

## Southern Regional Model United Nations, Atlanta 2012

### *From Crisis to Opportunity: Chartering a Path Forward for Global Self-Sustainability*

November 15-17, 2012 - Atlanta, GA

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Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Southern Regional Model United Nations Conference (SRMUN) XXIII. My name is Jim Lewis and I will serve as your Director for this simulation of The Arab League. I will be assisted by Ms. Lucie Bowman.

I work in Washington, D.C. as the chief media contact for a manufacturing trade association. Additionally, I serve as the Communications Director for the Virginia Young Democrats. I'm a graduate of The College of William and Mary where I competed on three WorldMUN teams winning Diplomacy Awards at all three (2008-2010.) I have been involved in Model United Nations for over 5 years, including as William and Mary's Head Delegate (2009-2010). My educational background is in international relations and biology. Lucie Bowman is a political science and history student at Western Carolina University and has been involved in Model United Nations since high school. We are excited to have her serve as Assistant Director.

The League of Arab States was formed in 1945 to allow for a political forum and collective voice for Arab states. We have developed three timely and critical topics that are currently facing The Arab League.

- I. Responding to External Threats to Arab State and Regional Economies;
- II. The Coming Resource Wars: Mitigating the Conflict over Natural and Economic Resources; and
- III. State Building and the LAS: Examining the LAS Response to Recent Regime Changes in Arab States.

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper which covers each of the three topics. Position papers should be no longer than 2 pages in length and single spaced. The objective of the position paper is to convince and persuade the members of your committee that the approach outlined in your paper is the best course of action. The position papers are therefore critical in providing insight into not only the policies and positions of each country, but should also provide insight into the direction each country will undertake in providing solutions to the challenges of this body.

Delegates are encouraged to use the position papers as an opportunity to state what your country plans to accomplish in this committee. Strong, well developed position papers are an excellent foundation for conference preparation. It is important to ensure all sides of each issue are adequately addressed and presented in a clear and concise manner that is easy for your audience to understand. More detailed information about how to write position papers can be found at the SRMUN website ([www.srmun.org](http://www.srmun.org)). **Please note that position papers MUST be submitted by October 26, 2012 at 11:59pm EST via the on-line submission system at <http://www.srmun.org>.**

Over the last year, a specific amount of upheaval has shaken the Arab world. The League has taken action on many of these developments, but still stands at a crossroads. Our simulation will follow the position, acts and policies of the Arab League until the start of the simulation. After that point, the simulation will continue independently of actions in the "real world" unless otherwise noted by the Board of Directors or the Executive Staff.

I look forward to seeing you all in November and working with you towards a successful simulation. If we can be of any assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Warmest regards –

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## Committee History of the League of Arab States

Established on March 22 1945, the League of Arab States is a regional organization seeking to “strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States.”<sup>1</sup> The concept for such an organization developed three years earlier when the United Kingdom first began promoting the idea of forming an Arab League as a policy to garner Arab alliances during World War II.<sup>2</sup> This British promotion of a league of Arabic states eventually came to fruition at a conference in Alexandria, Egypt in October 1944. The agreement between “official representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan (Jordan) and Arab community in British Mandate Palestine”<sup>3</sup> established the Alexandria Protocol, an agreement to form a League of Arab States and promising “cooperation in economic, cultural, social and other matters” and “consolidation of these ties in the future.”<sup>4</sup> Five months later, the seven States formed the Pact of the League of Arab States; officially inaugurating the League of Arab States.

The early years of the LAS were dominated by two key issues – Israel/Palestine and colonialism. As early as 1945, Palestine’s Jewish population was at the forefront of LAS discussion.<sup>5</sup> The LAS adamantly committed to the prevention of a Jewish state by the Jewish population in Palestine.<sup>6</sup> The other recurring topic for LAS was those few Arabic countries who still found themselves under colonial rule and how to free those states.<sup>7</sup> Other treaties were inaugurated which solidified the LAS as an organized and united unit. The Cultural Treaty, signed in 1945 promotes “intellectual and spiritual affinity among nationals of Arab countries,” as well as “universal education and raising the cultural standard of their peoples.”<sup>8</sup> The 1948 Arab Postal Union brought more solidarity to governmental institutions.<sup>9</sup> The year 1948 also brought the Arab-Israeli War and an attempt to capture Jerusalem by Transjordan’s Arab Legion.<sup>10</sup> The conflict lasted only six days but left the city divided and set a stormy tone for Arab-Israeli relations.

In 1950, the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty was signed and established the Economic and Social Council within the Arab League. The council is responsible for promoting and achieving the economic and social goals of LAS and its agencies.<sup>11</sup> The world began to take notice of the LAS and a 1950 United Nations General Assembly resolution requested the Secretary-General of the Arab League be invited to attend sessions as an observer.<sup>12</sup>

By 1958, the league had gained four new members and was recognized by the United Nations as a regional organization. With international recognize, the goals of the LAS shifted.<sup>13</sup> The league became the key UN organization in the Arab region for culture, science, and education. The LAS made greater strides as a regional organ by establishing the Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) at the 1964 Cairo Summit.<sup>14</sup> The second 1964 summit promoted the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)<sup>15</sup> which became an official member in 1976.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “Pact of the League of Arab States.” The Avalon Project. March 22, 1945.

[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/arableag.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp)

<sup>2</sup> “Timeline: Arab League.” BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550977.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> “Pact of the League of Arab States.” The Avalon Project. March 22, 1945.

[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/arableag.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp)

<sup>5</sup> BBC News, Profile: Arab League [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550797.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550797.stm)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> “About the League of Arab States.” Museums With No Frontiers.

<http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> “The Six Day War: Jerusalem.” SixDayWar.org. <http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/Jerusalem1948arabisraeliwar.asp>

<sup>11</sup> About the League of Arab States.” Museums With No Frontiers.

<http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php>

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> “Timeline: Arab League.” BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550977.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

In 1978, representatives from Egypt and Israel met in Washington DC and achieved the Camp David Accord. The following year, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed, in which both states recognized each other and promised to end the state of war that had existed since 1948. These treaties and negotiations with Israel caused Egypt's suspension from the league. It was not readmitted until 1989.<sup>17</sup>

The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of increased discord within the LAS. The Iraq-Iran War forced the Member States of the LAS to choose sides. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the league was split again. But even when divided, the league was able to agree that the West had no right to attempt to prevent or deter advanced weapons technology development in Iraq. At the October 1990 Summit the league demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and reaffirmed "the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Kuwait."<sup>18</sup> In 2003, the United States led an overthrow of the Iraqi government over which the LAS was again split. Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain offered resources to the US for this invasion; other States, such as Syria, were adamantly opposed to such military intervention.<sup>19</sup> In a 2004 Cairo meeting, Secretary-General Amr Moussa said, "the gates of hell are opened in Iraq."<sup>20</sup>

Another emergency meeting was held in Cairo concerning the crisis in Darfur, a region of Sudan. The LAS refused to impose sanctions or international military intervention. In July of 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) charged Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, with war crimes and genocide, and sought his arrest; LAS ministers were opposed.<sup>21</sup> In 2009, the LAS concluded its annual summit with "show of support" for al-Bashir.<sup>22</sup> The most dynamic year for the Arab World would be 2011 which again tested the league. When protests began in Tunisia, Moussa warned that the problems which "sparked Tunisia's political upheaval" are found throughout LAS. Libya would eventually be barred from LAS meetings because of the use of deadly force against protesters. The league eventually supported a UN Security Council resolution authorizing attacks on Libyan air defences. The Fall of 2011 saw Syria receive condemnation for the government's suppression of civil protests. The league demanded an immediate end to the violence. LAS efforts to achieve an agreement that would end military action and create dialogue with protesters were rejected by Syria and Syria's membership was suspended.<sup>23</sup>

The LAS often seems to be at odds with the UN but the issues involved are most often a reflection of the internal politics of LAS Member States. Frequent division and rivalries can dampen the effectiveness of the LAS on an international scale but since the Arab Spring of 2011, "the League has shown a greater sense of purpose."<sup>24</sup> Regionally the LAS has proven itself valuable in several arenas, especially by carrying out technocratic initiatives such as preserving various manuscripts, shaping curriculum for schools, and progress made in technology.<sup>25</sup>

The LAS is led by the General Secretariat which handles day-to-day operations. The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, currently Egyptian Nabil Elaraby. The highest governing organ, The Council, meets twice a year in March and September, and more meetings may occur at the request of two or more Members.<sup>26</sup> LAS Members receive one vote, regardless of size or population but certain members have larger influence over other states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.<sup>27</sup> LAS resolutions are binding to all Member States which voted in favor of them.<sup>28</sup> The LAS is composed of eight sectors: The Secretary-General, political, economic, national security, auditing, social affairs, Palestine, media and communication and human resources. There are three councils: the Council, the Economical Social Council and the Ministerial Councils.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> "Timeline: Arab League." BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550977.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm)

<sup>18</sup> About the League of Arab States." Museums With No Frontiers.

