



SRMUN Atlanta 2014
Revitalizing "An Agenda for Peace": Preventative Diplomacy,
Conflict Resolution, and the Making of Peace in Our Time Movement
November 20-22, 2014

Dear Delegates,

I would like to welcome you to the Historical Security Council (HSC) at the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) Atlanta 2014 Conference. My name is Alex Moffitt and it is an honor for me to serve as director of the Rwandan Crisis at SRMUN this year. As the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide approaches, the crisis in Rwanda is still misunderstood by many. Through diligent research, I hope delegates are able to gain an understanding of the intricate causes of the crisis in Rwanda, and be able to look back on ways the Security Council could have changed the fate of Rwandans. I look forward to working through the Rwandan Crisis together in order to gain a greater understanding of the situation and find a creative solution. As a seasoned Model UN veteran, I hope to create an innovative committee experience that will build a firm foundation for future leadership and diplomacy. The Security Council is one of the six main bodies of the United Nations. UNSC's main goal is to maintain both security and peace in the global community. The Security Council is the main international body designated to respond to crises around the world. Two important tasks of the Security Council are peacekeeping operations and establishing a unified response to crises. These important tasks are realized in the SRMUN 2014 Atlanta theme *Revitalizing "An Agenda for Peace": Preventative Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution, and the Making of Peace in Our Time*. The Rwandan Crisis will test delegates' abilities to prevent crises, resolve them, and make peace in a war-torn region of Africa.

The topic for the Historical Security Council at SRMUN Atlanta 2014 is:

I. Rwandan Crisis: January 11, 1994

Delegates are encouraged to use the position papers to state what you hope to accomplish in this committee. Every delegation must submit a position paper addressing the Rwandan Crisis. Position papers should not be longer than two pages in length and should be single-spaced. A proper position paper should provide insight into your country's position, history, and statement of goals for the topic. The objective of the position paper is to convince and persuade the members of your committee that the approach in your paper is the best course of action. Therefore, the position papers are critical in providing insight into the policies and positions of each country. Strong, well developed position papers are an excellent foundation for conference preparation. It is important to ensure all sides of each issue are adequately addressed and presented in a clear and concise manner that is easy for your audience to understand. Something essential in this committee is to not use information that occurred after the historical start date of this committee, which, in this case, is January 1994. It is also important to address the issue in a clear, concise manner that is easy for your audience to understand. More detailed information about how to write position papers can be found at the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). **All position papers MUST be submitted by October 31, 2014, by 11:59pm EST using the submission system on the SRMUN website.**

I am very excited for the opportunity to serve on your dais for the Historical Security Council during SRMUN Atlanta 2014. I wish you good luck in your preparation for the conference and look forward to working with each of you. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. Keep in mind that this is a sensitive topic, and the time period will be essential when researching, writing, and acting as the representative delegate for each of your respective countries.

Alex Moffitt
Director
hsc_atlanta@srmun.org

Jason Ackerman
Assistant Director
hsc_atlanta@srmun.org

Stefanie Vaught
Deputy-Director General
ddg_atlanta@srmun.org

The History of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council (SC) was created under Article V of the United Nations Charter in 1945 with the unique ability to pass resolutions that are binding on the Member States of the United Nations (UN)¹. The SC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It must be ready at a moment's notice to take action and protect the international community from harm that may come from conflict or perceived threats around the world.² Many bodies within the UN can make recommendations and suggest actions. However, only the Security Council has the power to enforce decisions and demand actions from Member States to prevent or react to an international crisis.³

Membership

As defined in the Charter, there are fifteen Member States on the Security Council at one time, consisting of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly every two years.⁴ The five permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.⁵ The ten non-permanent members at this time are Nigeria, Rwanda, Djibouti, Oman, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, Czech Republic, and New Zealand.⁶ Each member of the Security Council has one representative and is expected to be available at all times in case of an international crisis.⁷ In specific instances, Member States that are not on the SC have been invited to speak to the council and participate in discussions that "specifically affect" their interests.⁸

Special Procedures/Rules

The SC determines and operates under its own set of rules of procedure.⁹ Additionally, the Presidency of the SC rotates monthly with each Member State taking a turn as chosen alphabetically.¹⁰ This does complicate the process of representing a Member State for our simulation. On the SRMUN website we have provided an addendum to the Security Council located in the delegate resource section of the website. The addendum can be found by clicking [here](#). Included are all special procedures and idiosyncrasies that make this committee so different from any other at our conference. Please become aware of them in your preparations.

