Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Twenty-Third Annual Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) Conference, and to the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). My name is Matt Smither and I will serve as your director during the conference; assistant director for the committee will be Heather Hendon-Sigley. I have been a part of SRMUN for many years in addition to competing in MUN conferences regionally, nationally and internationally. Yet, I am most excited about this committee as we have the challenge of delving into some of the newest and untested workings of the United Nations. We have the pleasure of being the first PBC that SRMUN has undertaken in its history and I am sure that it will be an incredible success.

The PBC is one of the newest UN agencies and also represents a shift in international culture placing the building of peace in post-conflict Member States at the front of international dialogue. The PBC is tasked with the reconstruction of post-conflict situations with the ultimate aim of mitigating against any future violence. Institution-building, integrated strategies, economic recovery and merging Member States and relevant development partners are among the most important to the PBC. The topics we will consider in the PBC will be divided up based on the three (3) major sub-groupings of the Commission. Please note that these groupings reflect different aspects in peacebuilding and as such each topic points to different areas for consideration. The topics for SRMUN XXIII are:

I. Organizational Committee - The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan;
II. Working Group on Lessons Learned - Central African Republic; and
III. Country-Specific Configuration – Burundi.

Heather and I have developed a way for thematically understanding the three topics and committees within the PBC. Consider them as: BUILD peace, LEARN peace, and SUSTAIN peace. We want you to delve into these topics, consider alternatives, conceptualize peace structures, and research these topics in both depth and breadth.

"From Crisis to Opportunity: Chartering a Path Forward for Global Self-Sustainability" is the theme of this year's SRMUN conference and the work of the PBC falls perfectly into place with this concept. As you begin by reading this background guide and continue with your own research, you will discover that peace is not simply the lack of violence, but is a state of being that requires workers, institutions, infrastructure, financing and a mindset change. The PBC must engage all of these areas in order to best partner with Member States and other actors to insure a future free from the scourge of conflict.

Every delegation must submit a position paper which addresses each of the topics listed above and only those listed above. These papers should adhere to SRMUN's guidelines on position paper format and style. The objective of the position paper is to concisely lay out your delegation's plan for approaching the topics that focuses on your plan of action for within the committee. Your position papers should provide a brief insight into your Member State's history on the topic, goals and actions desired to be taken. Being the first work that Heather and I will see from you, we expect that each delegation to have well developed and researched papers that will serve as the foundation for our discussions. For specific details of formatting or if you need help in crafting a position paper, please visit the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). **Please note that all position papers MUST be submitted by October 26, 2012 by 11:59 PM EST using the submission system on the SRMUN website.**

Heather and I are very excited about the committee, your ideas and seeing them put to work during our time in Atlanta. Should you have any questions about the topics, structure or position paper, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am truly looking forward to a great conference and some incredible ideas out of what I am sure will be the best committee at SRMUN XXIII!

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History of the Peacebuilding Commission

"[T]here is increasing conviction that the international community can no longer afford to fail in shouldering its responsibility towards the populations in countries affected and emerging from conflict. We learned our lessons in many places and we promised to do better the next time. Let us insist that we will deliver on this promise."[1] — H. E. Dr. Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission

Secretary-General Kofi Annan created a 16 member High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in 2003 in response to the international tension created in the wake of the events of September 11th, 2001. He instructed the panel to "examine today's global threats and provide analysis of future challenges to international peace and security, identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges, and recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to a review of principal organs of the United Nations (UN)."[2] According to the panel's report they identified "a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace."[3] The panel's recommendation was the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission functioning as a subsidiary body of the Security Council. The commission's mandate, per the report, would be "to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding toward State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transition between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary."[4] Further recommendations include keeping the commission reasonably small, meeting in different configurations to consider both general policies as well as country specific strategies, involving relevant organs such as the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Support Office established by the Secretariat.[5]

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was officially established in December 2005 by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1645, S/Res/1645 (2005), and it was subsequently confirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/180, A/Res/60/180.[6] Each resolution delineates the role of the PBC as an intergovernmental advisory body responsible for publishing an annual report for the General Assembly which charged the PBC with a tripartite mandate as follows:
- "To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and,
- To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery."[7]

The Commission provides a necessary forum for the local government, international financial institutions (IFIs), and other pertinent parties to exchange experiences and advice. Secretary-General Kofi Annan further delineated the

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[1] Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations. "Statement by the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations H.E. Dr. Peter Wittig on the occasion of the conclusion of his term of office as Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission." 2011. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/statement_amb_wittig.pdf

[2] *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.* http://www.un.org/secureworld/panelmembers.html

[3] United Nations General Assembly Fifty-ninth Session Agenda Item 55. "Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit A/59/565." p. 69. http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. "Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml

[7] Ibid.

role of the PBC in the report, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: Explanatory Note by the Secretary-General, 2005*. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) augment and assist the PBC in its mandate.[8]

Structure & Membership

The PBC was designed to operate in three different capacities to carry out its mandate. These three working groups enable the PBC to efficiently and effectively use the resources at its disposal from the international community and propose integrated strategies in its post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in states emerging from conflict. The groups include the Organizational Committee, the Country-Specific Configurations and the Working Group for Lessons Learned. These groups are further assisted by the Peacebuilding Support Office of the Secretariat. Together, these configurations bring together the UN's "broad capacities and experiences in conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and long-term sustainable development assistance."[9] To further promote peacebuilding efforts, civil society or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are encouraged to participate in and attend meetings of the PBC. They may even informally contribute to the PBC's work by submitting written reports to the membership and the PBSO and are encouraged to engage in national consultations and peacebuilding frameworks. Civil Society representatives may serve as members of the Joint Steering Committees which oversees the PBF.[10]

The first group, known as the Organizational Committee consists of 31 Member States as follows: seven members of the Security Council, seven members of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), five of the top financial contributors to the UN, the top five providers of troops to the UN, and seven members elected by the General Assembly to balance out the committee.[11] The Member States serve for renewable two year terms. The committee is responsible for setting the agenda for the PBC, the development of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS), writing reports for the General Assembly, reviewing documents, and considering and authorizing proposals by the chair. The voting is done by consensus within the group. Any Member State "on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict" may be considered and placed on the agenda.[12] The Organizational Committee may seek advice from the Security Council, ECOSOC, the General Assembly or the Secretary General when setting the agenda.

The second group is known as the Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs) and is actually a collection of working groups for each Member State under the purview of the PBC. Currently there are six such groups on the agenda, Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. CSCs examine issues unique to the Member States on the PBC agenda and gather participants in New York via video link with partners in the field in a series of formal and informal meetings at UN Headquarters. In conjunction, CSCs use field missions to gather necessary information to fully comprehend the needs and concerns of a Member State. Membership in the CSCs includes all members of the Organizational Committee; the Member State under consideration; Member States in the region engaged in post-conflict or relief efforts; relevant regional and subregional organizations; major financial, troop or civilian police contributors that may be involved in the recovery effort; the senior UN representative in the field; and any other regional and international financial institutions relevant to the cause.[13] The CSCs deal with Member States emerging from conflict once a peace accord has been established and only a modicum of security issues still exist. Member States are expected to express interest in appearing before the commission, with a referral against the wishes of that government unlikely to occur. CSCs are formed based on the ideas of national ownership, coordination, and commitment amid all partners.[14] The goals being "the organization

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[8] Kofi Annan. *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: Explanatory Note by the Secretary-General*. 2005. http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add2.htm

[9] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. "Structure and Membership." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/structuremember.shtml

[10] Ibid.

[11] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. "Organizational Committee." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/orgcommittee.shtml

[12] United Nations General Assembly, *A/Res/60/180*, 2005, par 12. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/180

[13] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. "Country-Specific Configurations." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml

[14] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic 2009-2011*, 2009. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/3/CAF/7

and holding of an inclusive political dialogue; actions on the part of the national authorities and the support of the international community for the development of an effective, responsible and sustainable reform of the national security sector system; the re-establishment of the rule of law, including respect for human rights, and good governance in all regions of the country."[15] The bulk of the PBC's work is done in these groups as each CSC drafts a Strategic Framework for each Member State as the basis for action, establishing peacebuilding priorities, objectives, and risks.[16] The Strategic Framework is an instrument of engagement and dialogue for each state on the agenda, the Peacebuilding Commission, and other stakeholders for the consolidation of peace. The framework correspondingly sets targets and CSCs periodically assesses progress through a Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism.[17]

The third group is the Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL), formed "to analyze best practices and lessons on critical peacebuilding issues."[18] The PBC developed the WGLL to distill from current missions what works and what does not work when dealing with national and international experiences in post-conflict engagements. The meetings of the WGLL allow for opportunities to critique, amend, and further develop strategies and recommendations for implementation in future and/or existing post-conflict strategies. The WGLL brings together experts, PBC members, Member States transitioning out of conflict, and Member States with experience in post-conflict reconstruction.[19] The research and recommendations put forth by this body have the singular aim of promoting higher peacebuilding standards and are widely distributed among the PBC and its partners.[20]

The Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office

The Peacebuilding Commission partners with two other entities created by the UN Secretariat, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The PBF was created to provide monetary support for peacebuilding activities while the PBSO was created "to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission, administer the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and serve the Secretary-General in coordinating UN agencies in their peacebuilding efforts."[21] These two entities are instrumental in executing the PBC's mandate.

The PBF fills a void by providing for more sustained engagement in support of Member States in post-conflict arenas, supporting peacebuilding activities that directly contribute to stabilizing and strengthening governments; national and local institutions; and transitional or other relevant authorities.[22] As a global fund the PBF can support several missions at once. Designed to address immediate needs in post-conflict stabilization, it focuses on delivering services before donor conferences or multi-donor trust funds have been established, and will support intermediations of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process.[23] PBF resources are used as a catalyst to encourage longer term involvements by development agencies and bilateral donors.[24] The PBF relies on voluntary contributions from Member States and civil society.[25] While the PBF prioritizes the Member States currently on the PBC's agenda, any Member State may ask for monetary assistance from the fund.[26]

The PBSO was established in 2005. It aids in sustaining peace in conflict-affected Member States by gathering global support for "nationally owned and led peacebuilding efforts."[27] The general policy framework for the PBSO's commitment is outlined in the Secretary-General's reports on *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of*

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[15] Ibid.

[16] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi*. 2007
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/1/BDI/4

[17] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi*. 2007. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/2/BDI/4

[18] United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. *Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its Second Session.* 2008. p. 12.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/

[22] United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. *Preventing a Relapse into Violent Conflict.* http://www.unpbf.org/

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. "About Us." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/about.shtml

Conflict, and the *2010 Progress Report.*[28] These reports are focused on the major challenges that the international community faces in post-conflict arenas, and the PBSO actively takes part in discussions and organizes thematic events on a few of the most pressing topics.[29] There are five main topics: women and peacebuilding; strategic planning and peacebuilding; lessons learned and good practices; civilian capacities; and, measuring peace consolidation.[30]

I. Organizational Committee, Nagorno-Karabakh Region

Introduction

The Organizational Committee of the United Nations Peace Building Commission (PBC) is at the forefront of building lasting solutions to the world's conflicts. This committee is one of the three main organizational groups within the PBC and as such examines Member States emerging from conflict in order to ascertain how the PBC may help to move the state into not only a conflict free zone, but also one of sustainability and peaceful progress. The PBC Organizational Committee is comprised of 31 Member States as well as representatives from European Union, International Monetary Fund, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and World Bank. The PBC received its mandate which is carried into the structure and directive of the Organizational Committee, through Resolutions 60/180 and 1645 of 20 December 2005 from the United Nations General Assembly.[31]

The Organizational Committee is the first body within the PBC to begin work with post conflict states. Requests for the Commission to begin work in a Member State can be made by the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) or the Secretary-General, as well as any Member State who wishes to be considered. To that end, the PBC is likely to deal only with countries emerging from conflict, once a peace accord has been concluded and a minimum degree of security exists. Member States would be expected to express an interest in appearing before the PBC, even if the Member State in question was submitted from the GA, SC, Secretary-General or ECOSOC. A referral against the wishes of the Government is unlikely to take place. At present Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone are on the agenda of the Commission.[32]

For the purposes of this conference (SRMUN XXIII) and committee (PBC) the remainder of this section will serve as the outline for a submission requesting the assistance of the PBC Organizational Committee to assist with peace-building operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This simulated submission has been presented by Azerbaijan to the Organizational Committee of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.

Understanding the Region

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that lies in the South Caucus region of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Due to historic, economic, and cultural reasons the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has been overlooked by many Member States and, without question, does not exist as a source of international concern for the citizens of the world. Without massive petro dollars, a sizeable export market, relevant celebrities, and world leaders among other reasons, the region has received little attention. In effect, this has led to the entrenchment of the Member States' conflict narrative.[33] In order to craft a solution for lasting peace, the Organizational Committee must have a full understanding of both the conflict and the region up to the present.

The entire region of the Caucasus has historically been a crossroads of civilizations. Mongol hordes, Persian emperors, Russian Czars, Turkic and Islamic caliphates and British adventurers have all laid claims to the region's

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[28] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. "Policy." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/policy.shtml
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] "Mandate of the Pecebuilding Commission." The Peacebuilding Commission.
    http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml
[32] "Organizational Committee Members." The Peacebuilding Commission.
    http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/orgcommittee.shtml
[33] Erik Melander. "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?." *Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2.* 13 March 2006.

resources, people and have settled here themselves.[34] Geographically, the region benefits from large internal fresh bodies of water as well as the salt water Caspian Sea. In addition to water resources, there are large areas of agricultural development that have been honed through millennia of human settlement. Most notably, Azerbaijan has started to explore some of its energy resources with specific note to petroleum and carbon-based resources both in its territory and on the floor of the Caspian Sea.[35] The present day Caucasus includes, in part or whole, the Member States of Georgia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Iran – all of which play both a historical and currently pertinent role in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as its success at becoming a peaceful region once again.

