

Southern Regional Model United Nations XXI
The Global Paradigm: Enhancing Peace through Security Initiatives
November 18-20, 2010
Atlanta, GA
Email: las@srmun.org



Dear Delegates,

I am so excited to welcome you to the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) XXI and to the League of Arab States (LAS) committee. Come November, I will be your Director. I have served as a delegate and chair in Model Arab League and Model NATO for the last seven years and look forward to bringing that experience to Model United Nations. Model programs are a great way for students to “act out” history, a teaching method that I believe is the best way students can learn history, politics, and diplomacy.

The LAS was formed in 1945, prior to the United Nations, as a body whose goal was to strengthen the relationship between Arab states. In the years since its formation, it has expanded into various subcommittees including Ministers of the Interior and Economic Ministers. As this year’s SRMUN’s theme is *The Global Paradigm: Enhancing Peace through Security Initiatives*, we have chosen three topics that will help delegates think about these themes within an Arab context:

- I. Promoting Economic Integration Among Arab States
- II. Implementing tools to combat the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons throughout the Middle East
- III. Developing a pan-Arab Response to Requests for Extradition and Repatriation of International Criminals

Students are required prior to conference to write 2-page single-spaced position papers on each topic. These position papers should outline their countries positions on their topic and should serve as a launching point for debate within committee. These papers should be *strong* statements of your state’s point of view on each topic. Position papers should also say what a country is going to do in committee, to give you and other countries the ability to plan strategy prior to conference. Position papers should be concise and written straightforwardly, so as to make them accessible to all delegates. For more information about these position papers, please visit the SRMUN website (<http://www.srmun.org>). Position papers must be submitted on-line via the SRMUN website and will be due by 11:59PM EST on October 22, 2010.

I can’t wait to meet each and every one of you. If you have any questions prior to conference, please do not hesitate to email me. Good luck with your research!

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History of the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (LAS) was founded in Cairo, Egypt in 1945. The original purpose of the League was to bring together predominately Arab speaking countries and promote their common political, economic, and cultural interests.¹ When the Egyptian government first suggested that an Arab League should be created in 1943, they along with a few other Arab states, wanted a more unified approach to achieving political and social cooperation without the loss of self rule. What resulted was a regional organization of member states that was neither a union nor a federation.²

As World War II drew to an end, heads of Arab states began to realize the importance of unity in their region and thus convened in Alexandria in 1944. What resulted from that meeting was the Alexandria Protocol signed into effect on 7 October 1944, which would set the parameters for the formation of the League.³ While there were several reasons Arab leaders chose to meet in Alexandria, one of the most important was to declare a unified Arab policy on Palestine. As part of the decolonization efforts resulting from WWII, the United Kingdom intended to create a Jewish State in Palestine, which would eventually become Israel. However, the Arab states were seeking independence from foreign rule, and thus the sovereignty of Palestine was a top priority.⁴ Therefore, Article Five of The Alexandria Protocol addresses a special resolution concerning Palestine, proclaiming that:

“The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World. The Committee is also of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.”⁵

Through this resolution the Alexandria Protocol further declared The Committee's support of Palestinian Arabs and the safeguarding of their rights by setting up the Arab National Fund, which would help to protect the land of Palestinian Arabs.⁶ The signatories also wanted to express their desire to create a unified Arab state sometime in the future, as a strong sense of Arab nationalism had risen in the earlier part of the 20th century, encouraging Arabs to think of themselves as one people unified by language and culture, as deserving of an Arab state as the varied European nationalists who felt entitled to their own nations.⁷

On 22 March 1945, the resolutions of the Alexandria Protocol were set into motion and the Pact of the League of Arab States was developed. This document, much like the United Nations Charter, set forth the agreements by which the League would exist, its ultimate purpose, structure, powers and operational methods. This Pact established the Council of the League, several special committees, and a Secretariat.⁸ The Pact set forth that the Council of the League should meet twice per year and be the main governing body of the League.⁹ In the Council, Member States receive one vote, and resolutions are passed by simple majority.¹⁰ All League resolutions that pass are considered binding on those who voted in favor.¹¹ The Secretary-General drafts the budget of the League, and the Council of the League is responsible for approving it and determining the shares of the budget that Member States are responsible for.¹² Further, the Council is responsible for managing the membership of the League as well

1 Website dedicated for the Arab League. <http://www.arabji.com/ArabGovt/ArabLeague.htm>

2 Website dedicated for the Arab League. <http://www.arabji.com/ArabGovt/ArabLeague.htm>

3 The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. *The Alexandria Protocol: October 7 1944.* http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/alex.asp

4 Middle East Web. *The Alexandria Protocol.* <http://www.mideastweb.org/alexandria.htm>

5 The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. *The Alexandria Protocol: October 7 1944.* http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/alex.asp

6 Middle East Web. *The Alexandria Protocol.* <http://www.mideastweb.org/alexandria.htm>

7 Rashid Khalidi. "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature." *The American Historical Review.* December 1991. pp. 1363-1373

8 *Pact of the League of Arab States.* League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

9 Article 11. *Pact of the League of Arab States.* League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

10 Article 3. *Pact of the League of Arab States.* League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

11 Article 7. *Pact of the League of Arab States.* League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

12 Article 13. *Pact of the League of Arab States.* League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

as appointing the highest officials of the Secretariat, especially the Secretary-General.¹³ The Pact had seven original signatories: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Transjordan (Jordan, as of 1950), and Yemen. However as the League developed, so too did their membership and today there are a total of 22 members of The League of Arab States. An annex to the Pact even accepts Palestine as a recognized sovereign state with voting power in the League. Article 3 of the Pact granted each Member State one vote in the Council of the League, and granted the Council the role of executing agreements between member states, along with ensuring peace and security through economic and social relations. Article 4 set the parameters for the other committees within the Arab League that would present draft agreements for the Council addressing issues including trade, agriculture, aviation, and extradition, social welfare, health matters, and several other that were covered under article 2 of the Pact.¹⁴ With these methods in mind, the League hoped to create a more unified Arab state.

The Cultural Treaty of the Arab League was ratified in 1946, promoting cooperation among various cultural areas such as arts, sports, sciences and academia.¹⁵ It endorsed and outlined the creation of organizations to support trading of cultural knowledge, joint sporting events, and academic exchanges to support the education and development of the Arab people.¹⁶ This treaty encouraged Arab States to work together towards advancing literacy, preservation of cultural masterpieces, cultural development, and keeping pace with global intellectual movements.¹⁷ Through this treaty, the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization has been able to facilitate the cultural development of the Arab States through providing reference texts translated or written in Arabic, providing technical expertise, and hosting conferences of State Ministers in order to create strategies for educational and cultural development. ¹⁸

In 1950, the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (JDECT) was signed by Member States of the LAS. This action was taken following the establishment of Israel in 1948, and the failure of the Arab States to respond in a coordinated effort to the violence that ensued.¹⁹ The treaty established the Joint Defense Council (JDC) which would have binding power upon all Member States should a resolution be passed with a two-thirds majority.²⁰ It also established a collective security agreement between all Member States that would be upheld by the JDC and a Permanent Military Commission.²¹ This collective security agreement, as outlined in the second article of the JDECT, defines an attack on one Member State of the treaty as an attack on all Member States.²² As in all such agreements, this definition includes attacks from outside the League as well as attacks upon Member States by other Member States. The JDECT became the treaty most responsible for allowing the League to handle matters involving Arab peace and security with appropriate military force.

The League has always made efforts to uphold its primary goals of enhancing Inter-Arab economic and social cooperation. In 1994, the League signed the Arab Charter on Human Rights to reaffirm the rights set forth in several already established documents such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, while also noting several rights that are important to the League but were not previously outlined²³. In 1998, the League passed the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, dedicating themselves to the global fight against terrorist activity.²⁴ This document established the framework for the Arab States to act as a unified front against terrorism, as well as

13 *Pact of the League of Arab States*. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

14 Middle East Web. *Pact of the Arab League of States*. <http://www.mideastweb.org/arableague.htm>

15 *Cultural Treaty of the Arab League*. League of Arab States. 20 November 1946

16 *Ibid*.

17 *Ibid*.

18 "ALESCO Home Page." Arab League Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation

http://www.alecso.org.tn/lng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&lang=en&id=85&Itemid=0

19 "Historical Background." League of Arab States.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/print_page.jsp?art_id=1175

20 Article 6. *Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty*. League of Arab States. 17 June 1950

21 *Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty*. League of Arab States. 17 June 1950

22 Article 3. *Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty*. League of Arab States. 17 June 1950

23 *Ibid*.

24 *Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism*. League of Arab States. 22 April 1998

defining the League's commitment to fight the cause of international terrorism on both a political and judicial level²⁵.

The current members of the League of Arab States are:

ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN.²⁶

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Arabic German Consulting. *The League of Arab States*. <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm>

I. Promoting Economic Integration Among Arab States

Introduction

The economic integration of the Arab world has always been one of the primary goals of the League of Arab States. With the efforts put forth by the League in the past, Arab states have taken great strides towards improving the flow of trade and labor throughout the Arab world, creating the basis for a sense of economic unity, and bringing the Arab States towards a stronger economic position. The League's Member States have taken part in free trade agreements, international development opportunities, and other economic unions in an attempt to bring themselves to the higher echelons of economic development. The League has the manpower, the natural resources, and the resolve to become a greater economic force, and it is slowly growing into more unified organization.

