

**Southern Regional Model United Nations, Atlanta 2013**  
***Beyond 2015: Reshaping the Millennium Development Goals for an Empowered Future Sustainability***  
November 21-23, 2013 - Atlanta, GA  
Email: [sc\\_atlanta@srmun.org](mailto:sc_atlanta@srmun.org)



Dear Delegates,

It is my great honor to welcome you to the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) Atlanta 2013 conference and the Security Council (SC or the Council). I am thrilled to serve as the director of the Council which is my fourth year on the SRMUN Staff. Previously I have served as the League of Arab States Director at SRMUN 2012. I am extremely fortunate to be accompanied by Tiffany Soma, SC's Assistant Director. She is very excited about the opportunity to share her passion and experience with delegates and hopes to inspire you to develop an even better awareness and understanding of global security issues.

As for myself, I am eager to work alongside each of you in committee and have an expectation to learn from your expertise on the positions of your Member State. Every year I have participated in SRMUN, both as a delegate and a staff member, has been more educational than the last, so I am confident that this SC experience will be the best one yet.

The Council was created under Article V of the United Nations Charter, in 1945, with the unique ability to pass resolutions that are binding to United Nations (UN) Member States. The SC is primarily charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and must be ready at a moment's notice to take action and protect the international community from harm that may come from conflict and/or perceived threats around the world. While many organs within the UN can make recommendations and suggest actions, the Council alone has the power to enforce the decisions it comes to and demand actions from Member States to prevent or react to an international crisis.

Along with its open agenda, the Council has selected the following topics for debate at this year's conference because they are security issues with strong ties to the conference's theme, *Beyond 2015: Reshaping the Millennium Development Goals for an Empowered Future*.

- I: Children in Armed Conflict;
- II: Addressing Environmental Hazards and Natural Resource Induced Conflicts as a Result of Threats to Member States Border Security;
- III: Ensuring the Safety of Diplomats While on Foreign Soil;
- IV: Ensuring Stability in Post-Revolutionary States in the Middle East; and
- V: Transnational Security Threats of Central and Northern Africa

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper that covers three topics of their choosing. This can include topics from the list provided above, or a topic that is of great importance to your Member State. The paper should be no longer than two pages and follow the guidelines outlined on the SRMUN website. The purpose of the position paper is to outline a Member State's history with, current work on, and policy recommendations for the proposed topics.

**More information about position papers can be found on the SRMUN website ([www.srmun.org](http://www.srmun.org)). All position papers MUST be submitted by November 1st, 11:59pm EST via the on-line submission system at <http://www.srmun.org>.**

Please do not hesitate to contact Reggie, Tiffany, or myself with any questions. As you prepare for the conference, remember the words of Nelson Mandela. "Safety and security don't just happen. They are the result of collective consensus and public investment. We owe our children, the most vulnerable citizens in our society, a life free of violence and fear." With that said, good luck in preparation for the conference and I will see you all when we convene in November.

Best,

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## The History of the Security Council

The Security Council, created under Article V of the United Nations Charter in 1945<sup>1</sup>, is unique in its ability to pass binding resolutions on Member States of the United Nations (UN). While the United Nations General Assembly seems to be the epicenter of diplomacy and policymaking, its resolutions are non-binding on Member States and thus they must recommend to the Security Council items deemed threatening in order to achieve a binding mandate. As the body of the UN that is relegated to maintaining and protecting international peace and security, it is necessary for the Security Council to respond to new and immediate crises, but also to act to ensure lasting peace throughout the world. Thus, this body may be called upon to meet at any time, day or night, to handle international threats, in which the Security Council will produce detailed and measured resolutions designed to mitigate immediate concerns to international security as well as to set up a lasting peace after the crisis has passed. Understanding the make-up and duties of this body is essential then when taking part in a simulation of this type.

Customarily the role of the Security Council has been to handle hard security topics such as cross-border invasions, non-proliferation, and terrorism. Recently the Security Council has broadened its scope to include other security topics such as human rights, women & children in combat, and the role of HIV/AIDS in peace and security. The broadening of the Council's scope allows the UN to merge its core purposes of peace and security not just for Member States but for individual human security and development.<sup>2</sup> The other less mentioned role of the Security Council is to make recommendations to the General Assembly of new Member States and candidates for Secretary-General.<sup>3</sup>

A thorough reading of the UN Charter fully delineates the role of the Security Council as follows: Chapter VI authorizes the Council to respond to international threats to peace and security in a diplomatic arena. In this way it investigates perceived threats, analyzes potential outcomes and makes recommendations to mitigate those concerns; Chapter VII empowers the Security Council with the right to enforce its decisions, making its resolutions binding on Member States, whether through military or economic actions.<sup>4</sup> While peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not part of its official mandate, the Security Council has grown to include such issues on its agenda. Dag Hammarskjöld once called this evolution of power "Chapter VI ½ power" as it falls somewhere between traditional diplomatic dispute resolution methods and forceful measures.<sup>5</sup>

Thus the Security Council may be the most significant body within the UN system. Not only does the Council now practice peacekeeping, in the form of ceasefire monitoring, establishing the mandates of peacekeeping forces, and peacebuilding with a contingent of troops numbering 124,000 in sixteen deployment arenas, it still maintains the original mandate of peace and security whenever a crisis erupts.<sup>6</sup> Ready to be called upon at a moment's notice, the Security Council must be prepared to effectively and efficiently solve the world's greatest threats. Despite numerous cries for reform, it is still the only body within the UN that has the power to enact binding policy on the Member States. And as such, you as delegates must consider not only these weaknesses but the inherent strengths of the Security Council when considering the issues put before you.

### Membership

As defined in the Charter, there are fifteen Member States on the Council at one time, consisting of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly every two years.<sup>7</sup> The five

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<sup>1</sup> Charter of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions: 1261, 1999; 1308, 2000; 1820, 2008.*

<sup>3</sup> Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I Article 4, Chapter XV Article 97.

<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>

<sup>4</sup> Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI and Chapter VII. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml>

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Information Service, UNIS Vienna, *60 Years United Nations Peacekeeping.*

[http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years\\_peacekeeping.pdf](http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Department of Public Information, *United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet (DPI/2429/Rev.7)*, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.<sup>8</sup> The ten non-permanent members at this time are Argentina, Azerbaijan, Australia, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, and Togo.<sup>9</sup> Each member of the SC has one representative and is expected to be available at all times in case of an international crisis.<sup>10</sup> In specific instances, Member States that are not serving on the SC have been invited to speak to the council and participate in discussions that “specifically affect” their interests.<sup>11</sup>

### ***Special Procedures/Rules***

The SC determines and operates under its own set of rules of procedure.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the Presidency of the SC rotates monthly with each Member State taking a turn that is chosen alphabetically.<sup>13</sup> This does complicate the process of representing a Member State for our simulation. On the SRMUN website ([www.srmun.org](http://www.srmun.org)), we have provided an addendum to the SC located in the delegate resource section of the website. Included are all special procedures and idiosyncrasies that make this committee so different from any other at the conference. Please become aware of them in your preparations.

### ***Voting***

The procedural and substantive voting in the Council is structured like no other body in the UN. In all other organs of the UN, Member States are given an equal voice, but in the SC the five permanent members are given “the great Power unanimity” which is often known as the veto.<sup>14</sup> If one of the five permanent Member States on the SC veto a decision made by the body, the resolution or decision is void even if there were pro votes on the issue.<sup>15</sup> On both procedural and substantive matters, there is a requirement of 9 pro votes to pass anything.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Powers and Structure***

The primary goal of the SC is to “maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN.”<sup>17</sup> When facing the need for potential action, the first function performed by the Council is to determine whether or not a threat to peace exists. If the council should determine the presence of conflict, it follows these procedure: investigates the situation, recommends methods of reaching settlement, establishes a system to regulate armaments, calls upon Member States to use economic sanctions and/or force to end the aggression, and can opt to take necessary military action against aggressors.<sup>18</sup>

The Council functions to “recommend the admission of new Members, exercise the trusteeship function of the United Nations in ‘strategic areas,’ recommend to the General Assembly (GA) the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the GA, elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.”<sup>19</sup> The SC also issues cease-fires in cases of disputes, deploys peacekeeping forces to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, keeps opposing forces apart to create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements can be made, and decides on any enforcement measurements deemed necessary to resolve conflict, including economic sanctions or military action.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> “Members,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp> (accessed on March 28, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> “Members,” United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp> (accessed on March 28, 2013).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

<sup>17</sup> “Functions and Powers,” United Nations Security Council. [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_functions.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html) (accessed on March 28, 2013).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> “Background,” United Nations Security Council. [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc\\_background.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.htm) (accessed on March 28, 2013).

Structurally, the SC has the power to create the subsidiary bodies necessary to carry out the functions of the Council under Article 29 of the UN Charter.<sup>21</sup> Unlike the President of the Council's one-month rotational appointment, these established sub-committees can be chaired or co-chaired for a year by members that are designated with a Note of the President of the SC. In terms of scope, the committees can exercise both procedural and substantive mandates, ranging from scheduling meetings to overseeing peacekeeping missions. The SC has Standing and Ad Hoc committees and established others: Counter-Terrorism & Non-Proliferation, Military Staff, Sanctions.<sup>22</sup>

The current Members of the Security Council are:

ARGENTINA, AZERBAIJAN, AUSTRALIA, CHINA, FRANCE, GUATEMALA, LUXEMBOURG, MOROCCO, PAKISTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RWANDA, TOGO, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES.

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<sup>21</sup> "Structure," United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml> (accessed on March 28, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

## I. Children in Armed Conflict

*"The question of children and armed conflict is an integral part of the United Nations' core responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, for the advancement of human rights and for sustainable human development."*<sup>23</sup>

-Secretary-General Kofi Annan

### **Introduction**

The Council recognizes that Kofi Annan's statement about the connection between international security and children in armed conflict is still powerful and undeniable more than a decade later. Furthermore, the issue's influence on human development is evident in that all of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are affected by children in armed conflict—particularly MDGs One through Six.<sup>24</sup> Child soldier recruitment can be forced or voluntary, but voluntary recruits are often influenced by family pressures, poverty, discrimination, and revenge fueled by inter-state conflict.<sup>25</sup> Historically, there has been minimal accountability for violations against children in conflict at a state or international level, but courts and mechanisms have been created to address child participation in judicial processes and restitution for them.<sup>26</sup> The most difficult milestone beyond acquiring reparations for the children affected by conflict is ensuring the return of these children back into society to thrive as rehabilitated adults.

