This does complicate the process of representing a Member State for our simulation. On the SRMUN website, we have provided an addendum to the Security Council located in the delegate resource section of the website. The addendum can be found by clicking [here](#). Included are all special procedures and idiosyncrasies that make this committee so different from any other at our conference. Please become aware of them in your preparations.

Voting

Voting is an aspect of the Security Council that is unlike other United Nations bodies. In all other organs of the UN, Member States are given an equal voice. In the SC the five permanent members are given “the great Power unanimity” which is often known as the veto.⁹ If one of the five permanent Member States on the SC veto a decision made by the body, the resolution or decision is void, even if there were a majority of pro votes on the issue.¹⁰ On both procedural and substantive matters, there is a requirement of 9 pro votes to pass anything.¹¹

Powers and Duties

The primary goal of the Security Council is to “maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.”¹² When facing the need for potential action, the first function performed by the SC is to determine whether or not a threat to peace exists. If the council should determine the presence of conflict they first, investigate the situation; second, recommend methods of reaching settlement; third,

¹ Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

² Background” The Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_background.html

³ Ibid.

⁴ Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945

⁵ “Members” The Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>

⁶ Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ “Members” The Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

¹² “Functions and Powers” The Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_functions.html

establish a system to regulate armaments; fourth, call upon the Member States to use economic sanctions or force to end the aggression; and finally, take necessary military action against the aggressors.¹³

Additionally, the SC functions to “recommend the admission of new Members, exercise the trusteeship function of the United Nations in ‘strategic areas,’ and recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the GA, elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.”¹⁴ The SC issues cease-fires in cases of dispute, deploys peacekeeping forces to reduce tensions, keeps opposing forces apart to create conditions in which peaceful settlements can be made, and decide on any enforcement measurements necessary to resolve conflict, including economic sanctions or military action.¹⁵ The Security Council is an integral body within the UN system tasked with the readiness to be called upon at a moment’s notice and be prepared to effectively and quickly solve the greatest threats to the international community.

The Members of the Security Council are:

- Chile
- China
- France
- Ghana
- Ireland
- Romania
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- United Arab Republic
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- United States of America; and
- Venezuela.

Committee Directive

It is important to note that all historical precedence, factual evidence, United Nations documentation, Member State policies, and all other material completed prior to October 10, 1962, will be utilized and considered accurate during this simulation. However, after the Security Council has convened, the body will no longer follow the historical narrative with full accuracy. Therefore, it will be the duty of the delegate to represent the ideology and positions of their given Member State to the best of their abilities in the circumstances that may arise. The committee will be given an open agenda in which they may choose to discuss any topic pertinent to the current state of affairs on October 10, 1962.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ “Background” UN Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.htm

I. Cold War Tensions

Post-World War II

Fighting against Nazi Germany in World War II, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States had worked together against a common enemy but in May 1945, following the end of the war in Europe, the alliance began to crumble. Tensions were evident at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 as the Allies developed a post-war plan for Germany and a major goal of the Soviet Union was to create a buffer zone between them and Western Europe; they subsequently created pro-communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and eventually in East Germany. In reaction, the United States disembarked from their pre-war policy of nonintervention in Europe and instituted a policy of containment to thwart the spread of communism.¹⁶ In 1947, the Truman Doctrine pledged aid to any nation facing communist subversion and the Marshall Plan provided economic assistance to maintain political stability, which otherwise could encourage communist takeovers. In 1949, the United States joined the collective military and security alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union created an alliance with the nations of Eastern Europe called the Warsaw Pact which was finalized in 1955. The lines for postwar global alliance began to be drawn.¹⁷