<http://www.museumwnf.org/league-of-arab-states/?page=LAS-highlights-in-history.php>

<sup>19</sup> "Timeline: Arab League." BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550977.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> "Timeline: Arab League."BBC News. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/country\\_profiles/1550977.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550977.stm)

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> "Arab League." International Democracy Watch. <http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/arab-league->

Current Members of the League of Arab States:

ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA (currently suspended), TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN.

## **I. Responding to External Threats to Arab State and Regional Economies**

### ***Introduction***

The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq presented significant challenges to the Arab Member States.<sup>30</sup> "The declared 'war on terror' has led to discrimination against the Arab and Islamic countries and greater impediments and barriers to business as well as the flow of capital, labor, and people."<sup>31</sup> But these challenges also present a golden opportunity for LAS Member States to strengthen their bonds and work towards greater economic integration.<sup>32</sup> The establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 was an attempt to provide just such a common "voice" for the Arab world and to develop an Arab Common Market.<sup>33</sup> More recently, the emergence of large trading blocs and regional trade and integration agreements encouraged the Arab countries to move towards a Greater Arab Free Trade Area.<sup>34</sup>

The League and its Member States face grave external threats to the region's economy. Mohammah Kossari, the deputy head of the Iranian Parliament's foreign affairs and national security committee, told the Fars News Agency on January 23, 2012 that, "If any disruption happens regarding the sale of Iranian oil, the Strait of Hormuz will definitely be closed."<sup>35</sup> The issue concerning the Strait of Hormuz, and the ability of Iran to shut down freighter traffic through the strait and, in turn, seriously cripple the economy of the region, underwrites a larger concern for Members of the League – external threats that could destroy economic stability. At a fundamental level, the economy is vital to the security and prosperity of a state. Under realist thought, economic power is only a benefit because it enables a state to fund a stronger, larger and more-technologically advanced military force.

Like most international organizations, the League has the advantages of regional location sharing a common history, culture, language and religious tradition. However, the League is also advantaged and disadvantaged by the geography and political realities surrounding the region. Straits, inlets, seas, deserts, and nuclear-armed neighbors surround the members of the Arab League, and their proximity results in the ability of external forces to cripple the economies of League members. While topographical, geographical, and climatological factors allow for League enemies to limit or cut off global trade, human-based, political and economic dangers also exist.

It is imperative that the League develop a system by which threat assessment is conducted given the numerous opportunities for external threats to limit the region's economy. Additionally, the geographic diversity of the LAS Member States prevents a coordinated military action or standing military presence from directly insuring the continued passage of goods from Arab countries. Therefore, the League must be uniquely creative in addressing these concerns and developing solutions that can include military, legal, technological, economic, infrastructural, trade-based, and political options. Military force alone will not prevent external market threats to the region's economies. Instead, contingencies must be developed to address the overarching themes of the external threats to the economy and the diversity of these threats.

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<sup>30</sup> Nasser Saidi. "Arab Economic Intergration: An Awakening to Remove Barriers to Prosperity." Economic Research Forum. [http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/0322\\_final.pdf](http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/uploads/pdf/0322_final.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Emily Gosden. "Oil Prices Rise over Sanctions on Iran." *The Telegraph*. January 24, 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/9034179/Oil-prices-rise-over-sanctions-on-Iran.html>

## Case Study: Commodity Market Instability

Oil and petroleum products are the fundamental export of the Arab world. While not all Arab economies are based on oil, they are generally based on a specific commodity including metals, gems and minerals. The fundamentals of the global marketplace intrinsically mean that commodity prices will fluctuate over time. Many of The League members are also Member States in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC is a cartel that acts by establishing export limits within its membership to manipulate the global price of oil.<sup>36</sup> OPEC's objective is to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies among Member States in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; to ensure an efficient, economic, and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and to receive a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry.<sup>37</sup> In evaluating options for establishing these types of price controls within the markets, it is necessary to ensure Member States have sufficient market power to affect the global price. Additionally, such an organization requires an enforcement mechanism to ensure that cheaters do not add more supply to the market and decrease the effectiveness of the pricing scheme.

## Case Study: Strategic Transoceanic Hydrocarbon Limitation

Exports are the driving force of most Arab League economies and hydrocarbons are the central underpinning of these exports.<sup>38</sup> Five of the world's largest oil producers: Saudi Arabia (1<sup>st</sup>), United Arab Emirates (8<sup>th</sup>), Kuwait (11<sup>th</sup>), Iraq (12<sup>th</sup>) and Algeria (14<sup>th</sup>) are members of the Arab League. Iran, in the same immediate geographical region but not a traditionally Arabic state, is the world's fifth largest oil producer and utilizes similar shipping lanes for their hydrocarbon product.<sup>39</sup>

The region has an extensive network of pipelines, which transport oil overland to critical ports where the hydrocarbons are exported or refined into products and from which the majority are exported. Given the geographic realities of the Middle East and North Africa region, almost all of these products pass through three "oil chokepoints." The Suez Canal, Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The maintenance of these vital shipping lanes is the most critical external threat facing the regional economy of the Arab world.

### *Suez Canal*

The Suez Canal is one of the greatest feats of modern engineering. Almost immediately after its opening in 1869, the Suez Canal had a significant impact on world trade as goods were moved around the world in record time.<sup>40</sup> In 1875, debt forced Egypt to sell its shares in ownership of the Suez Canal to the United Kingdom.<sup>41</sup> However, an international convention in 1888 made the canal available for all ships from any nation to use.<sup>42</sup>

The canal itself is 101 miles (163 km) long and 984 feet (300 m) wide.<sup>43</sup> It begins at the Mediterranean Sea at Point Said, flows through Ismailia in Egypt, and ends at Suez on the Gulf of Suez.<sup>44</sup> It also has a railroad running its entire length parallel to its west bank. The canal can accommodate ships with a vertical height or draft of 62 feet (19 m) or 210,000 deadweight tons.<sup>45</sup> The Suez Canal has no locks because the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea's Gulf of Suez have approximately the same water level.<sup>46</sup> It takes 11 to 16 hours to pass through the canal, and ships must travel at a low speed to prevent erosion of the canal's banks by the ships' wake.<sup>47</sup> Overall, the canal saves an average

<sup>36</sup> "About Us." OPEC. [http://www.opec.org/opec\\_web/en/17.htm](http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/17.htm)

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> "The World's 15 Biggest Oil Producers." *CNBC.com*.  
[http://www.cnbc.com/id/41887743/The\\_World\\_s\\_15\\_Biggest\\_Oil\\_Producers](http://www.cnbc.com/id/41887743/The_World_s_15_Biggest_Oil_Producers)

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Amanda Briney. "Suez Canal Connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea." *About.com Geography*.  
<http://geography.about.com/od/specificplacesofinterest/a/suezcanal.htm>

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

of 6,000 miles of transit.

In 2010, two million barrels of petroleum per day passed through the Suez Canal: five percent of total seaborne petroleum trade.<sup>48</sup> These petroleum transport vessels accounted for one-fifth of the 16,500 ships to pass through the canal from January to November 2010; another five percent were liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels.<sup>49</sup> The Suez Canal Authority, an arm of the Egyptian government, operates the canal.