Voting

Voting is an aspect of the Security Council that is unlike other United Nations bodies. In all other organs of the UN, Member States are given an equal voice. In the SC the five permanent members are given "the great Power unanimity" which is often known as the veto.¹¹ If one of the five permanent Member States on the SC veto a decision made by the body, the resolution or decision is void, even if there were a majority of pro votes on the issue.¹² On both procedural and substantive matters, there is a requirement of 9 pro votes to pass anything.¹³

Powers and Duties

The primary goal of the Security Council is to "maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations."¹⁴ When facing the need for potential action, the first function performed by the SC is to determine whether or not a threat to peace exists. If the council should determine the presence of conflict they first, investigate the situation; second, recommend methods of reaching settlement; third,

¹ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945. (Accessed March 13, 2014).

² "Background" The Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (Accessed March 13, 2014).

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945. (Accessed March 13, 2014).

⁵ "Members" The Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp> (Accessed March 13, 2014).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945. (Accessed March 13, 2014).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ "Members" The Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp> (Accessed March 13, 2014).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945. (Accessed March 13, 2014).

¹⁴ "Functions and Powers" The Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html (Accessed March 13, 2014).

establish a system to regulate armaments; fourth, call upon Member States to use economic sanctions or force to end the aggression; and finally, take necessary military action against the aggressors.¹⁵

Additionally, the SC functions to “recommend the admission of new Members, exercise the trusteeship function of the United Nations in ‘strategic areas,’ and recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the GA, elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.”¹⁶ The SC issues cease-fires in cases of dispute, deploys peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keeps opposing forces apart to create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements can be made and decide on any enforcement measurements deemed necessary to resolve conflict, including economic sanctions or military action.¹⁷

The Security Council’s role in maintaining peace and security was put to the test in the early 1990’s during the ongoing crises in Bosnia. The United Nations Protection Force was recently established in Eastern Europe as a peacekeeping force via United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, which was adopted unanimously.¹⁸

In 1991, the Security Council recommended Boutros Boutros-Ghali for the position of Secretary-General, which he currently holds. With the Cold War over, cooperation seems more likely in the SC. Peacekeeping missions have been on the rise, especially including ones to African member states. Many have been created recently, including the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, the United Nations Operation in Somalia I, and others.¹⁹

The Security Council is an integral body within the UN system tasked with the readiness to be called upon at a moment’s notice and be prepared to effectively and quickly solve the greatest threats to the international community.

The Members of the Security Council are:

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CZECH REPUBLIC, DJIBOUTI, FRENCH REPUBLIC, NEW ZEALAND, NIGERIA, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RWANDA, SPAIN, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES

I. Rwanda Crisis: January 11, 1994

“We the Peoples of the United Nations, determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”

-- UN Charter

Introduction

Turmoil in Rwanda has been steadily building over the past few decades. Ethnic tensions have increased for years, a remnant of both colonial intervention from Belgium and basic ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi. The escalating conflict has caused troubles within the region as well, with Uganda, Burundi, and others receiving refugees. Rwanda was once a nation of peace, with Hutus and Tutsis living in harmony. Now, although overtures toward peace have occurred, peace seems far from possible.

Due to these problems in Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council (SC) established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) on 5 October 1993 by Security Council Resolution 872 (1993)²⁰. Its purpose is to monitor the Rwandan situation after its civil war to ensure the cease-fire was upheld and the de-escalation of tensions within the region between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups continued. Working in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement, the two sides of the conflict agreed to create a transitional government by the end of the year. SC delegates will consider and address the obstacles faced in Rwanda by

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ “Background” UN Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.htm (Accessed April 23, 2014).

¹⁸ S/RES/743, Resolution 743, United Nations Security Council, 21 February 1992 (Accessed April 23, 2014).

¹⁹ S/RES/745, Resolution 745, United Nations Security Council, 28 February 1992, S/RES/747, Resolution 747, United Nations Security Council, 24 March 1992, S/RES/751, Resolution 751, United Nations Security Council, 24 April February 1992 (Accessed April 23, 2014).

²⁰ S/RES/872. United Nations Security Council. October 5, 1993. (Accessed April 23, 2014).

UNAMIR. In addition, they will be tasked with developing contingency plans as well as responding to the developments occurring within the region.