With the current global economic situation, integration is becoming more necessary as the world becomes a smaller, more competitive place to work in. With modern communication and transit technology, money changes hands faster than ever, and laborers and employers have ever more opportunities, despite the increased competition. The global economic recession has also increased the necessity of integration. As it becomes clearer that the world's economies are intertwined, the League cannot help but notice that each Member State affects the others with every economic fluctuation. With economic activity already showing increase from the efforts of the past, the League must focus on exploiting every possible avenue of economic gain, and through their combined efforts, the League can rise one day as an economic power.²⁷

Increased Arab economic unity also brings the prospect of peace, as it further enhances greater ties between nations. With the growth of the economy at stake, individuals as well as states will have less to gain and more to lose with violent recourse. The League recognizes the value of economic prosperity to the Palestinian refugees, the citizens of poverty-stricken Somalia, and to the fledgling government of Iraq, as well as many other hotbeds of political and economic struggle. As the League grows in economic prosperity, the value of peace will rise, hopefully resulting in a more secure League of Arab States.

The League is not the only organization to be making such moves, however, and competition is strong. As such, the League must be ready to keep in mind the successes of other Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the European Union, as well as their failures, and begin moving towards a higher level of integration than has ever been seen in the Arab World before.

League Efforts for Integration

Article Two of the Alexandria Protocol explicitly states that Arab States should cooperate in “economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.”²⁸ This is later affirmed in the Pact of the League of Arab States, using nearly the same wording, and later creating a League Special Committee specifically for such cooperation²⁹ This Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs would be responsible for writing resolutions that “establish the basis and scope of cooperation,” and submitting these resolutions to the Council of the League prior to being submitted to any states referred to in such a resolution.³⁰ This cooperation, a very important first step taken in 1945, was only the beginning of Arab economic integration efforts.

Five years later, the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty was passed, and Article Eight created a new Council of Arab Economic Affairs Ministers, to realize the goals put forth in Article Seven of the treaty.³¹ This made the economic goals of the League clearer, stating that Member States shall, “in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural

27 Steven Hertog, “The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm.” *Middle East Policy*. Spring 2007. pp. 52-68.

28 *Alexandria Protocol*. League of Arab States. 7 October 1944

29 *Pact of the League of Arab States*. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945.

30 *Ibid*.

31 *Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty*. League of Arab States. 17 June 1950

resources.³² Further, they agreed to improve exchanges of agricultural and industrial trade goods, and to coordinate further inter-Arab agreements.³³ The Council of Arab Economic Affairs Ministers also had the ability to seek cooperation from the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs.³⁴ With representatives of the Ministries of Economic Affairs from all the Member States working together with Arab League representatives, the League became more capable of meeting the needs of individual Member-States with actionable plans that the League could agree would benefit all Member States.

The Greater Arab Free Trade Area

The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), an organization created in 1997 by the League, is a prime example of Arab integration efforts, even though it is still in its early stages³⁵ While the creation of GAFTA was a League effort, it currently only has 17 members out of the 22 Member States in the League.³⁶ Even so, it has worked to unify agricultural and industrial standards and specifications between its members.³⁷ In doing so, it hopes to increase the ease of interstate commerce.³⁸ It has also begun an effort to greatly reduce tariffs and customs with the ultimate goal of eventually create a region of free trade on exports and imports between GAFTA Member States.³⁹ In fact, with the exception of Sudan and Yemen, the agreement reached full liberalization of tariff barriers on 1 January 2005.⁴⁰ Because they did not fully fulfill the requirements stipulated by GAFTA, Sudan and Yemen were given special status and are expected to reach full liberalization by the end of 2010.⁴¹

GAFTA's efforts are having an exceptional effect, increasing inter-GAFTA trade at an average rate 7% higher than the global export increase between 1997 and 2005, the period of time in which tariffs were still being reduced.⁴² There is, however, much that can be done in the GAFTA regime. The most obvious improvements would be increased membership in GAFTA agreements, but that is not all there is to it. GAFTA members still struggle daily with unpredictable Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), which threaten to undermine the efforts of the tariff exemption.⁴³ Quotas, excessive documentation, overly thorough inspections and unusual standards all cause the cost of importing goods to increase, and GAFTA has found itself unable to change the already intrusive NTB standards of many Arab States.⁴⁴ Without GAFTA involvement in NTBs, no further progress can be expected by the organization⁴⁵

Other Multilateral Integration

Of course, League Member States have been involved in cooperative measures outside the League's efforts as well. Two such programs are the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). OPEC, the famous oil cartel, is not an Arab-exclusive organization although it does include several regional powers and has quite a bit of influence on the exploitation of natural resources that the Council of Arab Economic Affairs Ministers is explicitly concerned with.⁴⁶ The GCC, however, is composed of six economically powerful League members, expanding within their sub-region upon the cooperative efforts of the League as a whole.⁴⁷

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Javad Abedini and Nicolas Péridy. "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of the Trade Effects." *The Journal of Economic Integration*. Fall 2007.

36 Ibid.

37 "Ministry of Industry and Trade." Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Website. <http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=732>

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Javad Abedini and Nicolas Péridy. "The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): An Estimation of the Trade Effects" *The Journal of Economic Integration*. Fall 2007.

43 Steven Hertog. "The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm." *Middle East Policy*. Spring 2007. pp. 52-68.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 "Member Countries." Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm

47 "Secretariat General Website." Gulf Cooperation Council. <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php>

In any debate involving the economic concerns of the League of Arab States, OPEC's influence will have to be accounted for. OPEC, whose membership includes Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and five non-Arab states, controls the greatest natural resource the region has to offer.⁴⁸ As such, OPEC is heavily involved in matters concerning the many migrant workers from across the League and beyond who come to work in the petroleum industry in the Arab OPEC Member States.⁴⁹ As these Member States make large use of migrant labor in the production and export of petroleum, OPEC's influence on the entire region cannot be denied.⁵⁰ Many Arab families and even entire States depend on petroleum exports for their financial well-being, and so it is clear that the League must work closely with OPEC to carefully integrate Arab economies.

Many of the League's economic cooperation efforts have been taken one step further by the GCC.⁵¹ Several of the most capital-rich Member States of the League are members of this organization.⁵² Investors in the Gulf states have large holdings in Syria and Lebanon, and such are becoming the political focus of Arab Economic integration.⁵³ The GCC has also proven to be a strong coalition in political economic reform in the region.⁵⁴ This entire Council is made up of representatives from League Member States, working towards improving integration in their sub-region, often focusing on integration of the economic variety.⁵⁵ Many examples of successful integration policies in the League of Arab States can be found by examining the GCC. In 1992, the GCC Patent Office was established, effectively integrating sub-regional patent law, a maneuver that made industry and trade integrated in ways more subtle and binding than a free trade area would later create.⁵⁶ The UAE is the only member state not dedicated to a unified GCC currency, as they believe that GAFTA is not a true and complete Free Trade Area.⁵⁷

Foreign Influences

Member States of the League have shown through their actions their intent and hopefulness for a more integrated economic regime, but other factors also change the way in which Arab economies work together. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has had a great impact on economic integration in the area.⁵⁸ Indeed, many Arab investors have shown favor towards those projects that focus on the region.⁵⁹ Gulf investors especially prefer to invest in the Mashreq area, including Egypt.⁶⁰ Further, the League's share in global FDI increased by 3.7 percent between 2000 and 2005, to reach a total of over 37 billion United States Dollars (USD) and has continued to grow since.⁶¹ Even in 2008, when the world was experiencing a global recession, FDI within the League increased by another 20 percent.⁶² Further, a 2008 survey by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation that "compares the ease of operating a private business, benchmarks regulations, and identifies reforms and global good practices," reveals that 13 Arab States made major economic reforms to increase the ease of doing business in their economies.⁶³

Migrant workers also provide a driving force for integration. Millions of Egyptians migrate for work in oil fields throughout the Arab world, hoping to send money back to their families.⁶⁴ Further, migrant labor provides much of the labor force in GCC states, with foreign nationals comprising of between 60 and 80 percent of the population in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.⁶⁵ It is clear that Inter-Arab migration is a major power affecting the region's

48 "Member Countries." Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm

49 Omar Sattaur. "Gulf Crisis Takes Toll of World's Poor." *New Scientist* 1991.

50 Ibid.

51 "Secretariat General Website" Gulf Cooperation Council. <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php>

52 Steven Hertog. "The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm." *Middle East Policy*. Spring 2007. pp. 52-68.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 "Foundations and objectives" Gulf Cooperation Council. <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=3>

56 "GCC Patents Office" Gulf Cooperation Council. <http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-Show&ID=62>

57 "Single currency union takes a step forward." *Middle East*. July 2009.

58 Steven Hertog. "The GCC and Arab Economic Integration: A New Paradigm." *Middle East Policy*. Spring 2007. pp. 52-68.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 "Arab World Outlook" FDI.net. http://www.fdi.net/spotlight/spotlight_detail.cfm?spid=50

63 "Doing Business 2009 in the Arab World Highlights Increased Regulatory Reform." World Bank Group. November 2008.

64 Homa Hoodfar. "The Impact of Male Migration on Domestic Budgeting: Egyptian Women Striving for an Islamic Budgeting Pattern." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* Fall 1997. pp. 73-98.

