



SRMUN Atlanta 2014

Revitalizing "An Agenda for Peace": Preventative Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution, and the Making of Peace in Our Time Movement November 20-22, 2014

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) Atlanta 2014 Conference! We are pleased to serve on your dais for the Security Council (SC). My name is Jessica DeJesus and I will serve as your Director for Security Council along with my esteemed Assistant Director, Devon Preston. Your dais has focused on topics which closely relate to the conference and we are confident that the delegates of this committee will work together in the name of "human dignity, cooperation, development and justice." As staff of the SRMUN program, we are entrusted with creating the very best experience for you and we aim to do so by offering you the opportunity to discuss extremely relevant yet dynamic topics which mirror the reality of the world we currently live.

The topics under discussion for the Security Council are:

- I. Designing Effective Targeted Sanctions
- II. The Situation in Central African Republic
- III. The Threat of Cyber Warfare

The Security Council is the only body in the United Nations whose decisions are binding for all United Nations Member States. Its mandate, to assertively maintain international peace and security, allows the SC to address any situation quickly brought before them and therefore, has the ability to impose solutions in an expeditious manner. Although veto power, which can only be exerted by the five Permanent Members, exists and is sometimes utilized, it is far more common for the Security Council members to reach decision through consensus.

Your background guide will serve as a great tool and resource to ensure you are properly prepared for committee, however, it is not meant to be an all-inclusive source for research. A visit to the sources in the technical appendix guide provided in back of the background guide is a great place to start for further exploration. Delegates should continue to remain up-to-date with developments as the conference nears which ultimately will help to facilitate meaningful debate upon the commencement of our first committee session.

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper that covers three topics of their choosing. This can include topics from the list provided above, or a topic that is of great importance to your Member State. The paper should be no longer than two pages and follow the guidelines outlined on the SRMUN website. A proper position paper should provide insight into the position of your Member State, history and plan of action to outline future goals. It is important to provide a national, regional and international perspective of the actions taking place for each issue so that your audience and conference colleagues can also reap the benefits of the research you have done. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is mandatory. All position papers **MUST** be submitted by **October 31st, 11:59 pm EST** via the on-line submission system at <http://www.srmun.org>.

Please note that Security Council is a single delegate committee. Devon and I are elated to serve as your dais for the Security Council and we wish you the best of luck in your conference preparation. We are confident in your abilities to contribute an innovative dynamic to this committee and sincerely look forward to meeting each of you. Should you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the Director-General Fawn Apgar, Devon or myself.

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The Committee History for the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council (SC) was created under Article V of the United Nations Charter with the unconventional ability to pass resolutions that are binding on the Member States of the United Nations (UN). The SC is tasked with the responsibility of maintaining global peace and security. More specifically, as established in the Charter, the main function of the SC is to foster amicable relations amongst Member States, facilitate cooperation amongst nations, and to act as an advocate for the understanding and respect of human rights.¹ While many organs within the UN can make recommendations and suggest actions, Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations states that the Security Council has the power to enforce decisions and demand actions from Member States to prevent, or as a reaction to, an international crisis.² To fulfill its mandate and maintain peace and security, the Security Council has implemented various enforcement measures which range from peaceful approaches, such as the imposing of financial and economic sanctions, to more interventional methods such as peacekeeping operations or authorization of military action.³ When facing the need for potential action, the first function performed by the SC is to determine whether a threat to peace exists. If the council should determine the presence of conflict they first, investigate the situation; second, recommend methods of reaching settlement; third, establish a system to regulate armaments; fourth, call upon Member States to use economic sanctions or force to end the aggression; and finally, they take necessary military action against the aggressors. The SC additionally functions to “recommend the admission of new Members, exercise the trusteeship function of the United Nations in ‘strategic areas,’ and recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the GA, elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.”⁴

There are fifteen Member States that make up the Security Council, consisting of five permanent members and non-permanent members which are elected by the General Assembly every two years by a majority vote.⁵ The 10 rotating members are apportioned by region to achieve “equitable geographical distribution” and five of the ten are replaced each year.⁶ The five permanent members, often referred to as the ‘P-5’,⁷ are the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The concept of a permanent 5 Member States was established after World War II when the United Kingdom, USSR, and the United States were the frontrunners of the war and demonstrated strong global leadership.⁸ U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt supported the inclusion of China for its ability in international security and policing.⁹ Likewise, Great Britain suggested France’s participation to block any potential German-Soviet alliance.¹⁰ Interestingly, before the actual creation of the P5, Member States debated the idea of permanent membership and veto power. “It was acknowledged that such arrangements reflected the overriding global political influence of the P5 and that, without these privileges, the US and USSR would not ratify the UN Charter.”¹¹

The UN Regular Budget finances the Security Council, as well as all of the UN’s special political missions.¹² The present budget agreement for the UN Regular Budget is divided amongst Member States based on their gross national product (GNP) figures.¹³ The maximum rate expected for contribution is 22 percent of a Member State’s

¹ “About,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about> (accessed April 4, 2014)

² Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml> (accessed April 5, 2014)

³ “About,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/#> (accessed April 4, 2014)

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ “About,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/#> (accessed April 4, 2014)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ “Members,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/index.shtml> (accessed April 5, 2014)

⁸ “Russia as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council,” International Policy Analysis. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09461.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2014)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “The P5 and the Slow Pace of Security Council Reform,” Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/the-dark-side-of-natural-resources-st/water-in-conflict/41307.html> (accessed April 4, 2014)

¹² “UN Budgeting Process,” Better World Campaign. <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/funding/the-un-budget-process.html> (accessed April 4, 2014)

¹³ Ibid.

GNP and the minimum is a mere .001 percent.¹⁴ Funding also derives from pre-determined contributions and voluntary donations by Member States.¹⁵ Pre-determined contributions are assigned by a Member State's ability to pay as well as their depth of involvement in a matter or the various treaties which they become party to.¹⁶ The larger portion of pre-determined funding for Security Council peacekeeping operations come from the five permanent members who are expected to pay a greater fraction due to their exclusive veto power and duties regarding the preservation of peace and security.¹⁷

Each member of the Security Council is expected to be available at all times in case of an international crisis. As they are in a continuous session, this is the only UN body that must remain "on call."¹⁸ It should be noted that not all Member States of the UN have been chosen to hold a seat within the SC.¹⁹ In specific instances, Member States that are not on the SC have been invited to speak to the council and participate in discussions that "specifically affect" their interests. The Presidency of the SC is selected in alphabetical order, rotates monthly and provides each Member State the opportunity to hold the position.²⁰

Voting within the Security Council vastly differs from other UN committees. In all other organs of the UN, Member States are given an equal voice, but in the SC the five permanent members are given "the great Power unanimity" which is often known as the veto.²¹ If one of the five permanent Member States on the SC votes nay on a draft resolution, the draft resolution or decision is void, even if there were a majority pro votes on the issue by the other members of the council. On both procedural and substantive matters, there is a requirement of nine pro votes in order for the item voted on to pass.

The Members of the Security Council are:

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, CHAD, CHILE, CHINA, FRANCE, JORDAN, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, NIGERIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RWANDA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, and THE UNITED STATES.

I. Designing Effective Targeted Sanctions

Introduction

United Nations Security Council sanctions are imposed to address international challenges to global peace and security. The United Nations frequently utilizes sanctions to "apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force."²² The international community as a whole has various selections to choose from, such as military force, legal tribunals, and deployment of peacekeeping missions. These sanctions are often considered between two countries and lay outside the direct purview of the SC although often discussed and established during meetings. The spectrum of mandatory sanctions of the UN Security Council range from general trade sanctions to specific or targeted restrictions such as "diplomatic, arms embargoes,

¹⁴ "UN Budgeting Process," Better World Campaign. <http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/issues/funding/the-un-budget-process.html> (accessed April 4, 2014)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Financing Peacekeeping," United Nations Peacekeeping. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml> (accessed April 5, 2014)

¹⁸ "Insiders Guide to the Security Council," CNN. <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/10/16/insider.securitycouncil/> (accessed April 4, 2014)

¹⁹ "Members," United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/index.shtml> (accessed April 5, 2014)

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Membership and residency of the Security Council in 2003," UN Members. http://www.un.org/docs/unsc/unsc_members.html (accessed April 4, 2014)

²² "UN Security Council Sanctions Committees," United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/> (accessed July 20, 2014).

travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions.”²³ Comprehensive sanctions are considered more extreme as they “seek to deny a target state all normal international financial, trade and service interactions except those exempted on humanitarian grounds.”²⁴ The result of such sanctions can affect Member States in both intentional and unintentional ways which has drawn ample debate regarding their effectiveness. Critics of UN sponsored comprehensive sanctions disagree with the tactic, citing that innocent populations are adversely effected through these “cruel, unfair, and even violent” measures.²⁵ Humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have been very vocal against UN sanctions. UNICEF, along with non-governmental organizations, paid particular attention to the devastating outcomes of the sanctions imposed during Saddam Hussein’s reign within Iraq, stating that the restrictions “led to the deaths of more than a million people – the majority of them children.”²⁶ As a rebuttal, the SC approved an oil-for-food humanitarian program in 1996 to help alleviate the statewide malnutrition and disease issue. The program was infiltrated by scandalous businesses and government officials, and encountered scandal because of a “lucrative scheme to earn illicit funds.”²⁷ This example demonstrates an all too common result: the unintended consequences of the Iraqi sanctions and the attempt to soften their impact led to further complication which ultimately exposed the danger associated with the Security Council’s lack of instituting safeguards.²⁸

Targeted sanctions, also known as “smart sanctions” are “meant to focus their impact on leaders, political elites and segments of society believed responsible for objectionable behavior, while reducing collateral damage to the general population and third countries.”²⁹ The Security Council can target specific groups or non-state actors as it has done with Security Council Resolution 1373 and 1988, which targeted Al-Qaida’s financial assets in 2001 and 2011.³⁰ Targeted sanctions can further be viewed as “sanctions targeted on individuals, groups or corporate entities; sanctions targeted against particular commodities or sectors of an economy; and sanctions targeted against particular regions of a country.”³¹ The idea behind targeted sanctions is simply to inflict the intended punishment on the culprit rather than an entire population.

The process to determine the validity of a sanction is through an explicit system of established checks and balances. Under Article 29 of the Security Council Charter, the Security Council may establish “subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”³² which often includes a sanctions committee that helps to make recommendations regarding sanctions.³³ These subsidiary organs are tasked with the following:

²³ “UN Security Council Sanctions Committees,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

²⁴ “The Impact of Economic Sanctions: 2nd report of the session,” Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs. http://books.google.com/books?id=8buKjOL2Le8C&dq=what+are+comprehensive+sanctions&source=gbp_navlinks_s. (accessed July 20, 2014).

²⁵ “Sanctions,” United Nations Security Council. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/sanctions.html>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

²⁶ “The Debate over U.N. Sanctions,” PBS, November 2002. <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq/sanctions.html>. (accessed July 30, 2014).

²⁷ Sharon Otterman. “IRAQ: Oil for Food Scandal,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-oil-food-scandal/p7631>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

²⁸ “The UN’s oil-for-food scandal: Rolling up the culprits,” March 2008. <http://www.economist.com/node/10853611>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

²⁹ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Barbara Oegg. “Targeted Sanctions” A Policy Alternative?” February 2000. <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=371>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

³⁰ “Financial Sanctions; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),” HM Treasury, August 2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/302397/August_2013_version_-_amended.pdf. (accessed July 29, 2014).

³¹ Thomas J. Biersteker. “The Emergence, Evolution, Effects, and Challenges of Targeted Sanctions,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, June 2004. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/Biersteker-Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

³² *Subsidiary Organs of the Security Council*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_05.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

³³ “Structure: Part of the UN System,” United Nations Security Council”. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

“(a) seeking information regarding the implementation of measures imposed under Article 41; (b) considering information concerning the violations of the measures and recommending appropriate measures in response thereto; (c) reporting to the Council on the information regarding alleged violations; (d) giving consideration to and deciding upon request for exemptions from the measures; (e) examining reports submitted to them, including those from monitoring bodies; (f) identifying individuals and entities subject to the measures and to maintain such a list, and (g) making recommendations to the Council on how to improve the effectiveness of the measures.”³⁴

Similar to the purposes of the sanctions based subsidiary organs discussed above, this guide will observe the history and legality of sanction use, the different types of sanctions relied upon by the UN, objectives and strategies to implementing such sanctions, designated targets and criteria used to establish the need for sanctions, and lastly, it will consider the effectiveness of sanctions under international law.

Article 41

The United Nations Charter details in Chapter VII, Article 41, enforcement measures not involving the use of armed force available to the UN, in the vein of sanctions.³⁵ Though it does not specifically state “sanctions”, Article 41 does list certain measures we know to be sanctions and clarifies that the list is in no way exhaustive.³⁶ Sanctions under international law began during the Cold War, but thereafter in 1991 evolved into the targeted sanctions of more recent history and today.³⁷ Article 41 also has been used by the SC for a multitude of other purposes, such as the creation of international tribunals for (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) as well as compensation funds (UN Compensation Committee).³⁸ Contrary to the international law that was provided by the League of Nations Covenant, where sanctions were applied in the instance of interstate war and were specifically determined to apply comprehensive diplomatic and economic pressure while failing to centralize decision making, the UN Charter does not delineate under what circumstances sanction may be applied, and provides only guidelines as to the types of measures to be implemented, leaving the central decision-making authority in the Security Council.³⁹

The main objectives of the SC in the arena of sanction usage can be grouped into five main categories: conflict resolution, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, democratization, and the protection of civilians, which by extension include human rights. A few of the core issues with targeted sanctions that the Security Council considers when drafting a resolution to authorize them are: “the reason for imposing sanctions, alongside their purposes in the short-term and long term senses; the targets of the sanctions and under what criteria designations should be made and exemptions considered; the types of sanctions to be imposed, and the combination and sequencing of measures most likely to be effective; the institutional mechanisms needed for implementation – for example, sanctions committee, panel/group of experts monitoring group; and the longevity of the sanctions, (fixed term or open-ended) and under what criteria they should be terminated.”⁴⁰

History of Sanctions

The first use of its enforcement measures by the Security Council was in 1963, where the UN imposed “voluntary sanctions on the apartheid regimes of South Africa”.⁴¹ They were a reactive measure to the apartheid system, but

³⁴ *Subsidiary Organs of the Security Council*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2004-2007/04-07_05.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

³⁵ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

also to its ambitious pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. Following these, the apartheid regime of South Rhodesia was targeted with similar sanctions by the United Nations in 1965.⁴² In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Republic of Iraq was targeted with sanctions from 1990-2003 for its invasion of Kuwait, and for the possession and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the Kurdish people.⁴³ Regarded as “the most powerful sanctions in history – intended to cripple Saddam Hussein’s regime and prevent the development of mass destruction”⁴⁴ the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq were considered – internationally – to be excessively harsh and led to the Security Council’s development of the Oil-for-Food Program which was considered to be a lighter, pro-humanitarian approach. Other noteworthy examples of comprehensive sanction application include those against Yugoslavia (1991-1996) and Haiti (1993-1994).

Due to the severe criticism of comprehensive sanction use, the Security Council responded to concerns by focusing primarily on sanction reform that directed restrictions toward a particular sector, policymaker, or regime. The growing interest of targeted sanction sparked the Interlaken Process, headed by the Swiss Government. As a result of the Interlaken meetings, the *Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and Implementation* was created and presented to the Security Council in 2001 for its use.⁴⁵ Subsequently, the German Foreign Office led efforts to focus on travel bans, aviation sanctions and arms embargoes. The final report published and presented to the Security Council for its use also in 2001 is the Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the Bonn-Berlin Process.⁴⁶ Another major contribution to the targeted sanctions movement was the Stockholm Process which made recommendations on ways to implement the various sanctions.⁴⁷ All three reports have made major contributions to the design and implementation of sanctions and have continued to be depended upon by the Security Council as is evident by the following examples of more recent targeted sanctions usage: Somalia (1991-Present), Liberia (1992-2001) Angola (1992-2003), Rwanda (1994-2008), Sierra Leone (1997-2010), Kosovo (1998-2001), Sudan (2004-Present), Libya (1992-Present), North Korea (2006-Present), Iran (2006-Present), and Syria (2012-Present).⁴⁸

Determining a Targeted Sanction

Arms embargoes, travel bans and the freezing of assets are widely used examples of targeted sanctions. Arms embargoes are used to purposely influence political or military leaders by blockading their access to weapons or other necessary military equipment.⁴⁹ Arms embargoes are successful in avoiding unnecessary harm on innocent civilian populations while adding pressure along with international stigmatization to targets. The most commonly imposed form of sanctions are travel bans which can restrict “all air travel to and from a target country” or place “restrictions on the travel of targeted individuals, groups or entities.”⁵⁰ Likewise, visa and passport restrictions can be utilized to hinder individuals from traveling. Economic sanctions such as “limiting access to financial markets, freezing assets, restricting economic assistance, or prohibiting new investment” can severely bind a target in their

⁴² *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁴³ “Sanctions Against Iraq,” Global Policy Forum. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/previous-issues-and-debate-on-iraq/sanctions-against-iraq.html>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁴⁴ Uri Friedman, “Smart Sanctions: A Short History,” *Foreign Policy*, April 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/smart_sanctions. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁴⁵ *Background Paper on Targeted Sanctions*. Targeted Financial Sanctions Project Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. July 2004. http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Background_Paper_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 29, 2014).