The definition of a child soldier is "a person under the age of 18 who directly or indirectly participates in an armed conflict as part of an armed force or group."<sup>27</sup> Child soldiers are not always just engaged in "direct combat roles" that include violence like raping and killing, but can also serve in "combat support" roles like cooks, messengers, mine clearers, porters, sex slaves, and spies. Right now, it is estimated that 300,000 children under 18 are participating in conflicts around the world in 30 countries.<sup>28</sup> The majority of the soldiers under 15 years old are in the ranks of non-governmental military forces, with the youngest averaging around seven years old.<sup>29</sup> Children have become even more financially viable soldiers for armed groups than adult soldiers because of the children's level of efficiency—they are easily indoctrinated to fight and most have not fully conceptualized death.<sup>30</sup>

### **United Nations Briefings & Reports**

The Secretary-General's 11th Report on Children and Armed Conflict highlighted 23 situations: Afghanistan, the Central Africa Republic (CAR), Chad, Columbia, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Central African Region (covering CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda), Myanmar, Nepal, Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen.<sup>31</sup> Most recently, the Council was briefed on the impact of the conflict in Syria on more than three million children by the Working Group's Special Representative of Children

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<sup>23</sup> "Child Soldiers: Overview," United Nations Cyber Schoolbus. <http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/soldiers/index.htm> (accessed on June 23, 2013).

<sup>24</sup> "Millennium Development Goals," The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (accessed on July 28, 2013).

<sup>25</sup> Root Causes of Child Recruitment," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/root-causes-of-child-soldiering/> (accessed on June 25, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> "Children and Justice," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/children-and-justice/> (accessed on June 28, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> "Child Soldiers: Progress," United Nations Cyber Schoolbus. <http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/soldiers/index.htm> (accessed on June 23, 2013).

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> "Root Causes of Child Recruitment," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/root-causes-of-child-soldiering/> (accessed on June 25, 2013).

<sup>31</sup> A/66/782-S/2012/261. Report of the Secretary-General. Security Council. April 26, 2012. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%202012%20261.pdf>

and Armed Conflict, High Commissioner for Refugees, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence, and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. There are reports that Syrian children have been used by government forces as human shields and that the opposition is also recruiting them for its ranks.<sup>32</sup> These violations have continued despite agreements by the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian government to uphold the human rights of children under international law. In May, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict also received a briefing from its Special Representative about the situation in Chad and discussed the Secretary-General's Report on Children and Armed Conflict in Myanmar (S/2013/258).<sup>33</sup>

### UNSC Resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict

The Council brought the issue of children in armed conflict to its agenda in 1999 and has adopted nine significant resolutions on the subject in the following decade. Resolution 1612 is the most important for two main reasons: the establishment of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and the increased monitoring of violations against children. There is speculation that since the creation of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, the Council itself has weakened itself on the issue of Children in conflict as the Working Group has become more of a driving force on the problem than the Council.<sup>34</sup> The Working Group has increased its number of reports on violations like abduction, barring children from access to humanitarian assistance, raping and sexually abusing children, murdering and maiming children, recruiting child soldiers, and targeting schools and hospitals, but it ultimately needs the Council to take action on the data collected.<sup>35</sup>

There are a series of SC resolutions concerning the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) that confront perpetrators of child soldier recruitment and violations against children. UNSC Resolution 1778 created the UN Mission on the Central African Republic and in Chad (MINURCAT) six years ago.<sup>36</sup> UNSC Resolution 1996 is also a significant resolution for the topic of children and armed conflict. Operative clauses nine and ten focus on the children involved in the conflict. Operative clause nine calls for the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and other rebel groups to cease their multiple violations against and continued recruitment of children while recalling Resolution 1960 adopted in 2010.<sup>37</sup> SC Resolution 2031 extended the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic's (BINUCA's) mandate and in January 2013 the UNSC adopted Resolution 2088 which further extended its mandate for another year. It recalled multiple UNSC resolutions that address children and armed conflict, including Resolution 2031 which specifically focuses on addressing groups that target children.<sup>38</sup> It pinpoints the Seleka Coalition, which includes the Convention of Patriots for Justice (CPJP), Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK), Republican Forces Union (UFR), and Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR).<sup>39</sup> Just four months later, UN Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUCA, Margaret Vogt, briefed the SC that "there is an urgent need to restore stability in the CAR" and called for the SC to individually sanction groups that fuel the conflict before "citizens take the law into their own hands".<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> "Working Group Meeting on Children and Armed Conflict," Security Council Report. May 20, 2013. <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/05/working-group-meeting-on-children-and-armed-conflict.php> (accessed June 25, 2013).

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Security Council Report Cross-Cutting Report: Children and Armed Conflict. The United Nations Security Council. New York: August 27, 2012. [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/cross\\_cutting\\_report\\_cac\\_2012.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/cross_cutting_report_cac_2012.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> "Protecting civilians, promoting human rights, rule of law and regional peace," MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/> (accessed on July 15th, 2013).

<sup>37</sup> S/RES/1996. [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/documents/sres1996\\_2011.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/documents/sres1996_2011.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> S/RES/2088. Security Council. January 24, 2013 [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_res\\_2088.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2088.pdf)

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> "UN Central African Republic," United Nations. <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/2013/05/un-central-african-republic-5/> (accessed August 14, 2013).



## *Security Themes Associated with Children and Armed Conflict*

Vogt's call for the rule of law in the CAR reminds the SC and all UN Member States that countries with ongoing instability and security issues at a national level or weak national level policies on child soldiers are apt to be very slow to respond to the issues of children and armed conflict. A UN task force in Afghanistan reported 66 documented cases of recruiting young boys in 2012. In the same report, Taliban forces including the Tora Bora Front, Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia, the Latif Mansur Network, the Haqqani network, and Hezb-e-Islami recruited and utilized 47 children in their ranks.<sup>41</sup> A minimum of ten children were used for suicide bombings, while the others were mainly used to deliver supplies and make and/or plant explosives. In September 2012, eight children died in a suicide attack in Kabul, including the 16 year old suicide bomber. In addition to examples like these, there is reported cross-border recruitment of child soldiers in the Tribal Areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>42</sup>

In addition to a lack of state-level stability and policies, another topic very closely related to children in conflict is small arms and light weapons because any plan to address child soldiers must be accompanied by containment of these arms. In the last 50 years, increased access to small and light weapons and rising numbers of intra-state conflicts have equated to higher child soldier recruitment. Specifically, the AK-47 is not only the most widely-used arm in the world, but it has also become the lightweight weapon of choice for arming children. The psychological issues of children being empowered by this weaponry is perhaps one of the largest obstacles to rehabilitating child soldiers back to civilian life.<sup>43</sup> Poverty is yet another reason that children enter or return to these forces—in some cases even being enlisted by their own parents. Poverty can also influence rehabilitated child recruits to re-enter armed groups. While more than 3,400 child soldiers in Burundi have undergone a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) program, a majority of the children return home to possibly attend school and little else.<sup>44</sup> Initially funded by the World Bank, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) took over the funding of the program in 2010 working with NGOs in Burundi. Perhaps the largest issue in addressing child soldiers is that no one variable can explain influence on recruitment and cross-country studies are needed to better identify root causes.

### *Sudan: Then and Now*

*A child soldier is any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.*<sup>45</sup>

Today, both national military forces and armed opposition groups are still recruiting children in Eastern Chad and Sudan, with internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees from Darfur being the most vulnerable. While neither poverty levels nor rates of being orphaned have been consistent in predicting the use and recruitment of child soldiers, there is a strong connection to IDPs. Child soldier rates are lower in refugee camps where children are highly protected.<sup>46</sup> Children often disappear from IDP and refugee camps and have resurfaced as soldiers in armed forces like the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan. Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT), the Chadian

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<sup>41</sup> "Afghanistan." Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/countries/afghanistan/> (accessed June 23, 2013)

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> "Small Arms," Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/small-arms-landmines-and-unexploded-ordnance/> (accessed on June 23, 2013).

<sup>44</sup> "Burundi: Former child soldiers 'languishing in poverty'," IRIN, April 5, 2011. <http://www.irinnews.org/report/92371/burundi-former-child-soldiers-languishing-in-poverty> (accessed June 24, 2013).

<sup>45</sup> The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa. UNICEF. April 1997.

<sup>46</sup> Simon Reich and Vera Achvarina, "Why Do Children 'Fight'? Explaining Child Soldiers' Ratios in African Intrastate Conflicts," Ford Institute for Human Security, 2009. <http://www.fordinstitute.pitt.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9t%2BeoClcYdA%3D&tabid=471> (accessed June 26, 2013).

Army, has children present in its forces and government officials in Chad have acknowledged this presence.<sup>47</sup> While the majority of these recruits are boys, girls have been recruited in recent years by the United Front for the Democratic Change (FUC), usually following being raped or being promised protection from rape. Furthermore, a quarter of FUC's forces are estimated to be aged 12-18.<sup>48</sup>

In May, the UN and the South Sudanese army collaborated to remove 27 children from a military base in an effort to further discourage children from joining militant groups like the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).<sup>49</sup> Milestones like the 2005 peace deal and South Sudanese independence in 2011 have curbed the number of child soldier in the area.<sup>50</sup> In the 1980s, the SPLA heavily recruiting child soldiers to fight for independence and they became known as the Red Army.<sup>51</sup> The Red Army numbered tens of thousands at its peak and its skirmishes were known to have extremely large casualties. In 2012, the Red Army was re-established as the Red Army Foundation (RAF) to address social issues of the youth in South Sudan.<sup>52</sup> The repurposing of the group from a tool of destruction to a tool of rehabilitation can serve as both an example and a catalyst to address the ongoing issue of child soldiers in Sudan and neighboring Chad.

### ***Conclusion: A Recent Case of Child Soldier Release***

A recent commitment at a state level produced some justice for children in Myanmar. In July, Myanmar's Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw, released 42 child soldiers from its ranks. The UN immediately welcomed this discharge move and further urged the Tatmadaw to dismiss all children within the group.<sup>53</sup> In the presence of the UN Resident Coordinator in Myanmar, UNICEF representatives, and senior Myanmar government officials, the children were returned to their families as a result of an action plan the government agreed to with the UN in 2012. The action plan also gives UN monitors access to military training activities, which allows them to effect change in the military's practices toward children.<sup>54</sup> This success is attributed to the firm commitment of a Member State's government to address security and human rights for its children and UN support.

### ***Committee Directive***

The Chair expects delegates to be aware of their Member States' involvement in existing peacekeeping initiatives and bodies that address the issue of children and armed conflict. Delegates are encouraged to create policies that address different aspects and stages of child soldier recruitment. The Chair also welcomes draft resolutions that address conflicts where the conditions for and involvement in child soldier recruitment are high. Delegates should also keep in mind that the UN Department of Political Affairs manages field missions that prevent conflict and can also support fact finding missions. The Chair also expects delegates to be aware of initiatives of other UN bodies that address children in conflict (like UNICEF) and how the SC can elaborate upon them.

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<sup>47</sup> A Compromised Future: Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Groups in Eastern Chad. Amnesty International. London: 2011. <http://195.234.175.160/en/library/asset/AFR20/001/2011/en/1cf0816b-12e1-4c15-b055-26f18b5d5201/afr200012011en.pdf>

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> "Child soldiers removed from South Sudan army base," United Press International, May 7, 2013. [http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/World-News/2013/05/07/Child-soldiers-removed-from-South-Sudan-army-base/UPI-81821367931692/](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/05/07/Child-soldiers-removed-from-South-Sudan-army-base/UPI-81821367931692/) (accessed on June 27, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Andrew Green, "South Sudan's Red Army comes of age," theguardian, March 27, 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/mar/27/south-sudan-red-army-comes-age> (accessed June 27, 2013).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> "Hailing release of child soldiers, UN calls on Myanmar to accelerate discharge efforts," UN News Centre, July 8, 2013. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45359#> (accessed June 25, 2013).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.