65 Andrzej Kapiszewski. "Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries." United Nations Secretariat. 22 May 2006.

economy.⁶⁶ Despite this, traveling and sending remittances between League Member States are not always simple tasks.⁶⁷ Further, many Gulf states have been showing preference to Asian migrant workers, who are cheaper and leave their families at home, in an effort to secure dominance over the migrant labor force.⁶⁸ With furthered economic integration it may become prudent to provide Arab migrant workers an edge in internal migration over migrant workers from other non-regional states, such as India.⁶⁹

Infrastructure and Economic Integration

The League's various banking regimes hold potential as well as obstacles for integration. Muslim law, which still holds a great deal of sway over Arab legislature, forbids the practice of usury.⁷⁰ This means that loans are a difficult issue to broach within the League, especially from a political standpoint. Although major business and government transactions often still use credit, the average Arab national prefers to use non-credit bases of finance⁷¹. Further, banking practices in some areas have been difficult due to infrastructure problems, especially the conflict-ridden state of Somalia.⁷² This, however, has given way to "Hawala," a system in which money is informally transferred over borders between private individuals, permitting an easy method of sending remittances and other money transfers.⁷³ In Hawala, little record is kept on who sends or receives monies, and often the debt between the two Hawala dealers, or "Hawaladars," is dealt with through side businesses in imports and exports, in which they change the books to reflect the debt payments.⁷⁴ Hawala already has a great deal of international regulation and integration promoting accountability and making it a recognized system of monetary transfer in the Arab world, as well as parts of South Asia.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, Gulf banking operations, such as those in the UAE, have proven to be very effective, utilizing modern technology, having many branches, and utilizing private migrant labor.⁷⁶

The Global Economic Crisis and Arab Economic Integration

Despite the lack of integration into the global economy, the League of Arab States was hit hard by the global economic crisis beginning in the Summer of 2008.⁷⁷ Fluctuations in the oil market, the downturn in investment returns to GCC portfolios, and the strong economic ties between North Africa and Europe made the entire region feel the effects of the crisis.⁷⁸ This caused a decline in the revenues collected by financial institutions and real estate businesses first, followed by a reduction in petroleum production, which caused an increase in unemployment, especially among low-income and migrant workers.⁷⁹ The adverse affect on remittances of course showed its effect on the Arab world, as migrant workers were making less, if anything at all, with the exception of Tunisia, whose more skilled workers were shown favor during the height of the crisis.⁸⁰

66 Homa Hoodfar. "The Impact of Male Migration on Domestic Budgeting: Egyptian Women Striving for an Islamic Budgeting Pattern." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* Fall 1997. pp. 73-98.

67 Ibid.

68 Andrzej Kapiszewski. "Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries." United Nations Secretariat. 22 May 2006.

69 Homa Hoodfar. "The Impact of Male Migration on Domestic Budgeting: Egyptian Women Striving for an Islamic Budgeting Pattern." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* Fall 1997. pp. 73-98.

70 Maryam Razavy. "Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social phenomenon?" *Crime, Law and Social Change* 44.3 (2005): 277-299.

71 Edwina A. Thompson. "An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala." *Journal of the History of International Law*. January 2008. pp. 83-118.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 "Best practices issued by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Concerning the Hawala." Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. December 2005.

76 F. Al Shamsi, H. Aly, and M. El-Bassiouni. "Measuring and explaining the efficiencies of the United Arab Emirates banking system." *Applied Economics*. 2009.

77 Nader Habibi. "The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Arab Countries: A Year-End Assessment." *Crown Center for Middle East Studies*. December 2009.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

Government spending increases and fiscal policies acted quickly to stem the tide of this crisis, with many oil exporting countries as well as Jordan offering deposit guarantees to strengthen their banks.⁸¹ Many states also used banking deposits and government investments to inject capital directly into their financial institutions and equity markets.⁸² Saudi Arabia, for example, through fiscal stimuli, increased their government spending by 9.3 percent in 2009.⁸³ Such practices caused an increased deficit, as spending increased while revenue decreased, but many Member States have already begun balancing their budgets.⁸⁴

Conclusion

While the League and its Member States have made several moves towards an integrated economy, progress has been slow and hardly comprehensive. The GCC and GAFTA have made many individual moves toward integration, and have worked together as well as expected, but further action is necessary in order to fulfill the true expectations of their respective agreements. GAFTA will have to be reinforced to become a true free trade area, which will in turn strengthen each of the Member States, and will encourage total membership. The strength of the GCC will have to prove itself as they move towards open borders and a unified currency, and with that strength, even the economically weakest of Arab states will one day be able to stand on their own.

FDI and migrant labor have shown themselves to be major factors in economic integration, as the GCC invests monetarily in other Arab states while less financially powerful states invest their labor forces abroad, yet the downturn of the economy and the increasing favor of non-Arab migrant labor has stemmed the potency of these effects. Member State banking practices have been seen as a way to reflect the viability of economic improvement, the usefulness of FDI within the state, and the integration with the global economy.

With an increase in infrastructure and economic might, more legitimate and useful banking practices can be installed throughout the League, to increase the viability of economic integration and growth. But in order for finances to move quickly and legitimately, a modern banking infrastructure will be necessary. Through development of such infrastructure, the League can hope to increase internal investment in individual Member States, as well as improving the ability of FDI to aid Member States with their development.

All of these things are means to an end, the economic integration of the Member States of the League, an end which has been repeatedly stressed as one of the most important goals of the League. Further, such integration is necessary to complete a full recovery from the recent economic crisis, and to guard the League against future recessions. Such a cause is vital to the future economic prosperity of the League.

Committee Directive

Delegates should consider how the League can promote further economic integration, while also taking into consideration the usefulness of GAFTA. The committee could debate on methods of bringing in other Member States to GAFTA or making GAFTA more useful to trade, and whether or not to introduce resolutions to reduce NTBs. Other initiatives to make GAFTA a more powerful trade agreement, such as standardization of manufactured goods, should be developed upon and made more potent. For examples on how free trade can affect a region, delegates should look at other free trade agreements and their effects on the local economies, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement, and the European Union.

Delegates should consider the actions of the GCC in regards to economic integration, migrant workers, and financial investment, and how to encourage the GCC to act in a way that benefits all League members. The GCC's initiatives towards a common currency should be regarded, as well as their efforts to unify patent law and to open up borders for the citizenry of GCC Member States. Further increasing FDI throughout the League should also be a major concern, whether the source be from other Member States or outside influences.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

Increasing banking infrastructure as well as methods of banking cooperation could increase the flow of money as well as increase capital to regional economic projects. Delegates should be aware of the risks of increased integration as well as the benefits and should be aware of efforts their individual states have made to promote or even obstruct risky integration.

II. Implementing tools to combat the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons throughout the Middle East

Introduction

The issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation was first addressed by the United Nations in 1996 in General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/70, which delegated two panels to provide expert analysis of the situation.⁸⁵ In July of 2003, UN Member States reviewed the implementation of the 2001 “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” (PoA), which was formed on behalf of the 142 nations examining the SALW issue, and analyzed collectively ways to solve the illicit trade of such weapons.⁸⁶ Not only were UN member states highlighting the importance of curtailing the illicit small arms trade, but international, regional, and non-governmental organizations also joined in agreement that this problem will require “concerted action at the global, regional, sub-regional, national, and local levels.”⁸⁷

Looking specifically at Arab world and the broader Middle East, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., former U.S. assistant to Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, believes that the Middle East among other regions is deeply affected, stating that “this activity persists because of lax enforcement of laws and regulations, or their absence altogether.”⁸⁸ There are millions of SALW in various parts of the Middle East region, resulting in thousands of direct deaths yearly, yet there is no one approach or answer to solving this problem.⁸⁹ Nations within the League of Arab States have on one side expressed satisfaction with the addressed issues and solutions of SALW, while others in contrast have voiced continued concerns and need of reform in policies.⁹⁰ The League of Arab States and other organizations conducting expert analysis have put special emphasis on cultural and civil society roles and their correlation to the issue being addressed.⁹¹

History

The end of the Cold War saw both an increase in peace and security issues worldwide and a rise in UN operations internationally.⁹² This was due in part to a rise in conflict in areas of the former Soviet Union.⁹³ A Security Council Summit in January 1992 was the first of its kind to focus on disarmament issues.⁹⁴ The next major step came with General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/70, which was finalized and presented to the General Assembly in 1996. The Secretary-General observed at the time that the UN already had in place specific actions with regard to weapons of mass destruction, yet had no standing policies on the illicit trade of SALW, which causes the deaths of persons in

⁸⁵ “Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects Programme of Action.” *Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes Center for Nonproliferation Studies*. 13 February 2009. <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/sarms.pdf>

⁸⁶ “The Role of Regional Organisations in Stemming the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.” *The Geneva Forum*. 30 January 2004. <http://www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/20040129-30.pdf>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ “Illicit Trade in Small Arms, Light Weapons a Serious Threat.” *Washington File*. 08 July 2003. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/07/mil-030708-usia01.htm>

⁸⁹ “Traditional Cultural Practices and Small Arms in the Middle East: Problems and Solutions.” 04 November 2002. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/nafr_pdf/mideast-yem-leb-jor-eg-pal-2002.pdf

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² A/50/70 – S/1995/1. “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.” United Nations. 03 January 1995. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

conflicts around the world.⁹⁵ A/RES/50/70 reaffirmed the UN's role in disarmament and the right for each individual nation under Article 51 of the UN Charter to defend themselves and acquire weapons to do so.⁹⁶ In light of the violence and conflicts caused by the trade of SALW, this resolution requested that the Secretary-General appoint a panel of experts to generate a report on the type of SALW being used in conflict, the nature and cause of the excessive accumulation and illicit trade of SALW, and the ways and means to reduce this trend of illicit trade and excessive accumulation.⁹⁷

The first panel report was delivered to the General Assembly in 1997 through the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms Report A/52/298. The panel report identified five types of small arms and seven light weapons that should be of focus in the UN.⁹⁸ These weapons were chosen specifically because they are "those which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war."⁹⁹ A/52/298 suggested that the terms "excessive" and "accumulation" are relative and exist in the context of certain regions¹⁰⁰. Therefore, it would not be correct to classify a large quantity of weapons in a responsible state as "excessive" since it would not lead to violence and conflict.¹⁰¹ Illicit trade occurs when these weapons are traded illegally against the laws of States, and according to the report "plays a major role in the violence currently affecting some countries and regions, by supplying the instruments used to destabilize societies and governments, encourage crime, and foster terrorism, drug trafficking, mercenary activities and the violation of human rights."¹⁰² These situations are not caused by the accumulation of these weapons but rather are exacerbated by other political, cultural, and economic factors, and SALW only increase the lethality of these conflicts.¹⁰³