The regions' people; ethnically, linguistically, religiously, politically and culturally diverse; are some of the most varied in the world. This amalgam makes the task of crafting an individualized peace structure essential to the success of the Organizational Committee in Nagorno-Karabakh. For the purpose of this committee, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be heavily focused upon with peripheral attention given to the surrounding states.

The region is tied to many 'home' cultures as Turkic, Persian, and Russian influences have pervaded the very name of Nagorno-Karabakh. Karabakh is actually an amalgamation of Turkish and Persian. 'Kara' means Black in Turkish, and 'baδ' means garden in Persian. The contemporary ending 'bakh' stems from the Russification of the word 'bag'. The word 'Nagorno' simply means mountainous in Russian.[36] So, even the very name of Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident of the division and fusion of three great cultural centers. The region has many different languages and language families with three language families that are unique to the area. Also, Indo-European languages, such as Armenian, Ossetic and Azerbaijani are original to the area. There are more than 50 distinct

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[34] For a quality history of the region see: Charles van der Leeuw. *Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity: A Short History.*
      St. Martin's Press, New York. 2000;
      or Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian. *The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of*
      Nagorno-Karabakh. Zed Books, United Kingdom. 1994.

[35] Margarite Tadevosyan. "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: War, Humanitarian Challenge and Peacekeeping." Journal of
      Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition. Volume 3, Issue 1. June 1, 2010.
[36] Mary Kaldor. "Oil and Conflict: the case of Nagorno-Karabakh." In: Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, and Yahia Said
      (editors). *Oil Wars.* Pluto Press Ann Arbor, MI. 2007.
      http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf

ethnic groups living in the region.[37] However, due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) and specifically much of the ethnic cleansing and forced migration that occurred during this time, the Member States of Armenia and Azerbaijan have a near homogenous ethnic structure with between 95-98% of the population coming from the Armenian and Azeri ethnic groups respectively.[38]

Today the dominant religions in the region are Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Oriental Orthodox Christianity, and Sunni Islam. Historically, Shia Islam and Zoroastrianism were practiced in most, if not all, of Azerbaijan, with several pockets remaining to this day.[39] Religion and faith are powerful motivators for not only conflict but also as voices of peace and unity. Any successful attempt by the Organizational Committee to promote a lasting peace must take the religious institutions of the people in account. Overlooking the import of religion in peoples' lives may doom any attempt to build a lasting peace in the region.

History of the Modern Conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh Region

The modern conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has deep historical causes, as do all conflicts. Yet the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is unique in many of its facets, including its effects, regional significance, and protracted nature. To discover the roots of the modern conflict the Organizational Committee of the PBC must look to the conflict's history and development over the past century.

During a very brief independence in the early twentieth century, control of the region was already a contentious matter between the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1905, clashes between the two states ended with the involvement of both the Ottomans and the British, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh coming under Azerbaijan's control.[40] The states lived in uneasy co-existence for nearly two decades, but the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was temporarily laid to rest by the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The strict Soviet rule in some ways helped to maintain the status quo and limit further clashes between the two groups, but the authority over Nagorno-Karabakh still officially rested with Azerbaijan. With the softening of Soviet rule in the late 1960's to the late 1980's, Azeris and Armenians again took up the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh with militant action and propaganda. As the influence of communist/soviet ideology declined, the importance of nationalism and ethnic camaraderie came to the forefront which in many ways produced an even more antagonistic role for Armenia and Azerbaijan.[41]

On February 20, 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution urging Moscow to re-evaluate Nagorno-Karabakh, and encouraging the Soviet leadership in Moscow to place it under the auspices of Armenia.[42] This resolution was the powder keg that ignited a growing mistrust between ethnic Armenians and Azeris, resulting in a cycle of mutual violence. Ethnic groups assaulted, harassed, burned homes, and destroyed crops of their enemies which led what some have called ethnic cleansing. A region that had been mixed in ethnic diversity now focused on these differences as a point of violence. Attacks on entire populations of Armenians occurred in Baku and Sumgait resulting in mass killings. As a response, Armenians forced out all Azeris living in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. By the end of 1988 all Armenians had been forced out of Azerbaijan and conversely all Azeris were expelled from Armenia and the areas it controlled. To put this into perspective, by November 1988 around 180,000 Armenians had left Azerbaijan, and 160,000 Azeris had left Armenia.[43]

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to full-scale war, known as the Nagorno-Karabakh War, beginning in the winter of 1992. The war initially favored Azerbaijan, yet quickly turned in favor of the Armenian side. By 1993, between 10 and 20 percent of Azerbaijan was under the direct control of Armenia, not including the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenians expelled all ethnic Azeris living there. The year 1993 also saw the

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[37] A.N. Yamskov. "Ethnic Conflict in the Transcausasus." *Theory and Society, Vol. 20, No. 5.* 1991.

[38] Takayuki Yoshimura. "Some Arguments on the Nagorno-Karabakh History." Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

[39] Ibid.

[40] It is extremely important to note that neither the people nor the government of Armenia accepted the decisions of British or Ottomans to keep Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani control.

[41] Takayuki Yoshimura. "Some Arguments on the Nagorno-Karabakh History." Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

[42] Erik Melander. "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?." *Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2.* 13 March 2006.

[43] Margarite Tadevosyan. "Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: War, Humanitarian Challenge and Peacekeeping." Journal of Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition. Volume 3, Issue 1. June 1, 2010.

establishment of the Lachin Corridor which ties Armenia proper to the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.[44] Russia called upon the parties to sign a ceasefire agreement in 1994 that essentially established an end to recognized conflict and nothing else.[45]

Today, little has changed since the ceasefire was implemented. Sporadic skirmishes still occur along the borders and ethnic hostility remains high. Nagorno-Karabakh remains under Armenian control as does over 10% of Azerbaijan. Figures indicate that approximately 700,00 Azeri refugees are displaced, along with 235,000 Armenians, and since 1988 over 25,000 lives have been lost.[46]

Delegates need to consider the history of the conflict, with particular emphasis on the war and its effects. However, this is not intended to be a history of the conflict or of the brief war, but simply a starting place to gauge understanding and implementation of problem-specific solutions. Peacebuilding requires that each proposed peace plan must take into account of both the region's and the conflict's unique nature; only then will the PBC and the Organizational Committee succeed.

Presentation of the Region to the PBC and Organizational Committee

For the purposes of this committee Azerbaijan and Armenia have agreed to a cessation of violence and are willing to submit the question of peacebuilding to the PBC and its Organizational Committee.

Within this proposal to the Organizational Committee, Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to leave men and materiel where they lie and no orders will be given to the troops or commanders in the area in order to maintain a fragile ceasefire. It is nearly impossible for the PBC to function properly while conflict remains and, as a result, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh and Member States of Armenia and Azerbaijan will hold their commitments to peace provided that the Organizational Committee can present a working solution to the present conflict. The Organizational Committee has the burden of taking peoples, Member States, and non-state actors into consideration when proposing a solution to the question of lasting peace in Nagorno-Karabakh. The duty of the Organizational Committee is to determine how best to develop the region into an area that promotes unity, peace, and institution building while considering two elements of the conflict that are central to the continuing conflict. The first consideration is of a territorial aspect and belligerent parties, while the other is the number of international groups involved in the peace dialogue.

The present conflict has a territorial aspect which cannot be overstated. Member States and the Organizational Committee must not forget this crucial aspect when crafting the conflict-resolution and peacebuilding structures which will serve Nagorno-Karabakh and the region as a whole. Specific also to the conflict is the presence of multiple parties. Member States can identify three main parties in the current conflict; those being Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Due to the iron fist of Soviet rule, Azerbaijan and Armenia maintained peaceful relations, but following the collapse of the Soviet Union a power vacuum was created, allowing Armenian and Azeri leaders to turn yet again to antagonistic stances. The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh is a self-proclaimed state that exists within the internal boundaries of Azerbaijan. The government is not internationally recognized, but some semblance of independent governance does exist, and has existed for several years in the region.[47]

The Organizational Committee must ascertain how to best work with existing bodies in promoting the peace process. Powerful groups with fractured influence have hotly debated the issue of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh without being able to come to any consensus or true action on the topic. The Organizational Committee must

[44] Lionel Beehner. "Nagorno-Karabakh: Crisis in the Caucus." Council on Foreign Relations. November 3, 2005.
     http://www.cfr.org/armenia/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-caucasus/p9148
[45] Lotta Harbon, Stine Högbladh, and Peter Wallensteen. "Armed Conflicts and Peace Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 5.* September 2006.
[46] Lionel Beehner. "Nagorno-Karabakh: Crisis in the Caucus." Council on Foreign Relations. November 3, 2005.
     http://www.cfr.org/armenia/nagorno-karabakh-crisis-caucasus/p9148
[47] Stuart Kaufman. "Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh." PONARS Policy Memo 164.
     University of Kentucky. October 2000.

influence these groups to work within the overall peace plan and in the best interests of eliminating conflict from the region.

The most notable and powerful group influencing the region and its conflict resolution is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[48] The OSCE has evolved into an international organization that, "is actively engaged in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation - as well as a whole host of other activities related to security, co-operation, human rights and more."[49] The "Minsk Group" is the active body within the OSCE that is tasked with the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh.[50] The Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Minsk group has identified three main objectives in ending the conflict. They are (1) Providing an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in the way of assuring the negotiation process supported by the Minsk Group; (2) Obtaining conclusion by the Parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict in order to permit the convening of the Minsk Conference; and (3) Promoting the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces.[51] The OSCE and the Minsk Group are important players in the fragile peace of Nagorno-Karabakh and certainly may be forces used for the good of the region. However, it is important to note that the Organizational Committee of the PBC is outside of the scope of this group and may either work in contention or conjunction with the many efforts of the OSCE and Minsk Group.[52]

The European Parliament has several times spoken out about the continuing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and recently called on both Armenia and Azerbaijan to renew efforts to end the conflict. The Parliament condemned the region's militarization. It also called upon EU Member States to stop supplying weapons and munitions to both countries and urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan "to tone down the language of their statements to pave the way for a genuine dialogue."[53] Members of the European Parliament did stress the need for stability to be encouraged by members of the European Union. Such efforts, as cited by member of the Parliament, could be in the area of "youth exchange and academic mobility to promote confidence building"[54] Yet, the European Parliament has been unable to motivate the region's players into changing their positions.

The PBC is primarily tasked with using these existing bodies in the advancement of an overall peace plan, particularly in respect to funding. These groups are where the capital must come from in order to generate a true peace. Therefore, it is absolutely critical that the committee be able to motivate not only Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, but also all these interested parties in pursuing and financing positive peace in the region.

The Task of the Organizational Committee: Peacebuilding

Peace is much more than the simple absence of violence. True peace, for the purposes of this committee, shall be understood as 'positive peace' which is sometimes also referred to as sustainable or strategic peace. The key to the success of the Organizational Committee will be in implementing a strategy for Nagorno-Karabakh to (1) cease all

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[48] "CSCE/OSCE timeline." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2012.
    http://www.osce.org/who/timeline;
        For clarification on the OSCE: In 1994 at the Budapest Summit, the Heads of State of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) officially changed its name to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), denoting a shift in its mission to go beyond a simple conference in a move that made the group a fully-fledged international organization. (http://www.osce.org/who/timeline/1990s)
[49] Ibid.
[50] The Minsk Group is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States and has permanent members of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika. http://www.osce.org/mg/66926
[51] "Minsk Group: Background." Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2012.
    http://www.osce.org/mg/66872
[52] Isak Svensson. "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Lessons from the mediation efforts." IFP Mediation Cluster. Initiative for Peacebuilding and the European Union. March 2009.
[53] "EU deals with Azerbaijan and Armenia should make the region safer." The European Parliament. April 18, 2012.
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120418IPR43187/html/EU-deals-with-Azerbaijan-and-Armenia-should-make-the-region-safer
[54] Ibid.

violence, (2) work to solve the core or root causes of the conflict in question and (3) stop future disputes from escalating into violence and warfare.[55] This is done through many avenues, and the Organizational Committee should craft many pillars on which the peace of Nagorno-Karabakh shall rest, covering a range of topics that include but are not limited to institution building, reconciliation efforts, and political and economic transformation. The Kroc Institute, in a pioneering approach to peace, states that, "While it engages immediate crises, strategic peacebuilding recognizes that peacemaking is a long tern vocation that requires the building of cross-group networks and alliances that will survive intermittent conflicts and create a platform for sustainable human development."[56]

John Paul Lederach, a key figure in the field of peace studies, stated, "Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct."[57] Nowhere in peacebuilding does this ring truer than in institution building. Institution building is, in essence, constructing a "peace constituency" composed of members of society that includes top-tier political leaders and elites, mid-tier peace workers, and grass-roots members. The top tier is crucial as these are the international and national leaders, business executives and cultural icons who can pivot national policy towards peace. Mid-tier peace workers are those members of society who are not vulnerable to daily survival but understand nuance of the elite and plight of the common man. Religious leaders and community organizers are perfectly positioned for this role and make up the vast majority of the mid-tier structure. Finally, no true peace plan can be put into place without the lasting commitment of grass-roots members. This element comes from all sections of society, but should mainly consist of everyday citizens who act upon peaceful principles in their dealings with former antagonists.[58] Institution building targets peoples' perceptions of both governmental structures as well as those groups whom they would consider former enemies in an attempt to build bridges of commonality. In doing so, these institutions embrace trust and equality as powerful forces to be used for the continuation of the peace process long after the violence has ended. The United Nations Security Council also notes the need for national ownership and development of national capacities for institution building, while focusing on the international community to provide financial and coordinated support.[59] Accordingly, "building legitimate and effective institutions that respect and promote human rights therefore must be a central element of the overall peacebuilding effort."[60]

Reconciliation efforts are the least tangible of the changes that the Organizational Committee shall work towards. The efforts take on a uniquely human characteristic that challenge members of communities to face the scars and pain of war in an effort to create a narrative that does not advance hostility, but a shared burden of conflict.[61] Members of the Organizational Committee would do well to know and understand truth and reconciliation commissions. A few of the most notable are: the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment following Pinochet's brutal rule of Chile, the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador which was done under the guidance of the United Nations as part of the brokering of peace to end the Salvadorian Civil War. And, most widely known and considered the model for such commissions, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa following the transition away from apartheid, headed by President Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Reconciliation and policies encouraging this type of healing are central to changing grass-roots feelings of opposition groups. Such policies, "should be aimed at recasting ethno-nationalist myths into cooperative and tolerant ones, especially by promoting the writing and teaching of fair-

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[55] *An Agenda for Peace*. A Statement from the Secretary-General. June 17, 1992.