## II. Addressing Environmental Hazards and Natural Resource Induced Conflicts as a Result of Threats to Member States Border Security

### *Introduction*

Environmental degradation, climate change, and disproportionate resource distribution pose fundamental threats to human security.<sup>55</sup> Separately or in combination with other factors, they can destabilize livelihoods, negatively affect ecosystems, and undermine peace and development.<sup>56</sup> The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports that since 2000, there have been more than 35 major conflicts and some 2,500 disasters worldwide, affecting over two billion people.<sup>57</sup> At least 18 violent conflicts since 1990 have been driven by factors related to natural resources and environmental degradation, and 40 percent of all intrastate conflicts since 1960 have had a link to natural resources.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, conflicts involving natural resources are twice as likely to relapse within five years.<sup>59</sup> There is a significant potential for conflicts over the control of natural resources to intensify as the global population continues to rise and the demand for resources continues to grow.<sup>60</sup> In addition, the recent trends in climate change indicate that a decrease in the supply of certain natural resources will act as a threat multiplier in unstable regions.<sup>61</sup>

Climate change and conflicts over access to natural resources pose imminent challenges to the attainment of the MDGs by the 2015 deadline. The Millennium Project defines environmental security as “environmental viability for life support, with three sub-elements: preventing or repairing military damage to the environment, preventing or responding to environmentally caused conflicts, and protecting the environment due to its inherent moral value.”<sup>62</sup> The achievement of the MDGs are vital to international and national security and stability, as emphasized by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change—a panel of experts convened by former Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003 to identify the emerging and current threats to international peace and security.<sup>63</sup> In their report, the High Level Panel defines international peace and security as “any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system.”<sup>64</sup> Reaffirming the expanded definition of international peace and security, the former Secretary General labeled climate change and environmental degradation, among other things, as having the potential to produce “catastrophic consequences,” therefore acting as viable threats to international peace and security.<sup>65</sup>

### *The Role of Natural Resources in Conflict*

Natural resources play a number of roles in conflicts, from contributing to the initial outbreak to strengthening post-war economic recovery.<sup>66</sup> Violent conflicts are often fueled by revenues from the exploitation of natural resources,

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55 “Renewable Resources and Conflict: Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict,” United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action, October 2012. [http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN\\_Renewable\\_Consultation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN_Renewable_Consultation.pdf) (accessed April 29, 2013).

56 Ibid.

57 “From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment,” United Nations Environment Programme, February 2009. [http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb\\_policy\\_01.pdf](http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf) (accessed April 29, 2013).

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Richard Matthew, “Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge,” International Peace Institute, April 2008. <http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/rscar0408.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2013).

62 “State of the Future, Emerging Environmental Security Issues,” The Millennium Project, 2010. <http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/ES-scanning-10.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2013).

63 A/59/565. Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. United Nations General Assembly. December 2, 2004. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 “From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment,” United Nations Environment Programme, February 2009. [http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb\\_policy\\_01.pdf](http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

especially from primary commodities such as diamonds, minerals, oil, and timber.<sup>67</sup> Revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are not only used for sustaining armies, but also for personal enrichment and building political support.<sup>68</sup> As a result, they can become obstacles to peace, as leaders of armed groups involved in the exploitation are unwilling to give up control over these resources.<sup>69</sup> Even in post-conflict societies, the control over natural resources and their revenues often stays in the hands of a small elite and is not used for broader development of the country.<sup>70</sup> Conflict over natural resources has made African Member States the focus of international attention, particularly during the past decade. High-value, extractable conflict resources have sparked civil wars in Angola, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.<sup>71</sup>

Sierra Leone's civil war between 1991 and 1999 was partially financed by revenues from natural resources, in particular the illegal exploitation and trade of rough diamonds.<sup>72</sup> The brutal conflict brought conflict diamonds to the world's attention and in December 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted A/RES/55/56 supporting the creation of an international certification scheme to end the illicit trade in rough diamonds.<sup>73</sup> In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was set up through a unique joint initiative involving Member States, the international diamond industry, and NGOs.<sup>74</sup> This scheme requires Member States to certify shipments of rough diamonds as conflict-free each time they cross an international border through the use of tamper-resistant containers and forgery-resistant certificates with unique serial numbers.<sup>75</sup> In 2003, the Council expressed its profound support for the KPCS as a valuable contribution against the trafficking of conflict diamonds by unanimously adopting S/RES/1459.<sup>76</sup> More recently, Member States adopted A/RES/67/135 in December 2012 acknowledging the diamond sector as "an important catalyst for promoting economic and social development, which are necessary for poverty reduction and meeting the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals in many producing countries, particularly in developing countries."<sup>77</sup>

The increasing scarcity of basic renewable resources, heightened by pollution and degradation, rapid population growth and climate change, has also contributed to a number of violent conflicts.<sup>78</sup> Tensions often arise from competing demands over the available supply of natural resources. In Sudan and Afghanistan, violent conflicts have been linked to tensions over the control of fertile land and water.<sup>79</sup> Climate variability, water scarcity and the steady loss of fertile land have also contributed to the ongoing violence in Darfur, leading to over 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.<sup>80</sup> In many cases, the lack of good governance to resolve these tensions equitably leads to specific groups being disadvantaged, ultimately leading to conflict.<sup>81</sup> Robust laws,

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67 "Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and UN Peacekeeping Operations," United Nations Environment Programme, May 2012. [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP\\_greening\\_blue\\_helmets.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_greening_blue_helmets.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

68 "Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: Transforming a Peace Liability into a Peace Asset," United Nations Expert Group Meeting Conference Report, June 2006. [http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Africa\\_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov%2017.pdf](http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Africa_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov%2017.pdf) (accessed May 2, 2013).

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 "From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment," United Nations Environment Programme, February 2009. [http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb\\_policy\\_01.pdf](http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

72 Ibid.

73 A/RES/55/56. United Nations General Assembly. January 29, 2001.

74 "Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process Fact Sheet," World Diamond Council, March 10, 2008. [http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20\(CConflict%20Diamonds%20and%20the%20Kimberley%20Process\).pdf](http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Fact%20Sheet%20(CConflict%20Diamonds%20and%20the%20Kimberley%20Process).pdf) (accessed May 2, 2013).

75 Ibid.

76 S/RES/1459. United Nations Security Council. January 28, 2003.

77 A/RES/67/135. United Nations General Assembly. April 4, 2013.

78 "Renewable Resources and Conflict: Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict," United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventative Action, October 2012. [http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN\\_Renewable\\_Consultation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/events/environmentconflictday/pdf/GN_Renewable_Consultation.pdf) (accessed May 4, 2013).

79 "Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and UN Peacekeeping Operations," United Nations Environment Programme, May 2012. [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP\\_greening\\_blue\\_helmets.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_greening_blue_helmets.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

institutions, policies, and processes can help reduce the vulnerability of populations to renewable resource scarcity, resolve disputes between competing interests, and prevent conflicts over the control, access, and management of resources.<sup>82</sup> The sound management of natural resources in post-conflict settings can provide a foundation for addressing the pressing livelihood and governance challenges that are critical to sustaining peace.<sup>83</sup> Although 25 percent of UN peacekeeping missions since 1948 have had a direct or indirect mandate to address natural resources, the broader issues surrounding natural resource and environmental management have not garnered sufficient attention within the peacekeeping community until now.<sup>84</sup> Addressing the risks and opportunities presented by natural resources is often critical to the success of UN peacekeeping efforts and should no longer be seen as distinct from the maintenance of peace and security.

The SC has taken an unprecedented number of measures to tackle the links between natural resources and armed conflicts over the past decade. In its *Declaration on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Security Council's Role in Conflict Prevention* (S/RES/1625), the Council reaffirmed its “determination to take action against illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodities in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation of armed conflict.”<sup>85</sup> Previous SC responses to armed conflicts arising from the illicit extraction of natural resources and the mismanagement of scarce resources include implementing sanctions and imposing embargoes through resolutions, establishing committees and groups of experts, and authorizing peacekeeping operations.<sup>86</sup> In 2003, Member States imposed timber sanctions on Liberia in recognition of the role played by the timber industry in conflict and insecurity through SC Resolution 1478. In recent years, the Council has appointed a number of Expert Panels that investigate natural resource dimensions of specific conflicts in Angola, the DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.<sup>87</sup> These panels have issued revealing reports about the links between lucrative and abusive natural resource exploitation and the emergence and continuation of these conflicts.<sup>88</sup> In June 2007, the Council underscored the need for peacekeeping mandates to consider helping Member States prevent illegal exploitation of natural resources from inciting conflict.<sup>89</sup> However, to date, only a few peacekeeping missions have clear mandates to help host countries better manage its natural resources, including the ongoing UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).<sup>90</sup>

### ***Security Implications of Climate Change***

The potential consequences of climate change for water availability, food security, prevalence of disease, coastal boundaries, and population distribution can aggravate existing tensions and even generate new conflicts.<sup>91</sup> All of these consequences could lead to increased poverty and the reversal of critical development achievements, undermining progress towards the achievement of the MDGs. According to UNEP, climate change has been shown to cause a decrease in precipitation and an increase in desertification.<sup>92</sup> The decrease in rainfall reduces the availability of water, diminishing the amount of agricultural output, which ultimately results in food shortages.<sup>93</sup> According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), areas affected by drought are at an increased risk of water- and food-borne diseases.<sup>94</sup> The 2009 report of the Secretary General on *Climate Change and its*

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82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 S/RES/1625. United Nations Security Council. September 14, 2005.

86 Ibid.

87 S/RES/1478. United Nations Security Council. May 6, 2003.

88 “Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and UN Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations Environment Programme, May 2012. [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP\\_greening\\_blue\\_helmets.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_greening_blue_helmets.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

89 Ibid.

90 “Conflict and Resources,” United Nations Peacekeeping. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/resources.shtml> (accessed May 4, 2013).

91 “From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment,” United Nations Environment Programme, February 2009. [http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb\\_policy\\_01.pdf](http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf) (accessed May 1, 2013).