The Korean War

Frequently, the struggles to overthrow colonial regimes became entangled in the Cold War as the two superpowers rallied for influence and allies. In 1949, the communist regime won the Chinese civil war and the world's most populous nation became an ally of the Soviet Union. In lieu of the United States' policy of containment, losing China was seen as a huge defeat.¹⁸ Korea had been jointly occupied, more by accident and less than by design, by American and Soviet forces after the end of World War II; the 38th parallel became the assumed boundary. When the troops withdrew completely in 1949, there was no agreement concerning who controlled the territory. Both the American supported Republic of Korea in the South and the Soviet supported Democratic Republic of Korea in the north each claimed itself to be the legitimate government and threatened to invade the other.¹⁹

When North Korea officially invaded the South on June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council immediately responded. Resolution 82 called for an immediate "cessation of hostilities" and the "withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel."²⁰ On July 7, 1950, the United Nations passed Resolution 84 and decided to furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea in order to bring about "international peace and security in the area," Under the same resolution, the Security Council recommended that all assistance be made available to the "unified command under the United States of America."²¹ By the time an agreement was reached in July 1953, after years of mostly trench warfare, there was no clear victory for either side or the boundary barely shifted from its initial location in 1950.²²

Unrest in Vietnam

In 1954, another colonial regime fell as the French lost control in Vietnam. The United States, in fear of Vietnam being unified under the communist North, upheld a military government in South Vietnam. In 1955, The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed to prevent communist expansion and the United States sent 700 military personnel and economic aid to South Vietnam. After President Kennedy assumed office, the United States authorized 500 Special Forces troops and military advisers to assist the government of South Vietnam. With the threat of the fall of the government in South Vietnam looming, President Kennedy sent an additional 12,000 military advisers in February of 1962.²³

¹⁶ "The Cold War." The Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Cold-War.aspx> (Accessed April 24, 2016).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ John Lewis Gaddis. *The Cold War: A New History* (Penguin Books. 2007) 46-50.

²⁰ SC/1501. *The Resolution of 25 June 1950*. United Nations Security Council (Accessed April 24, 2016)

²¹ Ibid.

²² John Lewis Gaddis. *The Cold War: A New History* (Penguin Books. 2007) 46-50.

²³ "The Cold War." The Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Cold-War.aspx> (Accessed April 24, 2016).

Cuba and the Bay of Pigs

In 1959, a leftist revolution ousted an American supported President Fulgencia Batista. The new regime, under Premier Fidel Castro, quickly cut ties with the United States and began to forge a new relationship with the Soviet Union. Given the close proximity of Cuba to the United States, this was of grave concern to both the United States and all of Latin America. In March 1960, President Eisenhower and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began to plan an invasion of Cuba using counter-revolutionary exiles; the end goal of which was the overthrow of Castro. When President Kennedy was elected in 1960, he also endorsed the plan using a branch of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, known as Brigade 2506. On April 17, 1961, Brigade 2506 landed at the Bay of Pigs as was defeated by Castro's forces a mere two days later.²⁴

The Bay of Pigs was an embarrassment on the global stage, which led Castro to openly proclaim Cuba's intention to adopt a socialistic government and strengthened his alliance with the Soviet Union.²⁵ In July 1962, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and Castro reached an agreement to help deter any further invasion attempts by the United States. During routine surveillance flights, the United States discovered a buildup of military supplies in Cuba, including Soviet IL-28 bombers. President Kennedy addressed the developments on September 4, 1962, where he issued a warning against the movement of weapons into Cuba. There is no indication that the Soviets have ceased the introduction of military materials into Cuba, although recent reconnaissance flights have shown no significant developments.²⁶

²⁴ "The Bay of Pigs Invasion and its Aftermath, April 1961–October 1962," Office of the Historian.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs> (Accessed April 24, 2016)

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Office of the Historian.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs> (Accessed April 24, 2016)