The Suez Canal Authority (SCA), established on July 26th, 1956, is a public and an independent authority of a juristic personality and reports directly to the Prime Minister.<sup>50</sup> It has all the authorities needed for running the Canal without being limited by the laws and the systems of the government.<sup>51</sup> The SCA manages, operates, uses, maintains and improves the Suez Canal.<sup>52</sup> It is the SCA, alone and exclusively, that issues and keeps in force the rules of navigation in the Canal and other rules and regulations that provide for a well and orderly run canal.<sup>53</sup>

### *Bab el Mandeb*

With the Suez Canal at one end of the Red Sea, the other choke point is Bab el Mandeb between Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest and restricted to two two-mile wide canals for inbound and outbound shipments. An estimated 3.2 million barrels per day flow through the strait; 1.8 million barrels are bound for the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline complex.<sup>54</sup>

Much of Europe's crude oil from the Middle East passes through Bab el Mandeb. Closure of the straits could keep tankers from the Gulf of Arabia from reaching the Suez Canal and SUMED complex, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope).<sup>55</sup> The Bab el Mandeb could be bypassed for northbound oil traffic by utilizing an East-West crude oil pipeline, which traverses Saudi Arabia and has a capacity of about 4.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d).<sup>56</sup> However, southbound oil traffic could still be blocked. In addition, closure of the Bab el Mandeb would effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal except for limited trade within the Red Sea region.<sup>57</sup> Security remains a major concern of foreign firms doing business in the region, particularly after the French-flagged tanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists in October 2002.<sup>58</sup>

Bab el Mandeb also presents a concern to the LAS because of its strategic importance not only to hydrocarbon shipping from the region, but because of its importance to the European Union, China, Japan, India, and much of the rest of Asia. The volume of goods shipped through this strait makes control of the region a vital concern for western powers as well, so any instability in the area carries the threat of military action by the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to secure the region.<sup>59</sup>

### *Strait of Hormuz - The World's Greatest Oil Chokepoint*

In an article in 1979, Drew Middleton, the longtime military correspondent for The New York Times, stated flatly that "the Strait of Hormuz is the greatest economic choke point in the world." In 2011, roughly one-fifth of all the

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<sup>48</sup> "World Oil Transit Chokepoints." *Energy Administration Information*. August 22, 2012.  
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> "Suez Canal Authority." *Suez Canal Authority*. <http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=2>

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> "World Oil Transit Chokepoints." *Energy Administration Information*. August 22, 2012.  
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC>

<sup>55</sup> "Bab El-Mandeb." *Bab El-Mandeb*. [http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bab\\_el-Mandeb](http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bab_el-Mandeb)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair. "Choke Point Bab el-Mandeb." *Counterpunch.org*. November 17, 2011.  
<http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/11/17/choke-point-bab-el-mandeb/>

crude oil traded worldwide passed through its 19-mile wide shipping channel.<sup>60</sup> The potential flashpoint in the Strait of Hormuz could completely restrict the transport of goods to and from Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait and would severely limit exports by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. According to the United States Energy Information Administration, nearly 17 million barrels of oil was transported through the Strait of Hormuz everyday in 2011.<sup>61</sup> This volume was an increase from the 15.5-16 million barrels transported in 2009 and 2010.<sup>62</sup> Approximately 35 percent of all seaborne oil and 20 percent of all global oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz.<sup>63</sup>

In late December 2011, Iran began to warn that it would close the strait to shipping if the United States and Europe imposed an embargo on Iran's oil exports as a way of pressuring it to reign in its nuclear program.<sup>64</sup> An Iranian blockade by means of mining, airstrikes, or sabotage is logistically well within Tehran's military capabilities and would send oil prices soaring.<sup>65</sup> It also is not without precedent. Iran has conducted military operations to disrupt shipping in the Gulf several times in the last 20 years, and has always included the threat of closing the strait as part of its strategy. If Iran were to follow through with its blockade threat, the impact would be immediate. Energy analysts say the price of oil would start to soar and could rise 50 percent or more within days.<sup>66</sup> Iran's own shaky economy relies on exporting at least two million barrels of oil a day through the strait.<sup>67</sup> Despite such deterrents to armed confrontation, oil and foreign policy analysts say a miscalculation is possible that could cause an overreaction from one side or the other.<sup>68</sup>

## Conclusion

In the consideration of solutions, the Arab League should not seek a "one-size-fits-all" option or attempt to address specific external threats to the region's economy. Rather, the Arab League should look to establish a robust protocol for addressing current and future threats while articulating the League's position through enacted League policies, resolutions, communiqués, press releases or letters to Heads of State, other States or international organizations.

## Military

Beginning in 1950, the founding members of the Arab League signed *The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League*. The treaty was signed on June 17<sup>th</sup>.<sup>69</sup> Article Two of the treaty establishes collectively defense amongst the Arab League membership:

"The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately

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<sup>60</sup> "Strait of Hormuz." - *The New York Times*. July 3, 2012.

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/strait-of-hormuz/index.html>

<sup>61</sup> Tobias Vanderbruck. "Strait of Hormuz and Oil Price Rise." *Strait of Hormuz and Oil Price Rise*. <http://oil-price.net/en/articles/strait-of-hormuz-and-oil-price-rise.php>

<sup>62</sup> "Rising Middle East Tension May Not Seriously Impact US Oil Imports Read More: Rising Middle East Tension May Not Seriously Impact US Oil Imports." Mywesttexas.com: Business. January 11, 2012. [http://www.mywesttexas.com/business/article\\_9d535506-ee42-524b-b4fe-f911f4bfebf3.html](http://www.mywesttexas.com/business/article_9d535506-ee42-524b-b4fe-f911f4bfebf3.html)

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> "Strait of Hormuz." - *The New York Times*. July 3, 2012.

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/strait-of-hormuz/index.html>

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> "Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950." *The Avalon Project : Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League, June 17, 1950*. [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/arabjoin.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp)



to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace.”<sup>70</sup>

The treaty established two military bodies within the Arab League, the Permanent Military Commission and the Joint Defense Council.<sup>71</sup> The Permanent Military Commission is headquartered in Cairo. The Commission has the capacity to independently establish temporary or permanent sub-committees as needed.<sup>72</sup> A Chairman elected every two years heads the Commission; a Chairman must have at least the rank of “high commanding officer.”<sup>73</sup> Members of the Commission must be of the original nationality of the State he/she is representing and, in the event of war, the supreme command of joint forces will not rest with the Military Commission but with the State with the largest military force engaged in field operations.<sup>74</sup> However, the Member could establish a different Commander-in-Chief by unanimous vote. A Joint Staff supports the Commander-in-Chief.<sup>75</sup>

The Military Commission is subject to the Joint Defense Council composed of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the League’s membership.<sup>76</sup> The Joint Defense Council is subject to the Arab League Council; the decisions of the Joint Defense Council are achieved by a supermajority of two-thirds.<sup>77</sup> In January 1964 at the first Arab League Summit in Cairo, the Council established the United Arab Command (UAC.) After the Six-Day War it became evident that, with political dissent between LAS Member States and their unwillingness to cede actual command of forces on their own soil, the UAC was a unified force on paper only.<sup>78</sup> Other thought leaders have called for specific defense forces within the Arab League. “An Arab leadership on counterterrorism would pull these resources together, benefitting all countries involved, and would be backed by many Western countries.”<sup>79</sup> At current, any military force controlled jointly by the Arab League remains limited and in serious need of an updated command structure, updated guidance systems for action from the Arab Council and Joint Defense Council, and long-term strategic objectives.<sup>80</sup> The Arab League does have the capacity to establish an ad hoc military force or a coalition independent of the Arab League to pursue specific military, strategic, and peacekeeping objectives.

### *Economic*

The Arab League sits atop its greatest weapon, oil. In 1967, a meeting of Arab League Economic, Finance and Oil Ministers suggested Arab League States stop pumping oil as a weapon against Israel and its supporters. Conversely, the September 1967 Khartoum Resolution stated:

“After thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Moshe Shemesh. *Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir’s Descent to War, 1957 – 1967*. Sussex Academic Press. 2008. Pg. 153. [http://books.google.com/books?id=4u-ZheMnqf8C&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=six+day+war+uac&source=bl&ots=phBaU2iCel&sig=Bbf26H6qwnHeins5Kxrr\\_SKxLqE&hl=en#v=onepage&q=six%20day%20war%20uac&f=false](http://books.google.com/books?id=4u-ZheMnqf8C&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=six+day+war+uac&source=bl&ots=phBaU2iCel&sig=Bbf26H6qwnHeins5Kxrr_SKxLqE&hl=en#v=onepage&q=six%20day%20war%20uac&f=false)

<sup>79</sup> Walid Phares. "The Need for a Joint Arab Force against Terror." *Worldpress.org*. February 16, 2010. <http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3500.cfm>

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.



the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.”<sup>81</sup>

The Arab League could decide to enact a standing policy of limiting or ending petroleum exports to States that threaten or engage in negative military or economic action against League members. The League could also decide to establish a mechanism for addressing such cases with similar economic action. Many of the Arab League members are also represented in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC.) The main function of OPEC is to establish production quotas for cartel members in order to artificially manipulate global hydrocarbon prices.<sup>82</sup> Joint Arab League/OPEC members include: Algeria Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE; the other Middle Eastern member is the Iran. Collective action within OPEC or ignoring OPEC quotas could be used to punish Iran or other oil producing countries for transgressions against Arab League members.<sup>83</sup>

### ***Committee Directive***

While there are immediate threats which the League should address, that is not the intent of this topic. As stated previously, care should be given to the consideration of the larger themes in the examples presented to aid the League in developing contingencies and strategies to address not only these specific threats, but similar threats that might arise in the future.