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). November 2007. [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4\\_syr.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf)

*Possible Security Implications* further warns that rising sea levels will result in the loss of territory, including the loss of entire lowland islands, which will lead to involuntary mass migrations, possible statelessness, and disputes over territory that will ultimately have to be dealt with within the realm of international law.<sup>95</sup> The scale of migration and displacement, both internal and cross-border, is expected to rise with climate change, along with the proportion of population movements considered “involuntary.”<sup>96</sup> Member States have previously recognized massive migration flows as a risk factor to international peace and security through SC Resolution 1199.<sup>97</sup>

Attention to security implications of climate change by the Council first took place in 2007 in a High-Level Debate attended by more than 50 Member States.<sup>98</sup> At this debate, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued, “projected climate changes could not only have serious environmental, social and economic implications, but implications for peace and security as well.”<sup>99</sup> Two years later, the UN General Assembly adopted A/RES/63/281, which called upon all relevant UN organs to intensify their efforts to address climate change and its possible security implications within their mandates.<sup>100</sup> In July 2011, the SC debated the security implications of climate change for a second time, resulting in another presidential statement by the Secretary-General further stating that a shortage of food and water “undermines the most essential foundations of local, national, and global stability,” and that “competition between communities and countries for scarce resources... is increasing, exacerbating old security dilemmas and creating new ones.”<sup>101</sup> Although several Member States have questioned the authority of the SC to include issues of climate change on its agenda, others maintain that because the Council is charged with “maintaining international peace and security” under the UN Charter, it is an appropriate body for this debate.<sup>102</sup> The Charter gives the Council the right to discuss, at any stage of its development, an issue that may jeopardize international security.<sup>103</sup> The SC has also reaffirmed establishing policy that addresses the root causes of conflict such as climate change and resource scarcity under S/RES/1625.<sup>104</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

Over the years, violent conflicts have been directly or indirectly fueled by the scarcity of key resources like fertile land and water, or the abundance of lucrative resources like timber and minerals. Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources become scarcer and competition for them increases. From a conflict-prevention perspective, the question is how to prevent natural resources from becoming an initial cause of conflict. In the case of conflict, the challenge becomes how to prevent the exploitation of natural resources from inciting and perpetuating war. This has been the main focus of the Council’s action on natural resources to date by imposing commodity sanctions, and establishing sanction committees and groups of experts. Member States have recognized that the sound management of natural resources in post-conflict settings can provide a foundation for addressing the pressing livelihood and governance challenges that are critical to sustaining peace.

However, linking the terms “environment” and “conflict” remains a contentious issue in today’s international political arena. While the SC has acknowledged the link between natural resources, climate change and violent conflict, Member States are divided on how to address the linkages. Some express concern about protecting their sovereign right to use their resources according to their national interest, while others consider environmental degradation and the illegal exploitation of natural resources as issues of international concern requiring a coordinated global approach. The potential impacts of climate change on the availability of natural resources, coupled with rising consumer demand and the free flow of international investment capital, only sharpen the need for collective action. Member States wrecked with conflict and violence, and hampered by weak institutional capacities face particular challenges in meeting the MDGs by the approaching deadline. The Council is charged

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95 A/64/350. Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications: Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations General Assembly. September 11, 2009.

96 Ibid.

97 S/RES/1625. United Nations Security Council. September 14, 2005

98 SC/9000. United Nations Security Council. April 17, 2007. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm>

99 Ibid.

100 A/RES/63/281. United Nations General Assembly. June 11, 2009.

101 SC/6587. United Nations Security Council. July 20, 2011. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10332.doc.htm>

102 Ibid.

103 United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Chapter VI, Article 36.

104 S/RES/1625. United Nations Security Council. September 14, 2005

with the maintenance of international peace and security and as conflicts arise or exacerbate due to the changing climate and scarcity of natural resources, there is greater need for the attention of the SC.

### ***Committee Directive***

In discussing the conditions that often give rise to conflicts over natural resources, it is necessary to point out to delegates that many of the issues are interwoven. In addition to understanding the linkages between conflict and the environment, delegates are expected to have an understanding of the MDGs and the benchmarks their Member State has achieved when speaking about sustainable development. While improving governance of natural resources in the absence of conflict is not the primary responsibility of the Council, Member States should be prepared to discuss the role of the Council in the early identification of situations in which natural resources could create a risk of conflict. In what ways can the Council encourage other existing initiatives, such as the KPCS, to the extent that they have an impact on the maintenance of peace and security? How can the Council promote the effective governance of natural resources without imposing on Member States' sovereignty?

Although the Security Council has addressed the issue of natural resources in conflict, there has been open debate on whether or not to include climate change on its agenda. Is the threat of conflict from climate change and resource scarcity at a level that justifies increased attention by the SC to this issue? What preventive measures can be taken by Member States and civil society to minimize the threats posed by climate change to human well-being, development and security?

Delegates will also be expected to have an understanding of the current ongoing conflicts relating to natural resources and climate change and should explore how the effective the SC's actions in this area could be strengthened. What are the lessons learned from past and existing commodity sanctions, sanctions committees and groups of experts? How can these instruments be strengthened? In post-conflict situations, the issue becomes how to reinstate natural resources as an engine for development and how to move from a sanctions driven approach to a development-oriented one without natural resources again becoming a factor of instability and thus triggering a relapse into conflict. How can the Council strengthen its role in dealing with natural resources in the aftermath of conflict, in particular when establishing peacekeeping operations? What are the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations in such situations? Can their mandates better take this dimension into account? Do they have the adequate capacity, and how can they be better equipped to deal with it? Finally, are there any current or past proposals by Member States that can be looked at and used as a guideline to developing criteria for the effective management of natural resources and mediating the effects of climate change?

## **III. Ensuring the Safety of Diplomats While on Foreign Soil**

### ***Introduction***

While threats to diplomats can impede the achievement of all the MDGs, MDG Eight which develops a global partnership for development is most impacted by hindrances to diplomacy.<sup>105</sup> When coupled with the past decade's attacks on diplomats while on foreign soil, the insecurity of these representatives is appropriate to be addressed by the Council. A shockwave rippled throughout the UN in August 2003 when Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN's top envoy in Iraq, was killed along with 14 others in a terrorist bombing at the UN headquarters in Baghdad. Vira de Mello, originally from Brazil, served as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and had been involved in several other UN peacekeeping missions. Other victims included diplomats from Egypt, the Philippines, the UK, and the US, along with Canadian Program Coordinator for the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) Christopher Klein-Beekman. The UN headquarters had served as a workplace for more than 300 international staff and the Council condemned the criminal act in emergency sessions.<sup>106</sup> The loss of officials from so many different Member States in one attack highlighted the importance of improving security operations for diplomats, yet many approaches to diplomatic security still remain reactive as opposed to preventative.

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<sup>105</sup> "Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development," The United Nation Millennium Development Goals, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/global.shtml> (accessed July 5, 2013).

<sup>106</sup> "Top UN envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello killed in terrorist blast in Baghdad," UN News Centre, August 19, 2003. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8023#.Ue3h6RbBR8s> (accessed July 5, 2013).

For more than half a century, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 have prevailed as the international standards for diplomatic responsibility.<sup>107</sup> In fact, the first two clauses of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Treaty are key to ensure the safety of diplomats:

*“1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.*

*2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.”<sup>108</sup>*

As stated in the second clause, the host country has the majority of the responsibility in protecting foreign diplomats within its borders, but ambassadorial discourse is most needed in Member States where conflict exists or security is threatened. Diplomats accept that these positions are often risky, but regardless of the environment their security is vital simply so these representatives can do their jobs. Recent events in the international community have reminded the Council of the tragic events in Iraq more than ten years ago and emphasize that new policies must be enacted to optimize security for officials in and from each Member State.

### ***Recent Events***

In February 2013, the U.S Embassy in Ankara, Turkey was the target of a suicide bomber. The attack focused on the entrance to the building and a Turkish security guard died as a result. Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, stated that the assault was planned by the terrorist group Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKPC), which has been known to single out both Turkish and American officials since the Gulf War.<sup>109</sup> Just two months later in April, officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) requested that embassy diplomats leave the country amidst claims that the DPRK could not guarantee their safety if conflict occurred when South Korean troops participated in military exercises with the US. Staff representing the UN in the DPRK remained focused on its humanitarian efforts and did not evacuate its 36 international staff members. Although the DPRK said it would provide safe retreats for the diplomats at that time before any conflict occurred, the Vienna Convention requires host governments to evacuate staff *in the event* of a conflict.<sup>110</sup> One of the most significant moves taken in the realm of diplomatic security was implemented by the US in August 2013.<sup>111</sup> The State Department elected to temporarily close 21 consulates and embassies in North African and the Middle East due to warnings of possible al Qaeda attacks.<sup>112</sup> The potential of an attack in Yemen was seen as high because of al Qaeda’s presence and strength in the Arabian Peninsula. Libya’s US embassy was one of the embassies that closed, recalling the 2012 Benghazi attack.

### ***Libya and the Benghazi Attack***

Predating the Benghazi attack, there were incidents of violence against UN & UK diplomats in Libya that should be reviewed to prevent their reoccurrence as well.<sup>113</sup> The UK’s Ian Martin, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), was on a UN convoy that was a mark

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<sup>107</sup> Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The United Nations. April 18, 1961.

[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9\\_1\\_1961.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf)

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Richard Engel, Aziz Akyavas and Ian Johnston, “US Embassy compound in Turkey hit by ‘terrorist’ attack,” NBC News, February 1, 2013. <http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/news/2013/02/01/16804949-us-embassy-compound-in-turkey-hit-by-terrorist-attack?lite> (accessed on July 5, 2013).

<sup>110</sup> Faulconbridge, Guy and Ronald Popeski, “North Korea asks embassies to consider moving diplomats out,” Reuters, April 5, 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/05/us-korea-north-idUSBRE93408020130405> (accessed July 5, 2013).

<sup>111</sup> Chris Lawrence, Barbara Starr and Tom Cohen, “U.S. issues global travel alert, to close embassies due to al Qaeda threat,” CNN, August 2, 2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/02/politics/us-embassies-close/index.html> (Accessed on August 2, 2013).

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.



of a roadside bomb in April 2012.<sup>114</sup> Just two months later, another convoy transporting the UK Ambassador to Libya, Dominic Asquith, was attacked by an armed group that injured two British guards.<sup>115</sup> During the second week of September 2012, the international community saw US diplomatic offices attacked in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen.

The attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya occurred on the 11th anniversary of the September 11th attacks and four Americans died: US Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens, US Foreign Service Information Management Officer Sean Smith, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods (two former Navy Seals working in security positions at the consulate).<sup>116</sup> Both the U.S. Special Mission compound and its Annex, and subjects moving between the two, faced a string of arson, machine gun, mortar, rocket-propelled grenade, and small arm attacks.<sup>117</sup> According to the US Accountability Review Board's (ARB) 2012 Report (Unclassified), the US Consulate in Benghazi was protected by two groups: the Libyan February 17 (February 17) Martyrs' Brigade militia and the Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards.<sup>118</sup> The February 17 militia was "armed, but poorly skilled" and the BML guards were unarmed and locally contracted by the UK-based Blue Mountain Group for 783,284 USD.<sup>119</sup> While the ARB finds that the consulate's security was inadequate, acquiring security resources is more difficult for transitory missions and there was uncertainty that the Special Mission's mandate would have been extended past 2012.<sup>120</sup>

In response to the attack in Benghazi, the Security Council and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the actions and extended condolences to the families of the victims. The Security Council members called upon the international community to increase security for all diplomats under the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.<sup>121</sup> While recalling these international commitments, the Security Council also took the opportunity to reiterate its stance on the attack of the US Consulate in Egypt, which also occurred on Sept 11, 2012.<sup>122</sup> In late October after the attack, the General Assembly's Legal Committee (6th) also spoke out against the recent attacks on diplomats and called upon host countries to better protect them and comply with international law.<sup>123</sup>

### ***Diplomatic Security Issues***

All Member States are facing the obstacle of remaining mission-driven in initiatives abroad while simultaneously being constricted by lower financial and manpower reserves. Budget cuts in diplomatic security are affecting these resources in embassies and consulates around the world. Even though the US has spent more than 13 billion USD to secure buildings and upgrade security since 1999, its Congress cut almost 300 million USD from the State Department's embassy security spending from 2010-2012.<sup>124</sup> These cuts were enacted amid State Department

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<sup>114</sup> Colum Lynch, "U.S. Diplomatic Security Again Under Review," The Washington Post, September 13, 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-diplomatic-security-again-under-review/2012/09/13/5e7f2ba2-fd96-11e1-8adc-499661afe377\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-diplomatic-security-again-under-review/2012/09/13/5e7f2ba2-fd96-11e1-8adc-499661afe377_story.html) (accessed on July 26, 2013).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> "Chronology: The Benghazi Attack and The Fallout," NPR, December 19, 2012. <http://www.npr.org/2012/11/30/166243318/chronology-the-benghazi-attack-and-the-fallout> (accessed on July 20, 2012).