[56] "What is Strategic Peacebuilding" The Kroc Institute. 2008. http://kroc.nd.edu/node/313/

[57] From, "Introduction to Peacebuilding." peacebuildinginitiative. March 27, 2009: John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20. http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1764

[58] Michelle Maiese. "Peacebuilding: what it means to build a lasting peace." The Beyond Intractability Project, The Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado. September 2003.

[59] "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Institution Building." Security Council Report, Update report. Security Council. January 19, 2011. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Update%20Report%2019%20January%202011%20Post%20Conflict%20Peacebuilding.pdf

[60] Ban Ki-moon. "Secretary-General's remarks to the Special Debate of the Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Institution Building." New York, New York, USA. January 21, 2011. http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5042

[61] "Operationalizing Peacebuilding." peacebuildinginitiative. March 16, 2009. http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1765

minded history."[62]   True reconciliation is a phenomenon that removes antagonism from conflicted parties, and tends to only be successful when legitimate and respected leaders coordinate and take part in such mobilizations.

Political transformation may be the most sensitive area of a peace strategy. Member States' governments rarely bend under pressures that may cause the general population to think they are weak or in such a way that internationally they be seen as forfeiting their sovereignty. Yet, it is the task of the Organizational Committee to make such recommendations that alter the current political process in the cause for sustainable peace. The idea of 'rule of law' must be central in creating a political transformation which will be first tested by proper governance and the first post-conflict electoral process, to be followed by many other areas of proposed political transformation.

Governance is the first and most important question at the heart of political transformation. As has been outlined, conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has perpetuated for most of the past century. It is the task of the Organizational Committee to use existing governments and their structures as well as to make recommendations to the Member States on possible means of governance. To what end that may be lies in the assertions of relevant Member States and the aspirations of the people of Armenia, Azerbaijan and those residing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Many believe that some type of short-term transitional governance is essential to the peace process, whether that be solidified within one Member State, shared between two or be a move toward self-determination is up to the Organizational Committee and relevant parties. The writing or amending of Member State Constitutions and the amicability of local leaders may be the key to proper governance.

The second important question is the first post-conflict electoral process. Suffrage is of paramount importance to all Member States, and free and fair elections are a necessity of any Member State wishing to make itself legitimate not only in the eyes of its people, but also the international community. The PBC must make arrangements for the first post-conflict elections in such regard as helping to determine who qualifies, how seats may be allotted fairly and most importantly encouraging the Security Council and relevant bodies in sending monitors and peacekeepers during the election process. First post-conflict elections present the most delicate and fragile democratic processes; it is of upmost importance that the Organizational Committee understand this aspect and prepare accordingly.[63]

It is through these aspects, governance, election reform and democratically elected officials, that initial rule of law will be recognized by the people of the region and political transformation will begin. It is up to the Organizational Committee to set benchmarks for other sectors of rule-of-law assistance, as deemed necessary to the health of a peace process. Some areas of particular importance that may be considered by the committee are strengthening and removing corruption in law enforcement; gender equity; express rights of women and children; housing and property issues relating to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's); and general characteristics of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). In 2005, shortly after the creation of the PBC, the Secretary-General tasked the Rule of Law Coordination and Resources Group supported by the Rule of Law Unit to assist in PBC and PBSO.[64]

Economic equity is crucial to any peacebuilding that is to be considered long term. It is often cited that without a stable and fair economy true lasting peace will be elusive. Some sectors of the overall Member States' economic engine have a particular importance, those being employment opportunities, food scarcity, development programs, healthcare assistance, and social safety nets.[65]   Micro and macro level economic changes must be considered and proposed by the Organizational Committee. Micro-level programs should not necessarily be based on micro-credit as this tends to burden those already at a disadvantage, but should instead focus on local level investment, career training programs, and literacy and education expansion. On the macro-level, all post-conflict Member States and parties, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh region and Member States of the Caucusus, must be encouraged to assist each other in infrastructure and foundational economic principles projects. In doing so Member States promote economic justice and regional stability that are essential to the cause of positive peace. As economic

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[62] Stuart Kaufman. "Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh." PONARS Policy Memo 164.
        University of Kentucky. October 2000, pg. 4.
[63] A/59/2005/Add. 2. "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all." General Assembly.
        May 23, 2005.
[64] "Peacebuilding." United Nations Rule of Law. http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=27
[65] Michelle Maiese. "Peacebuilding: what it means to build a lasting peace." The Beyond Intractability Project, The
        Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado. September 2003.

motives tend to be some of the most paramount in creating conflict, the Organizational Committee must include avenues for economic development as part of a broad but tailored approach to peace.

In considering peacebuilding, the Organizational Committee shall hold itself to the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee statement, agreed upon in 2007.

> *"Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives."[66]*

In considering the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, the committee can only succeed when all of these concepts are established and implemented.

Conclusions

Ban Ki-moon, in a statement to the Special Debate of the Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Institution Building, stated, "[W]e must avoid one-size-fits-all solutions…Trying to impose an outside model on a post-conflict country can do more harm than good. Each country's institutions develop on their own trajectory and at their own pace. They should be allowed to develop incrementally and with a certain level of experimentation to learn and change."[67]

As shown by this brief, the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh not only has a deep seated historical component, but is also challenged by a conflict narrative, refugee and diaspora situation in addition to rifts in cultural and religious ties. The sheer volume of points of contention in the region underscores the truths of the Secretary General's remarks. Delegates of Member States must find a path to peace that contains long term and short term goals and actions; take into account the status of civilians and refugees; determine proper governance, post-conflict electoral processes; and envisions how to best work with existing institutions and international players. Remember, the PBC does not look for the absence of war as the definition of peace, but is more focused on building positive peace and the institutions that surround the notion. It is the mandate of the Organizational Committee to identify these areas and aspects and to put them to practice within the region in order to build a lasting and sustainable peaceful society in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Committee Directive

In this regard, the Peacebuilding Commission provides, "an important political platform for countries on its agenda, which could help focus attention on long-term institution-building priorities while mobilizing resources for them, sharing lessons learned and sustaining international engagement."[68]

It is the express directive of the delegates to the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission to propose a well-rounded peace process to the international community and specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan and the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. This is not an easy task or one to be taken lightly. As shown, decades of war and mistrust have pitted the people of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh against each other. The PBC must

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[66] "Peacebuilding and the United Nations." The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml

[67] Ban Ki-moon. "Secretary-General's remarks to the Special Debate of the Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding – Institution Building." New York, New York, USA. January 21, 2011. http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=5042

[68] SC/10160. "Security Council Presidential Statement Stresses Critical Importance of Institution Building in Post-Conflict Countries." *Security Council*. January 21, 2011.

use this opportunity granted by Armenia and Azerbaijan to set into motion peacebuilding initiatives that will not only cease the violence but to rebuild a community of trust and sustained peace. The Organizational Committee must cater to the specific conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh while delegates must comprehend both the nuances and oddities that are particular to the region. In this understanding, delegates will be able to concentrate on three principles of peacebuilding which are institution building, reconciliation and political and economic transformation within the region. If the Organizational Committee can formulate a peace strategy that engages these aspects while taking into account the region, its people, and history, the PBC may be able to help the region realize true, sustainable peace.

II. Working Group on Lessons Learned, Central African Republic

Sustained peace must be built on a durable foundation of national commitment, broad international support, and experience informed by the lessons of the past. The Peacebuilding Commission has an important role to play and can continue to enhance its contribution by focusing its efforts, strengthening coordination with internal and external stakeholders, and highlighting best practices.[69] —Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council Open Debate on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Introduction

The Peace Building Commission (PBC) established a Working Group on Lessons Learned (WGLL) in January of 2007 specifically to refine its role and methodology in its peacebuilding endeavors as part of its mandate "to develop best practices."[70] Desiring to effectively and efficiently work to capacity, the WGLL meets to engage the international community on a platform designed to improve the functioning of the PBC toward achieving this end. By periodically reviewing strategies and experiences in post-conflict engagements, it is the hope of the group to develop forward-looking lessons and recommendations for post-conflict policies and implementations.[71] The WGLL looks at the PBC's use of the tools at its disposal to determine their effectiveness and to suggest changes to capture more positive returns on the PBC's efforts.

The WGLL conducts its business as a series of open meetings, informal and/or formal discussions, and joint discussions with other UN entities. As such, the WGLL publishes its work in a different format than most other committees within the UN. Other than formal reports, it offers background papers, initial findings, concept notes, information notes, summaries, and follow-up questionnaires.[72] Thus, as a delegate it is important to put yourself in the mindset of a researcher and forward-thinker to develop comprehensive and effective documents to improve the PBC's ability to carry out its mandate. Therefore, a Synthesis Report and Summary of Discussions including key insights, principles, good practices and emerging lessons in peacebuilding with respect to the PBC's efforts in the Central African Republic (CAR) is the goal of the conference for this topic.

Understanding the Relationship of the PBC and CAR

The Central African Republic was placed on the PBC's agenda on 12 June 2008.[73] It was placed on the PBC's agenda due to a succession of various political regimes which steered the country toward an extremely fragile socio-economic situation. At the time that the CAR asked to be placed on the agenda, the current government was facing

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[69] *Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Security Council Open Debate on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*
http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/africa/178888-africa-un-envoy-rice-on-post-conflict-peacebuilding.html

[70] Working Group on Lessons Learned Special Session, 12 June 2008, "SYNTHESIS REPORT AND SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS Key Insights, Principles, Good Practices and Emerging Lessons in Peacebuilding,"
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/key_insights/synthesis_report_12_june08_conclusions.pdf

[71] UN Peace Building Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/sm_lessonslearned.shtml

[72] Ibid.

[73] UN Peace Building Commission, Country Specific Configurations, CAR. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/sm_car.shtml

a situation of high indebtedness, a limited treasury, and an increasingly volatile and unstable security situation.[74] Thus, the people of the CAR were confronted with the problems of poverty, security, and governance, which were only exacerbated by the unequal distribution of the population throughout the country and the existence of highly opposed political factions/militant groups. It was then the duty of the PBC to use the various tools at its disposal to help the CAR develop a lasting and sustainable peace within its borders. Per its mandate, the PBC would help build institutions, partner with the international community to increase the economic capacity of the country, and help create a policy for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), as well as initiating Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategies.[75] Another key part of the PBC's mission in the CAR is decentralization and regionalization of governance to help strengthen the rule of law and the presence of democracy within the country.[76]

In 2008, the CAR faced a formidable assortment of challenges in the political, security, humanitarian and development sectors. The government had developed plans and strategies in response to many of those challenges yet asked for the PBC to partner with them in the short, medium and long term, with a primary focus on addressing the most immediate priorities for peacebuilding as they emerged from discussions with the authorities of the CAR and the local and international donor community.[77] These priorities were: support for an effective, accountable, and sustainable national security sector; reinforcing of the rule of law, including respect for human rights, and good governance; and, the establishment of development poles.[78] The significance of focusing firstly on those peacebuilding priorities stemmed from the fact that they have been found to be fundamental when stabilizing a country and setting the foundation for sustained peace, which in turn would put that country on the path of recovery, continuous growth and development.[79] Furthermore, the ability to effectively build state institutions for economic and political governance is directly dependent on the progress of the building-up of the institutions to support the security sector, rule of law and human rights.[80] The PBC supported the post-conflict recovery, reintegration and reconstruction through the effort of its Steering Committee for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (SCDDR).[81] The PBC was also aided by the MINURCAT peacekeeping mission. "The United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established by Security Council resolution 1778 (2007) on 25 September 2007 in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law; and promote regional peace. The Mission completed its mandate on 31 December 2010, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1923 (2010) and at the request of the Chadian Government, which had pledged full responsibility for protecting civilians on its territory. Reporting to the Security Council in December, the Secretary-General said "MINURCAT has been an unusual and unique United Nations peacekeeping operation in that it was devoted solely to contributing to the protection of civilians, without an explicit political mandate. It has gone through the stages of planning, deployment and withdrawal in the short span of less than four years, enduring adversities in each."[82] One of the jobs of the WGLL is to look at how the PBC partnered with the CAR in achieving these goals and to determine if that approach was effective and able to be implemented elsewhere in post-conflict arenas.