II. United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

History

The Republic of the Congo began as a Belgian colony in the late 19th century. Belgium's King Leopold II, after becoming increasingly frustrated by Belgium's lack of international power, began to persuade his government to support colonial expansion. His attention was drawn to the area of the Congo River basin following Sir Henry Morton Stanley's exploration from 1874–77.²⁷ King Leopold II organized a geographical conference in Brussels in 1876, during which he proposed "establishing an international committee for the propagation of civilization among the peoples of Central Africa" including the Congo region.²⁸ While it was conceived as a multi-national organization focusing on scientific and humanitarian efforts, his primary goal was securing a trade route between Upper and Lower Congo for the exploitation of the ivory market in Central Africa.²⁹ In addition to Ivory, the Congo region was also very rich in palm oil, diamonds, other mineral resources, and rubber, which by the mid-1890s, had grown to be Congo's most profitable industry.³⁰

At the Conference of Berlin 1884-1885, several colonial powers amassed to finalize partitioning of Africa, at which Leopold was recognized as the owner of the *État Indépendant du Congo* (CFS, Congo Free State).³¹ The General Act of the Berlin Conference required Leopold to commit to "suppress the East African slave trade, promote humanitarian policies, guarantee free trade within the colony, impose no import duties for twenty years, and encourage philanthropic and scientific enterprises."³² Leopold violated these commitments and continually passed decrees which eroded at the Congolese rights to their lands.³³ To help curb the increasingly frequent uprisings, in addition to protecting his economic interests, Leopold established the *Force Publique* (FP) that was comprised mostly of Belgian soldiers and mercenaries from outside Congo, but increasing recruited from Zanzibar, West Africa, and even utilized the Arab slave trade from the Upper Congo to fill the ranks.³⁴ The FP continued to oversee the exploitation of the natives as *corvée* workers and managing Leopold's ever-closer movements to monopoly.³⁵ Beatings, lashings, kidnappings, and the burning of villages were all utilized by the FP to ensure the often unrealistic rubber-gathering quotas were filled.³⁶ It was a requirement of the FP to provide the hand of their victims as proof of a killing for not meeting a quota and, as a result, they were often paid in severed hands.³⁷ From 1885 to 1908, it is estimated the native population of Congo decreased by somewhere between ten million and thirteen million people.³⁸

Rumors of the atrocities occurring the Congo Free State began to spread quickly. Public opinion over the alleged large-scale violation of human rights led to a British official investigation in 1900. Reacting to the international pressure, the Belgian Parliament annexed CFS and removed Leopold from power in 1908. Before turning CFS over to Belgium, Leopold destroyed any evidence of what occurred under his reign in CFS, including the archives of the Departments of Finance and the Interior. On November 15, 1908, Congo Free State officially became a colony known as Belgian Congo.

As Belgium took over complete control of Congo, racism and discrimination remained in the Congo.³⁹ While the official philosophy towards Congo was that of paternalism, the situation in the Belgian Congo did not change

²⁷ "Congo Free State," Britannica Encyclopedia. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-Free-State> (Accessed June 7, 2016)

²⁸ Russell Schimmer and Dean Pavlakis. "Congo Free State, 1885-1908." Yale University Genocide Studies Program. http://www.cis.yale.edu/gsp/colonial/belgian_congo/ (Accessed June 7, 2016)

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "Congo Free State," Britannica Encyclopedia. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-Free-State> (Accessed June 7, 2016)

³⁷ Russell Schimmer and Dean Pavlakis. "Congo Free State, 1885-1908." Yale University Genocide Studies Program. http://www.cis.yale.edu/gsp/colonial/belgian_congo/ (Accessed June 7, 2016)

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

significantly.⁴⁰ The Congolese remained treated as “second class citizens” compared to the Belgians, which kept them from attaining better opportunities and moving up the social ladder.⁴¹ In reaction to the situation, resistance towards the Belgian government remained. A rebellion in the eastern districts erupted in 1919 and was not fully suppressed until 1923 and unrest increased during World War II.⁴²

The year 1958 saw Patrice Lumumba launch the Congo National Movement political party and, in January of 1959, riots began in Leopoldville as a rallying call for independence.⁴³ In the pre-independence election, MNC’s Patrice Lumumba was elected as Prime Minister, while Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the regional ABAKO party became President.⁴⁴ While many had reservations about the quick movement towards independence, including the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the Congo Ralph Bunche and United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the Republic of the Congo continued. Belgium and the newly elected leaders negotiated and agreed to a constitution, which granted the central government limited powers and gave more authority to the provincial leaders.⁴⁵ The Republic of the Congo gained full independence on June 30, 1960.