<sup>117</sup> "Accountability Review Board Report (unclassified) on Benghazi embassy attack, December 2012," Council of Foreign Relations, December 19, 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/libya/accountability-review-board-report-unclassified-benghazi-embassy-attack-december-2012/p29691> (accessed on July 29, 2013).

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Tabassum Zakaria, Susan Cornwell and Hadeel Al Shalchi, "For Benghazi diplomatic security, U.S. relied on small British firm," Reuters, October 17, 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/us-libya-usa-bluemountain-idUSBRE89G1TI20121018> (accessed on July 30, 2013).

<sup>120</sup> "Accountability Review Board Report (unclassified) on Benghazi embassy attack, December 2012," Council of Foreign Relations, December 19, 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/libya/accountability-review-board-report-unclassified-benghazi-embassy-attack-december-2012/p29691> (accessed on July 29, 2013).

<sup>121</sup> "Ban, Security Council condemn 'in the strongest terms' attack on US Consulate in Libya," UN News Centre, September 12, 2012. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42867&Cr=libya&Cr1=#> (accessed on July 21, 2012).

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> GA/L/3445. Legal committee condemns surge of attacks on diplomats, missions, saying host states must fulfill protection obligations. General Assembly Sixth Committee. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gal3445.doc.htm>

<sup>124</sup> Shaun Waterman, "Benghazi attack followed deep cuts in State Department security budget," The Washington Times, September 27, 2012. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/27/benghazi-attack-followed-deep-cuts-in-state-depart/?page=all> (accessed July 29, 2013).

recommendations to increase these budgets for international diplomacy initiatives.<sup>125</sup> Obviously, changes in financial support for diplomatic protection will affect all aspects of security for international representatives. Like in the case of Benghazi, security guards from the host country are often employed to work at various embassies and the training-level of these ranks can be varied.

Mitigating the risk to diplomats is a complex task that can require custom solutions depending on the host country, including factors like improved intelligence, more thorough evaluations of the circumstances of previous threats, possible withdrawal, and increasing bureaucratic efficiency. Since several UN bodies have called upon Member States to adhere to international law in order to protect diplomats, final and firm commitments to these international laws are also needed by all Member States to protect diplomats in all Member States. While the CAR, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and Israel signed the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by 1964, these Member States have yet to ratify the treaty.<sup>126</sup> There are also Member States that are not party to the treaty at all: Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia (among others).<sup>127</sup>

### ***Conclusion: UN Action***

Since 1995, the UN body that has addressed this very complex protection is the International Law Commission (ILC).<sup>128</sup> In 1996, the ILC compiled an outline of the legal issues of diplomatic protection and linked to topic to State Responsibility.<sup>129</sup> In late 2010, the General Assembly voted in resolution 65/27 to consider a convention on diplomatic protection, or other pertinent policies, at its sixty-eighth session in September 2013.<sup>130</sup> Increased public knowledge and respect of the commitment of diplomats and their expertise could be beneficial, but these benchmarks are more likely to happen if the SC were to take direct action. While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is an appropriate venue to deal with violations of international law after the fact, the continued pattern of attacks on diplomatic facilities in the international community will further compromise international peace and security, which makes the matter one to be dealt with preventatively by the Council.

### ***Committee Directive***

Since Member States both serve as host countries and deploy diplomats, the Chair welcomes the delegation to approach this issue from both perspectives. Delegates should be knowledgeable in several aspects of diplomatic security, including the locations of their Member State's embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities abroad as well as the locations of embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities within their Member State. It is also prudent for delegates to review the history of security threats to their Member State's and/or regional embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities and how your Member State responded to these threats. Delegates should also review the role of their state-level government in the Member State's diplomatic safety policies and develop an awareness of groups that have targeted diplomatic officials in both the host and/or international countries. Delegates should consider the current UN agreements on diplomatic safety and what if any further steps the international community or the Council should take on this matter. The Council is also encouraged to assess diplomatic safety of current conflicts.

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. United Nations Treaty Collection, April 24, 1963. [http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtsg\\_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en](http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en) (accessed July 29, 2013).

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> "Diplomatic Protection," United Nations. [http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9\\_8.htm](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_8.htm) (Accessed August 1, 2013).

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> "Articles on Diplomatic Protection 2006," United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/adp/adp.html> (Accessed August 1, 2013).

## IV. Ensuring Stability in Post-Revolutionary States in the Middle East

*“The United Nations and the international community should continue to support peaceful, democratic outcomes in the region, with humility and the recognition that there is no uniform response that can be applied across the board.”*

—Lynne B. Pascoe, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs<sup>131</sup>

### Introduction

The revolutionary movements in the Middle East, most widely known as the ‘Arab Spring’, that began through a wave of demonstrations, protests, and civil wars continue to hold the world’s attention as many states are currently undergoing democratic transitions. Since December 2010, 17 countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have experienced unrest through protests and uprisings.<sup>132</sup> Pro-government forces and militias have responded to the protests through civilian arrests and extreme violence, causing a massive amount of civilian casualties in particular countries.<sup>133</sup> Governmental collapse has become a major global concern, especially in conflict areas in the Middle East as rulers have been forced from power in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. The UN faces unprecedented challenges as it coordinates international efforts to assist these conflict-affected Member States in building lasting peace. Building strong, sustainable democracies from the rubble of failed states is a long and slow process with many obstacles that requires the restructuring of government institutions specifically through constitutional reform, a strong civil society with good leadership, free and fair elections, freedom of speech and press, and respect for human rights among other things.<sup>134</sup>

Although the UN has supported the social and political dimensions of democratic change inspired by the revolutionary movements from the onset, the turmoil and violence as a result of the movements will continue to have severe repercussions for the region as well as the rest of the international community for years to come.<sup>135</sup> Violent conflict constitutes the largest obstacle to the achievement of the MDGs as the severe consequences of violence have the ability of erasing years of important development gains, pushing countries even further off track from achieving the MDGs by 2015.<sup>136</sup> To date, conflict-affected and fragile states are the furthest away from achieving the MDGs.<sup>137</sup> According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Weakness of institutions in conflict and post-conflict states translates into weak policy commitments and poor service provision towards attainment of the MDGs.”<sup>138</sup> Building peace, reinforcing justice, and establishing security are essential elements for the full achievement of the MDGs.<sup>139</sup> The UN plays a leading role in helping to stabilize and build strong democratic institutions in post-conflict Member States.

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<sup>131</sup> “Crisis and Change in the Middle East and North Africa.” Bulletin of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2011.

<http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/DPA%20Politically%20Speaking%20Summer%20Fall%202011.pdf>

<sup>132</sup> Garry Blight, Sheila Pulham and Paul Torpey, “Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests,” theguardian, January 5, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline> (accessed May 5, 2013).

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Barry Mirkin, “Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition,” Arab Human Development Report, 2013. <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdrps/AHDR%20ENG%20Arab%20Spring%20Mirkinv3.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

<sup>135</sup> “Crisis and Change in the Middle East and North Africa,” Bulletin of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2011. <http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/DPA%20Politically%20Speaking%20Summer%20Fall%202011.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

<sup>136</sup> “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals,” UN Millennium Project, 2005. <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

<sup>137</sup> “What will it take to achieve the Millennium Development Goals?” United Nations Development Programme, June 2010. [http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset\\_id=2620072](http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=2620072) (accessed May 6, 2013).

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

### *The Middle East Uprisings and Post-Revolutionary States*

To date, anti-government protests and civil uprisings have emerged in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen other areas of MENA just to name a few. While the causes of the recent revolutions in the Middle East are numerous and complex, several factors have been identified to contributing to the turmoil sweeping across the region, including, but not limited to: lack of political freedoms, government corruption, human rights violations, high rates of unemployment, increased access to information technologies, and a dissatisfied youth.<sup>140</sup> The Arab region has a relatively young population, with one-third of its population under the age of 15 and one-fifth between the ages of 15-24.<sup>141</sup> This youth bulge is mostly due to the high fertility rates during the 1980s with an average of six children per woman.<sup>142</sup> Furthermore, the growing youth population is entering a labor market already suffering from persistently high unemployment. The already very high youth unemployment in the Arab region rose sharply in the wake of the Arab Spring and was hovering around 27 percent in 2012, the highest in the world and twice the global rate for youth.<sup>143</sup> This lack of economic opportunity for young people has contributed to the wave of social unrest sweeping the region. In addition, the drastic spread of modern communication technologies such as the Internet and social media has helped young people facilitate mass protests and demonstrations in the region. For example, the popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia started as spontaneous protests organized by urban lower middle-class youth using social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter to coordinate and disseminate their message.<sup>144</sup> In a recent poll conducted by the Dubai School of Government, nine out of ten Egyptians and Tunisians responded that they used Facebook to organize protests and spread awareness.<sup>145</sup>

The initial post-conflict period in most Member States is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty as humanitarian crises and continued violations of human rights may continue to unfold beyond the initial cessation of conflicts.<sup>146</sup> The end of conflict does not necessarily mean the arrival of peace, as a lack of political consensus and trust often remains and the root causes of the conflict may persist.<sup>147</sup> Many post-conflict Member States are governed by transitional political arrangements until the first post-conflict elections are held and national authorities are often appointed rather than elected, put in place through a brokered agreement between parties to the conflict who may not be fully representative or recognized by the population.<sup>148</sup> Conflict and political violence is commonly understood to “destroy a country’s economic, governance and administrative institutions” and create a situation of “institutional multiplicity” — that is, a situation, where a range of governance mechanisms and authorities compete with one another for power and legitimacy.<sup>149</sup> The SC has invested in conflict zones in the Middle East over the years, adopting countless resolutions and mandating UN support missions to deal with the issues plaguing the region.