History of the conflict and the region

The Hutu and the Tutsis make up the majority of the population of Rwanda. The Hutu comprise 85 percent of the population, the Tutsi comprise 14 percent, and the Twa comprise the remaining 1 percent. Scholars consider the Twa to be the original group in the area, and believe that the Hutus and Tutsis moved to the area of present-day Rwanda 700 years ago²¹. The Hutus were traditionally farmers, and the Tutsis were traditionally cow-herders. Feudal culture developed in which cow owners were considered wealthy, and the Tutsis became the higher class within the society. In pre-colonial times the Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language and culture and were separated largely by social strata, with the Tutsis holding the higher social status due to their cattle herds. Unlike present day, mobility between Hutu and Tutsi identities was possible, with rich Hutus considered Tutsis, and poor Tutsis considered Hutus²².

German colonizers arrived in 1884 and occupied Rwanda until 1916. During this time, Belgian Roman Catholic missionaries of the White Fathers Order flocked to Rwanda. The White Fathers had considerable influence. Due to racism and a belief in social Darwinism the White Fathers said that Tutsis were descended from more civilized Ethiopians, and that Hutus were lesser peoples²³. After World War I the League of Nations (and later the United Nations) gave Belgium trusteeship of the modern-day Member State as part of the Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. During the period of Belgian trusteeship, the ability of an individual to move between Hutu and Tutsi identities ended when Rwandans were required to have identity cards indicating their status. A Tutsi was anyone who owned more than 10 cows, and a Hutu was anyone who owned fewer than 10 cows²⁴. Belgian authorities cooperated with the Rwandan King and chiefs, who were Tutsi, until talk of independence began in the region. Under Belgian trusteeship, the government increased cash crop production, as well as state required labor to build infrastructure. Furthermore, these complications led to “loss of fertile land to cash crop production, food scarcity, and conflict over the unevenly distributed and scarce land”²⁵. Over 200,000 Rwandans immigrated to Uganda during this time, between the 1920s and 1950s.

During the 1950s, Tutsi political power became unstable due to changes in Belgian political policies. These changes allowed Hutus to gain a small power foothold²⁶. In 1957, the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus (PARMEHUTU) formed in Rwanda. They won a UN-supervised election and political violence escalated within Rwanda. As a consequence, 150,000 Tutsis fled to Burundi. After Belgian withdrawal in 1961, Hutus gained power in Rwanda. The Belgians supported the PAMEHUTU and gave formal independence to Rwanda in 1962²⁷. More Tutsis fled during the 1960s, with an estimated half the Tutsi population living outside Rwanda by the 1960s. During the 1960s, Tutsi refugees in countries such as Zaire and Tanzania attacked Rwandan Hutus in order to try to regain power in Rwanda. These led to killings of Tutsis in Rwanda, increasing the numbers of refugees flocking to neighboring countries. Over 480,000 Rwandan refugees lived in nearby countries by the end of the 1980s.

The many Tutsi refugees placed a heavy toll on surrounding countries. Uganda in particular was thrown into disarray by Tutsi refugees. After lengthy discussions among members of the Ugandan government, the Tutsis were allowed refugee status, but by the time over 100,000 refugees were unleashed on a neighboring state, which itself had only seven million people, Ugandans were suffering from compassion fatigue. The refugees caused “financial, security, and political problems” by the end of the 1960s²⁸. Ugandan citizens also felt alienated that their leaders

²¹ “Rwanda – UNAMIR Background.” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm#HISTORICAL> (Accessed July 15, 2014).

²² Ibid.

²³ Clay, Daniel. “Rwanda.” Encyclopædia Britannica, April, 29, 2014. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514402/Rwanda/274458/Rwanda-under-German-and-Belgian-control> (Accessed July 15, 2014).

²⁴ “Colonial.” Republic of Rwanda. <http://www.gov.rw/COLONIAL> (Accessed July 15, 2014).

²⁵ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 5.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ “Colonial.” Republic of Rwanda. <http://www.gov.rw/COLONIAL> (Accessed July 15, 2014).