⁴⁶ *Background Paper on Targeted Sanctions*. Targeted Financial Sanctions Project Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. July 2004. http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Background_Paper_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 29, 2014).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁴⁹ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Barbara Oegg. “Targeted Sanctions” A Policy Alternative?” February 2000. <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=371>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

ability to carry out further lawlessness.⁵¹ Commodity sanctions or “interdiction” can be imposed on particular sectors such as the oil, mining or diamond industry. Finally to note, targeted sanctions used less frequently include diplomatic severance sanctions and culturally, scientifically or academically based sanctions, for example, the boycott of a Member State which is hosting the Olympics, these sanctions are typically non-economic and reap minor consequences.⁵²

While comprehensive sanctions are perceived to be too broad and dangerous due to “their adverse humanitarian impact and a lack of precision in targeting those who had most threatened international peace and security,”⁵³ targeted sanctions help to minimize these “adverse side-effects” and remain commonly depended on today by the Security Council, as has been discussed.⁵⁴ In broad terms, targeted sanctions can have one of three different principal purposes – to coerce a change in the target’s behavior, to constrain a target from engaging in a proscribed activity, or to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.⁵⁵ In an effort to refine the objects of sanctions regimes, targeted sanctions are commonly designed based according to perpetrator. For example, targeted sanctions against states are specifically molded depending on the status of the state which can range from: single, multiple, de facto or unrecognized, and lastly, failed.⁵⁶ Likewise, non-state actors can be categorized by: “sub-state actors (rebel groups), extra-state actors (terrorist groups), individuals in decision-making positions, individual arm dealers and private-sector actors (corporations).”⁵⁷ Currently, the UN depends upon the following criterion to designate states and non-state actors for sanctions: “threatening peace, security or stability; violating an arms embargo, supporting armed groups through illegal commodity trade, impeding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; violating international human rights or humanitarian law; obstructing access to humanitarian assistance; targeting of civilians for human rights violations; recruiting of child soldiers; committing rape and gender-based violence; misappropriating public assets; obstructing or attacking peacekeepers; inciting public hatred and violence; supporting proliferation of nuclear weapons; being associated with or supporting a terrorist group; engaging in terrorist bombings or political assassinations; and preventing the restoration of constitutional order.”⁵⁸

While the determination of state or non-state actor is vital to the designing of a UN targeted sanction, consideration of other factors must be taken into account to achieve absolute effectiveness. Created by the Targeted Sanction Consortium (TSC) which was developed as a tool for sanctions policymakers, the Security Council relies on a checklist to determine an appropriate sanction to a situation. Sanctions episodes or Member State case studies, the purpose(s) of the sanction, the expected outcome or objective of the targeted sanction, an understanding of international norms, the different types of targeted sanctions which can be utilized, the potential unintended consequences, the cohesiveness of the sanction along with other policy measures, its implementation method, the current political atmosphere and the legal scope or limitations of the intended sanction.⁵⁹ Further complicating the design method of targeted sanctions, sanctions can be imposed either unilaterally by one sole Member State or multilaterally with the cooperation of other Member States or international organizations/blocs such as the European Union.

⁵¹ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Barbara Oegg. “Targeted Sanctions” A Policy Alternative?” February 2000.

<http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=371>. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁵² William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg. “Alternatives to Comprehensive Sanctions,” Department of Economics, University of Colorado, Bolder. February 2000. <http://www.colorado.edu/econ/papers/papers00/wp00-17.pdf>. (accessed July 29, 2014).

⁵³ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ “The Effectiveness of United Nations Target Sanctions,” Watson Institute, Brown University. November 2013. <http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/Effectiveness%20of%20UN%20Targeted%20Sanctions%20-%206.Nov.2013%20.pdf>. (accessed July 29, 2014).

⁵⁶ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ “Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. August 2012. http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG_images/Sanctions/Designing%20UN%20Targeted%20Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

Keeping this in mind, specific processes and criteria must be met before designating which target and what sanction is appropriate. The process known as listing and delisting a target, executed by putting the UN on notice of the impending target or removing the target from the list, can only be prepared via a resolution or a sanctions committee.⁶⁰ “Typically, Member States propose candidates to the sanctions committees that are then included if there are no objections with the committee within a specified time frame.”⁶¹ Some sanction committees, however, call upon other sources such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) when nominating a proposed target.⁶² Upon the approval of all deciding parties involved, the “target will be notified of their listing via the permanent mission to the UN of the country of their citizenship.”⁶³ Once listed, to be removed from the sanctions list or de-listed, the petitioner must go through a lengthy process that requires them to appeal their case to their committee by Member States, their state of nationality or residency or to the Focal Point for Delisting which was created in 2006 through resolution 1730.⁶⁴ Special provisions have been made for de-listing Al-Qaida and the Al-Qaida regime only and their appeal must be reviewed by the Office of the Ombudsperson who has the final ruling and can only be overturned by “a unanimous vote of the committee or referred to the Council by a committee member.”⁶⁵

Are U.N. Sanctions Effective?

Analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of UN sanctions demonstrate one-third of all types of sanctions (both comprehensive and targeted) are considered effective.⁶⁶ However, it is quite difficult to extract an absolute, unequivocal answer when evaluating the effectiveness of any sanction as the result is very much dependent on the criteria chosen when assessing its effects. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that sanctions are typically applied with other measures, varying in forcefulness and it is therefore difficult to attribute the desired action directly to a sanction.⁶⁷

In a study conducted by The Graduate Institute Geneva, in association with the Targeted Sanctions Consortium and the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, results show an increase in corruption and criminality, the strengthening of authoritarian rule in the target, and the diversion of resources in response to sanctions. This is clearly a negative, unintended humanitarian consequence of sanctions and lead to the topic of sanction effectiveness as a highly debated subject.⁶⁸ These were observed at rates of 69 percent, 54 percent, 44 percent, and 39 percent respectively.⁶⁹ Key findings of the study determined UN targeted sanctions are much more effective in signaling or constraining a target than they are in coercing a change in target behavior and that targeting is important as too many, too few, or unclear targets undermine the credibility of the measures taken.⁷⁰ The study also offers numerous recommendations as to designing better sanctions, such as: sanctions should be designed with comparable deliberation and planning of military operations, UN targeted sanctions should remain targeted,

⁶⁰ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁶¹ *Security Council Report: UN Sanctions*. United Nations Security Council. November 2013.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ “Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. August 2012.

http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/heid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG_images/Sanctions/Designing%20UN%20Targeted%20Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁶⁷ Thomas J. Biersteker. “The Emergence, Evolution, Effects, and Challenges of Targeted Sanctions,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, June 2004.

https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/Biersteker-Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

policymakers need to be realistic about what UN targeted sanctions can reasonably achieve, discursive treatment of UN sanctions matters, enhance the quality of public debate.⁷¹

Finally, it must be kept in mind that targeted sanctions are naturally limited by the rules of international law. Despite the movement away from comprehensive sanction usage and the significant evolution in the design of targeted sanctions, the implementation of such sanctions still face considerable legal challenges. In terms of international law, sanctions are legal but must comply with the rules of human rights and international humanitarian law.⁷² The issue, of course, presents itself when sanctions create adverse effects which endanger the lives or health of unintended targets. However, it is important to recall that due to the criticism displayed against UN comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions were developed to reduce unintended consequences.

Conclusion

In the area of effective targeted sanctions, much work remains to be done. Not only must the short-term, immediate effects be considered, but also those long-term implications of such actions. By examining what has already been done in the past, future sanctions can be designed in more effective, poignant ways to solve global issues. It must also be determined for the future in what situations sanctions are best used. Improved coordination and cooperation within the UN system could lead to enhanced implementation of sanctions regimes and higher levels of compliance. That being said, one of the main concerns in designing these future sanctions should be to decrease the percentages of their unintended consequences. Only if the Security Council comes to a consensus on what an effective targeted sanction looks like can it truly be effective. While there are reservations about whether or not to use sanctions or debate over when or what is the best time or place, they remain one of the Security Council's tools to handle conflict, crises, and international issues.

Committee Directive

Targeted sanctions are already a prevalent form of action, however many leave much more room for effectiveness of handling crises or issues on the global scale. Delegates should be prepared to bring forth new ideas about sanctions and how their respective Member States would approach other new methods or ideas of how to handle targeted sanctions. To what level should sanctions be extended? How long should they last to not cause further issues, or is that determined case-by-case? In what situations would your Member State agree sanctions are the best resolution? Has your Member State been affected by sanctions and seen long lasting unintended consequences? What else must be asked in order to properly address the issue of designing targeted sanctions for future unity and stability?