Key Dimensions of Peacebuilding

The WGLL has determined and examined a range of topics dealing with several key dimensions of peacebuilding such as: elections, local governance, transitional justice, the internally displaced persons, budget support, and the

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[74] Peacebuilding Commission Country-Specific Configuration on Central African Republic. *"National initiatives and support by the International Community to the establishment of development hubs."* http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/key_docs/pdd_background_paper_en.pdf

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, "*Background paper on the Central African Republic*", 4 September 2008. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/key_docs/car_bg_paper_4_sept.pdf

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York, Central African Republic, "Background." http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/geographic-files/africa/central-african-republic/article/central-african-republic

[82] MINURCAT, United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/

environment and natural resources.[83] Although each topic on its own is important, it is vital to understand the interconnectedness between each of the different dimensions of peacebuilding.[84] There are also a few cross-cutting issues to consider, including gender, regional approaches, peacebuilding strategic frameworks, and post-conflict compacts that affect the work of the UN as a whole.[85] To date, the WGLL has compiled an increasing body of knowledge, principles, good practices and practical lessons in peacebuilding taken from comparative experiences from different countries and regions.[86] Needless to say, one consistent theme has been apparent in each comparative analysis of the WGLL, that there are no "one-size-fits-all" models in peacebuilding, as each post-conflict arena is unique. However, common principles have become apparent in these analyses in regard to effective peacebuilding that are relevant across different post-conflict arenas and these include the following: adopting a holistic and strategic approach; promoting national ownership; strengthening national capacities; providing sustained engagement; achieving effective coordination; fostering mutual accountability; ensuring prioritization and sequencing; integrating a gender perspective; tangible peace dividends and quick wins; and encouraging a regional approach.[87]

It is challenging to leverage these principles within the realities of each post-conflict arena and the tools that the PBC has to collaborate with all relevant actors in the pursuit of effective and sustainable peacebuilding. However, there still is a lack of cohesiveness between relevant UN organs and civil society, drawing attention to the need to strengthen those ties to achieve these goals.[88] The WGLL is continually looking for ways to advance the PBC's effectiveness by refining its working methods, solidifying its links with the UN system and the larger peacebuilding community, and encouraging synergies for knowledge utilization.[89] Another key aspect of the PBC is using its influence to coordinate economic assistance among UN organs, Development Banks, ODA channels and civil society. This is a huge task, and one that is pivotal to the success of the engagement with the post-conflict country. Therefore it is vital that the PBC maintains a very close and synergistic relationship to the Peacebuilding Fund and eliminates redundancy and unnecessary bureaucracy that may limit the effectiveness of either body.

Tools of the PBC

In order to understand and evaluate the performance of the PBC in regard to its role with the CAR, it is imperative to understand the tools it has at its disposal to help it carry out its mandate.

Typically a Steering Committee is created to generate strategies and oversee their implementation. In the case of the CAR, the Steering Committee was linked with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration priority set forth for CAR and was known as SCDDR, created 21 June 2008. The committee decreed that the Executive Organ of the DDR CAR program would be UNDP.[90] It has been determined that there are three dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding: stability creation; restoration of state institutions; and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict.[91] The first stage of peacebuilding should always include disarmament, to ensure peace the weapons must be taken away. Secondly, the men and women who were formally combatants must be reintegrated into society in a useful and beneficial way or they will continue to find themselves in the role of a combatant. Next it is essential to rebuild or create institutions of governance, democratic platforms and the rule of law, while at the same time

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[83] Working Group on Lessons Learned Special Session, 12 June 2008, *"SYNTHESIS REPORT AND SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS Key Insights, Principles, Good Practices and Emerging Lessons in Peacebuilding,"* Executive Summary.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/key_insights/synthesis_report_12_june08_conclusions.pdf
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid. pg. 9
[86] Working Group on Lessons Learned Special Session, 12 June 2008, *"SYNTHESIS REPORT AND SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS Key Insights, Principles, Good Practices and Emerging Lessons in Peacebuilding,"* Executive Summary.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/key_insights/synthesis_report_12_june08_conclusions.pdf
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid. pg. 14
[89] Ibid. pg. 16
[90] UN Peace Building Commission, "Update on DDR Process, CAR: 29 Apr 2009"
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/key_docs/car_ddr_29_apr_2009.pdf
[91] Barnett et al. GFN-SSR, A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform, "Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?"
http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/3824/peacebuilding-what-is-in-a-name

rebuilding basic infrastructure to support the growth of those institutions. To further legitimize the State, strides must be made in education, health care, communication, utilities, transportation, technology and capacity-building. Then the PBC must deal with the social ramifications of post-conflict populations such as trauma care, transitional justice, gender empowerment, human rights, environmental awareness, and economic development within both civil society and the private sector.[92] In working with the CAR, the PBC adopted a three-year Strategic Framework for peacebuilding Document (SFD) in March of 2009.[93] Representing a living contract between the Central Africans and their national, regional, and international counterparts, the SFD serves as the key vehicle for providing mutual engagement and accountability among the actors, especially since it is subject to biannual review.[94] Among its key features will be a listing of priority actions, results, and commitments of these stakeholders in favor of peacebuilding.[95] After the second bi-annual review of the SFD it was determined that while progress had been made, there were still areas that needed improvement.[96] In an effort to mitigate funding gaps, the CAR became eligible for support from the Peacebuilding Fund in January 2008. To date, the PBF has contributed more than 31 million dollars to support these efforts, specifically the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the electoral budget.[97] The PBC has continually worked to encourage additional partners to come on board from civil society.[98] The World Bank and the PBC continue to work together to ensure their actions are mutually beneficial as well as mutually reinforcing in support of CAR's peacebuilding agenda.[99]

One of the main tools that the PBC uses when engaged in the second dimension of peacebuilding is institution building. The institutions needed in post-conflict arenas are political, social, and economic. The framework for these institutions may be inadequate, underdeveloped, or nonexistent. It is up to the PBC to help post-conflict States achieve healthy institutions in order to facilitate sustainable peace. The tenets of democracy and successful integration of such in developing States has shown to be effective in thwarting future conflict; therefore, implementing and facilitating the development of these institutions is critical. Development and Peace go hand in hand. That is why the UNDP was appointed as the Executive Organ. Acutely aware of the need to swiftly and steadily develop the CAR, the PBC and UNDP coordinate efforts and actively search for more partners to fund such development. Coming alongside fragile post-conflict states, coordinating efforts between UN bodies and civil society, and bringing in much needed financial aid not only allows the PBC to fulfill its mandate, but for the UN to do so as well, since lasting and sustainable peace is a main goal of the UN.

Rule of law assistance is an integral part of the process. The WGLL notes that the PBC's efforts can have a durable impact if they are grounded in legal and societal mechanisms to prevent recurrence of violence.[100] Long-term commitments of all relevant actors dedicated to a shared vision with a cohesive approach are needed for success. The peacebuilding process should include open and frequent dialogue between civil society and marginalized groups to allow for more responsive and inclusive rule of law assistance programs. To achieve the desired impact it is highly beneficial to act in an early stage in the peace process with a unity of effort among the actors in the peace process. Investment in national capacity-building and fortifying the foundation of local expertise in the area of rule of law is another key component to success.[101]

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[92] Ibid.
[93] UN Peace Building Commission, Briefing Paper, *"Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic: The Case for Increased Donor Engagement,"* http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/key_docs/car_briefing_paper_090327.pdf
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] UN General Assembly/Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, Fifth session, Central African Republic configuration "Conclusions and recommendations of the second biannual review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in the Central African Republic" http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/5/CAF/3
[97] "The Secretary-General Remarks To High-Level Side Event On Addressing Peacebuilding And Development Challenges In The Central African Republic," New York, 20 September 2010 http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/car/statements/sg_statement_20sep2010.pdf
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] "Comparative lessons from the United Nations Rule of Law Assistance Monday, Chair's Summary. Peace Building Support Office, Peacebuilding Commission – Working Group on Lessons Learned. 20 October 2008 http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/rol_comp_lesson_summary_3nov08.pdf
[101] Ibid.

Elections and the electoral process and decentralization of government with increased local governance are two areas that the PBC utilizes in its rule of law assistance programs. Increasingly accepted as a critical component in the shift from conflict to peace, elections and the electoral process must be met with a range of strategies and mechanisms to alleviate the risks and capture the benefits.[102] Successful electoral processes thrive in environments that are known to be stable; independently monitored; backed by a committed government to provide an unbiased approach to the electoral process; having technical, financial, and political support from the international community; demonstrating self-restraint on the part of political parties to honor the final outcome; and open to the media allowing for a national platform for dialogue.[103] Because an effort to create and maintain effective and inclusive governance is also considered essential for sustainable peace at all levels, the PBC works towards the goals of decentralization of governance and the development of local governance platforms.[104] Local governance involves generating effective networks, relationships and partnerships with local leaders and the community, while decentralization refers to the restructuring of authority to ensure a system of co-responsibility between central, regional and local levels of government.[105] It is important to note that the PBC and other relevant actors and/or donors must work to create the will for decentralization to take place in a post-conflict arena, rather than trying to force the issue. With budget support and strong technical assistance from donors, the PBC's rule of law assistance programs can empower a country to absorb resources and build capacity at different levels of government.[106]

At the same time, a plan of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) must be executed and continually monitored to ensure stability within the State. This goes hand in hand with Security Sector Reform (SSR). The WGLL has determined that truly regional approaches to the development and programming of DDR are still very limited. However, it is held that DDR can only succeed when backed by a political settlement between volatile factions within the post-conflict arena. "Progress in, and challenges to, national and regional peace processes affect the pace and effectiveness of DDR programs."[107] Resource deployment and capabilities for reintegration remain among the main challenges for successful DDR programs. Specifically, communities should be prepared to receive and accept demobilized combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons.[108] There should also be an effort to rehabilitate the communities to which these persons are reintegrated. There is a need to consider and examine the lessons from successful regional DDR experiences in Central America, in particular at the operational level, which could be translated into successful DDR experiences in other arenas. And, increasing the capacity of regional institutions would further help to facilitate the sustainability of the regional focus on DDR.

Security Sector reform is another component of the stabilization process, and the focus of much of the work of the PBC. In order to fully realize and understand the role of SSR, it is important to understand what and who the security sector is. Truthfully, there are many actors, and some may be at odds with each other.[109] While much of the security sector is comprised of State agencies, some are likely to be non-State organizations and systems. While understanding that the State has an irreducible role in justice and security provision, effective reform across the system requires working with a broad spectrum of actors. These include (1) core security actors such as the traditional armed forces; police service; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias); (2) management and oversight bodies which include the executive, national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations; (3) justice and the rule of law bodies comprised of judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice systems; and (4) non-statutory security forces, which are also included, such as liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security

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[102] "Emerging Lessons and Practices in Peacebuilding, 2007-2009." *Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission.* May 2010 http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_report_english.pdf

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Emerging Lessons and Practices in Peacebuilding, 2007-2009 *Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission.* May 2010. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_report_english.pdf

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Barnett et al. GFN-SSR, A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform, *"What is Security Sector Reform?"* http://www.ssrnetwork.net/about/what_is_ss.php

companies, and political party militias.[110] Consideration must be made towards all groups during SSR, or, as experience has shown, the project will have a limited and /or negative impact due to the intertwined nature of these actors.[111]

Developing National Capacities not only contributes to SSR, but is fundamental to building a sustainable peace as long as they are carefully targeted and timely capacity development programs.[112] Capacity is defined as the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a viable manner.[113] Toward this end, national ownership is essential for all peace and capacity-building processes and support for capacity development must address issues at all levels, including supply-side as well as demand-side issues, an endogenous and systemic process.[114] Properly functioning institutions and other critical capacities cannot be "imposed" from the outside, so the PBC must identify existing national institutions and capacities, and emphasize their rehabilitation rather than their substitution with externally-designed solutions and models.[115] Essential to these programs must be the differentiation between structural or pre-existing weaknesses in national capacities and those directly resulting from past conflict.[116] A holistic approach to capacity development should be paramount, and be part of a dynamic process to account for situational change over time.[117] All relevant actors, state and non-state, need to be flexible and willing not only to adapt to change but open to frequent dialogue among those actors, and should prioritize the basic needs of the most vulnerable populations.[118]

The peacebuilding process relies on complementary partnerships among UN system partners, Member States; donors; international, regional and sub-regional organizations and actors; the World Bank and other international financial institutions; the private sector; other multilateral partners; and civil society.[119] Each partner in the peacebuilding process however, is governed by directives, decision-making structures, and funding provisions that are quite distinct from one another.[120] Thus, integration in the pursuit of shared peacebuilding objectives requires constant coordination, dialogue, and negotiation among those concerned and is paramount to the PBC's ability to marshal needed resources when coordinating relevant actors.[121] Most important is the continued support and cooperation of the different agencies responsible for Official Development Assistance, such as international and regional development banks, the PBF, the private sector, and civil society because without adequate and continual funding there can be no progress toward sustainable peace and development. The CAR suffers from a limited donor base, which leads to deficient donor coordination mechanisms, which, in turn, results in a loss of efficient use of the limited resources that are available. In the case of the CAR, the PBC is working on a solution to identify resource flows allowing for determination of priorities and sectors that are underfunded.[122] Heightened collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations within these programs could also alleviate gaps.

Economic revitalization, along with its various sub-sectors, such as employment, transportation, communication infrastructure, public works, etc., are paramount in the pursuit of consolidating peace and preventing future hostilities.[123] There are three main dimensions of economic revitalization that must be realized to achieve success:

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[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Emerging Lessons and Practices in Peacebuilding, 2007-2009 *Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission* May 2010 http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_report_english.pdf
[113] Barnett et al. "GFN-SSR, A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform." *Capacity Development Practice Note.* http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/3007;/capacity-development-practice-note
[114] Ibid.
[115] "Emerging Lessons and Practices in Peacebuilding, 2007-2009." Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission. May 2010. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_report_english.pdf
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Peacebuilding Commission Working Group On Lessons Learned. "Concept Note: The PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned –Resource mobilization for peacebuilding priorities and improved coordination among relevant actors." March 29, 2011. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/resource_mobil_concept_note.pdf
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Peacebuilding Support Office and UN Development Program. "E-Discussion on Economic Revitalization and Peacebuilding Summary." http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/e_consultation_summary.pdf

social cohesion and reconciliation; peace dividends; and eliminating sources of resource conflict.[124] As part of the process, collaboration between communities and ethnic groups and/or conflict-affected groups, and other parts of society creates trust and changes attitudes.[125] The creation of jobs and improvements in basic services give the people a sense of future prosperity and lessens hostilities.[126] Mitigating tensions over scarce resources with resource development intercessions contributes to the unlikelihood of future conflict arising over access to things such as land, water, and access to valuable minerals or other natural resources.[127]

The WGLL has determined that there are four points that must be considered when framing an approach to economic revitalization: (1) consideration of the hard and soft capital that was destroyed by the conflict yet is necessary to maintain networks needed for a functional society; (2) how revitalization is achieved is just as important as what is restored or implemented; (3) the private sector is vital for job creation and must be integrated into any reconstruction plan; and (4) investment must create jobs immediately.[128] Due to the nature of war, many post-conflict States experience heavy "brain drain" as the country's brightest individuals leave. This results in a severe lack of skilled labor and high levels of instability and insecurity which make job training and creation a risky endeavor.[129] The combination of these factors produces an unattractive environment for foreign direct investment and makes it close to impossible for local businesses to succeed.[130] The PBC also looks to youth employment and gender advancement as key components of the economic revitalization process.