## **II. The Coming Resource Wars: Mitigating the Conflict over Natural and Economic Resources**

*“The naturally occurring assets that provide use benefits through the provision of raw materials and energy used in economic activity (or that may provide such benefits one day) and that are subject primarily to quantitative depletion through human use. They are subdivided into four categories: mineral and energy resources, soil resources, water resources and biological resources”.*

*- UN Recognized definition of ‘natural resource’<sup>84</sup>*

### ***Introduction***

It is estimated that forty per cent of conflicts occurring since 1950 between Member States have been connected to natural resources, or more often than not, a lack of thereof.<sup>85</sup> Natural resources and their exploitation have been a catalyst in at least eighteen various conflicts that turned violent around the world since 1990. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) suggests many of these conflicts were resolved at some point, but are twice as likely to occur over the same resources in the first five years following the initial onset.<sup>86</sup> Conflicts have erupted all over world within and between Member States over crucial resources that were necessary for economic stability or needed for the people that live there. High value resources, such as oil or diamonds, are economic staples for some countries and maintaining a hold on those resources is important for national economies.<sup>87</sup> Meanwhile, scarce resources used to sustain human life, such as water and land for agriculture, are decreasing in quantity and quality.

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<sup>81</sup> "The Avalon Project : The Khartoum Resolutions; September 1, 1967." *The Avalon Project : The Khartoum Resolutions; September 1, 1967.* Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library.  
[http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/khartoum.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/khartoum.asp)

<sup>82</sup> "Member Countries." *OPEC.* [http://www.opec.org/opec\\_web/en/about\\_us/25.htm](http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm)

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> United Nations, European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, 2005, Handbook of National Accounting: Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting 2003, Studies in Methods, Series F, No.61, Rev.1, Glossary, United Nations, New York, para. 7.42, EA.1

<sup>85</sup> "Conflict and resources." United Nations Peacekeeping.  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/resources.shtml>

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

Conflicts over these resources are becoming more frequent as the amount of potable water is limited, and as desertification decreases the amount of arable land.<sup>88</sup>

Such natural resources within the League of Arab States (LAS) are often highly impacted by external forces, including variables such as severe drought. As global climate change takes its toll on different parts of the world, natural resources will decline worldwide, but the Member States of the LAS are particularly affected. The UNEP recognizes this as a ‘threat multiplier;’ and problems such as poverty and the mismanagement of resources alongside this change will be an irritant to threats already posed.<sup>89</sup> Because of this, the United Nations Security Council (SC) has discussed resource conflicts and the effects climate change will have, and has deemed climate change as a factor with implications on security in the near future.<sup>90</sup> The LAS must find means to mitigate conflicts over these resources both internally and internationally. The Arab League must decide how to handle the possibility of conflicts that may have an impact on the League as a whole, and the economies of various Member States as oil prices increase and tensions between members of the LAS and greater economic powers mount.

### ***Resources within the LAS***

#### *Water*

Water is the most crucial to human survival of all natural resources. Without water, a person can only survive an estimated three days depending on diet and nutrition habits. Water is important for drinking as well as a number of purposes, including producing agriculture and horticulture, preparing food, and sanitation. Over two million people die each year from water-related diseases because of sanitary water supplies.<sup>91</sup> Each person in the world inherits a greater struggle for water as resources decline and populations increase.

The United Nations has declared water as a human right, including the right to drinking water and “...access to the amount of water required to meet his or her basic needs.”<sup>92</sup> Even though water has been determined a human right, it is difficult to guarantee that this right will be met. The negative correlation between population size and amount of available water for each person makes future resource limitations more apparent. Despite water being qualified as a human right, several factors make it highly improbable to ensure the delivery of water. Available supply, sanitary conditions, and water accessibility are clear indicators that make it increasingly hard for Member States to meet this requirement for populations. A state’s willingness to provide everyone the water they need by not hoarding its supply, and the ability to sanitize supplies are sometimes unnoticed factors by the league.<sup>93</sup> Several Member States have been studied by the United Nations (UN) to demonstrate problematic systems as well as how to best implement water as a human right.<sup>94</sup> Maintaining an adequate water supply is a significant challenge that has plagued some Member States due to droughts and economic inaccessibility in the region. Many Member States are considered to have at least a semiarid climate with limited freshwater considered a scarcity, as the region’s supply is down to just “one thousand cubic meters of fresh water available per person.”<sup>95</sup> By 2025, estimated population increases at a large scale will make water supplies even smaller.<sup>96</sup>

Internal and cross-boundary conflicts in the league rarely turn violent; yet, a sharp increase in these conflicts is of dire concern to the league. Violent conflicts are often not solely over resources, though they are certainly a catalyst.<sup>97</sup> Between 1990 and 2007, sixty-one violent conflicts arose due to inadequate water supplies.<sup>98</sup> The American Journal of Public Health noted, “violent conflict over water can have disastrous health consequences for

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Simone Klawitter and Hadeel Qazzaz, “Water as a Human Right: The Understanding of Water in the Arab Countries of the Middle East” *Water Resources Development*, vol. 21, no. 2, 253. June 2005.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

individuals and populations . . . but also destruction of the health-supporting infrastructure of society, including fresh-water; forced migration (...) and diversion of human and financial resources including resources to maintain and improve access to fresh-water.”<sup>99</sup>

Member States are facing the worst water shortage in years in terms of length of shortages and the effects of the shortages on hydrological and biological health of the environment. Five Member States have already suffered shortages in structure due to a lack of water, and the amount of water available only continues to grow smaller.<sup>100</sup> The Arab Population is expected to double before 2050, and a lack of water may be the tipping point in the destabilization of Member States’ Governments.<sup>101</sup> A lack of water has also caused food prices to rise substantially, especially in Northern African countries. The League has seen its share of what happens when food prices are too high for the people of the region. Riots sparked as a result of resource shortages have the capability to bring about great changes to governments and leave a great deal of destruction in their wake.<sup>102</sup> As water becomes more of a luxury, food prices will continue to rise--something many people, and the Member States they reside within, simply cannot afford.

Various sources have reported that, “the Middle East will not escape a serious [water] shortage” without a technological and scientific breakthrough.<sup>103</sup> A report filed on the region’s water shortage to the European Union suggested an alarming situation as the region’s concerns on resources shift from abundance of oil to water shortages.<sup>104</sup> Water will become more valuable, and has the potential to become a political weapon. If the LAS can develop a regional agreement on both how to handle water shortages, as well as how to handle conflicts that arise over water, they may be able to forestall significant turmoil in the region. The League is faced with several challenges over water. Internally, water scarcity that leads to food scarcity has the capability of severe repercussions, both on the people and on the government. Externally, the conflicts bound to arise over the supply of fresh water have the capability to unhinge relations between Member States and the rest of the world.

## *Oil*

Oil is a staple in many economies, and the need for these energy supplies, along with other factors in the League, need to be addressed holistically. Oil is also essential to almost every person on Earth. Fossil Fuels have become absolutely necessary to maintain a developing society. Two of the three countries that control half of the world’s supply of oil are Member States of the League.<sup>105</sup> Eventually oil fields will deplete, leaving economies that depend on that oil scrambling to find a means of replacing their main sources of cheap energy and other petro-chemical by-products.<sup>106</sup> As populations grow, more pressure will be put on the infrastructure of countries whose economies will weaken without hydrocarbon resources, particularly those elements of their infrastructure used to supplement agricultural production, water subsidies, and development projects.<sup>107</sup>

The rate of the export of oil is expected to decline a great deal, increasing unemployment rates within many countries. By 2020, the output of oil on the Arabic peninsula is “expected to reach a plateau.”<sup>108</sup> Less oil means greater competition for available oil, and stiff competition between oil producing countries to make the most profit. Violence, and the threat of conflicts, tend to drive up the price of oil, as reflected in the spring of 2011 when political and social revolts were widespread across the region. There is also a positive correlation between higher oil

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> John Vidal. “What does the Arab world do when its water runs out?” *The Guardian*. February 2012.  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/feb/20/arab-nations-water-running-out>

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> A.N. Dmitrievskii and V.I Vysotskii, “Global Oil and Gas Resources and Their Development,” *Russian Journal of General Chemistry*, Vol. 79. No. 11. 2009. pp. 2477-2485.