²⁸ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 10. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

proved unable to ameliorate indigenous poverty, but they were still able to aid a large number of refugees. Many international organizations also aided refugees, including the Red Cross, Save the Children Fund, YMCA, Oxfam, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Tensions were high between the Ugandan government and Tutsi refugees, especially after President Obote unveiled his “Common Man’s Charter, which, among other things, advocated a policy of Ugandinization of employment and land ownership.” This would have deprived Tutsi refugees of all jobs or land ownership²⁹. Although this was never implemented, it caused further tension between the Obote administration and Tutsi refugees. Though international monitoring of the situation continued, the conditions for refugees never improved, with violence against Tutsi refugees increasing during the Ugandan Bush War.

The Ugandan Bush War erupted in the early 1980s, and caused the overthrow of Milton Obote’s government and subsequent takeover by the National Resistance Army (NRA) and Yoweri Museveni. Many Tutsi refugees joined the NRA during this period because they believed it better to be in the army than to be in refugee camps, where conditions were poor and discrimination was widespread.³⁰ The refugee crisis in Rwanda had serious implications for both Uganda and for the future of the Tutsi. The violence destabilized the Obote regime in the eyes of the international community. Furthermore, it either created a cycle in which refugees attempted returning to their home countries, or joined the NRA to escape refugee camps. Later, these two plans merged when joining the Ugandan army became the “means to launch a military invasion to return to Rwanda”³¹. Major players in the later conflict included members of the NRA and the forerunner of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which included Paul Kagame. Members of the NRA began to create a type of shadow-military within the NRA, which would later be called the RPA. These Rwandans were able to quietly place refugees into positions within each NRA unit. Leaders of the NRA facilitated this via high-ranking Rwandans in the NRA: Major General Rwigyema, Major Paul Kagame, Major Dr. Peter Baingaina, and many others³².

In 1989, the RPA decided to launch its strike on Rwanda. They decided to do this both because anti-Rwandan sentiment was increasing in Uganda, and as a result of a power struggle within the RPA between Major Dr. Banyingana and Major General Rwigyema. The 1989 strike failed and the RPA retreated into Uganda. The Rwandan government began garnering support from its allies, especially Egypt, France, and Zaire³³. Concurrently, the government launched a new strategy. They would negotiate with the RPA and its political branch, the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Secretly, they would try to increase anti-Rwandan sentiment within the NRA, and increase the rivalry in the RPA. The government also bribed officers of the NRA to kill certain RPA officers, including Rwigyema and Banyingana. The two learned of the plot, and were forced to invade early. Other considerations for the 1990 invasion included increasing anti-regime and anti-Rwandan sentiment that forced Museveni to attempt to make Rwandans in the army less visible. In October 1990 10,000 RPA soldiers invaded Rwanda³⁴.

The main military forces in the conflict consisted of, on the Tutsi side, the RPF and RPA. On the Hutu side, the Interhamwe, or “militia of the President’s party”, as well as the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) were the main military forces.³⁵ Radio broadcasting also had a significant effect on the violence in the region. The subsequent conflict threw Rwanda into a state of disarray, which has not stopped completely for several years. After years of conflict, with UN aid, there was a consensus reached in terms, and a peace agreement was signed. The Arusha

²⁹ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 14. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

³⁰ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 22. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

³¹ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 24. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

³² Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 22. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

³³ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 36. (Accessed July 15, 2014).

³⁴ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 42. (Accessed July 22, 2014).

³⁵ *Rwanda : genocide and the continuing cycle of violence : hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, May 5, 1998, 122. <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000045317712;view=iup;seq=126> (Accessed July 19, 2014).

Peace Agreement, signed on August 4, 1993, by the Rwandan government and the RPF, was a pivotal step towards peace³⁶. Unfortunately, the Arusha Peace Agreement was not the end of the conflict, which has escalated.³⁷

United Nations Security Council actions

The Security Council has remained seized of the problems in Rwanda for several years, but has only begun to take action as of the most recent conflict in 1993. Security Council Resolution 812 was adopted on 12 March 1993. The SC consulted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on the issue, and encouraged working with them in promoting peace in the area. The OAU was responsible for monitoring the cease-fire that began on 9 March 1993. The SC also discussed creating a body to assist the OAU in monitoring and “to report most urgently on the matter.”³⁸ Finally, in October 1993, the SC created just such a force, UNAMIR, with SC Resolution 872.³⁹

Security Council Resolution 846, adopted in June 1993, established the “United Nations Observer Mission Uganda – Rwanda (UNOMUR)” to be “deployed on the Ugandan side of the border, for an initial period of six months” in order to aid peace efforts in the region.⁴⁰ On the Uganda-Rwanda border, UNOMUR “established observation posts at two major crossing sites and three secondary sites” and oversaw the border area, specifically on the Ugandan side. By December 1993, the SC extended UNOMUR’s mandate by six months.⁴¹ The SC resolutions establishing both UNAMIR and UNAMUR gave broader mandates to them than have been implemented. Implementation has been slow and troublesome, with lack of supplies and staffing causing them to be less effective than they could be.⁴² Furthermore, the SC has not been receiving reports of all the actions of UNAMIR and UNOMUR, and thus cannot be as effective as possible in quelling the rising violence in Rwanda.