II. The Situation in the Central African Republic

"The international community failed the people of Rwanda 20 years ago. And we are at risk of not doing enough for the people of the CAR today...Atrocity crimes are being committed in this country...Ethno-religious cleansing is a reality." – UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on his visit to the Central African Republic in 2014

Introduction

The former French Colony, known as the Central African Republic (CAR), has remained an unstable battlefield since its independence in 1960 due primarily to political upheaval, corruption and economic shortfalls.⁷³ Often referred to as the "worst crisis you've never heard of", the situation in the CAR has affected 4.6 million people to

⁷¹ Thomas J. Biersteker. "The Emergence, Evolution, Effects, and Challenges of Targeted Sanctions," Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, June 2004.
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/Biersteker-Targeted_Sanctions.pdf. (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁷² Anna Segall. "Economic Sanctions: legal and policy constraints," International Committee of the Red Cross. December 1999.
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jq73.htm>. (accessed July 29, 2014).

⁷³ Morten Boas. "The Central African Republic – a history of a collapse foretold?"
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f184b5f674ff9a5d613313e29788eae2.pdf (accessed June 9, 2014)

date, including an astounding total of 2.3 million children.⁷⁴ According to UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, the CAR has entered into a “state of anarchy”⁷⁵ given the 2013 ousting of Christian majority President Francois Bozize by Muslim rebels who remain in combat with Christian parties for control and power.⁷⁶ In addition to the thousands who have died from battle, the CAR is in dire need of humanitarian aid and a solution that addresses the countless number of internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁷⁷ Furthermore, the region has had to endure the estimated 500,000 refugees which have either fled the nation in search of a safe haven or become internally displaced.⁷⁸ 2012 statistics point out that roughly 65,000 have fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Chad and Cameroon.⁷⁹ The refugee situation has become a primary concern and remains in a state of vulnerability as reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) claim that as of June 2014, civilians seeking asylum were turned away at the borders of Chad, a previous safe haven for many CAR refugees.⁸⁰

The recent insurgency in the CAR led by a newly emerged and domineering armed coalition named Seleka, has contributed to the already deteriorating situation by engaging in acts of mass atrocity. Since its debut, the CAR has witnessed an influx in “human rights violations (including possible war crimes and crimes against humanity), increasing tensions between Christians and Muslims, intra-Seleka fighting and the arrival of foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan.”⁸¹ Efforts to reestablish law and order have continued to be met with adversity. In September 2014, 12,000 UN peacekeepers are expected to replace the 2,000 troops that have currently been policing the CAR.⁸² It is impossible to project the status of the CAR during this anticipated transition as the possibility of national unity has continued to be bleak. It is important to consider the contributing factors to CAR’s instability and the political history that has lent to such chaos in order to develop the strong interim government that is needed.

History: A Legacy of Instability

While necessary to focus on the current humanitarian crisis perpetuated by violence and human rights violations brought to the attention of the United Nations Security Council, it is important to recognize the legacy of conflict and weakness of state power that has inhibited the Central African Republic since its independence from France in 1960. The various coups and relentless regimes in support of internal instability date back to the reign of the CAR’s first President, David Dacko, who was ousted in 1965 by army commander Jean-Bedel Bokassa.⁸³ Bokassa ruled from 1966 until 1979 and was known for his militaristic approach, along with his fascination of French political leader, Napoleon Bonaparte.⁸⁴ Bokassa dissolved the legislation, abolished the constitution and declared himself

⁷⁴ “The Worst Crisis You’ve Never Heard Of.” United Nations Children’s Fund.

<http://www.unicefusa.org/mission/emergencies/conflict/central-african-republic/infographic-worst-crisis-youve-never-heard> (accessed June 7, 2014).

⁷⁵ “Ban Ki-moon warns of Rwandan genocide repeat in Central African Republic.” The Telegraph.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/centralafricanrepublic/10747572/Ban-Ki-moon-warns-of-Rwandan-genocide-repeat-in-Central-African-Republic.html> (accessed June 9, 2014)

⁷⁶ “U.N. chief warns against repeat of Rwanda in Central African Republic.” CNN.

<http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/05/world/africa/car-ban/> (Accessed June 8, 2014)

⁷⁷ Ibid

⁷⁸ “The Central African Republic – a history of a collapse foretold?” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center.

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f184b5f674ff9a5d613313e29788eae2.pdf (accessed June 9, 2014)

⁷⁹ “2014 UNHCR country operations profile - Central African Republic.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c156.html> (accessed June 18, 2014)

⁸⁰ UNHCR seeking clarification of reports that people fleeing CAR denied entry to Chad.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. <http://www.unhcr.org/539aef436.html> (accessed June 18, 2014)

⁸¹ “Violence in the Central African Republic.” Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#/?marker=26> (accessed June 21, 2014)

⁸² “Central African Republic: Chaos Could Further Radicalize the Conflict.” Council on Foreign Relations.

<http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/06/13/central-african-republic-chaos-could-further-radicalize-the-conflict/> (accessed June 15, 2014)

⁸³ “Central African Republic.” Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/254026/The-21st-century>. (accessed July 1, 2014).

⁸⁴ “Central African Republic.” History World. <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ad36>. (accessed July 1, 2014).

“president for life” in 1972.⁸⁵ In a noteworthy move, he then claimed the title as “Emperor of Central Africa” in 1979.⁸⁶ In 1993, the French government intervened and replaced Bokassa with previous president, David Dacko, after an outbreak of civilian protests due to claims of human rights atrocities, for which he was later convicted.⁸⁷ Finally, in 1993, civilian rule was established when Ange-Felix Patasse is elected president at the first multi-party presidential and parliamentary election under the Central African People’s Liberation Movement (MLPC) party.⁸⁸ Due to tensions beginning in 1996, clashes between rebels and French forces break out around the capital of Bangui and multiple attempts to overthrow the government occur.⁸⁹ As a result, the Bangui Accords are signed in 1997 to end the conflict in attempts to reorganize and reform the Member State.⁹⁰ Six years later, Francois Bozize gains control of presidency through a military coup with the support from neighboring Member State, Chad, and goes on to win reelection status in 2005 as well as 2011.⁹¹

The Impact of the Bozize Era

Francois Bozize came to power - not through democratic election, but through military coup and exited his presidency after ten years in the same fashion. In a recent Report by the Crisis Group Africa, Bozize’s governmental approach was summarized as an absolute failure which directly correlates to the current political, economic and social environment of CAR. The Report states, “The government lost control of much of the national territory, while foreign support receded. Isolated internally and externally, the government chose the strategy of political monopoly, which it no longer had the resources to maintain and which provoked the creation of a rebel coalition: the Seleka.”⁹² During the Bozize years, the Central African Republic Bush War took place and as a result, multiple regimes formed throughout CAR such as the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Union of Republican Forces (UFR), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and the anti-balaka, a group which is still highly active today.⁹³

In addition to the rival rebel groups known to cause havoc, external regional actors such as Chad, South Africa and France, heavily influenced agreements and each nation was responsible for providing troops for conflicting purposes within CAR.⁹⁴ For example, the 1,200 personal guards of Bozize, known as The Presidential Guard, hailed from neighboring Chad.⁹⁵ Likewise, having always been a supporter of the Bozize Administration, France pledged their support by providing troops in Bangui during Operation Boali.⁹⁶ To counter French involvement, South Africa’s presence in the CAR included the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)’s for additional personal protection of Bozize.⁹⁷ Best put, the CAR was a battleground state that not only encouraged

⁸⁵ Central African Republic.” Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/40700/The-colonial-era>. (accessed July 1, 2014)

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ “Central African Republic.” History World. <http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ad36>. (accessed July 1, 2014).

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ “Bangui Accords.” Peacemaker. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CF_970125_BanguiAccords_0.pdf

⁹¹ “Central African Republic.” Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-African-Republic/254026/The-21st-century>. (accessed July 1, 2014).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ “Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition.” International Crisis Group. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.pdf>. (accessed July 1, 2014).

⁹⁴ “Rebels, Anti Rebels, and Refugees in Central African Republic.” Think Africa Press. <http://thinkafricapress.com/central-african-republic/fanning-flames-war-car-seleka>. (accessed June 28, 2014).

⁹⁵ “State fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?” GSDRC. http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/CAR_GSDRC2013.pdf (accessed June 12, 2014).