The last report prior to the Programme of Action was the 1999 General Assembly Report A/54/258, which highlighted issues similar to A/52/298¹⁰⁴. The report revealed that there are over 500 million small arms and light weapons in existence, which are being developed in large numbers in developed countries. Furthermore, approximately 300,000 children have been coerced in using these weapons in armed conflicts.¹⁰⁵ Small arms and light weapons are considered ideal, given their lethality, inexpensiveness, portability, ability to be concealed, and the relative lack of maintenance and logistical support to operate.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, corrupt governments and leaders often assist in this particular market of weapons.¹⁰⁷

A/54/258 revealed that many regional governmental bodies have been implementing strategies to stem the illicit trade of SALW. Also, states including much of northern and western Europe, Argentina, Japan, and Mali had taken measures and initiatives at the regional and subregional, international, and UN levels.¹⁰⁸ For example, these states have sponsored international workshops or conferences to promote activities on problems associated with small arms proliferation or illicit arms trafficking.¹⁰⁹ There had also been a handful of other states that have strengthened legal or regulatory control of SALW. A/54/258 suggested that the UN develop a cost-effective program of marking weapons so they can be tracked, implement effective arms embargoes, make available systematic information on stockpile management, storage, and destruction of SALW.¹¹⁰ In addition, A/54/258 recommended a special meeting

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ A/RES/50/70. United Nations General Assembly (15th session). January 15, 1996.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/i_measur_pdf/UN_doc/g_%20assembly/GA/A_RES_50/A_RES_50_70_B.pdf

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ A/52/298. "General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms." (A/52/298) United Nations General Assembly. August 27, 1997. <http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html>

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ A/54/258 "Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (A/54/258). United Nations General Assembly. August 19, 1999. <http://www.un-casa.org/CASAUUpload/ELibrary/1999%20GGE.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

to be convened no later than 2001 on the study of restricting the manufacturing of SALW to manufacturers and dealers and how to eliminate the illicit trade in these areas.¹¹¹

A/52/298 and A/54/258 prompted the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms in 2001. The conference was held in New York for almost two weeks, whereby the Programme of Action was adopted.¹¹² The PoA highlighted the importance of the matter, presented again the deaths involved and how they were connected to SALW, how children were being affected, and the obligation that Member States have to comply with any weapon embargoes that the UN chose to implement.¹¹³

The Programme of Action suggested ways to combat and prevent the illicit trade of SALW, found in clause 22 of Section I, which includes global, regional, and national responses to the issue, including the combating of “illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons.”¹¹⁴ This would also include states already in compliance supporting states who wish to be in compliance with the policies set up by the PoA.¹¹⁵ There are also strategies and suggestions for the national, regional, and global levels. Placing more emphasis on the national level, it was desired that States adopt domestic legislation and adequate laws that would combat the illicit trade already in existence and prevent further illicit manufacturing of these weapons. These suggested laws range from licensing of manufacturers, regulation of these weapons, export and import laws, destroying of surplus weapons, spreading awareness, and addressing the needs of the victims, including children.¹¹⁶ The regional suggestions included establishing a point of contact to serve as a liaison of communication, adopting control mechanisms and border policies, as well as establishing regional norms and measures on disarmament and destruction of excessive stockpiles.¹¹⁷ Globally, it is desired for all States and regions to be in compliance and support of U.N. regulations concerning SALW (this goal is seen primarily in section III).¹¹⁸

The Programme of Action requested a conference to convene no later than 2006, which would launch a biennial meeting of States to examine the implementation of suggested actions, to develop a tracking system of SALW, to encourage the United Nations and other regional governmental agencies to adopt and implement the PoA, and to recruit non-governmental organizations to assist in implementing this Programme.¹¹⁹ The Review Conference in 2006 faced great challenges, namely disagreements on solutions for curbing the proliferation of SALW and the progression of implementing strategies for illicit trade of SALW. The Conference ultimately ended with no agreement or strategy to combat SALW.¹²⁰ Although widely viewed as a failure, the Review Conference did continue to spread awareness on the issue and highlighted that the PoA had successfully encouraged over 50 Member States to enact tougher laws and over 60 States to destroy large stockpiles.¹²¹

The 2008 biennial meeting was more successful than the preceding biennial meeting. States adopted by a vote an International Tracing Instrument that would “Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.”¹²² The main product of the 2008 Biennial meeting was “the full and effective implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, which would streamline the process of tracking and marking SALW internationally.”¹²³ Under this International Tracing Instrument, states not already in compliance with the initial Programme of Action and the subsequent meeting decision were yet again encouraged to do so.¹²⁴ A

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² A/CONF.192/15 “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.” United Nations General Assembly. 20 July 2001. <http://www.poa-iss.org/PoA/poahtml.aspx>

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ “United Nations Conference to Review Progress made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action.” Small Arms Review Conference. 07 July 2006. <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/index.html>

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3. United Nations General Assembly. 20 August 2008. <http://www.poa-iss.org/DocsUpcomingEvents/ENN0846796.pdf>

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

web-based Programme of Action Implementation Support System was highlighted, and states were encouraged to use it.¹²⁵

The fourth and most recent biennial meeting convened on 14-18 June 2010.¹²⁶ Chaired by Mexican Ambassador Pablo Macedo, the conference focused on prevention of illicit trade of SALW, preparations for future conferences, and education and public awareness.¹²⁷ The “Outcome on the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons” was finalized, completing the International Tracing Instrument set up in the 2008 biennial meeting.¹²⁸ The fourth biennial meeting also recommended a “comprehensive assessment of progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action, ten years following its adoption, as an input to the 2012 Review Conference.”¹²⁹

The League of Arab States and SALW

The League of Arab States (LAS), founded on 22 October 1945 and currently headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, has since its inception sought to foster relations between member states and to encourage the collaboration between member states for the advancement of the greater Arab world.¹³⁰ This overarching theme behind all LAS policies can be seen in Article 2 of its Charter, which states:

“The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close co-operation of the member-states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state.”¹³¹

The LAS began responding to the issue of the proliferation of SALW before the UN Programme of Action was conceived. Affirming both the Charter of the League of Arab States and the Charter of the United Nations, the League in its Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism laid out a plan to support the self-determination of Arab people by combating terrorism within member states.¹³² This meeting of ministers occurred in Cairo in 1998, over three years prior to the drafting of the PoA.

The LAS’ response to the issue of SALW came initially during the July 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹³³ At this conference, the LAS established a common position on the topic and have since implemented many policies both at the regional and national level to implement the UN Programme of Action.¹³⁴ Within the League, any decision made is only binding to the Member States that voted, and not to the League as a whole.¹³⁵ This is why, at least in general, common statements

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons Website. <http://www.poa-iss.org/BMS4/>

¹²⁷ “2010 UN Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms.” UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service. 11 June 2010. <http://www.un-ngls.org/spip.php?article2485>

¹²⁸ “Outcome on the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.” UN Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

¹²⁹ “Consolidated Draft Outcome.” UN Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms and Light Weapons. 17 June 2010. http://www.poa-iss.org/bms4/Documents/OutcomeDocument/OUTCOME_DOC-17June11pm.doc

¹³⁰ “League of Arab States.” Programme of Action – Implementation Support System. <http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹³¹ *Charter of the League of Arab States*. The League of Arab States. 22 March 1945. <http://www.ncusar.org/modelarableague/charter.html>

¹³² *Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism*. League of Arab States Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm>

¹³³ “League of Arab States.” Programme of Action – Implementation Support System. <http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹³⁴ *Report on The First Meeting of Arab National Focal Points on Small Arms and Light Weapons*. League of Arab States. Cairo, 26-7 December 2005. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/Arab%20League%2005%20mtg.pdf

¹³⁵ “Profile: Arab League.” BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/1550797.stm

are usually only issued as declarations rather than their own resolution.¹³⁶ With regard to the PoA, the League's common position can be found primarily in clauses 9-12 and 17 of the PoA.¹³⁷ By January 2002, the LAS met in Tunisia to expand upon this Common Position in a document written by the Interior Ministers Council entitled the "Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives, and Hazardous Material."¹³⁸ Article 1 of this document set down definitions of different types of weapons and munitions as set forth in the following articles. The rest of the document's articles set forth standards on the manufacture of weapons, importing and exporting weapons, possession of weapons, explosives, specific regulations on businesses and organizations that buy and sell weapons and munitions, and penalties and punishments for those acting outside of these regulations.¹³⁹

Quickly following the conference in Tunisia, the LAS met again at the Cairo Conference on the Implementation by Arab States of the UN Programme of Action in 2003.¹⁴⁰ This conference is seen as a positive step in the working relationship between the LAS and the UN.¹⁴¹ The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs organized the conference in conjunction with the LAS Department from Disarmament. In attendance were 21 of the 22 Member States of the LAS, with Djibouti not in attendance.¹⁴² While this conference strengthened ties between the UN and the LAS, it also served to reiterate that ultimately it is each member state of the UN and the LAS' responsibility to enforce the nonproliferation of SALW within their own state through the framework of the PoA.¹⁴³

In October 2004, LAS Ministerial Council Resolution 6447, "Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons," requested that member states do everything within their power to increase regional responsibility over issues of SALW.¹⁴⁴ With assistance from Germany and Switzerland, the LAS designated National Focal Points (NFP) to be established within each country, in addition to a system of national reporting of issues of SALW.¹⁴⁵ A higher Regional Focal Point (RFP) for Small Arms was entrusted to the General Secretariat of the LAS, which was tasked with "providing technical assistance to States wishing to prepare their National Reports, set up National Coordination Agencies or establish Focal Points with Regional and International Bodies and Organizations."¹⁴⁶