<sup>106</sup> Nicolas Sarkis. “The Depletion of Arab Oil Resources”. MERIP Reports. No. 89, Afghanistan (Jul. – Aug., 1980), pp. 27-28.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3011837.pdf>.

<sup>107</sup> Roger Howard. “Peak Oil and Strategic Resource Wars” *The Futurist*, October 2009 as cited in Ronald Bailey. “Peak Oil: The Threat of Resource Nationalism.” *Reason.com*. August 20, 2009. <http://reason.com/blog/2009/08/20/peak-oil-the-threat-of-resourc>

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

prices and the number of conflicts in oil-producing Member and Non-member States. More alarming is the positive correlation between the likelihood of a violent armed conflict and both oil dependence and abundance.<sup>109</sup> Oil has been found to “increase (conflict) risk for weaker states but reduces it for stronger ones.”<sup>110</sup> Another factor is the location of oil; when oil is within a country’s borders but “outside the conflict area,” the likelihood of conflict is less likely to occur. Conflicts in areas where oil fields are present tend to result in a higher number of deaths related to the conflict.<sup>111</sup>

But the simple issue of conflict in oil-producing states is not the only consideration that is pressing to the League. Member States should also be ready to address the outcomes of such conflicts, whether expected or unexpected. Where conflicts may occur and the danger of supporting the losing side of a conflict must be considered as well. Since 1989, more conflicts have occurred between nations that produce oil than between those that do not.<sup>112</sup> Conflict zones are also forty per cent more likely to overlap with areas producing oil.<sup>113</sup> Despite the correlation between higher oil prices and the number of conflicts within oil-producing countries, the number of conflicts between countries that produce and those that do not increases with oil prices.

The need to secure oil sources in times of conflict will also be more crucial as oil fields begin to run dry. Pipelines, drilling sights, and other means of storage can become targets during conflict. Protecting oil fields is difficult as the land area of these fields is vast, and the issue is complicated by the question of whether this is an issue for private companies who exploit the resource or the governments who hold sovereignty over the territory involved. The destruction or control of a pipeline can lead to electrical blackouts, ecological destruction, and a number of different outcomes; much like those in Eastern Europe and parts of Russia in 2008.

There is also important consideration over the effects that outside influences have upon oil exports. Threats of embargoes, economic sanctions, and/or the closing off of entire means of transport, bring into focus how quickly a country’s economy could flounder if one of that country’s largest exports is suddenly unable to be exported. Should methods of transport be cut off, the entire LAS could suffer, as they have little means of commerce without a functioning transportation infrastructure.

The LAS should come up with a contingency plan in the instance of oil-related disasters and/or conflicts that considers how best to deal with environmental emergencies. A contingency plan should consider losses as well as the protection of valuable infrastructural assets such as pipelines, sea-lanes, and cargo vessels. This plan should also consider how the LAS should respond in the event of a large blow to the economy of individual Member States, and the region as a whole, in the event of something as economically damaging as sanctions.

### *Arable Land*

Arable land is used for agricultural production and is used by both modern and nomadic groups. Until 1990, the Arab World had the fastest growing acreage of arable land; however, at this turning point development began to take its toll on the environment and the populations exploiting it.<sup>114</sup> The availability of arable land has a dramatic effect on the population surrounding it. The ability to create a sustainable food source is invaluable, but with the mismanagement of arable land comes damaging topsoil erosion.<sup>115</sup> Arable land is a valuable resource not just because of its food production capabilities, but for the ability to preserve important wildlife sanctuaries, natural green spaces, and the life of nomadic groups.

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> “Improving Food Security in Arab Countries”. The World Bank, FAO, and International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2009. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/FoodSecfinal.pdf>

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

### *Case study: The Tuareg of Northern Africa*

The Middle East and Northern Africa Region are home to many nomadic groups. These nomads have roamed the land for many centuries preceding the cold war. These nomads rely largely on the ability of the land to be both productive agriculturally and supportive of their pastoral, cultural and economic activities.<sup>116</sup> Not only do these groups look to governments to be supportive of their livelihoods, but also to create an environment in which their way of life is sustainable. Nevertheless, there are competing interests at stake as the land that these groups depend upon is also desired by companies, governments, and other groups that want to extract commodity resources.<sup>117</sup>

The Tuareg Tribe of Northern Africa and the Sahel provide an excellent example of the struggle by nomads in the modern world. The Tuareg's struggles have ranged from legal to armed struggles with many governments over natural resources such as water and rights to arable land; recognition of heritage sites and land tenure; and concerns over climate change.<sup>118</sup> As arable land in the region is becoming less abundant and populations are increasing exponentially in the region, the urban and developed world is expanding into areas that nomadic groups have laid claim to for centuries, causing friction between private and public interests and the Tuareg. Furthermore, climate change is profoundly affecting the amount of arable land that these groups can utilize for agriculture, pasturing, and other purposes, leading to shifting migration patterns by these groups.<sup>119</sup> Governments and private entities have intervened in conflicts between the Tuareg, often leading the destruction of livelihood for some of these groups while external and humanitarian organizations have worked to bring the plight of such indigenous peoples to light. The League still has significant work to do to solve the issue of handling arable land for indigenous and non-indigenous groups, as this is just one instance of how dwindling natural resources develop into serious concerns and conflicts.

### *Land resources in Palestine*

Finding food sources in changing climates is particularly difficult for Member States already experiencing turmoil from war and unsustainable environmental practices.<sup>120</sup> Palestine has been suffering from conflict in the Gaza Strip and the effects on arable land in the region are dramatic. The damage from military action along with a lack of access to other vital resources due to blockades has inhibited the development of arable land and contributes to topsoil erosion. Finally, the dumping of waste materials into Palestinian territory combined with a lack of access to the resources to manage that waste has had a profound effect on a population's ability to cope with the environmental changes that are being dealt to them.<sup>121</sup>

### *Fish Stocks and External Constraints*

Fish stocks have also been an important resource for many groups throughout the world. However, with population growth and increased urban development, overfishing and water quality depletion have led to a significant decrease in the diversity and quantity of fish stocks.<sup>122</sup> The depletion of fish stocks is happening for a number of reasons, yet one specific example illustrates geographic difficulties, as many groups have to fight for fishing stocks that are depleting.<sup>123</sup> The exploitation of Western Saharan fishing rights by Morocco has come under large international scrutiny as the exploitation of coastal waters, oil, and a number of other resources are consistently in the spotlights.

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<sup>116</sup> Muna A. Abdalla. "Understanding of the natural resource conflict dynamics: The case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel". Institute for Security Studies. August 2009. <http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER194.PDF>

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> "Ifad and the League of Arab States". International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2009. <http://www.ifad.org/pub/factsheet/las/e.pdf>

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> "In Dead Water: Merging of Climate Change with Pollution, Over-Harvest, and Infestations in the World's Fishing Grounds". UNEP. 2008. [http://www.unep.org/pdf/InDeadWater\\_LR.pdf](http://www.unep.org/pdf/InDeadWater_LR.pdf)

<sup>123</sup> "The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in Decolonization". Olsson, Claes; and Pazzanita, Anthony. G. The International Journal of African Historical Studies. Vol. 39, No 3. (2006). Pp. 535-537

## ***Conflict Mitigation***

The conflicts that are bound to arise as a result of competition over resources are ones that cannot be taken lightly. Conflicts within a Member State have the potential to break down critical infrastructure. Conflicts between states have the potential to destroy relations as well as lives, resources, and infrastructure. Both can have serious consequences for those involved. United Nations peacekeeping missions have been established in various regions where conflicts over resources are frequent, and a few have been specifically mandated for this purpose, such as the missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>124</sup> The Member State of Palestine is currently one of eight under the UNEP's environmental rehabilitation program as part of a post-crisis recovery initiative. Likewise, the UNEP has assessments in place for areas, both regionally and globally, that it believes may be at risk of a conflict over resources.<sup>125</sup>

The question of whether or not the LAS should seek to use the UNEP's model for the prevention of conflict, as well as for redeveloping and rebuilding following such a conflict, is largely one of finances. Each individual environmental project costs several million dollars, a steep price for Member States who are already struggling as a result of scarce natural resources.<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, conflicts can cost a great deal as well and may bear a significantly cost in both economic and human terms. The cost in human lives, resources, infrastructure, and military and materiel expenses needed to engage in any conflict are often astronomical. Damaged relationships between internal groups struggling with peace building, and escalated ethnic and regional tensions are also difficult to assess economically, but still have a real-world cost.