Finally, the PBC must address certain human rights issues to solidify its peacebuilding processes. These include, but are not limited to, poverty reduction; clean water and sanitation; transitional justice; health care; maternal care; education; and internal displacement. While each of these topics is critical for development, two of them are unique to post-conflict States: transitional justice and internal displacement. "Transitional justice is an approach to systematic or massive violations of human rights that both provides redress to victims and creates or enhances opportunities for the transformation of the political systems, conflicts, and other conditions that may have been at the root of the abuses."[131] A two-pronged approach is used for dealing with a legacy of systematic or massive abuse. On one hand it is imperative to get some level of justice for the victims while on the other it is vital to reinforce the possibilities for peace, democracy and reconciliation.[132] This is achieved by combining elements of criminal, restorative and social justice that have been adapted to the unique conditions of the societies undergoing peacebuilding after a period of abuses.[133]

The issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is just as intricate. "Today, there are some 25 million internally displaced persons in over 50 countries worldwide who have been forced to leave their communities by conflicts. The total number of IDPs far exceeds the world's ten million refugees."[134] These IDPs are particularly vulnerable in ways that differ from refugees and other war-affected civilians, and they require specific attention when determining peacebuilding processes.[135] Of utmost import is the return of IDPs to their former homes. Experience has shown that those who do return function in a large capacity toward rebuilding their homes and communities, and thus in contributing to the overall economic development of the country.[136] Therefore, transitional governments should take heed of the particular needs of IDPs, especially with regard to suffrage, by enabling them to vote on interim political

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[124] Ibid.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Institute for Global Policy. "Together for a Better Peace: WGLL Meets to Discuss Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the Development of Service Based Infrastructure." 12/13/2010. http://www.betterpeace.org/node/1714
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] UN Peacebuilding Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned. "WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? A Backgrounder." Feb 2008
        http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/justice_times_transition/26_02_2008_background_note.pdf
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] UN Peacebuilding Commission –Working Group on Lessons Learned, "Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons: An Essential Dimension of Peacebuilding."
        http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/comparative_lessons_internal_displacement/13_03_2008_background_note.pdf
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.

arrangements and to participate in the political life of the country even before they return to their communities of origin.[137] The return of IDPs is closely related to transitional justice in that IDPs usually have demands of restitution or some other compensation for their losses, as well as wanting a safe and secure environment to return to. A three-pronged approach is critical to the success of an IDP return program. Experience has shown that security, property restitution, and creating a sustainable environment are crucial and must be addressed in any IDP return program.[138] Therefore, the WGLL has determined that there are four critical elements of an IDP return program in order for it to be effective: ensuring voluntariness of return; ensuring the safety of returnees; returning property to the displaced and reconstruction of their houses; and, creating an environment that sustains returnees with appropriate funding mechanisms.[139] IDPs returning to their places of origin within their country must be granted access to basic public services, documentation and employment, and income generating opportunities without discrimination.

While the tools listed above have been shown to be effective in peacebuilding, it is important to examine them regularly as peacebuilding is a dynamic and fluid process. Considering that each forum that the PBC enters is unique and brings with it its own inherent challenges and needs, it is vital to continue to search for new and innovative ways to effectively and efficiently build sustainable peace in post-conflict States.

Conclusion

As the PBC prepares to lessen its involvement in the CAR, it is important to evaluate, review and monitor the work that has been done and that is still remaining. Much has been accomplished in the four years that the PBC has had a relationship with the CAR. Working hard to alleviate its high indebtedness, limited treasury, and unstable security situation, the country has made strides toward these ends. However, the people are still confronted with the problems of poverty, security, and governance, as peacebuilding is a slow process.

In April of this year, Margaret Vogt, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) said, "I believe that the possibility to stabilize Central African Republic is very much there now, if we only do a little to push them up," she followed up with, "But at the same time it is so fragile that if we fail to help the possibility of a degradation is also there."[140] Since the UN withdrew its peacekeeping operation from CAR and Chad in 2010, the end of its mandate, the PBC has concentrated on the civilian peacebuilding efforts, including promoting reconciliation, supporting the DDR and SSR processes, and providing electoral assistance. Ms. Vogt has urgently pleaded with the international community to close the gap on the still needed $19 million to complete the DDR program. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon warned that "further delay in supporting the DDR process will only accentuate tensions and undermine an already fragile process."[141] He further appealed to the international community to provide the necessary support and funding to ensure that the DDR process does not falter.[142] "The fallout from a return to conflict would have profound consequences, not only for the Central African Republic, but for the sub-region," the Secretary-General added.[143] Without the success of the DDR programs, there can be no success in the development programs. The CAR's Prime Minister, Faustin-Archange Touadera stressed this point at a recent press conference. "It is extremely important for the population to have peace and to be able to engage in farming," Mr. Touadera told reporters.[144] "This is a window of opportunity that offers us the possibility of security, especially because all armed groups would like to disarm, and are willing to lay their arms and to rejoin their communities of origin."[145]

Committee Directives

The committee will function as the WGLL in regard to this topic. As such, the committee shall take upon itself the challenge of reviewing, in detail, the work that the PBC has done with the Central African Republic in order to craft

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[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Ibid.

[140] UN News Centre. "UN official urges greater support for peacebuilding efforts in Central African Republic." 5 Apr 2012.
    http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41724

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid.

[145] Ibid.

a Synthesis Report and Discussion Summary. In so doing, delegates are required to research and evaluate the concept notes, background papers and strategic framework documents published on the CAR in order to gain a thorough understanding of the peacebuilding process that has occurred to date. It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of the tools enumerated above toward achieving sustainable peace in the region. The tools listed were by no means an exhaustive list. As a delegate, it is your job to be diligent in your research and to develop creative applications of the tools available. It is important to understand that the WGLL is capable of developing new and innovative ways to effect policy change and influence the course of the PBC in achieving its mandate. Bear in mind the following aspects of the PBC's mandate:

> …to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post conflict recovery,[146]

It is the work of this committee to determine how best the PBC can and has used the tools at its disposal in its partnership with the CAR.

Delegates should deduce which programs and actions have worked and which have been flawed while expounding on how and why those actions were effective or ineffective. Where are the successes and where are the gaps? Delegates should familiarize themselves with the unique challenges and obstacles presented by the CAR peacebuilding process and remain sensitive to the specific needs of the region. The international community should not be overlooked in the evaluation. Delegates should always keep the mandate of the PBC in mind during these evaluations, and use them as a measuring stick. Recommendations for improvements, changes or new tactics must fit within the mandates as well. The WGLL is an accountability partner in the PBC, thus it is imperative to consider the causes of lack of fulfillment of the objectives of the PBC in regard to the CAR, as well as make ecommendations to advance those stalled areas and reveal any new issues.

III. Country-Specific Configuration, Burundi

Introduction

The Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) of the United Nations Peace Building Commission (PBC) is crucial in building, implementing and sustaining peace processes in a particular Member State. This committee is one of the three main organizational groups within the PBC. It is tasked with engaging a Member State, in this case Burundi, in a unique and situation-specific set of objectives for retaining peace within fragile Member States.[147]

Membership in any CSC includes the members of the Organizational Committee along with the Member State being considered. Also present are Member States engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, such as Tanzania and South Africa, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations, like the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region. Field representatives also provide support and on-the-ground insight at the CSC meetings, using in-country meetings and tele-conferencing to engage the PBC Offices in New York.[148] Currently, Burundi, in addition to Sierra Leone; Guinea-Bissau; Central African Republic; Guinea and Liberia; has a CSC and is under the constant consideration of the PBC.[149]

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[146] UN Peace Building Commission. "Mandate of the Peace Building Commission."
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml
[147] "Country-Specific Configurations." Peacebuilding Commission. 2012.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml
[148] GA Resolution 60/180. *The Peacebuilding Commission.* General Assembly.
[149] "Country-Specific Configurations." Peacebuilding Commission. 2012.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/countryconfig.shtml

The CSC of Burundi has yielded some of the most promising steps in peacebuilding in the world. However, several elemental objectives for building a culture of peace have stalled and others have yet to be taken up fully. Karin Landgren, the former head of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB), said in her final briefing to the Security Council in that position, "This fragile, beautiful and courageous country [Burundi] has travelled a long and difficult distance along the road of peace consolidation in a little over a decade. It should no longer surprise us that war-torn countries do not put away their weapons and blossom instantly as plural and stable democracies."[150] It is the mandate of the CSC of Burundi to remain vigilant in promoting peace in the Member State by calling upon United Nations resources; international and regional partners; as well as civil society partners and the government of Burundi to take steps that will continue to promote peace.

Understanding the Region

As has been discussed, peace building initiatives require a unique approach to each conflict situation. This unique approach can only be undertaken when a comprehensive understanding of not only the causes and consequences of the actual conflict is achieved, but also a realization of the region's environment, people, culture, political system and economy. In the case of Burundi, many critical aspects must be considered by the CSC in crafting effective solution to the post-conflict situation.

Burundi is landlocked and shares its borders with Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the latter two being some of the most volatile states in Africa.[151] One of the smallest countries in Africa, by land mass, Lake Tanganyika as its only major body of water with only a few other subsidiary rivers and lakes within its borders. Excessive land use for intensive agricultural crops and soil erosion from a high level of deforestation has led to poor quality soils and little land left with original forest growth.

To say that Burundi is a poor country is to understate the economic realities. Burundi ranks in the poorest five countries in the world by nearly every international measurement; its GDP is a mere $1.325 billion with per capita GDP at 151 USD. Currently just over 70% of the entire population live below the poverty line, with a majority of communities, especially in rural Burundi, lacking basic necessities such as access to potable water, health and medical services and food security. The economy relies heavily on international aid and assistance, but Burundi is an exporter of several agricultural commodities with coffee and tea accounting for most of the foreign currency earnings. The contributing factors to the economic crisis that Burundi is undergoing include decades of civil wars and conflict, government corruption, poor access to education which diminishes human capital, and the effects of HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases such as dramatic death rates caused by malaria. The stress that the underdeveloped economy places on the peace process cannot be understated and is one of the reasons why one of the three major documents in peacebuilding in Burundi focuses specifically on reducing poverty within the Member State.

Two ethnic groups dominate the Member State, the Tutsi and the Hutu, both of which can trace their ethnic lineage to the area for hundreds of years. Additionally, a small minority of the population in Burundi are of the Twa people. Though the Hutu compose the vast majority of the population, the Tutsi have traditionally controlled the political and economic structure of the Member State. Burundi's people are exceedingly rural which is also reflected in their economy; a mere 10 to 11% of the entire population live in urban areas. However, a crucial fact to take into consideration is that Burundi is very densely populated with 300 people per square mile which puts Burundi second in Sub-Saharan African in terms of highest population density.[152] Burundi is also a very young demographically speaking, some 46% of the population are under the age of 14.[153] This high number of youth is a reflection of the high death rate of adults due to conflict and the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases. The large

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[150] SC 10699. *Burundi 'Immeasurably Different' from conflict-ravaged country of ten years ago, but decisive leadership needed to consolidate gains, Security Council told.* Department of Public Information, News and Media Division. 5 July 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10699.doc.htm

[151] For a good political and topographical map I recommend the map from the Burundi Embassy in Belgium. It can be found at http://www.burundi-embassy.be/burundi/?lang=en

[152] "Background Note: Burundi." US Department of State: Bureau of African Affairs. 2 February 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm

[153] "Africa: Burundi." Central Intelligence Agency – The World Factbook.13 July 2012. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html

population of youth also presents challenges for stability in the region as youth are some of the most vulnerable members of the population.

Religion can be a powerful motivator for the installment of peace programs, as often religious leaders are seen to have more legitimacy than government officials. Religious leaders also, generally, do not have to concern themselves with daily survival activities which in turn lends itself to the ability of these members of society to engage more fully and directly with any peace proposals. Christians make up the largest segment of the population at around 80% with the large majority being of the Roman Catholic faith. Additionally, some 15% of the population practice traditional or indigenous beliefs and the remainder, around 5%, follow the Islamic faith.[154]

Burundi is an established Republic, gaining its independence from Belgium in 1962. The modern political situation is observed through the post-transition constitution, approved nationwide on February 28, 2005. The government is divided into the executive and legislative branches with the current president, Pierre Nkurunziza, as head of the state. Notably, the constitution requires both the cabinet of the president and the legislative bodies to fill ethnic and gender quotas to ensure that the political structure engages all members of Burundi society. For example, the National Assembly is required to be 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi with a minimum of 30% of the representatives to be female.[155] Though slightly dated, the best way to envision the political system and parties of Burundi is the way in which the political and rebel groups were classified during the Arusha Peace Accords. Under the direction of then President Ndadaye, the 18 delegations attending the peace talks were organized into three groups. Generally, these can be characterized by government and pro-government groups, called the G3 then G2, Tutsi opposition parties, called the G8 then G10, and Hutu dominated parties, called the G7.[156] There are 44 total political parties registered, of which the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD- FDD), the National Forces for Liberation (FNL), the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), and the National Unity and Progress Party (UPRONA) are the most widely known and active.[157] The current Constitution outlaws discriminatory political parties and as such, these early groups reformed where applicable to non-ethnic bases party lines. However, today many of these groups still rely heavily on ethnic group support.