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ “State fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?” GSDRC. http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/CAR_GSDRC2013.pdf (accessed June 12, 2014).

support by conflicting external units, but also acted as an easily accessible stage for regional armed groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), known for its recruitment of Chadian, Sudanese and Ugandan child soldiers.⁹⁸

To establish some kind of effort toward order and reconciliation, Bozize supported multiple peace agreements such as the Birao Peace Agreement of 2007 and the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2008, however, they did little to bring stability amongst rival rebel groups who were promised amnesty but felt slated by the compromise.⁹⁹ As a result, the ceasefire ended two months after signing the Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the situation in the Central African Republic further deteriorated.¹⁰⁰ These failed treaties which detailed plans of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as well as a shared political power, symbolized Bozize's decline from power and signaled the future reigniting of prior conflict. Seeing no end to the dilemma, in 2009, the Security Council called for the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) to "consolidate peace, enhance governance and complete DDR process."¹⁰¹ Having undergone multiple extensions of what was only meant to be a yearlong commitment, BINUCA was most recently reinstated by the Security Council in January 2014 to last through 31 January 2015.¹⁰²

The Birth of Seleka

Deteriorating conditions and anger over the lack of compliancy set forth in the 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement exacerbated the CAR's poor perception of Bozize. The three active regimes that formed during Bozize's earlier years, the UFDR, CPJP and UFR, merged together with the common purpose to demand that promises made under the Libreville Agreement be implemented.¹⁰³ The new coalition, known as Seleka, originated from CAR's Muslim minority and Chadian rebels that were once supportive of Bozize. On 24 March 2013, Seleka seized power, ousted Bozize and presented Michael Djotodia as their new leader. With little plans on how to re-establish political influence, Djotodia hardly had a grasp on Seleka members. As a result, they continue to publicly engage in "assassinations, massacres, extrajudicial executions and disappearances; rape, gang rape, and other sexual violence; torture and the conscription of child soldiers; large-scale acts of pillage and extortion, and the destruction of homes and religious property" without any punitive consequences.¹⁰⁴

In stark opposition to the Seleka regime, the southern based anti-balaka militia materialized, creating further religious sectarian violence due to their mostly Christian membership. Although clashes in late 2013 occurred exclusively between anti-balaka and Seleka members which resulted in approximately 1,000 deaths near the capital city of Bangui, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported "more recently Muslims, many with no connection to the rebels, have been targeted in reprisals by anti-balaka and civilians."¹⁰⁵ Attacks such as these have resulted in "an exodus of historic proportions" and language used by anti-balaka militants has increasingly pointed to a greater plan – one which includes a religious-ethnic cleansing with the Muslim population as the prime target.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁸ "Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition." International Crisis Group.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/203-central-african-republic-priorities-of-the-transition.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2014).

⁹⁹ "Flawed Peace Process Leads to Greater Unrest in the Central African Republic." World Politics Review

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12820/flawed-peace-process-leads-to-greater-unrest-in-the-central-african-republic> (accessed July 12, 2014).

¹⁰⁰ "State fragility in the Central African Republic: What prompted the 2013 coup?" GSDRC.

http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CAR_GSDRC2013.pdf (accessed June 12, 2014).

¹⁰¹ S/PRST/2009/35. *Security Council Report: Statement by the President of the Security Council*. Security Council. 21 December 2009.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ "Central African Republic: They must all leave or die." FIDH. http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_rca_2014-uk-04.pdf (accessed June 14, 2014).

¹⁰⁵ "Briefing: Who are the anti-balaka of CAR?" IRIN. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99634/briefing-who-are-the-anti-balaka-of-car> (accessed July 11, 2014).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Established International and Regional Involvement

The Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council have worked collectively to handle the situation in the Central African Republic. In response to the thousands of refugees fleeing from the CAR as well as the cross-border violence that had taken place, resolution 1778 was adopted by the Security Council, approving the deployment of a UN civilian and police operation known as United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).¹⁰⁷ MINURCAT's mandate was extended with Security Council resolutions 1834, 1861, and 1913 and completed its mission in 2010 in accordance to Security Council resolution 1923.¹⁰⁸ The MINURCAT was referred to as "unusual and unique" by the Secretary-General in that it was "devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians without an explicit political mandate."¹⁰⁹ Although this mission is now complete, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), created in 2000 as the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), remained in the CAR and was extended by Security Council resolution 2088 until 31 January 2014.¹¹⁰ In April 2014, the UN Security Council approved resolution 2149 which permits the deployment of 10,000 peacekeepers and 1,800 police personnel to the CAR by 15 September 2014.¹¹¹ Furthermore, this African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) will be overseen by the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and will work with the Commission of Inquiry (COI) to "investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights."¹¹²

The European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have provided numerous preventative measures throughout the CAR, particularly by supplying troops responsible for containing violence.¹¹³ By June 2014, the AU had authorized additional battalions bringing the sum of troops to 6,000.¹¹⁴ Currently, these international peacekeepers from the (AU) assigned in the CAR, are expected to observe militia activity and maintain peace between groups, provide humanitarian aid and protect those that have remained in the nation, but these peacekeepers' lists of responsibilities are extremely maximized.¹¹⁵ Likewise, France's operation known as the Sangari Force has contributed a total of 2,000 French troops to support the MISCA force with internal security forces.¹¹⁶ Monetarily, the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response increased its original pledge of four million euros to Central African refugees who were forced to flee to Chad and Cameroon by six million euros in May 2014.¹¹⁷

The situation in the Central African Republic has influenced and affected numerous neighboring Member States and as a result, regional involvement has been steady. Born from the 1977 Bangui Agreements, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB), helped deploy 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo, aimed to restore peace and security by disarming unlawfully armed individuals with the CAR.¹¹⁸ In 1983, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was created to address peace and security issues within the region.¹¹⁹ Likewise, the Economic and Monetary Community of

¹⁰⁷ S/PRST/2009/35. *Security Council Report: Statement by the President of the Security Council*. Security Council. 21 December 2009.

¹⁰⁸ "About" <http://minurcat.unmissions.org/> MINURCAT. (accessed July 11, 2014)

¹⁰⁹ "About" <http://minurcat.unmissions.org/> MINURCAT. (accessed July 11, 2014)

¹¹⁰ "About." BINUCA. <http://binuca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?alias=binuca.unmissions.org/binuca-eng&language=en-US>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹¹¹ *Security Council Report.: Central African Republic*. Security Council. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2014-08/central_african_republic_7.php (accessed June 21, 2014)

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ 7114th meeting Report. Security Council. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11288.doc.htm> (accessed June 14, 2014)

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ The Central African Republic – a history of a collapse foretold?" Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center. "http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f184b5f674ff9a5d613313e29788eae2.pdf. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹¹⁶ "Sangaris: situation update on 10 July 2014." Ministry of Defense (France). <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/content/view/full/288127>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹¹⁷ "EU steps up efforts to help refugees fleeing violence in Central African Republic." Europa. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-520_en.htm. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹¹⁸ "Background." MINURCA. <http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/minurcaB.htm>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹¹⁹ Meyer, Angela. "Peace and Security Cooperation in central Africa" <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:442741/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

Central Africa (CEMAC) worked with ECCAS to develop the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC), a peacekeeping mission deployed from 2002 to 2008.¹²⁰ As a succession to FOMUC, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) was established in late 2008 to play a vital role in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process.¹²¹

More recently, in February 2014, interim President Catherine Samba-Panza, took office as one of three female heads of state within the African continent. In an interview with the internationally acclaimed Guardian newspaper, President Samba-Panza spoke to the issues troubling the CAR by stating, “ethnic-cleansing is a bad phrase, it’s not appropriate. We don’t have an ethnic problem. We have problems with a community conflict with religious aspects. We are not killing an ethnic group.”¹²² On 30 May 2014 she urged the International Criminal Court (ICC) to “open an investigation, acknowledging that Central African Courts are not in a position to carry out the necessary investigations” needed to prosecute serious crimes.¹²³ Ironically, in an effort to calm the increasingly volatile security situation, Seleka rebels signed a ceasefire with the anti-balaka militia in neighboring Republic of Congo on 23 July 2014¹²⁴. The ceasefire called for an immediate end to the fighting that has been ongoing since Djotodia’s appointment and also provided hope that the country would exist as one rather than split into two along religious lines as was proposed prior to agreement talks.¹²⁵ On 5 August 2014, both groups blamed one another for violating the ceasefire agreement by launching a new wave of attacks initiated by an alleged ambush on Muslims in three separate towns.¹²⁶ The agreement, although optimistic in nature, omitted one crucial element from its contract: impunity.

Conclusion

As of 2014, of the 4.6 million estimated to be living within the Central African Republic, it is reported that at least 2.5 million are in need of some form of assistance.¹²⁷ Given this perspective, it is no surprise that the current situation in the CAR is deeply concerning and has yet to truly gain international consternation. The dire crisis involving both the refugee and internally displaced populations help to perpetuate the already weak humanitarian status within its borders and has unfortunately spilled over into surrounding Member States. Furthermore, the political insecurity and the historical precedent of ongoing corruption which still has yet to be reconciled paints a grave picture for those citizens that are seeking punitive measures.

Committee Directive

In their research, delegates should explore the extent of international involvement and whether or not further intervention is needed. If so, on what level and how drastic should these measures be? What is the likeliness of the development of a peace agreement in which all parties are involved? Will it be successful and what prerequisites must be met before each party is satisfied? How can the government carry out a successful democratic election given the shadow of prior issues with corruption and legality? Attention should be given to the climate of the Member States which surround the CAR and their current political, economic and social atmospheres to determine a solution that is sustainable and feasible for all affected.