## ***Conclusion***

The League of Arab States is at a crossroads. When resources crucial to economies, infrastructure, and sustainability decline, and measures have to be taken to find ways to replace those un-renewable resources, what steps should be taken? Security of these resources, as well as the infrastructure and manpower needed to exploit them, are crucially important to sustain everyday life for all of those who inhabit the region. Additionally, as those resources dwindle, it may become increasingly difficult to protect them. Conflicts, both internal to Member States and between Member States, wherein these resources are the catalyst will erupt, and may only become more violent as these resources continue to dwindle. The mitigation of these conflicts is important to regional and global security, and the Arab League will have to deal with the conflicts that arise within and between Member States and non-Member States.

## ***Committee Directive***

Impending resource conflicts are a threat to infrastructure, sustainability, economies, and international security. The Arab League must figure out ways to deal with conflict both internally and externally, while simultaneously figuring out how to replace the resources that will be sorely missed. Delegates must prepare to discuss not only the specific resources that may be the root catalyst of conflict, but must also be able to address the following questions:

- How does the League of Arab States intend to deal with a lack of natural and economic resources?
- How does the League plan to prevent conflicts from arising, both internally and externally?
- How does the League plan to deal with these conflicts once they arise?
- When these conflicts are over, how does the LAS plan to not only help recover Member States who are influenced by these conflicts, but prevent further conflicts from recurring?

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<sup>124</sup> "Conflict and resources." United Nations Peacekeeping.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/resources.shtml>

<sup>125</sup> "Disasters and conflicts." United Nations Environment Programme.

<http://www.unep.org/pdf/brochures/DisastersAndConflicts.pdf>

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

### III. State Building and the LAS: Examining the LAS Response to Recent Regime Changes in Arab States

#### *Introduction*

Arab League Secretary-General, Dr. Nabil Elaraby, recently described the ongoing crisis in the Syrian city of Aleppo as one where war crimes are taking place.<sup>127</sup> Over the past 18 months, the Arab world has been the scene of continuing conflict as a result of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Arab Spring protests. In November 2011 Syria was expelled from the Arab League for stepping up attacks on protesters despite agreeing to a peace plan/solution.<sup>128</sup> The Arab League has seen several regimes and governments fall, and new governments elected into office over the last year. This, in turn, has prompted reforms in several other Member States. The first to fall was Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The 23-year reign of Ben Ali ended after massive protests in the wake of the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in the streets of Sidi Bouzid.<sup>129</sup> Not long after, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was ousted during the Arab Spring.<sup>130</sup> In Libya, Col. Moammar Gadhafi's rule came to an end after four decades.<sup>131</sup> And, where governments have not collapsed or regimes changed, governmental reforms have been undertaken, such as those in Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco and Jordan.

Having Tunisia emerge to become a pluralist and peaceful democracy could serve as a blueprint for the Arab League's 22 Member States. Currently, only three Member States can claim to be democracies, even if they are considered flawed in the traditional notion of a democracy. Those three democracies are Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon. Iraq is still afflicted by suicide-bombers and sectarianism, with a democracy that was, in part, implemented by an outside state; the Palestinian territories, a state as yet only in name, has part of its territory occupied by Israel; and Lebanon suffers from elections that are marred by the necessity of sectarian quotas and where the nation is torn between conflicting visions that, in recent months, have deprived it of a fully-functioning government.

In the aftermath of these sharp regime changes and the failed efforts to reign in violence in Syria, the ability of the Arab League to engage in and promote state building has become imperative. With this in mind, we will specifically examine the case of regime change in Tunisia, Yemen and Syria and the means by which the League has been involved or could be involved in future institutional development within these States. The League may make an evaluation on an individual course of action regarding a specific Member State or group of Member States or react to short and long-term developments on this issue. The goal is not to develop an action plan to address each State or crisis, but rather to examine the League's capacity and development and provide an overarching guidance for supra-State action by the League.

#### *Where the Arab Spring Began: Tunisia*

Mohamed Bouazizi was a 26 year old operating a produce stall without a license. After his stall and all of his produce was seized, Bouazizi covered his body in fuel and lit himself on fire. This act of civil protest took place on December 17, 2010. He survived with burns covering his entire body until January 3, 2011.<sup>132</sup> Bouazizi's act sparked a call for domestic, regional, and global change. Within Tunisia, it signaled a cry which cited youth

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<sup>127</sup> David Trifunov. "Arab League Chief says Syria site of war crimes". *Global Post*. July 29, 2012.  
<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/120729/arab-league-chief-says-syria-site-war-crimes>

<sup>128</sup> "Syria: Overview". *The New York Times*. August 6, 2012.  
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html>

<sup>129</sup> "Tunisia News". *The New York Times*. June 11, 2012.  
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.html?8qa>

<sup>130</sup> "Hosni Mubarak News". *The New York Times*. June 20, 2012.  
[http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/hosni\\_mubarak/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/hosni_mubarak/index.html)

<sup>131</sup> Neil MacFarquhar. "An Erratic Leader, Brutal and Defiant to the End." *The New York Times*. October 20, 2011.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-killed-as-hometown-falls-to-libyan-rebels.html?pagewanted=all>

<sup>132</sup> Moa Eltahawy. "Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution". *The Washington Post*. January 15, 2011.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/14/AR2011011405084.html>



unemployment, police corruption, and regime abuses as grounds for a dramatic change. Within 29 days of the death of Bouazizi, President Ben Ali was toppled by his own people at the cost of 60 to 80 lives.<sup>133</sup>

Ben Ali had ruled over what many believed to be the quintessential police state. Since Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, it has only had two presidents. During the 2009 election, Ben Ali was elected to his fifth term with 89.6% of the vote in an election which was not considered to be fair and free.<sup>134</sup> Despite the apparent unity of the electorate, there was significant turmoil below the surface. Out of Tunisia's 12 million citizens, approximately one-half are under 25, and of those under the age of 25, especially amongst the college-educated, the numbers of those unemployed is markedly high.<sup>135</sup> In the aftermath of Ben Ali's departure, an election was held and Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, received 41% of the vote, the largest single share. Following the election of Dr. Moncef Marzouki as interim president in December of 2011, Ennahda's Secretary-General, Hamadi Jebali was appointed Prime Minister.<sup>136</sup> Although the election was deemed free and fair, there have been concerns both within Tunisia and outside of the country over what role Islam and Islamic law will play in the development of Tunisia's constitution.<sup>137</sup> On March 26, Ennahda attempted to soothe fears and concerns over Tunisia's new constitution by saying it would not cite Islamic law as a legislative source.<sup>138</sup>

## Yemen

Yemen is the poorest Member State in the Arab League, and one of the poorest countries in the world. Yemen was ruled by President Ali Abdullah Saleh for 33 years. In January 2011, the people of Yemen began demonstrating and calling on Saleh to step down. Eventually he did and went into exile.<sup>139</sup> However, Saleh did not step down quietly, and put up a challenge as exhibited by the On March 18, 2011 incident where Saleh carried out a crackdown of protestors resulting in the deaths of more than 50 people and injuries to at least 100. Saleh's crackdown lost him critical domestic and international support. On 21 March 2011, five top military commanders and key tribal leaders shifted their support to the protestors. This triggered a stream of high-level government resignations. A deal with the opposition party was established for Saleh to leave at the end of 2011, but the protestors demanded his immediate ouster.<sup>140</sup> In April, international support for Saleh ended. The United States changed its position after three decades and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called for Saleh to transfer power. On the April 23<sup>rd</sup>, GCC mediators reached a deal with Saleh for him to transfer power to his deputy within a month. The deal also protected him, his family and key leaders from prosecution. Protesters rejected the deal.<sup>141</sup> Throughout the protests, there were calls for the League to suspend Yemen as a Member State. As the deals were repeatedly rejected, Yemen seemed to spiral closer to civil war. On June 2<sup>nd</sup>, a rocket attack injured Saleh and seven of his top aides. After immediate medical treatment, Saleh was taken to Saudi Arabia for advanced care.<sup>142</sup> Saleh was eventually voted out of office on February 21, 2012 in favor of his Vice-President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the only candidate on the ballot.<sup>143</sup> Hadi won with 99.6% of the vote.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> "Tunisia News". *The New York Times*. June 11, 2012.

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.html?8qa>

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Karim Fahim. "Tunisia Says Constitution will not cite Islamic Law". *The New York Times*. March 26, 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/africa/tunisia-says-constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html?scp=2&sq=Tunisia&st=cse>

<sup>139</sup> "Yemen News". *The New York Times*. August 6, 2012.