History of Burundi

The region that would become Burundi was first under colonial control under German East Africa in 1890. The Germans occupied much of East Africa initially, including territory that would become parts of Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. After the World War I, Germany had to surrender most of its foreign colonies and the territory designates as "Ruanda-Urundi" came under Belgian control. Belgian administration brought little real control and shows of hard power, instead leaving its colonies to all but govern themselves in tribal, chiefdom and feudal ways. Following World War II, Ruanda-Urundi was designated as a UN Trust Territory under Belgian authority. This was a significant step towards independence, and in 1948 Belgians first allowed the formation of political parties.

In 1962, after years of UN Trusteeship, Urundi was separated from Ruanda-Urundi and was granted independence as a constitutional monarchy to be ruled by King Mwami Mwambutsa IV and to be known as Burundi. It is also very noteworthy that the initial power structure within the newly formed state consisted of both Hutu and Tutsi leaders as the Parliament has a Hutu majority, but the prime minister of the government was a Tutsi. However, this was not enough to stop the coming chaos. Nearly immediately after Burundi declared its independence, the newly formed state was the scene of ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi groups.

The modern era of Burundi can be traced back to the overthrow of the monarchy that had provided ineffective rule since the Member States' independence. King Ntare V, son of Mwami Mwambutsa IV, was killed, supposedly by

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[154] "Background Note: Burundi." US Department of State: Bureau of African Affairs. 2 February 2012.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm
[155] "2011 Human Rights Report: Burundi." US Department of State. 24 May 2011
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186171.htm
[156] One of the most comprehensive documents explaining the formation and evolution of political parties in Burundi can be found using the following link. Its coverage is both broad and deep and provides pivotal insight and clarification into the modern political system of Burundi. http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2150.pdf
[157] "Background Note: Burundi." US Department of State: Bureau of African Affairs. 2 February 2012.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm

Hutus, though there is still debate over who actually assassinated the king.[158] What is certain is that the death of the king sparked one of the bloodiest reprisals in Burundi. During this time of conflict, the Burundi Worker's Party (UBU) is organized. This party is significant as it established a party with discriminatory admittance and was organized for the sole purpose of group annihilation of the Tutsi in Burundi. It was, however, the Tutsi led military that caused most of the killing in the early 1970's. Although reports vary, sources cite as many as 150,000 Hutus murdered, thousands of Tutsi killed, and hundreds of thousands of civilians turned into refugees with over 100,000 asylum seekers in Tanzania and Rwanda.

The next two decades were a scene of coup and counter-coup in the Member State with near continual ethnic strife, although it never reached the level of mass killings that occurred in the early 70's. Burundi was essentially ruled under a military, authoritarian regime for all of this period. After one successful coup by Baptiste Bagaza, the Constitution was amended to limit Burundi to a single party state which ultimately led to another coup by Pierre Buyoya resulting in another round of massacres on the Hutu populace in the late 1980's. Buyoya did lead to major advancements in democracy when Burundi first voted upon the new constitution allowing a multi-party system in 1992.

Hopes for the situation in Burundi never looked better when Melchior Ndadaye's FRODEBU won the multi-party elections and a Hutu-led government ended the military rule of the country in June of 1993. FRODEBU was an early political party formed out of the remnants of the UBU with a powerful Hutu base. This optimism would be short-lived as Tutsi soldiers assassinated Ndadaye, plummeting Burundi into one of the worst ethnic conflicts that would last many years. This is considered the second act of genocide in Burundi in which the Hutu populace killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsi. All told some 300,000 Burundians were killed with unknown multitudes that fled the Member State.[159] In 1994, Parliament appointed Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu, to the Presidency, but he was in power less than 6 months when a plane carrying him and the President of Rwanda was shot down over Kilgali. This event would trigger the infamous genocide in Rwanda and caused heightened ethnic conflict in Burundi and instability due to the situation in neighboring Rwanda. Virtual anarchy remained until Pierre Buyoya once again seized power in a coup in 1996. Two years later, Buyoya was sworn in as the President under a new transitional constitution based on power sharing term limits.[160]

The Arusha Peace Talks begin on June 15, 1998, marking the beginning of a renewed effort to bring peace to Burundi. Initially the peace talks were only successful in creating a ceasefire agreement between the government and several armed Tutsi groups while the main opposition Hutu groups, including the CNDD-FDD, refused to sign. The Arusha Peace Talks are also notable as they were mediated by South Africa and are witness to the growing concept of regional powers ushering in peace processes. By 2000, a transitional government for Burundi was being planned as part of the ongoing peace talks followed up by ceasefire agreements in 2001 and 2003 resulting in the majority of Hutu rebel groups turning from conflict. Initially, the African Union Mission to Burundi was deployed as peacekeepers while the peace talks continued, but by 2004 UN peacekeepers took over, indicating both a broader international involvement and an advanced peace process. In 2005, quotas were formed for determining positions in Burundi's government based on ethnicity in addition to the approval of a new constitution while under the Presidential leadership of Domitien Ndayizeye, a member of FRODEBU.[161] The FNL, the last major rebel Hutu group active in conflict, signed a ceasefire in 2008 and ,shortly after disarmament, became incorporated into the political system as a non-violent political party.

In February of 2006, the United Nations closed its peacekeeping operations in Burundi. The UN however, did not abandon the Member State, but transitioned its focus to that of reconstruction and peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission was tasked with Burundi in May of 2006 after the Member State requested its submission to the PBC

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[158] "Burundi profile: timeline." BBC. 6 June 2012.
    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13087604
[159] "International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report." United States Institute of Peace.
    http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Burundi-Report.pdf
    (The other genocide event the report notes is the 1972 mass killing of Hutus by Tutsi)
[160] It is important to note that while Pierre Buyoya ushered in two eras of power reformation in Burundi's political culture, he was far from a hero. He ruled as an authoritarian and under his administration Burundi's ethnic climate remained hostile.
[161] "Burundi profile: timeline." BBC. 6 June 2012.
    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13087604

through the Security Council.[162] This marked a major shift in not only the activities of the government of Burundi, but also in the involvement of regional and international partners as well as the marshaling of UN resources to build peace as the civil war was essentially over and political violence on the whole had nearly ceased. The year 2006 was the moment in which Burundi turned from a peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding operation.

The Foundation of Peacebuilding in Burundi

The peacebuilding operation in Burundi is based upon three foundational documents that came after the PBC was asked to review the situation in Burundi by the Security Council. These three documents are elemental to the peace process calling upon many parties and actions as necessary to the process. They consist of (1) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, (2) the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, and finally (3) the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism and accompanying matrix.[163] It is through the lens of these documents that peacebuilding under the direction of the PBC and CSC of Burundi shall be evaluated and altered as necessary to achieve a sustainable peace.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Finalized in September of 2006, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) seeks to identify the main causes of poverty within the Member State and use that information in a pragmatic way to promote a growth strategy that will be both sustainable and unique in its approach. Macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs are evaluated and used to build a strategy for combating poverty, and implemented by the Member State with input from relevant actors and the World Bank and IMF. Since the publication of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, two progress reports have been completed in March 10, 2009 and February 22, 2011. These documents will be crucial to understanding the evolving role of poverty in Burundi and its impact on the peace process.

Burundi's PRSP first must identify the reason or need to develop a comprehensive strategy to reduce poverty in the Member State. Burundi is crippled in almost every capacity by the burden of its extreme poverty. At the time the PRSP was presented, 81% of the citizens of Burundi live below the poverty line. The economic situation in Burundi is dire with nearly every sector identified as in need of targeted growth and recovery projects. In particular it is noted that the state has insufficient production and familial incomes, low levels of international assistance and investment with note to Foreign Direct Investment, there is heavy pressure on the state's cash flow and reserves, as well as the state's extremely limited public resources, and it is well recognized that the episodes of conflict have essentially depleted the Member State's human resource base. These factors coupled with the complete lack of social services in some areas, and difficulty in receiving basic social services such as basic education and low literacy rates, health care access and affordability, potable water and sanitation, food security, and housing problems in many others create a quagmire making it difficult for Burundi to effectively address the high prevalence of poverty. The PRSP provides the newly, democratically elected government with a powerful tool to avert a continued economic crisis, placing emphasis on reconstruction of a viable living situation for the vast majority of Burundians after decades of conflict.

The PRSP identifies seven major obstacles to poverty reduction and economic growth, ranging from continued political turmoil and conflict resolution, and the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, to the instability of the country's macroeconomic framework. The paper presents medium and long-term visions for the expansion of the economic sector and the stability of the Member State to encourage economic growth and output while incorporating international standards such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's). The most important section of the PRSP is its identification of four strategic axes upon which poverty in Burundi can be eliminated. The four elemental axes are (1) improving governance and security, (2) promoting and sustainable and equitable economic growth, (3) developing human capital and (4) combating HIV/AIDS within Burundi. The implementation of action on the axes is to be done by technical ministries, community organizations, NGO's, civil society, the

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[162] PBC/1/OC/2. Peacebuilding Commission.
   http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/bur/key_docs/letter_referral_sc.pdf
[163] Links provided to the documents.
   Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi: http://betterpeace.org/node/117
   Poverty Reduction Strategy: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Burundi_PRSP(Sept-2006).pdf
   Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism: http://betterpeace.org/node/784

private sector in conjunction with aid from development partners. These groups must rely on institutional frameworks put in place by the Government of Burundi and its assessments and monitoring indicators on the impact of growth, development and output projects. Examining these areas and their links to the reduction of poverty and its influence on the sustainable nature of peace in Burundi provides the first platform for building peace in Burundi. Burundi, once again, has demonstrated its ability to implement growth strategies that are effective, and in response to such activities, the IMF and World Bank waived 424 million USD debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in January 2009.[164] Without the fight against poverty the peace process cannot advance as economic situations are one of the foremost reasons for a Member State to relapse into conflict once again.

The Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi

On 30 July 2007, the most important document in the peace process was approved by the PBC. After months of deliberation and meetings, debates and compromise the PBC and the government of Burundi along with support from in-country partners, international partners and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi established the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.[165] A few crucial points can be made about the Strategic Framework with the first being that the document was not the product of a single group or organization or even government, but a collaborative effort of "key stakeholders."[166] Additionally, the document identifies national ownership and partnerships of all efforts in the Member State as key to the success of the peacebuilding work. The Strategic Framework identifies these areas as pivotal to both implementing the Framework and sustaining the peace process in Burundi. Another very important point brought forward by the Framework is that limiting the number of future documents on strategies for peacebuilding in Burundi would allow both the government and partners to focus more specifically on the Strategic Framework. In essence the Strategic Framework presents a broad and comprehensive strategy to building a culture of peace and removing the wounds of war in Burundi.

As written in the Framework itself, "[t]he present Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi reflects the mutual commitments of the Government and its partners to work together to overcome challenges and eliminate threats to building a sustainable peace within the framework of a continuing, transparent and flexible dialogue."[167]

The first area that the Strategic Framework tackles is Objectives. Six areas of import were identified to be the basis for all future projects in the Member State. For the sake of brevity, the committee may identify these areas as:
> (1) Promoting good governance;
> (2) Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and PALIPEHUTU-FNL;[168]
> (3) Security Sector;
> (4) Justice, promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity;
> (5) The land issue and the socio-economic recovery;
> (6) Gender Dimension.

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[164] "2011 Human Rights Report: Burundi." US Department of State. 24 May 2011
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186171.htm

[165] PBC 1/BDI/4. *Identical letters dated 21 June 2007 from the Chairman of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the President of the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council.* Peacebuilding Commission.

[166] Key Stakeholders are defined in the Strategic Framework as civil society organizations, the private sector, religious communities, political parties, UN agencies and bi-lateral and multi-lateral partners.

[167] PBC 1/BDI/4. *Identical letters dated 21 June 2007 from the Chairman of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the President of the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council.* Peacebuilding Commission.

[168] The PALIPEHUTU-FNL has, since 2007, agreed to lay down arms. Additionally, in 2008 the group renamed itself to simply FNL, noting a shift from an ethnic based group to a political party. By 2009, the FNL was a full functioning member of the political system in Burundi and engaged in the 2010 elections. Generally speaking, the FNL has been fully incorporated into the political fabric of Burundi and as such the CSC will consider this objective fully complete. Since this objective is considered fulfilled in entirety this paper will not take a detailed look at the challenges and risks associated with this objective. The Challenges and Obstacles to Sustainable Peace, however, will cite growing political violence as a hindrance to the peace process in which case the committee may choose to reevaluate the second objective of the Strategic Framework.

Understanding fully the objectives and a detailed account of the most volatile areas is necessary for the advancement of the Country-Specific Configuration. This section will be a breakdown of the challenges and risks posed to the objectives.[169] In regard to the first area: promoting good governance, the fragility of democracy and democratic institutions is the central idea. Specifically, strengthening the culture of democracy is important as democratic governments have failed multiple times in the political history of the Member State. Because of this failure the people of Burundi have very little trust in their government and the idea of a social contract is all but non-existent. The government is inundated with corruption, poor public services, substandard performance and a past of ethnic favoritism. In fact, the 2011 Human Rights Report, by the US Department of State, asserts that, "corruption exists at all levels of government."[170] This decreases the legitimacy of the government which must be restored, but can only be done through proper action taken by the Member State of Burundi. Such actions to increase the legitimacy would include, but not limited to, increasing social services, fairness in granting government contracts and equitable distribution of resources. Additionally, the reintegration of refugees and IDP's, while a goal in and of itself, may also undermine the fragile stability of communities with locally elected leaders.