¹²⁰ Meyer, Angela. “Peace and Security Cooperation in central Africa” <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:442741/FULLTEXT01.pdf>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹²¹ “Micropax.” European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/peace-support-operations/micopax_en.htm. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹²² “Can Catherine Samba-Panza save the Central African Republic?” The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/catherine-samba-panza-central-african-republic>. (accessed June 20, 2014).

¹²³ “Central African Republic Cease-fire Ignores Justice.” Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/02/central-african-republic-cease-fire-ignores-justice>. (accessed August 8, 2014).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ “Clashes between Muslim rebels, Christian militia leaves Central African Republic ceasefire in tatters.” DNA. <http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-clashes-between-muslim-rebels-christian-militia-leaves-central-african-republic-ceasefire-in-tatters-2008371>. (accessed August 8, 2014).

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ “Central Africa Republic (CAR) Situation Report No. 37 (as of 6 August 2014).” ReliefWeb. <http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-africa-republic-car-situation-report-no-37-6-august-2014>. (accessed August 6, 2014).

III. The Threat of Cyber Warfare

Introduction

The issue of cyber warfare and cyber insecurity is a contemporary, yet evolving phenomena affecting Member States throughout the international community. Cyber networks and telecommunication infrastructures are relatively new tools that are being utilized by public and private sectors to enhance efforts to globalize and connect human populations across the world. With these advancements come new threats to the way of life they provide. Cyber warfare is defined as “the use of computers and other devices to attack an enemy’s information system as opposed to an enemy’s armies or factories.”¹²⁸ While “cyberspace” is described as a globally interconnected network of digital information and communications infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and the information resident therein.¹²⁹ Moreover, “cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation’s computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.”¹³⁰

For many Member States, a potential problem stemming from cyber warfare is the threat to their own national security, as cyber warfare can be used to obtain secret information – such as classified federal documents – from an array of sources: individuals, competitors, state governments, militaries, etc. Such information could be used to greatly damage or undermine the infrastructure of Member States. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted in a statement from 2010, “Cyber-warfare attacks on military infrastructure, government and communications systems, and financial markets pose a rapidly growing but little understood threat to international security and could become a decisive weapon of choice in future conflicts between states.”¹³¹ With this in mind, an innovative, centralized movement, focused on technologically established Member States, has begun in hopes of creating new agencies or divisions within existing agencies for combatting cyber warfare, both on the national and international level.

This new world war is fought by faceless enemies determined to destroy entire societies, values, and morale using the internet and social media. And this is a war gaining momentum, with over eighteen attacks per second globally.¹³² This activity costs the United States alone USD 250 billion a year.¹³³ Cyber warfare expert Moutaz Kokash warned delegates at a panel discussion at the thirteenth edition of the Arab Media Forum that this new global phenomenon could have lethal effects, and in a far different way than conventional warfare. He continued to highlight the far-reaching effects of such warfare, noting that cyber attacks cost the Gulf Arab countries USD 1 billion a year and counting, and that no countries are immune to this new virtual world battlefield, because in this realm there are no boundaries or borders, it is global.¹³⁴

State-sponsored cyber warfare may use some tools that common criminal hackers can use, and in some cases even attack the same targets, but they want to take these attacks a step further. Military grade cyber weapons, unlike regular hacker tools, differ because they are a more sophisticated digital weapon, used to break things, creating real physical or tangible damage.¹³⁵ One of the key issues then is the speed and destructiveness of attacks, as Vice Chancellor Naoimi stated, “In a cyber war, there is no ethics and damages are done in seconds... We have a wide battlefield - which is global and the consequences of these warfare could be catastrophic.”¹³⁶

¹²⁸ Dictionary.com. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cyberwarfare?&o=100074&s=t> (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹²⁹ “Cyberwarfare and International Law,” UNIDIR Resources. <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf> (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹³⁰ “Cyber Warfare,” RAND Corporation. <http://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html> (accessed June 9, 2014)

¹³¹ “Cyber-warfare is ‘growing threat,’” The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/feb/03/cyber-warfare-growing-threat> (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹³² “Virtual warfare bigger threat than nuclear war,” Zawya. http://www.zawya.com/story/Virtual_warfare_bigger_threat_than_nuclear_war_experts_caution_at_the_Arab_Media_Forum-ZAWYA20140520114115/ (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ “Inside the secret digital arms race: facing the threat of a global cyberwar,” TechRepublic. <http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/#> (accessed June 16, 2014)

¹³⁶ “Virtual warfare bigger threat than nuclear war,” Zawya. http://www.zawya.com/story/Virtual_warfare_bigger_threat_than_nuclear_war_experts_caution_at_the_Arab_Media_Forum-ZAWYA20140520114115/ (accessed July 1, 2014)

A United Nations group of governmental experts on cybersecurity agreed on a substantial consensus report in 2012; a report that represents an important achievement for maintaining international peace and stability in the new cyber era.¹³⁷ The report lays out a foundation from which Member States can address the mutual risks that are incurred from exponentially increasing cyber threats in three ways: by acknowledging full applicability of international law on Member States' behavior in cyberspace, extending traditional transparency and confidence building measures, and recommending international cooperation and capacity building to make information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure more secure around the world.¹³⁸ An increasing abundance of more sophisticated cyber tools are enabling further attacks on critical infrastructure within Member States, which when coupled with the uncertainty of the rule governing cyberspace action, has managed to raise concern over potential cyber conflict between Member States.¹³⁹ Since 2012, multiple meetings of governmental experts have been made, the most recent in June of 2013 – a meeting in which important strides were made, especially with important bilateral United States negotiations with Russia and China on cybersecurity.¹⁴⁰ While these measures are significant, the global stage for cybersecurity is still unclear and a pressing matter for the United Nations and the Security Council.

Defining Cyber Warfare and All Forms of Cyber Assault

Cyber warfare is a relatively new and evolving phenomenon, defying conventional definitions for war and armed conflict. Whereas assault rifles and hand pistols were the norm, malware and computer viruses are the tools of conflict today. The challenge thus far has been a lacking consensus to a universal definition for cyber assault and cyber warfare, which therein creates difficulty for Member States to develop policy on the issue. Furthermore, there is no uniform definition separating a cyber crime from a cyber attack. According to a law journal released by Yale University, a cyber attack is defined as “any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security purpose.”¹⁴¹ While this definition is very broad, it does afford Member States the opportunity to encompass a plethora of types or examples of cyber assault when defining cyber warfare. There are varying degrees of cyber warfare. Each coordinated attack upon an infrastructure is designed to meet a specific need in order to achieve a particular goal. As such, there are several infrastructures that are vulnerable to a cyber attack. These infrastructures include finance, transportation, telecommunication, energy, water, military, and control systems.¹⁴² Any attack to these infrastructures can severely damage any tangible or intangible facet of a Member State with irreparable consequences.

Financial infrastructures are perhaps the most vulnerable targets and pose a serious threat to the economic and national security of Member States.¹⁴³ Corporations, nation-states, and international organizations could disrupt domestic and international markets by infecting information network systems with crippling viruses or re-routing transactions from financial institutions to alternate destinations. Such actions would de-rail and erode the economic health of a single Member State or a group of Member States for an undetermined length of time.

Telecommunication infrastructures are also vulnerable to cyber attacks. Because of the internet's capabilities, communications are far more integrated, which makes Member States more exposed to an attack. Traditional telephone networks are not a primary target as one might expect, however, the ability to disrupt operations at physical facilities for telephone networks does exist. Primary targets have included telecommunication satellites,

¹³⁷ “The UN Takes a Big Step Forward on Cybersecurity,” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_09/The-UN-Takes-a-Big-Step-Forward-on-Cybersecurity (accessed June 9, 2014)

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ “The Law of Cyber Attack,” Yale Law. <http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cglc/LawOfCyberAttack.pdf> (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹⁴² “Understanding Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection-CIP Policies in Modern States: A Complicated and Tough Mission,” Hazar. http://www.hazar.org/blogdetail/blog/understanding_critical_energy_infrastructure_protection_cip_policies_in_modern_states_a_complicated_and_tough_mission_804.aspx (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹⁴³ “EU Regulators Call for Tougher Defenses against Cyber Attacks,” Financial News. <http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2014-04-03/eu-regulators-call-for-tougher-defences-against-cyber-attacks?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622> (accessed July 1, 2014)

DNS infrastructures, and BGP routing protocols.¹⁴⁴ The key objective of a cyber attack on telecommunication infrastructures is to disrupt communication between people and to control the flow of information from one source to another.¹⁴⁵ By controlling the flow of information, an attacker will be able to disseminate its choice of information to a number of recipients.¹⁴⁶ For example, U.S. military drones rely heavily on telecommunication satellites to receive and transmit information. If a cyber terrorist were to hack into its source signal and transmit information to the drone via satellite, it could direct the drone to conduct air raids on unintended populations.