Current Situation

Tensions between Belgium and the Congo quickly escalated as their relationship deteriorated. On Congo’s independence day, Lumumba gave a strong speech, reminding the crowd of the atrocities Congo endured under Belgian colonial rule: “Who can ever forget the firing in which so many of our brothers died; or the cells where those who refused to submit any longer to the rule of a ‘justice’ of oppression and exploitation were put away.” King Baudouin of Belgium considered leaving midway through Lumumba’s speech, as he and his officials were irate.⁴⁶

Belgium had envisioned an economic ally in its former colony, as the Congo was laden with financial resources. However, with Lumumba’s alleged communist sympathies and an announcement of support from the Kremlin, the relationship began to seem very unlikely and was solidified after his Independence Day speech. Lacking the ally in Lumumba they hoped to obtain, Belgium looked elsewhere and began to court Moïse Tshombe, the president of Katanga.⁴⁷ The province of Katanga was the most developed of the Congo, which accounted for two-thirds of the total mineral production. Tshombe was known to be member of the Congolese separatists and was considering it even prior to independence. Both Lumumba and Belgium were well aware of the economic contributions Katanga retained and neither party wanted to be severed from those resources.⁴⁸

On July 4, 1960, five days after independence, Belgian General Janssens wrote “After Independence = Before Independence” on a blackboard to remind the Congolese forces in the Force Publique that they would retain their subordinate positions and nothing would change with independence.⁴⁹ On July 5th, the Congolese forces at the Thysville military base conducted a mutiny against the Belgian officers, demanding higher pay and greater opportunities.⁵⁰ This action quickly spread to other bases as violence and looting spread across the nation.⁵¹ Beginning on July 9th, Belgian troops were sent back into the Republic of Congo to protect the Belgians that remained.⁵² Since Belgium did not receive permission from either Kasavubu or Lumumba to do so, this was a clear

⁴⁰“Congo Free State,” Britannica Encyclopedia. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-Free-State> (Accessed June 7, 2016)

⁴¹ Nicole Hobbs. “The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960.” Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

⁴²“Congo Free State,” Britannica Encyclopedia. <http://www.britannica.com/place/Congo-Free-State> (Accessed June 7, 2016)

⁴³ Nicole Hobbs. “The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960.” Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ “The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold War, 1960–1965” Office of the Historian.

<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs> (Accessed June 10, 2016)

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Nicole Hobbs. “The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960.” Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

violation of the Treaty of Friendship.⁵³ Although unratified, the document was a signed agreement between both parties, which stated: "a Belgian military presence could only be reestablished in the Congo after a request from the Congolese government."⁵⁴ On July 11th, after welcoming a Belgian military force, Tshombe formally announced that Katanga would secede from the Republic of Congo.⁵⁵ After his announcement, Tshombe invited his advisors and ambassadors from Belgium to return to Katanga.⁵⁶ Intermittent conflict began to occur between the Belgian troops, who now occupied some Congolese cities, and the Congolese National Army.⁵⁷ By July 13th, Belgian paratroopers took over several parts of the capital, Leopoldville, including the airport.⁵⁸ On the next day, Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu sent a cable to the United Nations to request military assistance in order to combat Belgian aggression and address the situation in Katanga, citing the now broken Treaty of Friendship as justification.⁵⁹