In considering the security sector; the PBC identified two key elements of any peace process: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR). In dealing with these concepts, the CSC has pointed to the reorganization of the National Defense Force (FDN) and the National Police as crucial because these bodies have historically been based on ethnic hierarchies. In addition, 20,000 rebel combatants needed to be disarmed or incorporated into the police or army in order to build an ethnically diverse force that would hopefully eliminate ethnic targeting. A major challenge in SSR is reforming the security sector to act in the best interest of all citizens, not just a segment of the population. Many human rights violations, including rape, occur from elements of the national security forces that act in a deviant manner or are rogue elements of their national structure. The economics of Burundi also play a huge role here. As tens of thousands of rebels are attempting reintegration into society there are few economic opportunities awaiting the former combatants.[171]

The next area: justice, promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity; may be among the most difficult of the objectives as it is difficult to quantify and in many cases lacks measures to ascertain the development of these concepts. First and foremost, Burundi is in peril due to the lack of an independent judiciary. The resulting consequences create a spiral of injustice within the Member State. Moreover, the lack of a transitional justice structure cripples Burundi as these structures tend to focus on four elements crucial to conflict resolution: truth, justice, reconciliation and forgiveness. Out of these, the most important is reconciliation. Without the ability of the citizens of Burundi have any post-conflict reconciliation leads to the incendiary notion of impunity. Impunity, defined as exemption or freedom from punishment, harm or loss, could be the most destructive aspect that lingers in a society after a conflict, especially conflicts like those in Burundi where crimes against humanity, rape, torture and child soldiers were used.[172] Impunity, thus leads to a sense of the need for vigilante justice to redress wrongs, removing the legitimacy of any judicial structures. With impunity of crimes committed, citizens often feel that the justice system has let them down and therefore feel that they must act independently to bring about a sense of fairness and in some cases retribution.

At the creation of the Strategic Framework, there were some 260,000 returnees in Burundi without land, and through that narrow lens it is possible to view the scope and magnitude of the land issue and the socio-economic recovery. Much of the land of these returnees is now occupied by others or part of Member State infrastructure and cannot be simply 'given' back to the returnees. As previously noted, Burundi lacks large areas of land that have not been developed and is one of the most densely populated states in Africa, again pointing to the land issue as a possible catalyst for future conflict. The economy of Burundi is in shambles. With nearly a constant state of warfare since 1962, economic decline is prevalent. In fact, economic decline has been steady since 1995. Women and youth are particularly vulnerable in Burundi's economic situation where they lack access to markets and employment. The

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[169] This section is not meant to stand alone. It is imperative that delegates understand the challenges and risks that are covered in the Strategic Framework and outlined in this paper, but that they also examine other PBC conclusions on the Strategic Framework to identify areas that may have not been considered in 2007 or that have become issues since the publication of this document.

[170] "2011 Human Rights Report: Burundi." US Department of State. 24 May 2011
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186171.htm

[171] Geoff Burt and Chelsea Plante (contributors). "Burundi: Country Profile." Security Sector Reform Resource Centre.
http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Country-Profile-Burundi-May-11.pdf

[172] Merriam-Webster. Online Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impunity

Strategic Framework identifies the need for large yet targeted recovery projects on some of the most urgent areas of economic development, and that any economic reforms must be alongside "basic social protections." If not handled, economic decline, food insecurity, lack of employment, pressure from returnees and frustration with IDP's could be a flashpoint for violence that could quickly escalate to the local, regional and national level. Notably, the Strategic Framework warns against the privatization of enterprises within Burundi.

In order to achieve the goals of the CSC, a sustainable peace must be put into place. This cannot be done without the mobilization and coordination of international assistance and a subregional dimension of the post-conflict world in Burundi and the surrounding areas. Simply put, Burundi has not received the required support needed to address critical challenges it faces in the wake of a post-conflict situation. Two key terms are at the basis of the ideological and developmental disagreement between Burundi and its international partners. This is the principle of additionality and conditionality – defined as what extra assistance will Burundi receive from the international partners to achieve goals and duties outlined in the peace process and development and what measures will be placed on the assistance given to the Burundi by those Member States, respectively.[173] These key fundamentals underscore the divergent views that the two groups take toward each other while also underpinning the adversarial role that exists. In essence, Burundi must find solutions to its structure problems and international partners must release funds immediately or Burundi runs the chance of being caught in a dire political, economic and eventually social situation. The conflict in Burundi, from the 1960's to the 2000's, was exacerbated by conflicts in neighboring states, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. Just as the region once promoted instability, steps can be taken to regionally secure the area and find multi-state answers to the questions of economic output and trade. Without engaging neighboring Member States there can be no real solution to the hundreds of thousands if not millions of IDP's, refugees and returnees.

Unequivocally, the gender dimension cannot be understated. Women must be a priority in the culture of any Member State that seeks to legitimize itself in the eyes of its people. Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security identify gender equity as essential to any post-conflict state and essential in halting a Member State from returning to conflict. Laws that are discriminatory, such as those dealing with in heritance, gifts and marital property, must be dismantled in full. Rape as an act of war also must be addressed and it is important to again consider the impunity of the transgressors of this reprehensible act. The full empowerment of women in social, political and economic aspects is of the highest concern to the CSC, the PBC and the government of Burundi.

Objectives, analysis of major challenges and identification of risks portion stands as the true substance of the document, yet that does not diminish the latter portion, mutual engagements. This area is, for all intents and purposes, a contract guaranteeing what each major group involved in the building of the Strategic Framework commits to act upon in order to achieve the objectives outlined previously. Four groupings are used to define the various organizations involved, identified as the Government of Burundi, The Peacebuilding Commission, International Partners and Stakeholders, each broken down into subgroups with specific actions required. The Mutual Engagements section is imperative in ascertaining the progress and effectiveness of each grouping.

Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism

The Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism was the final major document to establish a sustainable foundation for peace in Burundi. The Mechanism is to be used in conjunction with the Strategic Framework to ensure implementation of the Strategic Framework in full by laying out a process for in-country evaluation and review and support in doing so by the PBC and UN offices in New York. The Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism consists of three main parts: (1) Partners Coordination Group in Burundi which is the monitoring structure, (2) the matrix and progress reports which help to establish the rate of success or failure of implementation of the objectives and mutual engagements of the Strategic Framework and (3) review meetings of the PBC and other groups which evaluate the progress reports and matrix in order to encourage implementation and support from international partners. Through these three major devices the CSC of Burundi attempts to be able to set standards for peacebuilding and ensure that the people of Burundi have the means to transition to a culture of peace through the institutionalization process defined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Strategic Framework.

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[173] Brent R. Hendricks and Lakshman D. Guruswamy. *International Environmental Law in a Nutshell*. 1997.

The Partners Coordination Groups in Burundi is "to serve as a dedicated framework for the dialogue, coordination and monitoring for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Strategic Framework."[174] Emphasis is placed on the ability of these groups to be both flexible and pragmatic in nature in order to best deal with the evolution of the peace process in Burundi. A guide below lays out the structure of the Partners Coordination Groups and their main purpose with regard to the PBC and CSC of Burundi.

The Matrix and Progress Reports identified within the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism seek to monitor both the implementation of the mutual engagements of the Strategic Framework and the contributions contained within, ensuring that all parties abide by their respective requirements for the realization of the Strategic Framework. In addition, the matrix will provide a basis for the biannual report that the Political Forum will provide to the PBC. This annual report is of the utmost importance as it is the document that is used by the PBC in motivating international partners to assist in the peace process. The CSC, under the requirements of the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism, will also be required to hold, at minimum, two 'high level' review meetings each year. These meetings will constitute the dissemination of information gained from the Partners Coordination Groups by the way of reviewing progress in achieving the objectives and mutual engagements of the Strategic Framework with a particular emphasis on the contributions, both monetary and non-monetary, and to serve as a forum for drawing in a larger pool of support for Burundi in developing the Strategic Framework. The final portion of the document, the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism, identifies the priority areas and risks (those have already been reviewed in the Strategic Framework) then further sets benchmarks, indicators and engagements of the Government of Burundi, the PBC and other relevant partners – knowing understanding these charts will be key to the work of the CSC in reviewing the situation in Burundi.

Challenges and Obstacles to Sustainable Peace

The ability to implement a peace plan is often met with much difficulty. This section will shed light on some areas that pose the greatest risk to undermining the future success of the foundational peace documents. In looking at these events and thematic aspects, the CSC can build a plan to mitigate against such problems. Not all problem areas have been included, but a starting point for many of Burundi's most urgent problems are laid out in order to influence the work of the CSC in mitigating and responding to evolving crises that present a problem with the full implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, and the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism.

It is also worth noting that the success of several aspects of the Strategic Framework have been completed, such as the ceasefire agreement with PALIPEHUTU-FNL which has subsequently been disarmed and reformed into a political party, now simply titled FNL. And, in fact, the Security Council in 2012 stated that since the involvement of both the Council and subsequent PBC participation that in Burundi, "…an elected President had been able to complete his tenure, the refugee camps were emptying and the country was in a period of reconciliation and reconstruction."[175] These successes are an important measure of the impact of the peace plan, but are not included as these events are contained within the progress reports and conclusions of the Security Council, CSC and PBC.

The government, in an attempt to curb and restore a sense of justice due to the egregious number of extrajudicial and unsolved killings, directed all prosecutors to open files and follow all murder cases, regardless of whether or not a suspect was in custody.[176] This action was taken in September of 2010, just prior to the formation of the National Independent Human Rights Commission (CNIDH), and, as a result, it is clear that the government itself is attempting to battle rampant extrajudicial executions and a sense of impunity. The CNIDH was established by the national parliament as a means to investigate extrajudicial executions. During the year the CNIDH exercised power over sectors and members of leadership either responsible for or responsible for the cover up of the killings.[177] This

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[174] PBC/2/BDI/4. *Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.* Peacebuilding Commission. 27 November 2007.

[175] SC 10699. *Burundi 'Immeasurably Different' from conflict-ravaged country of ten years ago, but decisive leadership needed to consolidate gains, Security Council told.* Department of Public Information, News and Media Division. 5 July 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10699.doc.htm

[176] "2011 Human Rights Report: Burundi." US Department of State. 24 May 2011 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186171.htm

[177] Ibid.

Commission and other similar bodies are effective in Burundian society, but they are new and still have only just began to uncover and investigate many crimes. The bodies also require more support both on the national and international level in terms of finance, structure and most importantly institutional memory and legitimacy of the people.[178]

One area that Burundi has struggled with is in the creation of a sense of reconciliation of its people. The Arusha Peace Accords called for a commission to take place in 2003, and in 2005 the Security Council further encouraged the government of Burundi to establish such a commission for peace and justice, "as soon as possible."[179] The Security Council even adopted SC Resolution 1602 (2005) encourage the creation of an independent commission to examine the crimes committed since 1962.[180] President Nkurunziza and the government submitted plans for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to examine crimes committed during the country's conflicts since its independence in 1962.[181] A government committee was tasked with the creation of a TRC in October and by December of 2011 the report was made available to in-country and international partners. The commission would address the unresolved political and ethnic tensions that are a result of decades of conflict, especially in dealing with the two episodes of genocide that have occurred within the Member State. At the time of writing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has not begun work. Again, Burundi requires much more assistance in building a fully functional and effective TRC, with noted emphasis on international assistance from Member States that have built successful TRC's and in the financing of such a nationwide commission.

Since the 2010 elections there has been a marked upsurge in politically motivated violence within Burundi. A cycle of violence, consisting of killings of opposition sympathizers followed by the killings of ruling party sympathizers, renewed the concept of retribution killings in Burundi. The most widespread cases were between members of the ruling, CNDD-FDD and the FNL.[182] The United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) estimates that between 50 and 400 people have been killed in politically motivated violence since the elections in 2010.[183] Mostly responsible for the exacerbation of these killings is the complete lack of an independent judiciary. The lack of judicial process has lead to the vast majority of perpetrators of this violence to avoid, and in some cases protected from, arrest, the filing of charges, or even a trial even in cases in which the attackers can be identified by eye-witnesses. Exceptional cases of what is termed 'blanket impunity' are most prevalent in cases in which links to the ruling party, CNDD-FDD, or security forces are present. The 2011 Human Rights Report on Burundi even charged that, "The general reluctance and slowness of police and public prosecutors to investigate and prosecute--and of judges to hear--cases of government corruption and human rights abuse led to a widespread perception of impunity for government and ruling CNDD-FDD party officials and agents. In many cases investigative and judicial officials hesitated to act as a result of bribes or threats to themselves or their families."[184] The victims of the majority of these attacks have been former rebels with the FNL or current party members of the FNL. A Human Rights Report notes, "Not only has the state failed to take reasonable steps to ensure security and provide protection for its citizens, it has also not fulfilled its duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent and prosecute these types of crimes."[185] The difference with the type of political violence taking place now is twofold. First, these are occurring after the second round of elections after the civil war, noting what should be a more stable society. And secondly, these actions for the most part are concentrated in and around Bujumbura and are targeted killings of usually one or two individuals.