### *Application of Security Council Resolutions: Case Studies from Yemen and Syria*

The protection of civilians is a matter of top concern for the UN, particularly the SC as it is the only UN body with enforcement power within its resolutions. In light of the mass protests resulting in attacks on demonstrators and other civilians from authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the Council intensified its focus to the protection of civilians in 2011.<sup>150</sup> During a SC high-level debate on the “Maintenance of International Peace and Security” on February 11 of that same year, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said recent world events were “a sharp reminder of

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<sup>140</sup> Tiom Behr and Mika Aaltola, “The Arab Uprising: Causes, Prospects and Implications,” FIIA Briefing Paper, March 2011. [www.fiaa.fi/assets/publications/bp76.pdf](http://www.fiaa.fi/assets/publications/bp76.pdf) (accessed May 8, 2013).

<sup>141</sup> Barry Mirkin, “Arab Spring: Demographics in a Region in Transition,” Arab Human Development Report, 2013. <http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdrps/AHDR%20ENG%20Arab%20Spring%20Mirkinv3.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> Dubai School of Government, “Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and Twitter,” Arab Social Media Report, May 2011. <http://www.dsg.ae/en/ASMR2/Images/report.pdf> (accessed May 8' 2013).

<sup>146</sup> A/63/881-S/2009/304. Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. June 11, 2009.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> SC/10518. Security Council 2011 Round-Up. United Nations Security Council. January 12, 2012.

the need for political stability to be anchored in peace, opportunity, decent standards of living and the consent of the governed.”<sup>151</sup> In 2012, the Council held nine high-level meetings during the course of the year, with four specifically dealing with the agenda item entitled “The Situation in the Middle East”.<sup>152</sup>

In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the General Assembly Resolution on the *2005 World Summit Outcome*, Member States agreed that there was a collective responsibility to protect populations from crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.<sup>153</sup> In addition, Member States expressed a willingness to take timely and decisive action through the SC when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to prevent such atrocities.<sup>154</sup> The following year, the Council adopted Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the *2005 World Summit Outcome* and committed to taking actions that would protect civilians in armed conflict.<sup>155</sup> The endorsement of these paragraphs became known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). A 2009 report by the Secretary General on *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* raised concern over the use of veto by one of the permanent five members (P5) in R2P situations.<sup>156</sup> The use or non-use of the veto has recently played a prominent role in conflict situations in the Middle East that fall under the scope of R2P where the SC has or has not taken action.

### *Yemen*

Inspired by the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, protests in Yemen against the rule of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh began in early February 2011 and continued through the end of the year.<sup>157</sup> Fueled by popular anger over mounting poverty, unemployment, corruption, and the brutally repressive response of the government, demonstrators called for reform and an end to President Saleh’s 33-year rule.<sup>158</sup> Political crisis soon escalated into an armed conflict, with many protestors and members of the security forces killed or injured.<sup>159</sup> Government security forces and supporters of President Saleh responded to the largely peaceful demonstrations with excessive force, often firing live ammunition directly at unarmed protesters killing more than 250 people and injuring thousands.<sup>160</sup> In addition, government security forces carried out mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, and used torture and other ill-treatment with impunity.<sup>161</sup> A September report from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) found that officials “seeking to achieve or retain power” were “collectively punishing” the population by curtailing access to electricity, fuel, and water.<sup>162</sup>

On October 31, the Council responded by unanimously adopting Resolution 2014, which addressed the human rights violations by Yemeni government forces and recalled their ‘primary responsibility to protect’ their people.<sup>163</sup> The Resolution called for authorities to allow the right to protest and immediately end the violence against civilians.<sup>164</sup> In addition, the Resolution requested a peaceful transition of power based on the Gulf Cooperation Council

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<sup>151</sup> SC/10172. Statement by the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council. February 11, 2011. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10172.doc.htm>

<sup>152</sup> SC/10881. Security Council 2012 Round-Up. United Nations Security Council. January 14, 2013. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10881.doc.htm#MiddleEast>

<sup>153</sup> A/RES/60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. United Nations General Assembly. October 24, 2005.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> S/RES/1674. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. United Nations Security Council. April 28, 2006.

<sup>156</sup> A/63/677. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General. United Nations General Assembly. January 12, 2009.

<sup>157</sup> “Next Steps in Yemen’s Transition,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Briefing Paper, March 2012. [http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2012/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/Next\\_Steps\\_in\\_Yemens\\_Transition\\_paper.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2012/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/Next_Steps_in_Yemens_Transition_paper.pdf) (accessed May 10, 2013).

<sup>158</sup> “Yemen.” Annual Report 2012: The State of the World’s Human Rights. Amnesty International. 2012. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/yemen/report-2012>

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> “Yemen,” World Report 2012, Human Rights Watch, January 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-yemen> (accessed May 10, 2013).

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> A/HRC/18/21. Report of the High Commissioner on OHCHR’s Visit to Yemen. September 13, 2011. <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/YemenAssessmentMissionReport.pdf>

<sup>163</sup> S/RES/2014. Middle East. United Nations Security Council. October 21, 2011.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.



initiative, which offered immunity to Saleh and top officials in return for Saleh relinquishing power.<sup>165</sup> Member States also demanded that opposition groups cease the use of force and refrain from recruiting children or targeting vital infrastructure.<sup>166</sup> On November 23, President Saleh signed the agreement and stepped down from power.<sup>167</sup> Within two weeks, a Prime Minister from the opposition was appointed and a national government was formed representing the ruling party and members of the opposition.<sup>168</sup> However, protests continued denouncing the reported immunity agreement.<sup>169</sup>

In 2012, the SC held four meetings on the situation in Yemen, mainly focusing on assessing adherence to the November 2011 Peace and Transition Agreement aimed at establishing a representative government.<sup>170</sup> The fragile transition government continues to face multiple challenges in ending human rights violations such as arbitrary detention and child-soldier deployment.<sup>171</sup> Although fighting linked to the political upheaval has decreased, sectarian clashes remain in the north and government forces continue to battle with the Yemen branch of Al-Qaeda militants in the south, which took advantage of the instability to temporarily seize control of several towns.<sup>172</sup> The country also faces a growing humanitarian crisis linked to widespread poverty and malnutrition, with nearly half the population lacking sufficient food.<sup>173</sup> Member States expressed concern at the growing number of attacks carried out or sponsored by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and reaffirmed Yemen's 'responsibility to protect' its people through Resolution 2051.<sup>174</sup> The Council demanded an end to all actions undermining the Government of National Unity, such as attacks on oil, gas, and electricity infrastructure, interference with the restructuring of the armed and security forces, and obstruction of the implementation of presidential decrees.<sup>175</sup> The Council also expressed its readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41 of the Charter, if such actions continued.<sup>176</sup> During a high-level meeting, Ministers voiced support for Yemen's transition and held that the international community had a duty to help the country find the way forward.<sup>177</sup> They agreed that providing security was a great challenge as the country had a fast-growing young population and faced depletion of its oil and water supplies, as well as continued threats from Al-Qaeda.<sup>178</sup>

## *Syria*

The situation in Syria represents the complex nature of violent conflict in the Middle East and the difficulty in reaching an international consensus. The Council's consideration of the situation in Syria occurred in response to the uprising that began with public demonstrations on January 26, 2011 after a man was publicly assaulted and arrested by a police officer in old Damascus.<sup>179</sup> At the beginning of the uprising, demonstrators called for political freedom, an end to corruption and action on poverty.<sup>180</sup> What began as sporadic demonstrations had, in only two months, transformed into a large-scale revolt, with protesters demanding the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad and the overthrow of nearly five decades of Ba'athist rule.<sup>181</sup> Just like in Yemen, the Syrian government responded and tried to suppress the protests and demonstrations from the citizens. The United Nations Refugee Agency reports that more than 70,000 Syrians have been killed and some 1.5 million have fled the country since the

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<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> "Yemen." Annual Report 2012: The State of the World's Human Rights. Amnesty International. 2012.

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/yemen/report-2012>

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> SC/10881. Security Council 2012 Round-Up. United Nations Security Council. January 14, 2013.

<sup>171</sup> "Yemen," World Report 2012, Human Rights Watch, January 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-yemen> (accessed May 10, 2013).

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> S/RES/2051. Middle East. United Nations Security Council. June 12, 2012.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> SC/10775. Statement by the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council. September 26, 2012.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> SC/10518. Security Council 2011 Round-Up. United Nations Security Council. January 12, 2012.

<sup>180</sup> "Arab Uprising: Country by Country—Syria," BBC World News, August 31, 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309> (accessed May 12, 2013).

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.



unrest.<sup>182</sup> Similar to Yemen, the UN highlighted its concern for the worsening situation in the country. Prior to the involvement of the SC, the Secretary-General condemned Syria's violence against peaceful demonstrators, calling on Syrian authorities to respect international human rights, including the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and freedom of the press.<sup>183</sup>

In December 2011, the League of Arab States (LAS) suspended Syria's membership from the organization and at the same time sent an observer mission to the country as part of its efforts to reach a peaceful settlement to the situation.<sup>184</sup> After this measure taken by the LAS, many observers assumed that the SC would invoke R2P just as it did with Yemen, and uphold the responsibility of the Syrian government to ensure the protection of its civilians. However, the Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have voiced deep concern over the violence in Syria due to a veto on behalf of China and Russia on the grounds that the resolution violated Syria's national sovereignty.<sup>185</sup> The use of the veto by China and Russia angered many Member States that viewed this as standing in the way of enforcing R2P in what they considered a clear cut case where it should be applied.

In April 2012, Member States agreed to deploy unarmed monitors as part of a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to observe a ceasefire in support of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan's six-point peace plan through SC Resolution 2043.<sup>186</sup> In late June, the Council adopted Resolution 2052, providing an extension of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for an additional six months, which was originally established to supervise the disengagement agreement between Syrian and Israeli forces in 1974. A February 2013 report by a United Nations Human Rights Council Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that "grave human rights violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity" continue to occur in Syria.<sup>187</sup> The situation in Syria will take time to resolve, but the SC should remain committed to addressing the impact of armed conflict on civilians and its consequences in post-conflict situations.

### ***Post-Conflict Peacebuilding***

When large-scale violence ends, the challenges facing the leadership and people of the Member State are massive. While the threats to peace and security are often greatest during this early phase, so are the opportunities to set virtuous cycles in motion. The 2009 report of the Secretary General noted that the first two years after conflict has ended offers a window of opportunity to "provide basic security, deliver peace arrangements, build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacities to lead peacebuilding efforts."<sup>188</sup> At the heart of peacebuilding is the attempt to build a new and legitimate state that will have the capacity to peacefully manage disputes, protect its civilians, and ensure respect for human rights.<sup>189</sup> The 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report, defines peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war."<sup>190</sup>

Within the international community, the UN has played a critical and significant role in peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission, an intergovernmental advisory body of the UN established by the SC in 2005 through

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<sup>182</sup> "Syria: UN delivers essential aid to civilians affected by recent fighting near Homs," UN News Center, May 28, 2013. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45009&Cr=syria&Cr1=#.UaVIRGT72JM> (accessed May 13, 2013).

<sup>183</sup> "Crisis and Change in the Middle East and North Africa." Bulletin of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs. 2011. <http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/DPA%20Politically%20Speaking%20Summer%20Fall%202011.pdf>

<sup>184</sup> "Arab Uprising: Country by Country—Syria," BBC World News, August 31, 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309> (accessed May 12, 2013).

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> SC/RES/2043. Middle East. United Nations Security Council. April 21, 2012.