Although the SC has many pressing issues to resolve, such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Cambodia, the SC has made several actions in 1993 alone to combat the problems in Rwanda. By September 1993, attacks against UN officials in Rwanda had increased to an alarming level, prompting SC Resolution 868, which cautioned further UN groups to consider certain factors in the Member State before sending in personnel.⁴³ This resolution highlighted the danger of Rwanda, and was proof that the Arusha Peace Agreement did not establish peace. Rwanda has just begun its term on the SC as of January 1994, which may change the dynamic of actions in the region.⁴⁴

United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)

The Arusha Peace Agreement created a place for the United Nations within Rwanda by allowing the UN to implement the Accords for 22 months as the Neutral International Force (NIF). Security Council Resolution 872 established UNAMIR. At a maximum, the UN authorizes UNAMIR to have 5,500 military personnel. In addition, civilian staff may be recruited both locally and internationally. The headquarters is located in Kigali, and there is a significant budget for expenditures. UNAMIR had a six-part mandate:

- (a) To contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city;*
- (b) To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, which calls for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarized zone and other demilitarization procedures;*
- (c) To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government’s mandate, leading up to the elections;*

³⁶ S/1999/1257. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, United Nations Security Council. 15 December 1999.

³⁷ “The Arusha Peace Agreement.” Republic of Rwanda. <http://www.gov.rw/THE-ARUSHA-PEACE-AGREEMENT> <Accessed July 19, 2014>.

³⁸ S/RES/812. United Nations Security Council. March 12, 1993.

³⁹ S/RES/872. United Nations Security Council. October 5, 1993.

⁴⁰ S/RES/846. United Nations Security Council. June 22, 1993.

⁴¹ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm#OCTOBER> (Accessed July 19, 2014).

⁴² <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement> (Accessed July 19, 2014).

⁴³ S/RES/868. United Nations Security Council. September 29, 1993.

⁴⁴ S/1999/1257. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, United Nations Security Council. 15 December 1999.

- (d) To assist with mine clearance, primarily through training programmes;
- (e) To investigate at the request of the parties or on its own initiative instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General;
- (f) To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
- (g) To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations;
- (h) To investigate and report on incidents regarding the activities of the gendarmerie and police.⁴⁵

In October 1993, the SC appointed Brigadier-General Dallaire, who previously worked in UNOMUR, as UNAMIR Force Commander.⁴⁶ UNAMIR's headquarters was created in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Rwanda, and was operational by November 1993. The UNAMIR Special Representative initiated a meeting between the Rwandan Government and the RPF in December 1993 that ended with both sides "reaffirming their commitment to the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement."⁴⁷ They also agreed to begin setup of the transitional government by the end of 1993. The transitional government would include a Transitional National Assembly. In response to this, the UN extended UNAMIR's mandate to implement the transitional government. The second battalion of UNAMIR forces was deployed into the DMZ by January 1994.

Furthermore, a UNAMIR civilian police contingent (CIVPOL) was established in Kigali in January 1994 and will soon have 60 civilian police monitors. As part of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the "incumbent head of State would remain in office until the elections" in 1995. Thus, Major-General Habyarimana remains President of Rwanda, and was sworn in in January 1994. Unfortunately, due to disagreements on both sides, neither the transitional Government nor the Transitional National Assembly have been installed. The fulfillment of the Arusha Peace Agreement has been delayed, and tensions have escalated this month in Rwanda. UNAMIR stands committed to aiding the Rwandan peace process, and its forces stand ready.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The situation in Rwanda has escalated despite action by several UN bodies. The Arusha Peace Agreement, which was meant to begin a transition to a peaceful society via the sharing of power, re-establishment of a system of law and refugee aid, has stagnated. The transitional government and National Assembly have not been established, nor have significant inroads been made for refugee aid. Violence continues throughout the region, with an escalation markedly seen in January 1994. The conflict affects not only Rwanda, but Burundi, Uganda, and other Member States in the region, who have troops, refugees, and UN personnel occupying their territories.