Member States can also experience cyber attacks on energy infrastructures. Nuclear reactors, electrical grids, oil refineries, and natural gas installations are optimal targets for an attack.¹⁴⁷ An attack on these infrastructures could usher in two particular devastations: economic and operational catastrophe. Almost every Member State depends on energy for economic stimulation, whether as an export or as a domestic commodity. Both attribute to the economic health of nation-states world-wide. If a cyber attack were to disrupt or damage energy infrastructures, then it would force economies to recede into recession, or worse, cause them to plummet. More importantly, every nation-state depends heavily on energy to function and fulfill normal day-to-day operations on both the micro and macro level. Kokash also points out, however, that in the Gulf hackers are targeting key installations in the oil and gas industry, and warns that infrastructure and individuals should be on guard against attacks.¹⁴⁸ By disrupting daily operations, nation-states would not only suffer economically, but would be susceptible to invasion, attack, or even a strategic nuclear strike.

Transportation infrastructure is no exception to cyber warfare. Like most infrastructures, transportation depends on software and telecommunication systems to perform essential niches. Successful cyber attacks could erode a nation's ability to schedule and access varying modes of travel, whether by air, rail, vehicle, or boat.¹⁴⁹ This would have obvious short-term implications on a state's economy, but could potentially degrade a state's economic health over time. Furthermore, cyber terrorists could create real, tangible harm to a state and to its people by hacking into information systems and disrupting travel to cause, for example, two public transits to travel along the same rail and collide into one another. Kokash also detailed a further example of a hacker who brought a California airport to a complete standstill by hacking into the operations of the airport; all flight plans were halted, takeoffs and landings delayed and caused even more stress to already over stretched staff and travelers.¹⁵⁰ The rationale is that cyber terrorists or international state actors could institute acts of war upon nation-states in a multitude of unseeing ways and cause wide-spread panic and carnage. This complicates not only national security interests, but international interests as travelers of all nationalities may become victims to a cyber attack.

Additionally, infrastructures such as water or control systems are also potential targets for cyber attacks. A cyber attack on water infrastructure could become a very serious hazard for any Member State, as it could cause billions of dollars worth of damage as well as a serious loss of life. Dams and reservoirs operate primarily on switch board systems connected to the internet, and if infiltrated, could open floodgates releasing trillions of gallons of water into towns and communities.¹⁵¹ Cyber attacks may even be achieved on control systems linking to physical

¹⁴⁴ "Security Risks and Responses in an Evolving Telecommunications Industry," PWC.

<http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/communications/publications/communications-review/cyber-telecom-security.jhtml>
(accessed July 1, 2014)

¹⁴⁵ "Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World," World Economic Forum.

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IT_PathwaysToGlobalCyberResilience_Report_2012.pdf (accessed June 14, 2014)

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ "Research Note on the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database," Perspectives on Terrorism.

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/315/html> (accessed June 7, 2014)

¹⁴⁸ "Virtual warfare bigger threat than nuclear war," Zawya.

http://www.zawya.com/story/Virtual_warfare_bigger_threat_than_nuclear_war_experts_caution_at_the_Arab_Media_Forum-ZAWYA20140520114115/ (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹⁴⁹ "Cybersecurity Considerations for Public Transit," American Public Transportation Association.

http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Public%20Comment%20Dynamic%20Library/RP_cyber_security_considerations_%20PUB_COMMENTS_V10%2012%2019%2013.pdf (accessed June 15, 2014)

¹⁵⁰ "Virtual warfare bigger threat than nuclear war," Zawya.

http://www.zawya.com/story/Virtual_warfare_bigger_threat_than_nuclear_war_experts_caution_at_the_Arab_Media_Forum-ZAWYA20140520114115/ (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹⁵¹ "Cyber Security 101 for Water Utilities," EPA.

<http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/watersecurity/features/upload/epa817k12004.pdf>

infrastructures. For example, if there is a wireless network modem outside of a nuclear reactor, hackers could infiltrate its network system via wireless LAN cards and obtain any information on the reactor's operational control network. Once obtained, hackers could shutdown key processes within the reactor and potentially cause it to melt down. Fortunately, most water infrastructures and control systems have physical security measures in place to counteract any failure to its cyber security, thus, making it less vulnerable to a cyber attack when compared to other infrastructures.

Documented Attacks Involving Member States

As recently as 2013, startling developments were made in the American national security doctrine that changed the common thought of fear and safety in the world.¹⁵² Since these revelations, it is thought that cyber warfare and cyber espionage may pose greater threats than any conventional terrorist group.¹⁵³ However, the players in the realm of cyber warfare are not limited only to large Member States (such as China and the United States) but also incorporate middle and minor powers on the global stage.¹⁵⁴ For example, despite sanctions and curbs on its scientific progress, in August 2011 Iran managed to infect the information network of the Saudi Arabian oil major, Aramco, with a deadly virus that erased data on three quarters of its corporate computers and all of the infected screens displayed the image of a burning American flag.¹⁵⁵ Another major attack and turning point in the international thought process regarding cyber warfare occurred in 2007, as attacks on Estonia swamped banks, newspaper and government websites following the decision to move a Soviet war memorial and lasting three weeks.¹⁵⁶ Estonia, while a small state, has highly developed infrastructure as it is heavily invested in e-government services, digital ID cards, and online banking.¹⁵⁷ Due to the dependency on digital resources, these attacks were massively crippling to the nation. As the head of the Estonian defense ministry's Information Technologies (IT) noted, "If these services are made slower, we of course lose economically."¹⁵⁸ In the following time period, many nations have begun to strongly improve their digital defenses as well as their own digital weapons. In 2013, the then head of US Cyber Command, General Keith Alexander, told the news program 60 Minutes that the threat of cyber-attacks was still very large and that he believed "that a foreign nation could impact and destroy major portions of [the US] financial system."¹⁵⁹ However, the United States has also developed weapons of their own – though the only documented successful use of such a weapon was the Stuxnet worm, which caused damage and delayed the Iranian nuclear program.¹⁶⁰

A Cause for Concern –And For Cooperation

As the world continues to evolve through globalization, with new markets arising to offer diverse opportunities for advancement and commercialization, so comes with it new threats that are readily adapting to shifting geopolitical landscapes. One of these threats includes the "hackers-for-hire" industry.¹⁶¹ Autonomous individuals and organizations with expertise in cyber intrusion and espionage are offering their services to broad clienteles in return for monetary exchanges –most importantly at astronomically low and affordable rates.¹⁶² These individuals and organizations are especially dangerous because they do not operate [necessarily] within a confined border, nor do they comply with an established set of rules or norms dictating ethical behavior while navigating the 'cyber

¹⁵² "Cyber warfare is the new threat to the global order," The Nation. <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Cyber-warfare-is-the-new-threat-to-the-global-orde-30203813.html> (accessed July 1, 2014)

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ "Inside the secret digital arms race: facing the threat of a global cyberwar," TechRepublic.

<http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/#> (accessed June 16, 2014)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

¹⁵⁹ "A Question for 60 Minutes: Why Would China Want to Destroy The World Economy?," The Atlantic.

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/a-question-for-em-60-minutes-em-why-would-china-want-to-destroy-the-global-economy/282376/> (accessed Jun 17, 2014)

¹⁶⁰ "Inside the secret digital arms race: facing the threat of a global cyberwar," TechRepublic.

<http://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/#> (accessed June 16, 2014)

¹⁶¹ "Hackers for Hire," Tech News World. <http://www.technewsworld.com/story/32847.html> (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹⁶² Ibid.

sphere'.¹⁶³ States and corporations with larger technological endowments are at greater risk for cyber intrusion as competing agents seek to acquire equal if not superior technologies. If these agents are not using cyber intrusion for acquisition, then they are invading foreign cyber networks to cripple and destroy targeted infrastructures. One example can be found in the People's Republic of China where a group of highly-skilled cyber hackers known as "The Hidden Lynx" are regularly contracted by various entities to infiltrate cyber networks of special interest.¹⁶⁴ This particular group is "suspected of playing a major role in the 2009 Operation Aurora attacks, a high-profile cluster of [cyber] attacks against American companies such as Google, Yahoo, Adobe, Morgan Stanley, Dow Chemical, and Symantec".¹⁶⁵

The Hidden Lynx, and other similar groups, are effective by employing a variety of strategies using "disposable tools along with basic but effective techniques to attack many different targets".¹⁶⁶ These groups are market-driven, and are essentially "online bounty hunters" who do not conform to nationalistic agendas but align its allegiances by assimilating with a free-market system ruled by the highest bidders.¹⁶⁷ By far, these are the more destructive and elusive organisms available, it is a technological great white shark surfing through cyber-electronic waves in search for its next prey to devour, only to disappear upon attack. Groups or individuals can be pinpointed to a particular state or region, however, it is considerably difficult to discover the exact location or origin of operations in order to arrest and detain these said agencies. Therefore, it is far more difficult to hold these groups or individuals accountable for their cyber crimes if they cannot be directly located. Additionally, each sovereign state defines "cyber crimes" or "acts of cyber terror" differently, which prompts different actions (or lack of action) accordingly. Furthermore, these hackers-for-hire may also obtain clients directly or indirectly tied with sovereign governments. In order to avoid political backlash, governments may hire hackers or a group of hackers as a third-party source to execute cyber attacks.¹⁶⁸ This also complicates judicial processes for holding hacker groups accountable for cyber crimes. It also dispels mistrust and angst amongst regional and international actors such as the United States and China.