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/yemen/index.html?8qa>

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> "Yemen slides toward Civil War as President injured along with seven top officials in rebel rocket attack on palace". *Daily Mail*. June 3, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1393954/Yemen-President-Ali-Abdullah-Saleh-injured-rebel-rocket-attack-palace.html>

<sup>143</sup> Laura Kasinov. "Yemen's Election Ensures Leader's Exit". *The New York Times*. February 21, 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/world/middleeast/yemen-votes-to-remove-ali-abdullah-saleh.html?hp>

<sup>144</sup> Laura Kasinov. "Yemen swears in new President to the sound of applause, not violence". February 25, 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/world/middleeast/abed-rabu-mansour-hadi-sworn-in-as-yemens-new-president.html?ref=middleeast>

While many are happy to see Saleh leave office, his influence is not gone. According to the *New York Times*: “The reality is that Mr. Saleh still wields considerable influence in Yemen. His relatives control most of the military and government security agencies, and it is not known how independent Mr. Hadi, a longtime Saleh loyalist, will be.”<sup>145</sup> This type of power transfer solution has become known as the Yemeni solution and the League has attempted it as a solution to be implemented in Syria.<sup>146</sup> The case in Yemen highlights three critical areas for consideration by the League including its role in peace talks, representation of Member State citizens and the overall usefulness of the Yemeni solution. The Saleh agreement was brokered by the GCC, a sub-regional organization focused on economics by representing many Arab League Members.

### *The Situation in Syria*

The al-Assad family has ruled Syria for two generations. Hafez al-Assad established a tightly ruled regime in the country that his son, Bashar al-Assad, has continued to rule. When Bashar al-Assad assumed his father’s office, he was heralded as being a reformer and there was optimism that change would come to Syria, but Assad has only continued to maintain authoritative policies. The Assad family has used ethno-religious identification and divisions to maintain rule over the years. The Assads and most of the inner circle are Alawite, a minority group in the country group that makes 12% of the population in the predominately Sunni country.<sup>147</sup>

The Arab Spring reached Syria on March 15, 2011. In an effort to end protests, Assad undertook some reforms and lifted Syria’s decades-old state of emergency. Within days of ending the state of emergency, Assad dispatched tanks and security force to Homs, the center of the protest against his rule.<sup>148</sup> Since then, the international community has been privy to daily reports of violence in Syria. According to the United Nations, more than 10,000 people have been killed in the violence, and more than 3,000 people died in June 2012 alone.<sup>149</sup> A May 2012 estimate from the Red Crescent said more than 1.5 million are in need of assistance for food, water, or shelter.<sup>150</sup> The international community has repeatedly called for action on the crisis in Syria including a February 2012 resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly condemning Assad’s crackdown.<sup>151</sup> In an effort to broker a peace plan, the United Nations and the Arab League appointed former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to act as a joint envoy between the organizations and the Syrian government.<sup>152</sup> However, attempts at stronger and more forceful United Nations action have been blocked by repeated use of the veto in the Security Council by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China who are opposed to taking a more direct role and involvement by the UN. In August, Mr. Annan stepped down from his position as UN/LAS envoy to Syria citing “finger-pointing and name-calling,” by the Security Council.<sup>153</sup>

The conflict in Syria has seen a greater collective action from the Arab League than either Tunisia or Yemen. The League has publicly backed Annan’s six-point plan and expelled Syria as a Member State from the organization.<sup>154</sup> Additionally, The League has one significant advantage over other organizations in that it has monitors already in

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<sup>145</sup> “Ali Abdullah Saleh News”. *The New York Times*. February 28, 2012.

[http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/s/ali\\_abdullah\\_saleh/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/s/ali_abdullah_saleh/index.html)

<sup>146</sup> Jason Ditz. “Arab League presses ‘Yemen Solution’ on Syria, asks Assad to transfer power to Deputy”. *AntiWar*. January 22, 2012. <http://news.antiwar.com/2012/01/22/arab-league-presses-yemen-solution-on-syria-asks-assad-to-transfer-power-to-deputy/>

<sup>147</sup> “Yemen News”. *The New York Times*. August 6, 2012.

<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/yemen/index.html?8qa>

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> Rick Gladstone. “General Assembly votes to condemn Syrian leader”. *The New York Times*. February 16, 2012.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/middleeast/secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-castigates-syria-ahead-of-general-assembly-vote.html?hp>

<sup>152</sup> BBC News. “Syria unrest: Opposition seeks arms pledge.” February 24, 2012.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17144805>

<sup>153</sup> “Syria crisis: Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy.” BBC News. August, 2, 2012.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19099676>

<sup>154</sup> Mariam Karouny. “Syria Crisis: Arab League backs Kofi Annan Peace Plan”. *Huffington Post*. March 28, 2012.

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/28/wrapup-2-arab-ministers-u\\_n\\_1385617.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/28/wrapup-2-arab-ministers-u_n_1385617.html)

Syria.<sup>155</sup> The United Nations Security Council has also sent monitors but they have not had the access nor do they possess the cultural understanding of monitors deployed by The League. Syria presents an interesting study in the League's action against new and unprecedented challenges. The Annan plan calls for the withdrawal of heavy weapons and troops from population centers, prisoner releases, the free movement of citizens, humanitarian assistance, and access to Syrian cities by journalists. Unlike other plans, it does not specifically call for Assad to leave office.<sup>156</sup> During the March 2012 meetings of the League held in Baghdad on the Syrian crisis, the League made it clear through Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari that it would not accept foreign intervention in Syria.<sup>157</sup> While the Arab League has endorsed the plan and Assad has approved it, little progress to ending the crisis has occurred. "The international resolution, which Syria has approved, we believe it's a positive and constructive step," said Zebari. "But it needs implementation."<sup>158</sup>

### *Constructing and Creating Constitutions*

The Arab League had little time to act in Tunisia and was taken off-guard by this unexpected regime change. While no significant action from The League was taken, The League has an opportunity to contribute to future state-building in Tunisia. Providing support for the processes of state-building, including developing constitutions; effectively communicating Islamic principles within and outside the sphere of government; and ensuring opportunities for youth, will significantly strengthen the emerging government. The development of a constitution is not a simple task. Primarily, there exist two types of constitutions: those that establish a framework of government that is more-or-less figured out completely over time such as the Constitution of the United States, or constitutions that are highly specific and address areas of social, cultural, religious or business interest to a country. The Lebanese constitution serves as an example of the latter. It mandates from which religious groups key leaders must come and specifies that the Parliament be divided proportionally between Christians and Muslims. The Lebanese President must be a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister must be a Sunni, and the Speaker of the House must be a Shi'ite.<sup>159</sup> Similarly, Nigeria's constitution, though not a Member State of the League, lays out specifics on the management of the wealth that comes from natural resources like oil.<sup>160</sup>

Both models of constitution have positives and negatives. A looser framework allows for flexibility over time and better responsiveness. Conversely, its vagueness allows it to be more easily manipulated. For example, the United States Constitution now limits the number of presidential terms to two under the 22<sup>nd</sup> amendment. More strict constitutions lack flexibility and responsiveness; they also require that every possible question be answered beforehand. They can also establish rules that are outdated or represent systemic issues within states. For example, in a *New York Times* OpEd, visiting fellow at Stanford University's Program on Arab Reform and Democracy, Elias Muhanna, writes of Lebanon's system: "If Lebanon is ever to establish a new social contract — one based on true citizenship rather than begrudging coexistence — it will need to change its electoral arithmetic."<sup>161</sup>

### *Addressing Unemployment*

According to *The National*, "One hundred million young people will enter the jobs market over the next decade in the Arab region compounding unemployment among youths, which is already the highest in the world."<sup>162</sup> Early in

<sup>155</sup> Mohammed. Hatem, et. al.. "Yemen's Saleh gets immunity as Arab League seeks peace in Syria". *Businessweek*. January 10, 2012. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-10/yemen-s-saleh-gets-immunity-as-arab-league-seeks-peace-in-syria.html>

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> Elias Muhanna. "Lebanon, by the Numbers". *International Herald Tribune*. January 17, 2012. <http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/possible-change-in-lebanon-electoral-system-is-move-to-address-sectarianism/>

<sup>160</sup> Otiye Igbuzor. "Constitution Making and struggle for Resource Control in Nigeria". Dawodu. October 27, 2007. <http://www.dawodu.com/igbuzor1.htm>

<sup>161</sup> Elias Muhanna. "Lebanon, by the Numbers". *International Herald Tribune*. January 17, 2012. <http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/possible-change-in-lebanon-electoral-system-is-move-to-address-sectarianism/>