"The First Meeting of Arab National Focal Points On Small Arms and Light Weapons" of the LAS was held 26-7 December, 2005. Organized by the RFP at the Multilateral Relations Department of the LAS, this meeting represented both 17 of the member states and the Council of Arab Interior Ministers as a whole.¹⁴⁷ This meeting reiterated the necessity of the adoption of LAS Resolution 6447 by member states that had not already done so.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, it encouraged member states to attend the PoA review

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ League of Arab States." Programme of Action – Implementation Support System.
<http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ *Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material*. League of Arab States Interior Ministers Council, League of Arab States. <http://www.international.gc.ca/informalmeetinggeneva2007/arab-model-law-en.asp>

¹⁴⁰ "League of Arab States." Programme of Action – Implementation Support System.
<http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² *Co-Chairs' Summary: The Implementation, by the Arab States, of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Conference for the Implementation by the Arab States, of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 16-18 December 2003.
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/illicit.html>

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ LAS Resolution 6447. *Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. LAS Ministerial Council. 14 September 2004.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/Arab%20League%20Res%206447.pdf

¹⁴⁵ League of Arab States." Programme of Action – Implementation Support System.
<http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ *Report on The First Meeting of Arab National Focal Points on Small Arms and Light Weapons*. League of Arab States. Cairo, 26-7 December 2005.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/Arab%20League%2005%20mtg.pdf

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

conference in 2006.¹⁴⁹ At the regional level, it required the RFPs to “establish an Arab Database and an Arab Regional Information Network.”¹⁵⁰ The purpose of these measures was to “intensify efforts and strengthen coordination among Arab States to promote cooperation between NFP including exchange of information and experience and support efforts aiming at preventing illicit trade in SALW.”¹⁵¹

The recommendations of this First Meeting were extrapolated upon in LAS Ministerial Council Resolution 6625.¹⁵² Resolution 6625 required even more responsibility from member states, entrusting “the Regional Focal Points to hold a meeting for the Arab National Focal Points at least once a year.”¹⁵³ In addition, it asked that the NFPs compile their achievements in the combating of SALW in the years since the 2001 PoA for inclusion in the Arab Database, and it also asked that the NFPs coordinate their positions prior to the 2006 Biennial UN Review Conference on the PoA.¹⁵⁴ One such position paper was submitted to the Review Conference by the Arab Republic of Egypt, which outlined not only Egypt’s point of view on the issue of SALW, but also its contributions to this goal, namely a meeting of “international and regional experts, in cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Africa, to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in Africa.”¹⁵⁵ This Egyptian meeting was held 17-19 June 2006 (just prior to the 2006 UN Biennial meeting).¹⁵⁶

Member states of the LAS have had a continued presence at the Biennial Meetings of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. The report of the Third Biennial Meeting in 2008 was adopted by Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.¹⁵⁷ Lebanon informed the secretariat that they would have adopted the report had they been there.¹⁵⁸ There were no votes against this resolution, indicating that the rest of the member states simply were not there.¹⁵⁹ For the Fourth Biennial Meeting in 2010, Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and United Arab Emirates did not submit national reports as generally recommended by the First Meeting of Arab NFP on SALW.¹⁶⁰

The Situation Today

At the crux of any issue involving Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation is the difference between legislation and the reality of the situation. As seen by the history of SALW legislation within the League, at least on paper there have been great strides towards information sharing and the limitation of SALW to civilians. However, there are many situations both within the LAS and in neighboring regions directly affecting the LAS, the situation on paper and the situation on the ground is very different. What follows is a set of examples wherein SALW have had a major influence on safety and stability within Member countries. This list is by no means exhaustive, and delegates are highly encouraged to find their own examples *as they affect their own Member State*.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² League of Arab States.” Programme of Action – Implementation Support System.

<http://www.poa.iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/21.aspx>

¹⁵³ LAS Resolution 6625. *Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. LAS Ministerial Council. 04 March 2006.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/Arab%20League%20Res%206625.pdf

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ *Statement by the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. 28 June 2006. www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060628egypt-eng.pdf

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3. *Report of the Third Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. UN General Assembly. 20 August 2008. www.poa-iss.org/bms4/Documents/BMS3Outcome-E.pdf

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ “National Reports on the Programme of Action.” <http://www.poa-iss.org/bms4/NationalReports.html>

Morocco and Western Sahara

The history of Morocco and the Western Sahara is long and convoluted. At its heart is a dispute over the southwestern portion of state borders of Morocco as recognized by the League of Arab States, known throughout the international community and to the UN as the Western Sahara.¹⁶¹ More recent conflict history began in 1975 when the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on the Western Sahara stating that there were no legal ties between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom in Morocco. Spain, the governing colonial power in the region, was quick to leave the Western Sahara region after this ruling and on February 27th, 1976, the Polisario Front (a national liberation movement within the Western Sahara) declared independence under the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).¹⁶² Peace accords in 1991 were to include a referendum on independence, which to this date still has not occurred due to issues of citizenship and voter status.¹⁶³ The issues of the Western Sahara have also caused problems between Morocco and Algeria, as Algeria has since 1975 supplied the Polisario with light arms, vehicles, and supplies.¹⁶⁴ These weapons became more and more refined during the 1980s.¹⁶⁵ Beginning in 1989, the Algerians were unable to keep up such high financial support of the Polisario, but they continue to be supportive of the right of determination of the Sahrawi people.¹⁶⁶ The LAS has never recognized the right of autonomy for the Western Sahara, in spite of several UN resolutions to the contrary.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the presence of civilian SALW in this region has destabilized not only Morocco but also Algeria for 35 years.¹⁶⁸

Palestine – The primary area of concern for issues of SALW is the Gaza Strip portion of Palestine. Gaza, like other regions in the Middle East, has been controlled by a succession of foreign powers, including but not limited to the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Israel.¹⁶⁹ An escalation in the number of attacks launched by Israel in response to attacks from Hamas has increased external violence.¹⁷⁰ A marked increase in the flow of small arms into Gaza began in response to the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, which signified to the Palestinians an additional setback to Palestinian rights.¹⁷¹ As human rights in the Gaza Strip deteriorated, a marked increase in violence caused by SALW was noted, especially violence due to misuse of arms.¹⁷² According to statistics gained by the Middle East North Africa Action Network on Small Arms (MENAANSA), an overwhelming majority of respondents from within Gaza (nearly 90 percent) believe there are too many weapons within their area.¹⁷³ Despite this, only about half of the residents of Gaza state that they would go to the police in the event of a harmful threat, showing the prevalence of personal security within Gaza¹⁷⁴. Many of the rest said they would be more likely to go to friends or family for aid.¹⁷⁵ With regards to the West Bank, after the Oslo Accords, the issue of SALW proliferation initially was negligible in the West Bank, as legislation was in place that criminalized the illegal possession of weapons.¹⁷⁶ The Second Intifada, as in Gaza, was the event that started an escalation of SALW within the West Bank.¹⁷⁷ In response to the continued occupation of the

¹⁶¹ “History of Western Sahara.” <http://www.historyofnations.net/africa/westernsahara.html>

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ “Security Problems with Neighboring States.” <http://countrystudies.us/algeria/157.htm>

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ See S/RES/1570 (2004), S/RES/1495 (2003), and S/RES/1541 (2004), for example.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ “Public Perceptions of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Community Security in the Middle East: A Preliminary Research Initiative by the Middle East North Africa Action Network on Small Arms (MENAANSA).” February 2006. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/nafr_pdf/mideast-leb-pales-sudan-2006_en.pdf

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 17-18.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

West Bank by the Israelis, especially since 2000, demonstrations by militant groups have intensified.¹⁷⁸ According to those interviewed by MENAANSA, more Palestinians in the West Bank would be more likely to call family members, friends, or former members of the military before they would call the military.¹⁷⁹

Sudan – Sudan achieved full independence from the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1956. Since then, it has fallen through a succession of unstable governments, leading to a civil war which has lasted since 1983.¹⁸⁰ The main conflict is between Arab Muslim northern Sudanese, who primarily control the government, and black Africans southern Sudanese of varying religious backgrounds.¹⁸¹ The problems between these two was further complicated by the imposition of Shari'a law in 1983 upon the entire country.¹⁸² Sudan's long history of being occupied by colonial powers is where the influx of SALW began, with Sudan receiving the earliest of its weapons from England.¹⁸³ Sudan early in its independence also received weapons from the USSR, China, Egypt and Libya.¹⁸⁴ The conflict in the Darfur region, especially as beginning in the late 1980s, began an enormous influx of illegally obtained SALW into Sudan¹⁸⁵. This problem is made worse by pervasive social mores within Sudanese tribal society which favor weapon possession.¹⁸⁶ An overwhelming majority of Sudanese (73 percent) in the southern region believe their portion of Sudan is just as safe if not more safe than the rest of the state, despite the fact that over 1.2 million people as of 2006 have died as a result of Civil War since 1983.¹⁸⁷

Yemen – Armed violence plagues the country of Yemen and accounts for approximately 4,000 deaths yearly.¹⁸⁸ This is due in part to easy access to SALW and in part to laws which are not well enforced.¹⁸⁹ The government of Yemen, furthermore, encourages certain forms of violence as part of its social mores, which is leading to increased instability in Yemen.¹⁹⁰ In 2008, the Yemen Armed Violence Assessment (YAVA) was established to discover hard evidence of what causes the sort of armed violence occurring in Yemen.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, YAVA, along with the Yemeni government, will also attempt to curtail armed violence within Yemen.¹⁹² The situation in Yemen is difficult to address, as nearly two-thirds of the media-documented deaths from armed violence within Yemen are politically related.¹⁹³ Yemen has only been a unified state since 1990, when North and South Yemen reunited. Prior to this unification, Yemen had been governed by “theocratic imamate, colonial rule, revolutions, Marxist-Leninist socialism, [and] republicanism.”¹⁹⁴ This lack of consistency alone can account for much of the social upheaval within Yemen. Parliamentary elections were held in 1993, three years after unification.¹⁹⁵ A civil war then broke out in 1994.¹⁹⁶ Political power, especially from the mid-1990s, has been centered in the north and stems from a patronage-based political system (very different from the earlier sheik-based leadership).¹⁹⁷ Sectarian tensions and Jihadi movements within Yemen further add to the instability found in this