Alternatively, these agencies do provide regional and international actors with an opportunity to collaborate with one another to defend against cyber espionage. This of course assumes that all actors have an invested interest in securing cyber networks from all intrusions, including their own. The exchange of information and technology freely between governments and private corporations would allow each respective party to develop countermeasures against cyber threats, and to secure cyber space for both private and public use. This would help prevent terrorist organizations from disrupting financial services and/or military operations in one or multiple Member States. Therefore, there is not only an opportunity for international cooperation to exist, but there is also a necessity for Member States to collaborate and engineer defensive strategies to counter cyber attacks on key infrastructures.

Conclusion

With a growing global dependence on the internet in the digital era and an ongoing acquisition of technological knowledge, the threats that accompany cyber warfare will inevitably increase in both number and strength. As countries build their own digital defenses and weapons, the need for further research and understanding into the realm of cyber warfare is evident. The lack of physical visibility makes the fight against cyber attackers incredibly difficult. As Sun Tzu states in chapter 6 of *The Art of War*, "O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands."¹⁶⁹ This new era of cyber attacks and defenses utilizes this concept in ways no one could have foreseen before the internet and

¹⁶³ "Hackers for Hire," Tech News World. <http://www.technewsworld.com/story/32847.html> (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹⁶⁴ "Hackers for Hire Group Responsible for Cyber-Espionage Attacks from China: Report," SiteProNews. <http://www.sitepronews.com/2013/09/17/hackers-hire-group-responsible-cyber-espionage-attacks-china-report/> (accessed July 2, 2014)

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ "Cyber Hackers 'Hired to Attack Governments and Banks'," Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/10317634/Cyber-hackers-hired-to-attack-governments-and-banks.html> (accessed June 8, 2014)

¹⁶⁸ "Hackers for Hire Group Responsible for Cyber-Espionage Attacks from China: Report," SiteProNews. <http://www.sitepronews.com/2013/09/17/hackers-hire-group-responsible-cyber-espionage-attacks-china-report/> (accessed July 2, 2014)

¹⁶⁹ The Art of War (translated by Lionel Giles). <http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html> (accessed June 8, 2014)

digital era arose. The key to the debate on cyber warfare lies in determining how to defend from critical attacks, as there has yet to manifest a method of fighting those advances you cannot see.

Committee Directive

The issue of cyber warfare is one that is not only ever growing, but ever changing. This fact makes it incredibly pressing for the Security Council, as what is done may shape the future growth and development of cyber warfare. These facts make the necessity for delegates to be well prepared that much more pressing. Delegates should become knowledgeable not only about what cyber warfare is and is not, but how their Member States have individually been affected thus far by cyber warfare, and what if any actions they have already taken. The key idea is what can be done internationally by the Security Council to either stop future devastating attacks on Member States, or how to best cope with the reality of more, stronger attacks possibly manifesting as the world grows more digitally dependent. How then can Member States best prepare defenses against attacks? Should Member States be cautioned against or outright stopped from building their own cyber weaponry? If so, how could this best be managed? These types of questions will prove the most beneficial in preparing for the topic of cyber warfare.

Technical Appendix Guide

Topic I: Designing Effective Targeted Sanctions

Bonn. "Smart Sanctions, the Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions."

www.un.org/Docs/sc/.../sanctions/background.doc

This paper focuses on Embargoes and Travel Bans in different countries, and their effectiveness. It also takes into account the efforts already made towards increasing effectiveness.

Drezner, Daniel W. "How Smart are Smart Sanctions?" <http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/smartsanctions.pdf>

This review examines how sanctions that are intended to be smart, targeted sanctions end up affecting the populations they effect both directly and indirectly.

Reich, Johannes. "Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999)."

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268163

This paper looks at another side of the debate, which is sanctions imposed on individuals not necessarily involved with the state or even state actors.

Security Dialogue. "The Efficacy of UN Sanctions."

http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Mack_Khan_Efficacy_of_UN_Sanctions.pdf

This source examines the degree to which UN Sanctions work as instruments of coercion, and how this plays into international sanctions making.

Vines, Alex. "The effectiveness of UN and EU sanctions: lessons for the twenty-first century."

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_4/88_4vines.pdf

This article examines the most recent years of target sanctions, and what can be learned from what has already been done to better aid policy making in the future.

Wallenstein, Peter; Staibano, Carina. "International Sanctions."

http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781134252398_sample_479654.pdf

This source notes the new challenges arising for international sanctions, and how policy can adapt to address them.

Topic II: The Situation in Central African Republic

BBC News Africa. "Central African Republic profile" <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150040>

This profile gives extra background and facts about CAR, as well as information about the leaders and different media spotlights over CAR.

Deutsche Well. "Killing continues in the Central African Republic." <http://www.dw.de/killing-continues-in-the-central-african-republic/a-1772837>

This source shows the depth of killings in CAR, and what fuels the conflict, and details the struggles for power in the country.

Economist. "Sectarian savagery." <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21596523-situation-still-out-control-christian-militiamen-pictured-hunt>

This article shows the struggle between different groups in CAR, and links to several other useful articles and related topics.

Reuters. "Broke UN Agency Warns of Catastrophic Situation in Central African Republic."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/16/central-african-republic-un_n_5161470.html

This article explains how aid efforts are running out, and how their dissolution will only further intensify the situation.

UN News Center. "'Extremely Grave' situation in Central African Republic demands urgent action."

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47302#.U-ZVGPldWSo>

This article shows the appeal of an UN official for the situation in CAR, and how the need for action is a pressing issue.

Voice of Russia. "How critical is the current situation in Central African Republic?"

http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_12_08/How-critical-is-current-situation-in-Central-African-Republic-9354/

This radio interview gives another view of the conflict, and further examines the struggles facing CAR.

Topic III: The Threat of Cyber Warfare

Economist. "Hype and Fear". <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-way-developing-doctrines-cyber-warfare-other-countries-may>.

This article, available online but taken from the December 2012 print edition of The Economist, goes into the idea of how much cyber warfare is a serious threat, and how much of the news is actually just a hyped up version of the security threat it poses.

Freedberg JR., Sydney J. "Cyberwar: What People Keep Missing About the Threat".

<http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/cyberwar-what-people-keep-missing-about-the-threat/>.

This article delves into the complexities of cyberwar, and why people continually miss the boat on what the threat – or payoff – of such methods of attack really are for all the players involved.

Healey, Jason. "'Cyberwar Isn't an Existential Threat to the US". <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us>.

This article goes into detail from one perspective as to why the new cyber warfare threats are not as pressing of a matter as other threats – such as nuclear warfare – especially as in regard to the United States.

Hudson, Alex. "Is cyber-warfare a Genuine Threat".

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9393589.stm.

This article, much like others listed, approaches cyber warfare from the standpoint of whether or not it is a genuine threat to security or if it is just one more worry on the minds of today's global population. It differs in the sense that rather than questioning if the attacks are real or not, it instead questions how to handle the current issues and if it is going to be a huge matter for the global playing field or if it can be contained.

Kaplan, Fred. "The Art of Cyberwar".

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/02/chinese_military_cyberwarfare_how_would_beijing_threaten_the_united_states.html.

This article considers the side of an attack on the United States, rather than being about the US policy and action taken in regards to cyber warfare and cybersecurity. Specifically, this article considers how Beijing might threaten the US.

Manoske, Andy. "How Does Cyber Warfare Work". <http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/07/18/how-does-cyber-warfare-work/>.

This Article truly does what it says, and considers the inner workings of cyber warfare, and why it truly matters to countries and individuals. The article breaks down different aspects of cyber warfare and then explains each in more detail.

Masters, Jonathan. "Confronting the Cyber Threat". <http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577>.

This article discusses more in-depth the identification of threats from cyber warfare, and how to better defend from them in both the near and distant future. The evolution of cybersecurity is also a key point from the article.

Smith, Philip. "How Seriously Should The Threat of Cyber Warfare be Taken?" <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/01/17/how-seriously-should-the-threat-of-cyber-warfare-be-taken/>.

This article effectively synthesizes multiple sources and analyzes the data to further examine the validity of the threat that cyber warfare poses to the international community.