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[178] "Burundi: Strengthen Support for National Human Rights Commission." Human Rights Watch. 6 October 2011.
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/06/burundi-strengthen-support-national-human-rights-commission

[179] SC 8506. *Security Council encourages establishment of 'Partners Forum' for peace, reconciliation in Burundi 'as soon as possible.* Department of Public Information: News and Media Division. 22 September 2005.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8506.doc.htm

[180] S/RES/1606. *Security Council Resolution 1602 (2005) on Burundi.* Security Council. 31 May 2005.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,BDI,,42bc1a174,0.html

[181] "You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living." Human Rights Watch. 2 May 2012.
http://www.hrw.org/node/106509/section/12

[182] "World Report 2012: Burundi." Human Rights Watch. January 2012.
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-burundi

[183] "Gatumba: An escalation, not an anomaly." United Nations Office in Burundi. 21 September 2011.
http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2961&ctl=Details&mid=5312&Itemid=3442&language=en-US

[184] "2011 Human Rights Report: Burundi." US Department of State. 24 May 2011
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186171.htm

[185] "You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living." Human Rights Watch. 2 May 2012.
http://www.hrw.org/node/106509/section/12

There has been a recent escalation in the violence in Burundi. On September 18, 2011 the deadliest attack on civilians occurred since the end of the last civil war. A total of 37 people were killed and another 26 were injured in the massacre. While most of the victims seem to have had no or little political affiliation, a mass killing of this magnitude has been linked to the political activities of the perpetrators. It is worth noting that Gatumba was the site of the 2004 massacre in which FNL members killed 150 Congolese refugees, but since then the area had prospered under a welcome peace. The massacre occurred at a bar, *Chez les amis*, and transpired when several gunmen burst into the bar in military and civilian clothing and began indiscriminately killing those inside. The scene was that of complete chaos for 20 to 30 minutes as the perpetrators used firearms, grenades and even a knife to kill those in the bar.[186]

One eye-witness described the scene to the Human Rights Watch researcher in Bujumbura in October, just two months after the attack. (Warning: this is a disturbing personal account, but one that underscores the prevalence of violence and disregard for human life that the PBC works against)

> *They said: "come here!" [...] One of them held his gun opposite my head. I tried to stand up and asked: "what did you say?" I had hardly finished my sentence when they shot at my head. The bullet hit the fridge. I fell down. They thought I was dead. They started going out. I tried to stand up and they saw I wasn't dead. They came back and shot again, but the bullet didn't touch me. It went over my shoulder. It hit the woman in the chest and she died [....] When the shooting first started, the woman was running with the baby, but the baby tripped on a step. The baby was killed after the mother. They grabbed the baby by both arms, took a knife and slit its throat, chest and stomach. I saw it [....] One was talking, the other was holding the gun [...] The one who was talking was giving the orders. After trying to shoot me, he said "we've finished" and they went to leave.[187]*

Though the government's response was unusually public and swift, it was marred by inconsistency and erroneous deadlines. Sixteen individuals were found guilty though most, including the Human Rights Watch, speculate that these men were tried as scapegoats and the true perpetrators remain at large.[188]

As is clear by grievous nature of these problems, Burundi has many areas that need critical attention. In evaluating these problems, the issue of an independent and fully functioning judiciary, impunity for crimes, and the growing political violence in the Member State threaten to throw Burundi back into chaos and potentially return it to conflict. By examining the progress reports and conclusions prepared by the PBC and CSC, it is possible to see the transformation of post-conflict Burundi. Yet, all is not well within the post-conflict Member State – the areas of concern must be addressed by the configuration to prevent such a stalling of the peace plan and in the worst case, a return to conflict.

Conclusions

Burundi, one of the original two mandates of the PBC, presents years of diligent work in creating a lasting peace by the Member State government, the PBC, affiliated UN agencies, international and in-country partners, as well as the resolve of the citizens of Burundi. Yet, peace, as has been stated many times, is not simply the absence of conflict, but is a state of being, one in which dialogue, progress and equity reign. Through this notion, it is clear that Burundi, despite this work, still requires much work in sustaining peace. Just as all conflicts are unique, so too must its peace solutions be catered to a specific environment. In building this peace, the CSC must remain conscious of the long and bloody history of Burundi, particularly the two episodes of genocide, its environment and most importantly, its people. A foundation of peace has been laid with the formation of the major three peacebuilding documents, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, and the

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[186] "World Report 2012: Burundi." Human Rights Watch. January 2012.
    http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-burundi
[187] "You Will Not Have Peace While You Are Living." Human Rights Watch. 2 May 2012.
    http://www.hrw.org/node/106509/section/12
[188] Ibid.

Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism and accompanying matrix. Yet, the CSC must continually review and assess the implementation and effectiveness of such works. And finally, it is apparent that for all of its successes, the peace in Burundi is not without both challenges and obstacles ranging from economic decline to lack of an independent judiciary. Leaders, especially opposition party members, find themselves threatened and in many cases extra judicial executions have occurred; there is a despicable sense of impunity and lack of development of independent commissions to address human rights abuses, crimes against humanity and national reconciliation.

Committee Directive

The committee shall function as the Country-Specific Configuration for Burundi. In doing so the committee shall take upon itself the challenge of reviewing, in detail, the three peace documents, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism, in order to craft a Sixth Conclusion on the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.

 "The Peacebuilding Commission reiterates its determination to provide unflagging support to Burundi in the consolidation of peace with a view to securing a future that is free from fear and free from want."[189]

In crafting the Sixth Conclusion on the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, delegates are required to research and evaluate the accompanying updates and progress reports in order to gain a perspective of the evolution of the peace process in Burundi. The challenges and obstacles reflected in the previous section will be pivotal in deciding which areas the PBC, the Government of Burundi and relevant partners must renew their commitments and mutual engagements. It is also the responsibility of the delegates to have insight into the necessary funding mechanisms available for peacebuilding as well as the sources of financing that have been acquired in order to enact the Strategic Framework's objectives. The Sixth Conclusion on the Strategic Framework will be in a hybrid resolution/report and fashioned after the previous five conclusions. The Country-Specific Configuration, we must remember, is a policy and oversight body and as such evaluates the conditions in Burundi. It is necessary for the advancement of peacebuilding in Burundi that the CSC examine the causes of lack of fulfillment of the objectives and mutual engagements, make recommendations to advance those stalled areas and finally note any new issues that may require an update of the three fundamental documents, while referring any such policies to the appropriate body.

The task of the Country-Specific Configuration is not an easy one, but the CSC of Burundi presents an opportunity to witness and be involved in some of the most effective peacebuilding strategies that have ever been implemented. It is upon the delegates to discuss, debate, and decide which areas are functioning properly, what areas require further support, and how to proceed moving into the second decade of the twenty-first century.

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[189] PBC 1/BDI/4. *Identical letters dated 21 June 2007 from the Chairman of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission to the President of the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council.* Peacebuilding Commission.

Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)

I. Organizational Committee, Nagorno-Karabakh Region

Charles van der Leeuw. *Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity: A Short History*. St. Martin's Press, New York. 2000.

> This book is one of the first full histories of the region written in English. Here, van der Leeuw is able to craft a document full of pertinent information about the history of development, political and social transformations in Azerbaijan. The book has a clear bias towards Azerbaijan, but any delegate wishing to know more about the historical roots of the conflict must read this work.

Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian, and Claude Mutafian. *The Caucasian Knot: The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh*. Zed Books, United Kingdom. 1994.

> The authors of this work do an excellent job of tying the history of particularly ethnic Armenians to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. They trace conquests of the regions from early antiquity to the most recent conquest by the Soviet Union, detailing the account of ethnic Armenians' interactions with their conquerors. This source heavily favors the Armenian side of the conflict narrative and also, due to its publication date, speaks more to historical fact than modern political situations.

"The Global Peace Building Strategy." The World Peace Festival. 2012. http://www.worldpeacefestival.org/world-peace-partnership/global-peacebuilding-strategy/global-peace-building-strategy-gpbs

> Launched the inaugural World Peace Fstival in 2011, the Global Peace Building Strategy (GPBS) is an unprecedented effort to create a worldwide strategy to build positive peace and ways to circumvent violence and conflict in our society. Of particular importance is the "7 Programmes" which lay out seven distinct areas of global challenges to the spread of peace. These areas, such as financing; gender equity; youth engagement; and arms, may be useful in developing a plan for the post-conflict situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

"Annual Report: Azerbaijan 2010." Amnesty International. 28 May 2010. http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-azerbaijan-2010

> Amnesty International may be the most well recognized NGO dealing with human rights abuses throughout the globe. In the 2010 Annual Report the organization lays out areas of promise and challenges of Azerbaijan in human rights. In the report there is a large amount of research and reporting done not only on the Nagorno-Karabakh War and its effects, but also the lasting problems of the war such as refugees and IDP's.

"Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh." Human Rights Watch. December 1994. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf

> This report from the neutral Human Rights Watch is valuable in tracing how the underlying mistrust of ethnic Armenians and Azeris led to full scale war. The document provides pivotal insight into the people of the region. Human Rights Watch researchers have included several eye-witness reports and through such information a unique, grass-roots feel can be gained into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Tabib Huseynov. Peace and Conflict Development. "Mountainous Karabakh: Conflict resolution through Power-sharing and Regional Integration." January 2005.

http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/Mountainous%20Karabakh%20final%20version%20edited%203.pdf

        Huseynov relates the challenges in terminating one of the most protracted conflicts in the modern era. Specifically, Huseynov, argues that the conflict requires intra and inter-state measures to bring the conflict to finality. He also points to the importance of power-sharing, national dialogue, and lays out a three step solution to the issue of ethnic mistrust and political violence.

II. Working Group on Lessons Learned, Central African Republic

Institute for Global Policy. "The Central African Republic Engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission: The Future Engagement." March 2012.
        http://www.betterpeace.org/files/PBC_CAR_Engagement_with_PBC_Future_Engagement_March2012.pdf
        This document provides a good thumbnail of many of the frameworks and tools discussed as well as further statistical data regarding the PBC mission in the CAR.

Louisa Lombard. "Central African Republic: Peacebuilding Without Peace." June 2011.
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/130559/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/c926749a-3926-439e-ac75-ffb5af6dbae2/en/2011C15_lombard_ks.pdf
        This article provides a valuable critique to the efforts of the PBC to promote accountability in governance as well as free and fair elections.

Dr. A. Sarjoh Bah. "Long-term Peacebuilding in Africa: Challenges for the United Nations." November, 2009.
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/docs/bah_Symposium_UnivofDenver.pdf
        In his presentation on sustainable peacebuilding, Dr. Bah presents an important argument that peacebuilding must be regarded as a political process, not a technical process.

"Human Security and Peacebuilding in Africa: The Need for an Inclusive Approach." United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa. December, 2009.
http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/human_security_peacebuilding_africa.pdf
        An excellent and detailed argument for why peacebuilding must be a holistic endeavor. This report also provides excellent insight into peacebuilding operations in both the CAR and Burundi.

"Mission Reviews: Central Africa." *Review of Political Missions 2011*. The Center On International Cooperation. New York University. http://www.cic.nyu.edu/politicalmissions/docs_missions_11/reviews/centralafrica.pdf
        Along with providing excellent statistical information, this publication gives a very comprehensive examination of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts throughout central Africa, and examines the ways in which the UN has begun to shift from military to political engagements to address conflicts in the region.

www.BetterPeace.org
        This website provides an easy set of links to information not only on all of the activities of the PBC, but also has the latest news on UN PBC activities and press releases.

III. Country-Specific Configuration, Burundi

Desmond Tutu. "No Future Without Forgiveness." 1999. In: David P. Barash (editor). *Approaches to Peace: A reader in peace studies.* New York, Oxford: University of Oxford Press. 2010.
        Bishop Desmond Tutu is one of the world's most renowned 'peace celebrities' through the direction of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africa's model of TRC is the roadmap used by all subsequent commissions. Additionally, Tutu speaks to the need for reconciliation and about how must choose forgiveness over animosity or else prepare for a future of violence rather than one of peace and prosperity. Any true scholar of peace must read his words.

"Introduction: Economic Recovery Strategies: Strategies & Models." International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. peacebuilding*initiative*. 2007-2008.
http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1906

> There is no debate that economic recovery is an essential element in building a sustainable society and even more so this rings true with Burundi. The peacebuilding*initiative* lays out a map to help guide states in post-conflict situations transition to economies that can support a peace process. Interestingly, the article points to five target areas for economic growth that may work in Burundi's case.

The Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA)
http://www.ossrea.net/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1

> The OSSREA is a quality example of an international and regional partner that may be used in post-conflict situations to help establish institution building and national capacity for post-conflict states. It is headquartered in Ethiopia and is already active in Burundi as well as most of East Africa. Its true goal is to support research and dialogue on how to raise East Africa from its current situation. Many documents and briefs may be of use in the site's archives.

PBC/5/BDI/2. *Outcome of the fifth review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi.* Peacebuilding Commission. 26 April 2011.
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/5/BDI/2

> This document shows the last effort by the PBC to review the Strategic Framwork. Delegates may use this as a guide of sorts to help construct their report on Burundi. The report is especially valuable in ascertaining the development of the Strategic Framework and its current challenges far removed from the initial crafting of the Strategic Framework.

PBC/5/BDI/3. *Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi: Fifth progress report.* Peacebuilding Commission. 26 March 2011.
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=PBC/5/BDI/3

> This concise brief is just as crucial as the "Outcome" and actually lays out the advances made in each strategic area of Burundi better than the previous document. The PBC has written this document for the Member States and the CSC specifically to develop strategies to combat the short-comings of the Strategic Framework. Also, a list of acronyms is included which will make understanding the groups and organizations in Burundi's peace plan that much easier.

Mapping of Resources and Gaps for the Implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. The Peacebuilding Commission. 23 June 2008.
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/bur/key_docs/mapping_resources_bur.pdf

> Completed just one year after the publishing of the Strategic Framework, the Mapping of Resources and Gaps is more of a financial measure of action. This document points to the macro=economic environment of Burundi and also looks at over 150 individual peace proposals and initiatives that are currently underway. The most important aspect of this report is in determining the areas which require the most financial assistance.