From colonial occupation to present, Rwanda has been divided by ethnic tensions. Thousands of refugees have poured out of Rwanda since the end of World War I. These refugees continue to face conundrums in finding food, water, and shelter in the war-torn region. SC efforts to minimize the damage and promote peace have been unsuccessful, since the Arusha Peace Agreement has stagnated in implementation. Fortunately, UNAMIR and UNOMUR remain in the region to help bring peace to the region. UNOMUR has several checkpoints on the border, where RPA troops traditionally cross to combat government troops. UNAMIR has established a civilian police force as well as headquarters on the DMZ. However, UNAMIR and UNOMUR are both undermanned to be facing

⁴⁵ S/RES/872. United Nations Security Council. October 5, 1993.

⁴⁶ "Rwanda – UNAMIR Background." The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm#HISTORICAL> (Accessed July 20, 2014).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "Rwanda – UNAMIR Background." The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm#HISTORICAL> (Accessed July 22, 2014).

the glitches in the region. They lack a large stock of water, rations, and fuel. Furthermore, there is a severe lack of weapons and ammunition that makes UNAMIR and UNOMUR operations difficult to carry out.⁴⁹

Committee Directive

The objective of these Security Council sessions is to plot a path to peace. Doing so in a timely manner is essential to limit the amount of bloodshed continuing to occur within Rwanda and in bordering Member States. The UN has already created UNAMIR and UNOMUR to aid peace efforts within Rwanda, but the efforts have been dangerous for UN personnel, and the situation become more volatile since their creation. What creative solution can the SC implement to accelerate the peace process in Rwanda? How can the SC protect personnel in the region while still remaining effective at ensuring peace and monitoring the situation?

The Arusha Peace Agreement was supposed to be the way to end the conflict. UNAMIR was created to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, yet the implementation has stagnated due to disagreements from both sides. Furthermore, UNAMIR establishment has been delayed and UNAMIR has nowhere near the strength it was recommended to have by the SC.⁵⁰ What can UNAMIR do to increase the pace of implementation? Can UNAMIR regain peace after the escalation of violence? Should UNAMIR presence increase and take on a stronger role in the region? How can the SC prevent future bloodshed and bring this long-fought conflict to the end?

The SC has faced difficulties with ethnic conflicts before, but has not created a general action plan for such types of conflict. It may be a proactive step to create a general action plan for ethnic conflict, so the UN is able to react in a faster, more calculated way. How can the UN determine the best method to react to ethnic conflict in various regions? Which aspects of the Rwandan conflict's resolution could be applied to other conflicts?

The Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) received a cable from the head of UNAMIR requesting protection for an informant who is part of the Interhamwe, as well as information regarding the current situation in Rwanda. The fax disturbingly suggests that the Interhamwe "has been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali." The informant "suspects it is for their extermination."⁵¹ This information is alarming, as it would suggest an escalation in violence, rather than a reduction as the Arusha Peace Agreement worked towards. By luck, the SC received a copy of this fax, as it was not sent to the SC. This important information should have been sent to the SC, but was not. It is imperative that further violence be curtailed, and the informant's information investigated. Decisive action is essential in order to stop an escalation.

Committee Members

Argentina: Mr. Cardenas

Brazil: Mr. Sardenberg

China: Mr. Chen Jian

Czech Republic: Mr. Kovanda

Djibouti: Mr. Olhaye

France: Mr. Merimee

New Zealand: Mr. Keating

Nigeria: Mr. Gambari

Oman: Mr. Al-Khussaiby

⁴⁹ S/1999/1257. *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, United Nations Security Council, 15 December 1999.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Adelman, Howard, edit., Suhrke, Astri, edit., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), xxi. (Accessed July 17, 2014).

Pakistan: Mr. Niaz

Russian Federation: Mr. Vorontsov

Rwanda: Mr. Bizimana

Spain: Mr. Yañez Barnuevo

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Sir David Hannay

United States of America: Mr. Walker

Technical Appendix Guide

Bhavnani, Ravi. "Ethnic norms and interethnic violence: Accounting for mass participation in the Rwandan genocide." *Journal of Peace Research* 43.6 (2006): 651-669. Available at:

<http://ernie.itpir.wm.edu/pdf/NewArticles/Constructivist/27640417.pdf>

Ethnic violence and its potential to evolve into genocide has plagued contemporary conflicts since 1916. This article seeks to identify and analyze the motivations and vehicles that promoted mass participation by the Hutu population in the wholesale slaughter of their Tutsi neighbors. Among those discussed are the use of mass media propaganda, the gradual elimination of dissenting voices within the government, and the systematic coercion of the population's behavior.