<sup>162</sup> Tom Ashby. "Arab Youth jobs crisis deepens on low growth". *The National*. October 31, 2010. <http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/arab-youth-jobs-crisis-deepens-on-low-growth>

the crisis, in late January of 2011, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vice President to Studies and former foreign and deputy Prime Minister of Jordan Marwan Muasher was asked, “What were the underlying causes for the uprising in Tunisia.”<sup>163</sup> He said: “The protests were triggered by economic grievances and rising prices, but it’s a mistake to think that the crisis was solely about money—economics alone did not bring people to the streets. The unrest was as much about governance as it was about the economy.”<sup>164</sup> When considering the slogans used in Tunisia and across the Arab world, few targeted high prices. Rather they accused the government of abandoning its people. There is a high degree of frustration about the lack of good governance, and this is a lesson that must be learned in Tunis and other Arab capitals.”<sup>165</sup>

Unemployment is extremely high in the Arab world and Arab countries tend to have large youth populations. In everyday life, this situation results in increasing numbers of young people competing for a decreasing number of jobs. The relative wealth of the Arab world means that more young people are highly educated, yet are unable to find a good job despite their education. While Muasher points out that the revolution is about more than economics, Bouazizi was an unemployed, college-educated, and 26 years old. Images from the protests throughout the Arab world show young people taking to the streets. Addressing the youth unemployment crisis is critical to the prevention of future regime collapse after establishing functional governments within Members States.

### ***Conclusion***

The West has watched the Jasmine Revolution and resulting Arab Spring with optimism, and then with concern as Islamists leaders are elected in various states.<sup>166</sup> While it is true that within the League, religion plays an important role in society, in a larger context, the League can offer solutions for the integration of cultural/religious laws in a legal framework; provide communications support to explain these rules and traditions to the outside world; and help establish institutions completely independent of cultural or religious influence. However, the Members States of the League must decide what resources will be used to this end, and by what means the League will offer this capacity to Member States.

### ***Committee Directive***

The United Nations developed the Peacebuilding Commission to directly carry out state-building and peacebuilding efforts in conflict and post-conflict countries. Does the United Nations have a specific expertise that should be supported by the League or does the League have the resources and cultural and regional knowledge to better conduct state-building efforts assisted by the United Nations? On what levels should The League be interacting with economic organizations such as the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to add additional pressure to Syria in support on the Annan plan? Remember that the GCC has backed international efforts to transfer the power of Yemeni President Saleh. Can regional or global cultural and or religious organizations such as the Organization of Islamic States (OIS) assist in achieving the state-building goals of the League? Ethno-religious tensions routinely flare in the Arab world but as of yet, the foundation of a minority rule over a majority has yet to surface in the Arab Spring.. Should the League be concerned over ethno-religious tension within Syria and in the larger region? What, if any, institutions would be necessary in a post-crisis Syria to ensure no ethno-religious violence erupts?

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<sup>163</sup> Marwan Muasher. “Tunisia’s Crisis and the Arab World”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. January 24, 2011. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/24/tunisia-s-crisis-and-arab-world/1n0e#causes>

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Suzanne Daley. “Tensions on a campus mirror turbulence in new Tunisia”. *The New York Times*. June 11, 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/africa/tensions-at-manouba-university-mirror-turbulence-in-tunisia.html?hp>

## Technical Appendix Guide (TAG)

### Topic I. Responding to External Threat to Arab State and Regional Economies

Hinnebusch, R., & Ehteshami, A. (2002). "Introduction: The Analytical Framework."

*The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

<https://www.riennner.com/uploads/47d59f4f705ef.pdf>

A realist and structuralist overview of the driving factors in the foreign policies of several of the Middle East states which also gives a nice overview of other commodities and the specific threats to their economic viability.

Russell, J. (2007). "Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East."

Strategic Studies Institute.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub814.pdf>

The author presents a comprehensive view of the political arena post 9/11 and presents a US-centric consideration of the realities faced by the Middle East. Despite his focus on US policy, he provides an excellent discussion of the political, social, and military dangers faced by LAS Member States.

Al-Mani, S. A., (2001). "The Regional Challenge for National Security in the Arabian Gulf Countries: Threat Perceptions."

Gulf Defence Conference

<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=0CGYQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Ffaculty.ksu.edu.sa%2Famani%2FMy%2520Publications%2Fregional%2520challenge%2520almani.doc&ei=8tUpULfQEJDO9ATozYGIAw&usg=AFQjCNH21YlzZvm9YoC57zA4GMpA3SPtWw&cad=rja>

A presentation to the Gulf Defence Conference in 2001, the paper examines the differing nature of threat perceptions of the Member States of the GCC

Al-Hamad, T. "Will the Gulf Monarchies Work Together?"

*The Middle East Quarterly*. March 1997. pp. 47-53

<http://www.meforum.org/340/will-the-gulf-monarchies-work-together>

Although a little dated, this paper presents an excellent history of military threats to the Gulf region beginning in the mid 1970s, and considers the ways in which GCC Member States have reacted to them.

"Regional Programme Framework"

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

<http://www.unodc.org/middleeastandnorthafrica/en/regional-programme-framework/regional-programme-framework.html>

Focused on trafficking, crime, and terrorism, the Framework provides a "holistic, integrated, and nationally owned" look at the security challenges faced by the Arab states.

### Topic II. The Coming Resource Wars: Mitigating the Conflict over Natural and Economic Resources

"Conflict and resources." United Nations Peacekeeping.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/environment/resources.shtml>

This is a basic overview, and the base with several linked resources, for existing attempts at mitigating conflict over resources, such as missions in Liberia and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While these are not members of the LAS, they are models of what could be tailored to fit the Arab League's needs.

"Disasters and conflicts: an overview." United Nations Environment Programme.

<http://www.unep.org/pdf/brochures/DisastersAndConflicts.pdf>

This is a detailed fact sheet of ideas that the UNEP already has in place with natural resource conflicts. It discusses the current conditions, possible conditions, and assesses the current risks. As economic resources are also an issue, it also gives an estimation of how much various projects cost, should the LAS decide to try to replicate these within it.

“Conflict & Natural Resources.” Environmental Literacy Council.

<http://www.enviroliteracy.org/subcategory.php/222.html>

The ELC has compiled a list of several resources for in depth research on resource conflict. Within the sources are details on specific conflicts and various political theories related to conflicts. There is also a link to an MSNBC look at conflict over oil, specifically in Iraq. As tensions between states within the League and others mount, and the threat of sanctions and embargoes in key ports still looming, the LAS needs to consider this as part of their resolutions towards conflict mitigation.

Tisdell, C., & Wilson, C. “Conflicts Over Natural Resources and the Environment: Economics and Security, Working Paper No. 86,”

*Economics, Ecology, and The Environment*. September 2003.

Queensland: The University of Queensland Press

<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/48967/2/WP86.pdf>

Clem Tisdell and Clevo Wilson intertwine economic theory and current knowledge of resource conflicts to give a better look at how one is effected by the other and the two cannot be separated.

### **Topic III: State Building and the LAS: Examining the LAS Response to Recent Regime Changes in Arab States**

Jedea, H. “Spotlight: The Arab League’s Evolving Role In A Restless Middle East.”

The Stimson Center. November 2011.

<http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-arab-leagues-evolving-role-in-a-restless-middle-east/>

A brief, but excellent overview of the changing role faced by the LAS in promoting state-building and proactively addressing conflict within Member States.

Masters, J. (2012). “Backgrounder: The Arab League.”

Council on Foreign Relations

<http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/arab-league/p25967>

The article not only provides an excellent overview of the potential role the LAS has in promoting statebuilding, but also links to several excellent articles on the successes and failures the League has faced in the past.

Hussein, H. (2012). “League of Arab States BRIDGE Workshop.”

<http://bridge-project.org/news/arab-world/1092-league-of-arab-states-bridge-workshop>

A brief overview of a conference held by the LAS to “build the technical capacity of its election observation mission to Algeria.” The workshop was prepared and presented by Egyptian presenters and is to be the first of several workshops on election monitoring.

“Yemen in need: League of Arab States, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and The Humanitarian Forum hold humanitarian conference in Cairo.”

AlertNet. 6 May 2012.

<http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/yemen-in-need-league-of-arab-states-organisation-of-islamic-cooperation-and-the-humanitarian-forum-hold-humanitarian-conference-in-cairo/>

Report of the findings of a group of 85 NGOs who met at a conference organized by the LAS and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to appraise the immediate and critical needs of the Yemeni people.