Secretary-General Hammarskjold invoked Article 99 of the U.N. Charter and coordinated an emergency meeting with the President of the U.N. Security Council. When the Security Council met on July 13th, Hammarskjold described "the presence of those troops was a source of internal and, potentially, international tension." With China, France, and the United Kingdom abstaining, the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 143⁶⁰ in the early hours of July 14th. The Resolution called for a withdrawal of Belgian troops, authorized the Secretary-General to provide military assistance, and request that the Secretary-General report to the Council as appropriate. Security Council Resolution 143 created The United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and Hammarskjold selected Ralph Bunche to head the operation.⁶¹ On July 15th, Major-General Carl von Horn was appointed to lead the military aspect of ONUC as the Commander of the United Nations Forces in the Congo.⁶²

On August 9, the province of Kasai succeeded under the leadership of Albert Kalonji. He declared that Kasai would remain close with Katanga, which was similarly economically important to the Republic of Congo. In reaction to the Kasai secession, Lumumba appealed to Khrushchev for military equipment in maintaining order in his threatened territory. The Soviet Union supplied 100 trucks and 16 airplanes to Lumumba, who used it to invade the province of Kasai. The violence quickly escalated out of hand, as Congolese soldiers attacked civilians and the result was ethnic warfare. On August 6th, Lumumba received a personal letter from Khrushchev reiterating his confidence and economic commitment to assisting the Congolese in expelling the interventionists.⁶³

On September 5th, Kasavubu announced via radio that he was removing Lumumba from his role as Prime Minister, along with six additional ministers. On September 14, 1960, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, the Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army announced he was neutralizing both Lumumba and Kasavubu in a coup d'état and ordered the Soviets out of the Republic of the Congo. The following day, Mobutu occupied Parliament and arrested Lumumba. After being placed under house arrest with U.N. protection, Lumumba escaped to reunite with his supporters but was intercepted by Mobutu's forces on December 1, 1960. After being transported to Katanga, Lumumba was brought before a firing squad and assassinated on January 17, 1961.⁶⁴

With the death of Prime Minister Lumumba and the looming severity of civil war, it had become clear that the members of U. N. Security Council needed to act. They adopted a joint draft resolution, which aimed to devise a solution on two fronts that became Resolution 161 on February 21, 1961.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Nicole Hobbs. "The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960." Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ SC/1501. *The Resolution of 25 June 1950*. United Nations Security Council (Accessed April 24, 2016)

⁶¹ Nicole Hobbs. "The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960." Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Focusing on aiding the situation from the U.N. perspective, Part A of Resolution 161 laid out three major points that reiterated previous Security Council resolutions: 1) urged all Belgian, foreign, paramilitary, and mercenaries who were not under the United Nations command to evacuate; 2) called upon the Member States to assist in preventing any departure of such forces for the Republic of the Congo; 3) instituted an immediate investigation into the death of Prime Minister Lumumba and his colleagues in order to bring those responsible to justice.⁶⁵

Most significantly, however, Clause One urged the United Nations to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.”⁶⁶

Part B of Resolution 161 focused on addressing the situation internally, by reconvening the Congolese Parliament, urging a reorganization of the Congolese National Army to bring about discipline and control, and called upon the Member States to extend their full cooperation and assistance.⁶⁷

The summer months following the passage of Resolution 161 saw no drastic change; Tshombe continued to resist negotiation on the document, the Katangese gendarmes harassment of ONUC troops remained, and the mercenary activity persisted. With the current state of affairs remaining unchanged, internal and external pressure encouraged the United Nations to take a firmer stance. In the early morning of August 28, 1961, Operation Rumpunch was launched in Elizabethville as an answer to those pressures. Aided by the guise of surprise, the Operation saw the successful and peaceful capture of 81 foreign military personnel by the same afternoon. The arrests ceased after Conor Cruise O’Brien, the Secretary-General’s representative in Katanga, agreed to allow foreign consuls to process the deportations. Although the consuls immediately revoked their commitment, Operation Rumpunch was ruled a success.⁶⁸