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁸⁸ Gavin Hales, Emile Lebrun, and Robert Muggah. “Yemen Armed Violence Assessment.” *Small Arms Survey Issue Brief*. May 2010. Number 1. p. 1. <http://www.yemenviolence.org/pdfs/Yemen-Armed-Violence-IB1-Tracking-armed-violence-in-Yemen.pdf>

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p 10.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 2-3.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 3-4.

country.¹⁹⁸ Yemen is often listed as one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, with conservative figures estimating one small arm per every two civilians in the country.¹⁹⁹ There are laws in Yemen which regulate the owning and carrying of firearms within Yemen, but these laws are unevenly enforced, and such enforcement very much depends on region within Yemen.²⁰⁰

Conclusion

While a relatively new issue in international conflict, small arms and light weapons proliferation is quickly becoming one of the most important topics in international discussion. An experts meeting is scheduled for 10-14 January 2011 and a review conference is scheduled for 2-13 July 2012.²⁰¹ It has been 20 years since the end of the Cold War, and many of the issues present in the League are not directly related to that conflict. The League of Arab States has been at the forefront of this dialogue, their first meeting on SALW taking place before the UN's 2001 Programme of Action. Great progress has been made in the last decade, and both the League of Arab States and the United Nations have set in place goals to help eradicate illegal small arms and weapons proliferation.

Committee Directive

The issue before this committee is challenging. Delegates not only have to remember the history of the conflict and write resolutions in line with that which has already been written, but also must write resolutions that respect the sovereignty of each Member State. Some Member States of the LAS have had more issues with violence and instability due to SALW than others and will be more passionate on this issue than others. The issue of SALW trafficking is very complex, and while there are many examples of conflicts worldwide directly affected by SALW, delegates should remember that the focus of our committee is the League of Arab States. Delegates should be well-versed in what the League has attempted in the past, as described in the guide and through their own research, and should bring to the table new ways to understand and cope with the challenges that the League still faces and needs to overcome. Delegates should consider many questions before coming together to write resolutions. What are the cultural and societal impacts and the causes of the proliferation of SALW within your country and the greater Arab world? What effects have the proliferation of SALW had on the Middle East as a whole? In what ways can the League create objective and creative solutions that benefit themselves and the greater League? Committee discussion could, for instance, focus on border control policies, issues of intraregional communication on the issue of SALW, data mechanisms on reporting the progress or lack of thereof, or other ideas that will promote multilateral cooperation within the League of Arab States. However, delegates should never feel limited to this list or these questions and should come to the committee with any idea they feel is within their country's policy.

Resolutions could take one of many forms. They could outline a plan of action to be suggested to the Member States. They could implement a program to aid in gaining information about SALW. They could bring to light a particular issue of SALW trafficking in a specific situation. Delegates are encouraged to be creative in how they tackle this delicate subject while paying respect to the hard work of UN and LAS delegates who have come before them.

III. Developing a pan-Arab Response to Requests for Extradition and Repatriation of International Criminals

Introduction

In Article 2, Section D of the Pact of the League of Arab States, Member States agreed that the League should include in its purpose a cooperation of states in matters of extradition.²⁰² Since then, Member States have still mostly depended on bilateral agreements when determining the goals, standards and limitations of extradition and repatriation. Often, these are important cases to international peace and security, and the most prominent cases

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Jeff Abramson. "Consensus Found at Small Arms Conference." *Arms Control Today*. July/August 2010.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07/IllicitArms

²⁰² *Pact of the League of Arab States*. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945.

bring the threat of international terrorism to mind. With the current political focus on terrorism and the process of the United States closing Guantanamo Bay at hand, the international community is looking to the Arab States to see how they will respond to the calls for extradition and repatriation of purported international terrorists. This is a critical moment in Arab history, where a unified policy towards extradition and repatriation of international criminals could change the way the world fights terrorism.

Extradition has had a long history in international law. The ability of a state to request transfer of a criminal across borders dates all the way back to Ramses II of Egypt.²⁰³ Many states hold the right to reclaim fugitives captured in another state as a delicate but necessary matter, to ensure international security as well as maintain order and justice throughout the world.²⁰⁴ By the late eighteenth century, it was considered a simple principle of international respect that extradition should be granted, explaining a lack of intricate extradition treaty before the nineteenth century.²⁰⁵ Today, with very few exceptions, most cases extradition only happen through treaties.²⁰⁶ These treaties are often bilateral, but attempts to create universal standards in both the United Nations and in regional intergovernmental organizations have been seen.²⁰⁷ Most notably, the European Union recently passed a minimum standard for all extradition agreements involving its Member States, and the bilateral treaties have been reformed to reflect such standards.²⁰⁸ In the modern fight against terrorism, extradition is a necessary tool to maintain justice despite the international nature of such conflict.²⁰⁹ Despite the cooperative efforts of the international community to respect extradition requests, these agreements are not always respected.²¹⁰ When some more powerful nations feel that existing extradition policy is simply not enough, they use irregular rendition, a term synonymous to abduction, in order to return criminals.²¹¹ Especially in the United States, rendition does not nullify the jurisdiction of a court unless such is prescribed in an extradition treaty with the state the accused was abducted from.²¹² It is because of the recent increase in rendition attempts that many feel that extradition policy needs to be analyzed and strengthened, unified and brought to a simpler, stronger conclusion.

Repatriation is a process that has been used throughout history for many purposes, including deportation, returning prisoners of war, exercising the right of refugee return, and most importantly to this debate, the return of criminals to their home states.²¹³ Repatriation is therefore a natural side effect of extradition, should a penal sentence be completed.²¹⁴ Although returning individuals to the law enforcement agents of their state where a crime was committed seems like it would be relatively simple, such a process requires delicate handling in order to reintegrate the individual back into their own home society.²¹⁵ Only with proper rehabilitation can a criminal, especially a radical terrorist, contribute to society without returning to any previously held criminal tendencies.²¹⁶

The Process of Extradition

As defined by INTERPOL, extradition is a specific legal process in which:

“[O]ne State (the requested State) surrenders an individual found on its territory to another State (the requesting State) where he is wanted either to stand trial for an offense he is alleged to have committed, or to serve a penal sentence already pronounced against him.”²¹⁷

203 Michael J Garcia and Charles Doyle. “Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties.” Congressional Research Service. 17 March 2010. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf>

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 Ibid.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid.

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

213 *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. May 2004.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.

216 Ibid.

217 “Extradition – Some Benchmarks.” International Criminal Police Organization. 18 March 2003. <http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS11.asp#2>

Extradition is used only in this capacity, and as such, an individual must explicitly be either charged or found guilty of an offense in the requesting State.²¹⁸ Specifically, it is a different process than when an individual is called from another State to serve as a witness to an offense, transferred from a State court to an international tribunal, or sent to their State of citizenship after serving a sentence.²¹⁹

Although many States will allow some level of extradition as a reciprocal courtesy, there is a great deal of both State law and international law that covers the subject, as well as several situational considerations.²²⁰ The United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network (UNCJIN) keeps a publicly accessible comprehensive list of conventions and bilateral agreements on extradition, with bilateral agreements making up most of the world's extradition law.²²¹ Bilateral extradition agreements are so common that the United Nations created a framework treaty in 1990 to expedite the process of creating such a bilateral agreement with a semi-standard format.²²²

With the wide variety of bilateral agreements, however, extradition requests are dealt with in a variety of ways. Often, State executives or judiciaries will consider several principles before responding to a request for extradition.²²³ One such consideration is the nationality of the individual, and if the individual is a citizen of the requested State, the State may decide to apply the principle of *aut tradere, aut judicare* (either extradite or judge) and hold trial against the individual under their own laws instead.²²⁴ Other considerations include the possibility of political persecution, namely the double jeopardy principle of *ne bis in idem*, a principle called 'double criminality' in which the crime must be a punishable offense in both States involved.²²⁵

The Process of Repatriation

Repatriation is the process by which an individual is sent to their State of citizenship, although the circumstances vary from case to case.²²⁶ Repatriation can indicate deportation, the return of prisoners of war, or the right of refugee return. However, none of these uses are particular to the international criminal aspect of repatriation.²²⁷ In matters relating to the development of a pan-Arab response to Requests for Extradition and Repatriation of International Criminals, it can only refer to the action of sending an individual back to their State of citizenship after completing or otherwise being released from a penal sentence.²²⁸

Although it may seem like an individual can just be sent home after incarceration, often it is necessary for a State to take action to reintegrate a citizen back into society and ensure that they have been reformed.²²⁹ Often, this is left entirely to the State receiving the repatriated individual.²³⁰ In many cases these individuals leave prison with psychological damage, or without actual rehabilitation as the penal sentence was simply imprisonment.²³¹ In these situations, these criminals are likely to return to their criminal past, a potentiality that must be prevented at all costs.²³²

218 Ibid.

219 Ibid.

220 Ibid.

221 "Bilateral Agreements on Extradition, Judicial/Legal Assistance, Control of Narcotic Drugs, and Prisoner Transfer by Country." United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network. <http://www.uncjin.org/Laws/extradit/extindx.htm>

222 "Extradition – Some Benchmarks." International Criminal Police Organization. 18 March 2003. <http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS11.asp#2>

223 Ibid.

224 Ibid.

225 Ibid.

226 *Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. May 2004.