<sup>187</sup> A/HRC/22/595. Fourth Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria. February 2013

<sup>188</sup> A/63/881-S/2009/304. Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. June 11, 2009.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> "UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation," United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, September 2010. [http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding\\_orientation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf) (accessed May 15, 2013).

Resolution 1645, is specifically dedicated to helping countries in transition from violent conflict to lasting peace.<sup>191</sup> The Commission combines a close link to three principal organs of the UN: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the SC. It is charged with bringing together all relevant actors to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.<sup>192</sup> The Peacebuilding Fund, funded by voluntary contributions, was launched in 2006 to ensure the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities, as well as the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.<sup>193</sup> The Peacebuilding Support Office assists and supports the Peacebuilding Commission, administers the Peacebuilding Fund, and serves the Secretary General in coordinating UN agencies in their peacebuilding efforts.<sup>194</sup>

The Council held four meetings on the topic of post-conflict peacebuilding in 2011, issuing a presidential statement during its first meeting on January 21, 2011 that stressed the need of the international community to continue to support Member States emerging from conflict in order to sustain peace by creating national bodies that would promote democratic processes and socio-economic development.<sup>195</sup> In late 2012, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission reaffirmed its commitment to assisting post-conflict Member States in achieving sustainable peace, and emphasized the need for a comprehensive and coordinated response to their security and development challenges.<sup>196</sup> The *Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels* was adopted by the General Assembly through A/RES/67/1 as Member States also recognized the critical importance of peacebuilding in preventing the relapse of post-conflict countries into war and achieving long-term sustainable peace through security and development.<sup>197</sup>

The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Special Political Missions and Integrated Peacebuilding Missions are also given the mandate to cover a wide range of peacebuilding tasks. The DPA works at the center of the UN's response to the political uprisings in the Middle East. The DPA also provides staff support and guidance to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), tasked with assisting the Libyan transitional authorities in the fields of security, democratic transition, and economic recovery among others.<sup>198</sup> Through collaboration between the DPA and the UNDP, a team of UN electoral experts deployed to assist national authorities in the organization of crucial Constituent Assembly in Tunisia.<sup>199</sup> In addition, Senior DPA officials have carried out several missions to Yemen, expressing concern about tensions and violence in the country and assisting with diplomatic efforts to resolve the political stalemate.<sup>200</sup>

The UN Peacebuilding Support Office has also partnered with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, which is a forum for political dialogue to bring together conflict-affected and fragile Member States, international partners, and civil society to catalyze successful transitions from conflict and fragility. At the Fourth High-Level Forum in November 2011, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding shared with the international community a "New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States" intended to address development gaps in conflict-affected states that had not been sufficiently addressed by the global development agenda, particularly the MDGs.<sup>201</sup> The New Deal outlined five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals as a basis for

<sup>191</sup> S/RES/1645. Post-conflict Peacebuilding. United Nations Security Council. December 20, 2005.

<sup>192</sup> "UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation," United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, September 2010.  
[http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding\\_orientation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf) (accessed May 15, 2013).

<sup>193</sup> Ibid.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> S/PRST/2011/2. Statement by the President of the Security Council. United Nations Security Council. January 21, 2011.  
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2011/2](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/2011/2)

<sup>196</sup> "World Leaders Reaffirm Commitment at UN Event to Help Post-conflict Nations Build Peace," United Nations News Center, September 25, 2012. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43018#UaWEUmT72JM> (accessed May 16, 2013).

<sup>197</sup> A/RES/67/1. Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. United Nations General Assembly. November 30, 2012.

<sup>198</sup> "Crisis in North Africa and the Middle East," United Nations Department of Political Affairs.  
[http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities\\_by\\_region/middle\\_east/crisis\\_middle\\_east](http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/middle_east/crisis_middle_east) (accessed May 16, 2013).

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States," International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.  
<http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/themes/newdeal/docs/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf> (accessed May 18, 2013).

development, which are expected to be brought up for discussion during the post-2015 debate.<sup>202</sup> The SC plays an essential role in signaling strong international attention and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorizing a number of potential steps, including new peacekeeping operations, special political missions, panels of experts and other measures.<sup>203</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

Over the decades, the UN has helped end numerous conflicts, often through actions of the SC—the primary organ for dealing with issues concerning international peace and security. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, new conflicts have emerged raising complex issues regarding the adequate response from the international community, including the question of how to best protect civilians in conflict. The violent conflicts in the Middle East that have emerged out of aspirations for democratic change will have long-term social and economic effects, ultimately hampering the achievement of the MDGs. Social conflict affects nearly every country in the region, hampering development outcomes. The SC acknowledges the need for continued improvement in the delivery of support in the immediate aftermath of conflict in order to help stabilize the situation. Investments in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction are needed in the countries that suffer from social, economic, or other divisive tensions. The UN Millennium Declaration rightly emphasizes the critical role of peace, security, and disarmament as fundamental for human well-being and eradicating poverty in all its forms. Member States have accepted R2P as a valid norm for which the Council can undertake action in order to maintain international peace and security. Still, as exhibited by the case in Syria, there is no universal standard of when R2P should be enacted and when the UN must use force in order to ensure the enforcement of R2P. Because R2P is intertwined with other critical variables such as the protection of civilians (PoC) in armed conflict, certain benchmarks or standards may need to be agreed upon in order to establish a clear criteria of when R2P should be invoked.

## ***Committee Directive***

Delegates will be expected to have a working understanding of the specific instances of conflict in post-revolutionary States in the Middle East and the impact that such conflict has had on the achievement of the MDGs. Delegates should come prepared to discuss their Member State's positions on the current situation in the Middle East, specifically in regards to ongoing peacebuilding efforts and the application of the R2P. Delegates should understand the impact on their particular Member State and the international community caused by violent conflict in the Middle East. The binding nature of Security Council resolutions is one of the most important aspects of the Council. Delegates should come prepared to not only discuss important resolutions, but also their application in the real world. Oftentimes, civilians bear the burden and pay the price through extreme human rights violations and casualties. What does the Council need to do in order to be able to invoke the R2P in situations that appear to fall under the scope of the protection of civilians in armed conflict? While reconciliation must be nationally driven, the international community can play a supportive role by creating a favorable environment, advocating for international norms and standards, and introducing lessons learned and good practices from other countries. What are some of the best practices that have assisted countries in transition from autocratic rule? How can and should the SC deal with the current and ongoing intra-conflict situations? Even after peace agreements are made, instability and political uncertainties may still remain. What role does the Security Council play in strengthening peacebuilding efforts and maintaining stability in post-revolutionary States? Delegates should broaden the topic as they see necessary since the topic at hand may be relevant in many different issues.

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> A/63/881-S/2009/304. Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. June 11, 2009.

## V. Transnational Security Threats of Central and Northern Africa

*“More than any time in the past, Africa is ready to play its part for peace and stability in the continent, and it has the wherewithal to be a good partner for the United Nations and the Security Council for the realization of this objective.”*

-Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations Tekeda Alemu to the Security Council in April 2013<sup>204</sup>

### **Introduction**

Hostilities anywhere in the world impede achievement of the MDGs, but preventing conflicts on the African continent is paramount to achieving all eight MDGs. The SC met in mid-April this year to deliberate on conflict prevention in African Member States and prioritized the triggers to conflict rather than the aspects of the conflict itself, naming abuse of human rights, hunger, impunity, poverty, and rape as the top causes. The Council also emphasized in a Presidential Statement that the UN and regional organizations on the continent need to strengthen ties to contend with the root causes of conflict accordingly.<sup>205</sup> UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon added, “In all of our efforts across Africa, the United Nations benefits from reinvigorated regional organizations. They are playing a stronger and strategic role as key partners.”<sup>206</sup>

For the purposes of this debate, the Council will consider Member States as being located within the following areas: North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, and Sudan), Central Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda), Middle Africa (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe).

### **Current Transnational Issues Discussed by the Council**

The SC’s Group of Experts reported in February 2013 that Libya has become a weaponry source for the region and beyond, despite the arms embargo enacted by resolution 1970 in 2011<sup>207</sup>. The report further outlines:

“Cases, both proven and under investigation, of illicit transfers from Libya in violation of the embargo cover more than 12 countries and include heavy and light weapons, including man-portable air defense systems, small arms and related ammunition and explosives and mines.”<sup>208</sup>

These illicit arms are connected existing conflicts on the continent, particularly in Egypt, and being transferred to Syria.<sup>209</sup> The weapons are also making their way into Algeria and other Northern and Central African Member States. In late February, security officers in Egypt seized two trucks of missiles en route to Sinai from Libya and this flow of weapons that saw its peak at the end of the Gaddafi regime is still ongoing.<sup>210</sup> Libya’s Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, has met with representatives from Algeria and Tunisia to work on transnational arms smuggling and it is believed that he is in talks with US officials to formulate a plan to secure Libya’s weapons. The Council has called upon Member States to adhere to the Libyan arms embargo and urged Libyan leaders to increase its monitoring mechanisms for the arms trade in the country.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> “Conflict Prevention in Africa must address poverty, marginalization, UN warns,” UN news Centre, April 15, 2013. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44655&Cr=conflict+prevention&Cr1=> (accessed July 21, 2013).

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> S/RES/2011. Peace and Security in Africa. United Nations Security Council. February 26, 2011. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>208</sup> Michelle Nichols, “Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. Experts,” Reuters, April 9, 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-libya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409> (accessed on July 20, 2013).

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Ashish Kumar Sen, “Smuggled Libyan arms disrupting North Africa,” The Washington Times, February 28, 2013. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/28/gadhafis-weapons-flooded-africa-middle-east-west-l/?page=all> (accessed on July 22, 2013).

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

Actions taken by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is another area where the SC has focused in regard to transnational security issues on the African continent. The CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda are all trying to protect their civilians against this threat and need assistance from the UN and the African Union (AU) to successfully do so. Over the last 25 years, the LRA has killed more than 100,000 people in the Central African region and have kidnapped anywhere from 60,000 to 100,000 children.<sup>212</sup> While the group originated in Uganda, the LRA has become a transnational security issue that has the attention of the international community and is known for brutal murders, mutilations, and rapes. In June 2012, the Secretary-General released its "Regional Strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the LRA."<sup>213</sup> On the 29th, the SC endorsed the strategy, which was originated by the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and contains five main objectives.<sup>214</sup> These objectives include: Supporting the AU Peace and Security Council Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA; Increasing civilian protection, Expanding capabilities of the affected areas to disarm, demobilize, repatriate; Coordinating child protection and humanitarian aid response; And extending state-level government authority across territories affected by the LRA.<sup>215</sup>

The Member States most affected by the LRA have allocated troops to the AU's Regional Task Force (RTF) with the objective of bringing the force's number to 5,000.<sup>216</sup>

### ***The Recent African Union-United Nations Relationship***

In January 2012, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 2033 to strengthen its ties with the AU to address conflict.<sup>217</sup> Since 2007, the Council holds annual meetings with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). It is important to note that this is the only group that the SC routinely meets with to address regional conflict.<sup>218</sup> The relationship is beneficial because conflict resolution resources outside the UN are needed to enact preventive policies and it has been found that conflicts in Africa occupy most of the SC's agenda. However, the meetings need better planning and follow up to become more effective, and that task is delegated to the SC's Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, as noted in clause 18 of Resolution 2033.<sup>219</sup> The AU-UN Joint Task Force (JTF) on Peace and Security also met for the sixth time on January 26th of this year and, in regard to Northern and Central Africa, discussed the conflicts in DRC and CAR.<sup>220</sup> The JTF also reviewed the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (AU RCI-LRA).