DORN, A Walter; MATLOFF, Jonathan. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide?: *Journal of Conflict Studies*, [S.l.], aug. 2000. ISSN 1715-5673.

<http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4333/4968>

The United Nations has had methods and mandates to identify and prevent certain humanitarian disasters in place for decades. However, in 1993 these same methods were generally not brought to bear on the gradually declining political situation and rapidly escalating violence which would spread throughout all of Rwanda. This articles' thorough evaluation of those methods and their failure to be implemented may provide a blueprint to prevent future regional tragedies.

Feil, Scott. "Preventing genocide: how the early use of force might have succeeded in Rwanda." *Leadership and Conflict Resolution* (1998): 304-388. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a372355.pdf>

Not all solutions are diplomatic. The use of force, and by extension the concept of R2P, is sometimes necessary to achieve effective intervention and/or prevention of an inter-regional conflict. This article covers the possible scenarios and requirements to carry out preventative military operations, and the methodology behind them; all within the scope of the Rwandan Genocide.

Friedman, Willa. "Local Economic Conditions and Participation in the Rwandan Genocide." *APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper*. 2011.

http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/25/5C_Economic_Causes_and_Consequences_of_Conflict.pdf

This article analyzes the effects that local economic conditions and social class may potentially have had on the move toward and execution of the Rwandan genocide. Apart from merely simple ethnic hatred, greed, economic instability, jealousy, and employment opportunities are all factors in conflicts between friends and neighbors. Only with regard to Rwanda, we see an extreme example of the negative fallout of these economic factors. How much did economic factors affect the events on the ground, and could wider access to goods, trade, and increased opportunities have prevented such a crisis?

McDoom, Omar. "Rwanda's ordinary killers: interpreting popular participation in the Rwandan genocide."

DESTIN: Development Studies Institute (Dec 2005). W.P. no. 77, ISSN 1740-5815

<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28153/1/wp77.pdf>

This paper describes the participation of many in the Rwandan Genocide, especially the role of ordinary citizens, as opposed to those in government. It posits that there was a mass mobilization of people, which was contingent upon the mindset of man and the commitment of state institutions in the genocide. It describes just how quickly the events descended into chaos and led to genocide.

McNulty, Mel. "French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda." *Crime, law and social change* 33.1-2 (2000): 105-129.
<http://users.skynet.be/wihogora/McNully.pdf>

This article focuses specifically on the role of French weapons in the Rwandan Genocide and how involved they were in selling arms to the developing world. Due to this role the NGO Lobby scrutinized France's role in providing weapons to those participating the Rwandan Genocide. This article is rather Member State specific, but it provides information about the role Member States play in times of armed conflict.

Turshen, Meredith. *The political economy of rape: An analysis of systematic rape and sexual abuse of women during armed conflict in Africa*. na, 2001.

<http://www.meredethurshen.com/www/pdf/WorldBankRapechapter.pdf>

This article outlines three different types of violence against women in times of conflict, political, economic, and social or interpersonal violence. The author expands the definition of types of violence against women during armed conflict and breaks them down into smaller components, in order to gather more information about rape and abuse. The article also uses a different, more refined approach to analyzing the prevalence and effect systematic rape has on women and the international community who is trying to prevent it.

Yanagizawa-Drott, David. "Propaganda and conflict: Theory and evidence from the rwandan genocide." *draft on file with the author. The ghost of causation in international speech crime cases* 267 (2010).

<http://202.154.59.182/mfile/files/Jurnal/Jurnal%202010/Propaganda%20and%20conflict%3B%20Theory%20and%20evidence%20from%20the%20rwandan%20genocide.pdf>

This source discusses the role of mass media coverage in times of conflict, particularly state-sponsored violence, and how that influences viewers. This article uses the Rwandan Crisis as a model to investigate how media coverage can, at times, facilitate participation in conflict. This investigation relies on radio broad casts, and shows that at least 51,000 contributors to violence in Rwanda can be linked to listening to radio broadcasts.