227 Ibid.

228 Ibid.

229 Ibid.

230 Mohammed, S.. "TO DEPROGRAM A JIHADIST. " *Current*. April 2009

231 Ibid.

232 Ibid.

A history of Extradition Policy in the League of Arab States

Extradition has always been an explicit concern of the League, beginning with the Pact of the League of Arab States.²³³ In 1952, they signed Council of the League Resolution 429, regarding Inter-Arab extradition, effectively granting each Arab state a standard of extradition with all other Arab states.²³⁴ While similar in nature to the many bilateral agreements that make up most international extradition law, this agreement was primarily different in that it was a League-wide resolution between several states instead of only two.²³⁵ This was one of many steps the League has taken on extradition.

In 1998, the League made their first attempt at creating a response to such matters with other states, creating the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.²³⁶ Articles five through eight of this Convention deal explicitly with the terms by which, under the terms of the convention defining a terrorist offense, an individual suspected or found guilty of such an offense could be extradited to a requesting state.²³⁷ This agreement was a great step forward for Pan-Arab extradition policy, but still could only be used in circumstances of terrorism as defined in the Convention itself, which explicitly excludes organizations with an agenda of liberation, self-determination and opposition of occupation.²³⁸

The case of Mohammed Saleh Ali is a prime example of Extradition policy in action. In 2007, Ali was charged with the murder of Banaz Mahmod and fled from the United Kingdom to Iraq.²³⁹ During the trial of two other individuals who played significant roles in aiding the murder, pressing evidence showed that Ali the primary actor in the crime.²⁴⁰ On 29 June 2009, Iraqi officials reviewed and confirmed the request from the UK to extradite Ali, and he was quickly sent to London where he was tried for the murder, conspiracy, threats, and perverting the course of justice.²⁴¹

A history of Repatriation Policy in the League of Arab States

The repatriation of Jihadist individuals has also been one of the major concerns of many states receiving recently incarcerated citizens.²⁴² With therapeutic initiatives designed to reduce radicalism created in the wake of rising extremism in the early 2000s, the League has seen many successes alongside a few critical failures in this field.²⁴³ A program started in Iraq by Coalition forces in 2007 has helped over 24,000 detainees find moderation, some of them repatriates.²⁴⁴ Saudi Arabia is noted for their program specifically using moderate religious scholars to challenge the extremist ideology and incentives ranging from shortened sentences to new cars.²⁴⁵

Despite this, the Saudi Arabian program has failed on at least 25 separate occasions, most notably in the case of Guantanamo detainee Said Ah al-Shihri.²⁴⁶ Al-Shihri emerged as an al-Qaeda deputy in Yemen shortly after going through the program.²⁴⁷ Although there have been setbacks, many States, especially Saudi Arabia, continue to call for repatriation of terrorists through these religious deradicalization programs.²⁴⁸

233 *Pact of the League of Arab States*. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945.

234 Resolution 429. *Establishing inter-Arab extradition agreements*. Council of the League of Arab States. September 1952.

235 *Ibid*.

236 *Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*. League of Arab States. April 1998.

237 *Ibid*.

238 *Ibid*.

239 "Extradited Iraqi appears in court accused of strangling woman in 'honour' killing." Daily Mail. 30 June 2009.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1196609/Extradited-Iraqi-accused-strangling-woman-honour-killing.html>

240 *Ibid*.

241 "Extradition of Mohammed Saleh Ali from Iraq." Crown Prosecution Service. 29 June 2009.

http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_statements/extradition_of_mohammed_saleh_ali_from_iraq/

242 Mohammed, S.. "TO DEPROGRAM A JIHADIST." *Current*. April 2009

243 *Ibid*.

244 *Ibid*.

245 *Ibid*.

246 *Ibid*.

247 "Ex-Guantanamo Inmates 'Fail Rehab'" Al-Jazeera. 20 June 2010.

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062013047249951.html>

248 James M. Dorsey. "Gulf States Seek Return of Arab Fighters --- Call Clashes With U.S. Wish To Hold Foreign POWs Of

Extradition in the League today – The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO)

The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) was created in the 1960's by college-educated Iranian nationals, who believed in a philosophy that mixes Marxism with Islam and who hoped to bring this ideal to the forefront of Iranian politics in a time when the western-allied Shah of Iran was in power.²⁴⁹ This organization saw the failed uprising in 1963 as a reason to consider violence as a means to revolution and used training from the Palestinian Liberation Organization training camps to aid them in their actions against western influence in Iran.²⁵⁰ Although it took part in the 1979 revolution in Iran that deposed the Shah and installed an Islamist regime, the organization's politics were not in line with those of the new Iranian leadership, causing strife between the two political groups.²⁵¹ The organization's attempts to pose as a counterweight to the clerics' rule legitimately were quickly and violently stamped out by the new Iranian government by 1981, despite the support of a significant portion of the population.²⁵²

After the MKO was forcefully removed from their base of operations near the Iran-Iraq border, many MKO members fled to Paris.²⁵³ Over the next eight years, they would support Iraq in the war with Iran.²⁵⁴ By 1986, they had moved the majority of their operations to Iraq, where the Hussein regime would support them against the Iranian government, granting them shelter while they conducted cross-border raids, even after a cease-fire was declared between Iraq and Iran.²⁵⁵ Although their main targets were government buildings, and while the organization claims that it does not target civilians, attacks have caused a number of civilian casualties.²⁵⁶ In retaliation, Iran has targeted MKO bases even inside Iraqi borders.²⁵⁷

With the 2003 invasion of Iraq came the end of Iraq's patronage to the MKO.²⁵⁸ No longer under the rule of Saddam Hussein, the organization could neither gain financial support nor shelter inside Iraq.²⁵⁹ While the western Coalition forces cracked down on Iraq's MKO bases, France also arrested 160 MKO members near Paris.²⁶⁰ Having been dealt this major blow, the majority of MKO forces now consolidate themselves in Camp Ashraf in Iraq.²⁶¹ Despite maintaining their status as a terrorist organization, the United States offered the MKO protection in Camp Ashraf after the MKO revealed information they had obtained regarding Iran's nuclear program.²⁶² Originally under Coalition guard after the invasion, the control of Camp Ashraf was granted to the new Iraqi government and its military in 2009.²⁶³

Afghan Opposition. " *Wall Street Journal* 27 Nov. 2001.

249 "Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations." United States Department of State.

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm>

250 "In the Spotlight: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." Center for Defense Information. 11 September 2002.

<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/mek-pr.cfm>

251 "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." *globalsecurity.org*.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm>

252 "In the Spotlight: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." Center for Defense Information. 11 September 2002.

<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/mek-pr.cfm>

253 "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." *globalsecurity.org*.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm>

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.

256 Ibid.

257 "In the Spotlight: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." Center for Defense Information. 11 September 2002.

<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/mek-pr.cfm>

258 "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." *globalsecurity.org*.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm>

259 <http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/SubjectGuides/SpecialTopics/TerroristProfile/Current/MujahedineKhalq.html>

260 "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)." *globalsecurity.org*.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm>

261 Ibid.

262 Timothy Williams. "Tensions in an Iranian Exile Camp in Iraq." *New York Times*. 9 November 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/world/middleeast/10ashraf.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=ashraf&st=cse

263 "Iraq Envoy in Iran says MKO Extradition not possible." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 25 January

2009. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,COI,RFERL,COUNTRYNEWS,IRN,497ddd8126,0.html>

Since this capture of over 3000 MKO members in Camp Ashraf, Iran has pressured Iraq to extradite the organization's members to stand trial for their crimes.²⁶⁴ Iraq has replied in turn, denying extradition of MKO members without the involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Iraq wants the mass of MKO members out of their country, where in such numbers they pose a threat to the peace of the new government.²⁶⁶

Repatriation in the League today – Guantanamo Bay

Guantanamo Bay, the famous US military detention center where those accused of terrorism are held without trial, has recently come to be a major focus for the world as the US declared its eventual closing.²⁶⁷ Since then, very few have been let out and about 200 remain in the facility.²⁶⁸ While approximately 90 of these detainees are likely to be held in the United States, the rest are slowly finding homes and beginning the process of repatriation.²⁶⁹ These detainees will likely need to be put under surveillance and given psychological treatment.²⁷⁰

While the US continues to hold many detainees at Guantanamo Bay, approximately 30 detainees are set to return to Yemen despite a freeze on repatriating Yemeni detainees created after Yemeni terrorists attempted an airplane bombing over Detroit, Michigan last Christmas.²⁷¹ This hold is to remain until the construction of a rehabilitation center in Yemen is complete, in order to assuage fears that the detainees will return to terrorism if set free.²⁷² Having pledged over \$11 million to its construction, the US intends to maintain some level of control over the fate of Guantanamo detainees.²⁷³ Despite this, many fear that the facility will not do as well as even the Saudi Arabian program, which has still had some failures despite many successes.²⁷⁴ With fears of an inferior rehabilitation center having poorer results than the expensive Saudi program, this center holds little hope for the retrieval and rehabilitation of Yemeni repatriates.²⁷⁵

Conclusion

Extradition is an extremely delicate process, with many regulations, treaties and other international agreements. While some effort has been made to unify some treaties, such as the European Union's agreements and the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, treaties regarding extradition still number in the thousands worldwide.²⁷⁶ Even the United Nations has attempted to universalize the process, but still many variations in treaties can create entirely different results based on the participating parties. With so much variation in the process of extradition, it is not surprising that it can take years for an extradition request to be processed. Furthermore, most treaties do not prescribe against irregular rendition, which makes such abduction a more viable and simple matter for many more powerful countries.