### ***An Innovation in Transnational African Peacekeeping***

With Resolution 2098 in March, the SC authorized a special force to work in Eastern DRC as a part of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and extended the peacekeeping mission's mandate for another year.<sup>221</sup> While MONUSCO is one of the largest UN missions with close to 20,000 peacekeepers, the newly approved addition is singular in that it is approved for offensive duties outside of typical peacekeeping missions.<sup>222</sup> This resolution has spurred new security policy debates and the UN

<sup>212</sup> "LRA rebels 'kill villagers in Central Africa,'" Al Jazeera, June 16, 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/06/201361685619791359.html> (accessed August 1, 2013).

<sup>213</sup> Getting Back on Track: Implementing the UN Regional Strategy on the Lord's Resistance Army. December 2012. [http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/lra\\_joint\\_report.pdf](http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/lra_joint_report.pdf) (accessed August 1, 2013).

<sup>214</sup> "Security Council endorses UN regional strategy to combat LRA threat," UN News Centre, June 29, 2013. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42363&Cr=LRA&Cr1=#.UghR1xbUF8s> (accessed August 1, 2013).

<sup>215</sup> December 2012 Monthly Forecast, Security Council Report, December 2012. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-12/unocalra.php?print=true> (accessed July 20, 2013).

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> SC/10519. Security Council Commits to 'Effective steps' to Enhance Relationship with African Union in Conflict Prevention, Resolution, with Unanimous Adoption of 2033 (2012). United Nations Security Council. January 12, 2012. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10519.doc.htm>

<sup>218</sup> Monthly Forecast: July 2013, Security Council Report, June 28, 2013. [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2013\\_07\\_forecast.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2013_07_forecast.pdf) (accessed July 20, 2013).

<sup>219</sup> Ibid.

<sup>220</sup> Joint Communiqué: Sixth Meeting of the African Union-United Nations Joint Task Force on Peace and Security. African Union and United Nations. January 26, 2013. <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-un-6th-jtf-meeting-26-01-2013.pdf>

<sup>221</sup> S/RES/2098. Democratic republic of the Congo. United Nations Security Council. March 28, 2013. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098\(2013\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2098(2013))

<sup>222</sup> Margaret Besheer, "UN Security Council Approves Special Force for DRC," Voice of America, March 28, 2013.

Office of Legal Affairs briefed the Council a month after the vote. The office noted that the MONUSCO brigade might not have the same protected status under international law that other peacekeepers do and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations suggested restricted operations as opposed to continued engagement in combat.<sup>223</sup>

This is a new security initiative that allows the brigade to pursue armed groups in DRC or even aide the Congolese army in its maneuvers. The main goal of the initiative is to disarm and neutralize militant groups to prevent them from growing and harming more civilians. All 15 SC members voted in favor of Resolution 2098, including neighboring Rwanda.<sup>224</sup> One of the rebel groups that MONUSCO hopes to deter is M23.<sup>225</sup> In August, the peacekeepers enacted a plan to secure the city of Goma and its surrounding areas by setting up a weapons-free zone where only the DRC's army and security officers could carry guns.<sup>226</sup> The area was briefly held by M23 in November 2012 and any escalating violence there could easily spill over into Rwanda or Uganda.<sup>227</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

From its prior actions and statements, it is becoming increasingly clear that the SC is focused on regional answers to security issues in Africa. Given this information, it is essential for delegations to channel a similar approach. The AU-UN relationship is one that should continue to grow but needs further investment of time and a focused agenda to be more effective. The Security Council's actions in the DRC is a strong example of a targeted mission with significant UN resources to complete its mission. Although the MONUSCO brigade has made progress through its innovative makeup, it is important to keep in mind the questions of its status under international law. Aside from the bodies referenced in this guide, there are a number of additional UN peacekeeping missions and offices that address transnational security threats in Northern and Central Africa. These include, but are not limited to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and the Cameroon/Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC).

## ***Committee Directive***

Delegates should review the other peacekeeping missions and offices that have either completed or are in progress to determine their effectiveness and how they can improve other missions. Delegates should focus on the flow of weaponry throughout these areas, seeing as illicit weapons must travel over Member State borders to continue fueling conflicts. How can the SC address Member State's transnational security breaches while maintaining state sovereignty of all parties involved? What collective actions can the SC take to address the source of these weapons while respectfully keeping in mind state sovereignty? Delegates are encouraged to review the effectiveness of the African Regional Taskforce from the lenses of your own Member State and a specific region.

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<http://www.voanews.com/content/un-security-council-approves-special-force-for-drc/1630748.html> (accessed on July 22, 2013).

<sup>223</sup> Monthly Forecast: July 2013, Security Council Report, June 28, 2013. [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2013\\_07\\_forecast.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/2013_07_forecast.pdf) (accessed July 20, 2013).

<sup>224</sup> Margaret Besheer, "UN Security Council Approves Special Force for DRC," Voice of America, March 28, 2013. <http://www.voanews.com/content/un-security-council-approves-special-force-for-drc/1630748.html> (accessed on July 22, 2013).

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> "UN troops enforcing security zone in the DR Congo," Al Jazeera, August 2, 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/20138224850346324.html> (accessed on August 2, 2013).

<sup>227</sup> Ibid.



## Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)

A/59/565. A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility. United Nations General Assembly. December 2, 2004. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf>

In September 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to examine and review a number of aspects to improve the United Nation's ability to respond to threats faced by Member States. This report lays out the recommendations and proposals suggested by the panel that addresses six clusters of threats of great concern for the international community. In paragraphs 199-203, the report addresses how the Security Council has been slow to respond to incidents of mass atrocities and how the international community shares a responsibility to address this. This report will be of benefit, as it will provide delegates with an understanding of the current view and application of R2P by countries as well as a better understanding of the application of the concept.

"Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review." *Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.* United States Government Accountability Office. November 2009.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10156.pdf>

This report is a state-level analysis of diplomatic security in the US. While this is a US-based resource, the US has the most diplomatic facilities in the world and the information on these is the most readily available of all Member States. The GAO's finding could possibly be applied to other Member States and this report outlines some issues with diplomatic security that can increase delegates' overall knowledge on the subject.

Fractured Walls... New Horizons Human Rights in the Arab Region." Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS). 2012. <http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/the-report-e.pdf>

This report is a great starting point for delegates in understanding the specific instances of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab uprisings. This report will be of tremendous benefit for delegates as it documents and analyzes the state of human rights in the Arab world in 2011 in 12 countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the occupied Palestinian territories.

"Fragile Situations, Sturdy Commitments: The Special Challenges of MDG Achievement in Conflict-Affected Countries." *Beyond The Midpoint Achieving The Millennium Development Goals.* United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). January 2010. [http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset\\_id=2224163](http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=2224163)

This is a relevant chapter from the UNDP's report *Beyond The Midpoint Achieving The Millennium Development Goals*. From reading this chapter, delegates will gain an understanding of the special challenges that countries affected by conflict confront in their efforts to attain the MDGs.

Guidance Note on Natural Resource Management (NRM) in Transition Settings." United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA). January 2013.

[http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNDG-ECHA\\_NRM\\_guidance\\_Jan2013.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNDG-ECHA_NRM_guidance_Jan2013.pdf)

This Guidance Note will assist delegates in understanding the positive and negative roles that natural resources can play in peace consolidation. It provides practical guidance on how to feed-in to transitional analysis and planning frameworks including: Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), peace building frameworks and tools, the UN Common Country Analysis (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The guidance provides diagnostic tools to assist delegates in deciding where and when natural resource management issues need to be addressed, how this can be done, what types of roles the UN can take on, and how the UN can support other actors.

Mason, Simon A., Adrian Muller, Albrecht Schnabel, Rina Alluri, and Christian Schmid. "Linking Environment and Conflict Prevention: The Role of the United Nations." Center for Security Studies (CSS). Zurich, Switzerland. 2008. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Linking-Environment-Conflict-Prevention.pdf>.

This is an amazing report that is highly relevant to topic two and serves as a great starting point for research. Published by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zurich, Switzerland, this report examines the links between the environment and violent conflict, the impact of climate change, and the role of the UN in preventing conflicts related to environmental factors. Part two of this report highlights a number of UN accomplishments, shortcomings and the challenges that it has faced in its attempt to prevent environment-related conflicts. In addition to providing a

number of case studies throughout different regions of the world, this report also examines various measures to improve the effectiveness of UN conflict prevention in part three.

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. The United Nations. <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org>

This website is an excellent resource for understanding the topic of Children and Armed Conflict. There are up-to-date videos, press releases, field mission descriptions, and several other resources to increase the delegates' understanding of child soldiers. Most importantly, delegates can connect to the office via Facebook, Twitter, Google+, or other social media in preparation for the conference.

“Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law.” United Nations Environment Programme. November 2009. [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/int\\_law.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/int_law.pdf)  
This UNEP report examines the range of international laws that protect the environment during armed conflict. It also identifies current gaps and weaknesses through the relevant provisions within four bodies of international law: international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law (ICL), international environmental law (IEL), and international human rights law (HRL). The report concludes with twelve concrete recommendations on ways to strengthen this legal framework and its enforcement. This report is beneficial to delegates as it provides a basis upon which Member States can draw upon to clarify, expand, and enforce international law on environmental protection in times of war.

“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council.” The United Nations.

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/index.shtml>

This website is an online version of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. The Repertoire, mandated by the General Assembly in 1952, is a constitutional and procedural guide to the proceedings of the Council since 1946. It presents, as comprehensively as possible, relevant data regarding the practice of the Council and the application of the UN Charter and the Council's provisional rules of procedure. The FAQs section is a great guide to allow delegates to learn about how the Security Council functions day-to-day.

“Security Council and the UN Peacebuilding Commission.” Security Council Report. April 18, 2013.

[http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special\\_research\\_report\\_1\\_pbc\\_2013.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_1_pbc_2013.pdf)

This Special Research Report on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) examines the work of this relatively recent addition to the UN system with a particular focus on the country-specific contexts of its work. In addition to its country-specific case studies, this report will be helpful to delegates as there is a section that examines past and current Council practice and working methods regarding the PBC. Delegates will also benefit from its suggestions on the possible ways of maximizing the potential of the PBC to provide real benefits for the Council and thus strengthening its ability to contribute to lasting peace.

Understanding Environment, Conflict and Cooperation.” United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Division of Early Warning and Assessment and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 2004.

<http://www.unep.org/pdf/ECC.pdf>

This report discusses the broader nexus of environment, conflict and cooperation. It highlights risks but also presents examples for entry points that allow turning risk into cooperation. The report is a great introduction for delegates into the broader topic but does not cover specific tools to address the issues.