Many Member States, including the United States and the United Kingdom, grew increasingly concerned that the U.N. was utilizing or even perceived to be using, force to end the secession in Katanga. Due to this perception, and considering the Security Council had only authorized the use of force as a last resort, the Secretary-General was placed under immense pressure to end the fighting. Upon his arrival in the Congo, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was caught off guard, immediately focusing his efforts on ending the fighting. Hammarskjöld arranged a meeting with Tshombe on September 16, 1961, to discuss a cease-fire in Ndola. Just before his arrival at the Ndola airport the next day, the plane carrying Hammarskjöld crashed killing him and everyone onboard.⁶⁹ Given the circumstance, allegations began to circulate that his plane was shot down.⁷⁰

On September 20, 1961, the ONUC and Katanga signed a ceasefire agreement. In lieu of the situation, many Member States changed their positions in favor of strengthening the ONUC operation, including the United States. For Katanga, the cease-fire agreement was seen as a victory over the U.N and only encouraged anti-U.N. political and military actions. On November 11, 1961, thirteen Italian pilots arriving in Kindu were beaten, shot, and had their bodies mutilated by Congolese military forces in front of a crowd. This significantly exaggerated the already looming ideas among the Member States to strengthen the ONUC and solve the situation in the Congo.⁷¹

Their solution was Security Council Resolution 169 passed on November 24, 1961. In response to the perceived use of force, Resolution 169 clarified the mandate for ONUC and the purpose of the actions of the United Nations regarding the Congo and reiterated prior resolutions and reaffirmed their commitment to resolving the situation in the Congo with two notable exceptions. First, the U.N. Security Council agreed to “completely reject the claim that Katanga is a ‘sovereign independent nation’” and demanded a cease of the secession activities. Second, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to “take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ SC/1501. *The Resolution of 25 June 1960*. United Nations Security Council (Accessed April 24, 2016)

⁶⁸ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Greenwood Publishing Group 2001.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Nicole Hobbs. “The UN and the Congo Crisis of 1960.” Yale University 2014.

http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=applebaum_award

⁷¹ Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Greenwood Publishing Group 2001.

force, if necessary" to immediately remove all military personnel, not under the United Nations command. No nation voted against Resolution 169 and only two abstained: France and the United Kingdom.⁷²

Even with the authorized use of force, the gendarmes of Tshombe in Katanga continued attacks on the ONUC troops. A flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement, Katangese troops continued in conducting sniper attacks, aerial attacks, ground assaults, the detention of U.N. personnel, and the establishment of roadblocks to stall communication. With a heavy amount of reinforcements from the United States, the ONUC forces began to take direct action against the roadblocks on December 15, 1961. Such actions finally swayed Tshombe to meet and discuss the status of Katanga on December 20, 1961. Facing heavy pressure from the United Nations and the United States, Tshombe signed the Kitona Declaration on December 21, 1961. Among the eight major points laid out in the Kitona Declaration, three of the most important were the acceptance of Kasavubu as head of state, acceptance of the authority of the Congo government over all of the Congo, including Katanga, and that the Katangan gendarmes be placed under the authority of the President of the Congo.⁷³

Recent Developments

While initially considered to be a major breakthrough towards ending the secession efforts of Katanga, it has become apparent that it was merely a tactic to buy time. In the past year, Tshombe has continuously stalled and backtracked on the agreements within the Kitona Declaration. Recent developments hint that Tshombe has been using the time to strategize a new push for independence. Recent intelligence demonstrated that the Katangese gendarmes and mercenaries might be preparing for a conflict. How should the United Nations respond? Is an increase in manpower via reinforcements the answer to the conflict preparations in Katanga? Or should the Security Council completely reform the ONUC mandate?⁷⁴

⁷² SC/1501. *The Resolution of 25 June 1950*. United Nations Security Council (Accessed April 24, 2016)

⁷³Jane Boulden. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Greenwood Publishing Group 2001.

⁷⁴Ibid.