The way that Iraq is handling the MKO is a prime example of many of the other issues with extradition. The members are clearly under the definition of terrorists, and they are also Iranian citizens, yet the members of the MKO will certainly be put to death with little chance for a fair trial should they be returned to Iran. Iraq does not want to keep the MKO members in their fledgling country, but they also do not want to be responsible for their

264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Timothy Williams. "Tensions in an Iranian Exile Camp in Iraq." *New York Times*. 9 November 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/world/middleeast/10ashraf.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=ashraf&st=cse

267 Jacob Sullum. "Gitmo Survives." *Reason*. 2010.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 Mohammed, S.. "TO DEPROGRAM A JIHADIST." *Current*. April 2009

271 Jacob Sullum. "Gitmo Survives." *Reason*. 2010.

272 Peter Finn, et. al. Six Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo Bay to be repatriated. *Washington Post*. 18 December 2009.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121800898.html>

273 Ibid.

274 Mohammed Goban. "Yemen plans U.S.-funded militant rehab centre." *Reuters*. 27 January 2010.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60Q3EE20100127>

275 Ibid.

276 "Bilateral Agreements on Extradition, Judicial/Legal Assistance, Control of Narcotic Drugs, and Prisoner Transfer by Country." United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network. <http://www.uncjin.org/Laws/extradit/extindx.htm>

wholesale slaughter. The MKO has also been known for committing crimes in France, but little evidence other than membership shows that those living at Camp Ashraf have committed a crime there.

Repatriation is another matter entirely. States know full well that these criminals are coming home after years of incarceration and in many cases want revenge. Radicalism in these repatriates can cause repeated incidents of terrorism, and with their granted freedom in a home country, they have the means to continue their old ways. In addition, lack of funding and proper infrastructure in many states means that police forces may not be as capable of discovering the new crimes of terrorists before it's too late. The lack of funding also means that rehabilitation is not as feasible in poorer states. While Member States are often happy to bring their citizens back home after incarceration, they find themselves responsible for the care and rehabilitation of these criminals even after their sentence, an expensive and difficult matter, in order to protect their people and the world at large.

Committee Directive

Delegates should keep in mind the events relating to the MKO. Delegates should keep in mind how Member States and their citizens are affected by these events and by other extradition requests for known terrorists to be sent to known violators of human rights. While delegates should be extremely careful to preserve the legal protections of their citizens and of other visitors to their countries, they should also adhere to the established justice system and the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Delegates should be looking to set precedents and to establish a unified policy for extradition requests.

Delegates should also be concerned with the events surrounding Guantanamo Bay. Many of the prisoners will be returning to their homes within the foreseeable future, and the League should be prepared to handle all of them, regardless of what Member State they come from. Each of these prisoners are citizens of a Member State, with rights granted by that State, but each is also a potentially dangerous criminal who must be reformed after years of mistreatment. These prisoners are going to require delicate care in order to fully protect the world from potential acts of violence. Their freedom is often dependent on such delicate care, and as such the League as a whole should be concerned with ensuring that this freedom is obtained.

Technical Appendix Guide

Topic 1: Promoting Economic Integration Among Arab States

“Annual Review of Developments in Globalization and Regional Integration in the Arab Countries, 2006. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Pages 38-53.

This United Nations report is a great way to learn the history of economic integration in the Arab world prior to 2006. It also gives a breakdown of GCC efforts within the region. For delegates new to UN report language, this document is a great introduction to that style of writing.

Broude, Tomer. “Regional Economic Integration In the Middle East and North Africa: A Primer.” Hebrew University International Law Research Paper No. 12-09. 26 January 2009.
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333292>

This paper is one of the most recent papers on the topic of regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa. Not only does it look at GAFTA and the GCC like most papers, it also looks the Arab world’s involvement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agadir Agreement.

“Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA).” Ministry of Industry & Trade: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
<http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=732>

This article from the Kingdom of Jordan is a great starting point for delegates who are not already familiar with the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and how it fits into Arab League economics. The article also lists agreements within GAFTA which may help delegates identify countries with policies similar to their own.

“Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]” Global Security. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm>

This website, complete with links to other sources of information, gives delegates a great overview of the history of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This history includes not only the economic side of the GCC but also the defense component of the Council.

Suleiman, Nasser M. “Economic integration tendencies in the Middle East.” Al-Bab: An Open Door to the Arab world. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/econ/suleiman.htm>

This article explains general steps towards integration within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The best part about this article is a chart which gives the population, population growth, and GNP through the 1990s. On the page the article is hosted on, there are also other great links on economic issues within the Middle East.

Zineldin, Mosad. “Globalisation and Economic Integration among Arab countries.” The Fourth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in Globalizing World. 13-16 August 1998.
<http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/zineldin.html>

This article looks at aspects of globalization within Arab economic integration. It gives a good overview of regional trade agreements before looking specifically at Islamic identity within a regional and global economy.

Topic 2: Implementing tools to combat the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons throughout the Middle East

Boutwell, Jeffrey and Klare, Michael T. “A Scourge of Small Arms.” Scientific American. June 2000.
<http://amacad.org/news/scourge.aspx>

This 2000 article looks at some of the major areas where small arms and light weapons have had an enormous impact on the safety and security. It gives the history of the problem and statistics on the numbers of weapons and

the income made from these weapons as of 2000. Finally, it looks at goals in the fight against illegal weapons proliferation, and this article's conclusion may help delegates find ways to approach the topic within committee.

“Greater International Cooperation Critical to Fighting Small Arms Trade, Say Speakers, as Meeting to Review 2001 Action Programme Continues.” 13 July 2005.

<http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/dc2977.html>

This press release gives the opinions of 50 Member States on small arms and light weapons proliferation. The document closes with statements from several NGOs, including UNIDIR, and the WHO. The country statements come from all over the world.

Esposito, John L. and Mogahed, Dalia. *Who Speaks For Islam: What a Billion Muslims Really Think*. Gallup Press: March 8, 2008.

This book is a must-read for delegates approaching the issue of Islam within the great context of the League of Arab States. An overwhelming majority of the Arab world is Muslim, and this book is great for both delegates who are not familiar with Islam or Muslim culture and for delegates who want a refresher on information they already know. The book is written in very straightforward language separated by topic, so delegates can find what they need quickly.

United Nations General Assembly. 22 October 2009. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gadis3397.doc.htm>

This document is very interesting, as it presents statements from several countries on the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferations, including Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Egypt. This resource is also particularly helpful, as it shows how two very unique rights of reply would work within the UN.

Gildea, Timothy and Pierce, Glenn. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking.” *The Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 14, Issue 1. March 2007, pages 1-31.

This article looks at the increased discussion of small arms and light weapons trafficking amongst the academic and international communities. Furthermore, it looks at state and regional cause for this proliferation, and what the international community is doing to combat this situation.

“IANSA: The Middle East and North Africa.” <http://www.iansa.org/regions/nafrica/nafrica.htm>

IANSA, or the International Action Network on Small Arms, is a NGO against gun violence. Their website is a wonderful jumping for research. They break the world down by region, and the Middle East and North Africa regional page covers 18 of the LAS states (Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti can be found on the “Central and East Africa” page; Comoros is not included in any of these pages).

Muslim West Facts Project: What the People Really Think. <http://www.muslimwestfacts.com>

This website, supported by Gallup and the Coexist Foundation, is an amazing resource for getting information from man individuals in the Muslim World. Their “Peace and Security” tab gives delegates articles, speeches, and news about issues of Peace and Security in the greater Muslim world. Delegates can also sign up for email updates on stories which directly relate to their topic and their country.

Renner, Michael. “Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament.” *Worldwatch Paper*, 137. October 1997. <http://www.worldwatch.org/node/853>

This short introduction to small arms and light weapons gives the reader a great idea of the nature of the discussion on SALW around the time the UN began looking at these issues. While not a resource that focuses on the Middle East specifically (though there are parts that do focus on the greater Middle East), this paper does discuss the global issues of SALW within a post-Cold War context.

Topic 3: Developing a pan-Arab Response to Requests for Extradition and Repatriation of International Criminals

Arabic Summit 1428-2007. League of Arab States Arab Summit Decision.
<http://www.mideastweb.org/arabsummit2007.htm>

This is the decision from the 2007 Arab Summit. Much of the document talks about the repatriation of prisoners, primarily from Israel and Lebanon. This source gives delegates a great idea of how diplomatic language is drafted within the League.

“Broad coalition of Arab Organisations calls on Arab League to show leadership on Sudan.” Cairo Institute for Human Right’s Studies. 23 March 2010. <http://www.cihrs.org/English/NewsSystem/Articles/2586.aspx>

A large coalition of Arab countries have come together require the Arab League to make stronger statements regarding Libya. According to the article, this “coalition of more than a 100 organisations from 19 countries across the Arab world is the largest-ever to come together on Sudan and is united by a shared belief that finding a ‘peaceful solution to the crisis in Sudan is of paramount importance to the region.’”

Plachta, Michael. “The Lockerbie Affair: When Extradition Fails Are the United Nations’ Sanctions a Solution? (The Role of the Security Council in the Enforcing of the Rule Aut Dedere Aut Judicare)” The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-10750600>

The Lockerbie bombing is an interesting case in extradition and repatriation, as it involves PanAm Flight 103, an American flight flying over Scotland that was bombed by Libyans. Any case involving this many nationalities is always tricky, and this source does a great laying out the different issues involved in the case. Of note is the fact that this case, which began in 1988, is ongoing, with the latest news on the issue coming as late as 25 July 2010.

Worthington, Andy. “Obama and US Courts Repatriate Algerian from Guantánamo Against His Will; May Be Complicit in Torture.” <http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2010/07/21/obama-and-us-courts-repatriate-algerian-from-guantanamo-against-his-will-may-be-convicted-in-torture/>

This article brings up the interesting point of view of the wishes of the person being repatriated. In certain cases of repatriation, the person being repatriated has legitimate reasons not to want to return to their home country, regardless of their crime. In this case, an Algerian until recently being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was repatriated to Algeria while another Syrian, also having been held in Guantanamo Bay, was not. It should be noted that Andy Worthington has written many articles about this issue.