Southern Regional Model United Nations XXI
The Global Paradigm: Enhancing Peace through Security Initiatives
November 18-20, 2010
Atlanta, GA
Email: cd@srmun.org

Dear Delegates,

My name is Lee Boswell and I would like to welcome you to the Southern Regional United Nations Conference (SRMUN) XXI and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). I will serve as your Director, and it is an honor for me to serve on the CD committee of SRMUN. I will be working with our Assistant Director, Jimmy Lewis. This is Jimmy's first year on SRMUN staff, but he has years of experience staffing simulations at the high school and collegiate levels. We are both looking forward to working with all of you for the duration of the conference. This is my third SRMUN conference and second year on staff, and I have found that participating in Model United Nations simulations can serve as one of the best ways to learn the fine arts of public speaking and diplomacy. I hope that each of you are looking forward to this committee and are ready for some intense debate!

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established in 1978 by the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly (GA). The CD operates on the basis of consensus, which requires all members of the committee to vote in favor of a decision before it can be officially adopted. As the CD works to bring peace through international disarmament efforts we have chosen the following topics to discuss at this year's conference due to the important role in enhancing peace through security initiatives:

I. Draft Convention on the Regulation of Small Scale Nuclear Weapons and Radiological Devices
II. Evaluating the Restrictions on the Testing and Use of Ballistic Missiles
III. Addressing the Need for Small Arms Control in Post-Conflict Zones

Each delegation is required to submit a position paper which covers each of the three topics. Position papers should be no longer than 2 pages in length and single spaced. The objective of the position paper is to convince and persuade the members of your committee that the approach outlined in your paper is the best course of action. The position papers are therefore critical in providing insight into not only the policies and positions of each country, but should also provide insight into the direction each county will undertake in providing solutions to the challenges of this body.

Delegates are encouraged to use the position papers as an opportunity to state what your country plans to accomplish in this committee. Strong, well developed position papers are an excellent foundation for conference preparation. It is important to ensure all sides of each issue are adequately addressed and presented in a clear and concise manner that is easy for your audience to understand. More detailed information about how to write position papers can be found at the SRMUN website (www.srmun.org). **All position papers MUST be submitted by October 22nd at 11:59pm EST to the online position paper submission system found at http://www.srmun.org**.

I look forward to the opportunity to serve as the Director of the Conference on Disarmament during the 2010 Southeast Regional Model United Nations. I wish you all the best of luck and look forward to working with each of you. Please feel free to contact myself, Jimmy, or Charles if you have any questions.

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History of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established in 1978 by the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly (GA).[1] The CD operates on the basis of consensus, which requires all members of the committee to vote in favor of a decision before it can be officially adopted.[2] Although this often lends legitimacy to CD's resolutions, many important disarmament treaties have failed to get through the CD, only to be incorporated into GA working papers and later passed as full United Nations (UN) resolutions. One reason that consensus is so hard to achieve is due to the fact that once the CD accepts a proposal it immediately becomes a binding treaty to all of the CD's Member States. This is different from other UN resolutions which may pass with only a simple majority vote. Ratification of these agreements is at the discretion of UN Member States. The CD is one of only a few forums for serious discussion of disarmament issues and so holds an important place in world affairs and the development of any future disarmament agreements.[3] It is funded by the United Nations budget and reports annually to the GA. The CD's headquarters is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and it is staffed by the Department of Disarmament Affairs from the UN Secretariat.[4] The Secretary General of the CD is appointed by the UN Secretary General and serves as his representative to the body as well as managing the Secretariat that facilitates the CD's discussion and actions. However, despite this relationship, the Conference is completely independent in its deliberations and decisions, and thus the UN serves only as an advisor to the body.

The CD sets its own agenda and runs on a separate set of rules regarding procedure compared to other UN bodies.[5] The dates of these meetings are open to debate and are established at the end of each annual session. These official sessions are conducted in a plenary style similar to the GA, but the CD has the ability to call informal meetings of its members that may even include experts on the issue in question.[6] Emergency meetings may also be called by the sitting President with the agreement of all Member States. The President of the CD is appointed on a rotating basis determined at the conclusion of each annual session according to the English language Member State roll.[7] The Conference also has the ability to create any subsidiary bodies that it deems necessary to explore or discuss an issue. These bodies operate on rules determined by the CD and are free to hold informal meetings of their own as needed. Member States are not limited to the topic at hand even in formal debate, which means a member may speak on any issue germane to disarmament regardless of the actual topic before the Conference.[8]

The CD replaced other temporary discussion bodies headquartered in Geneva such as the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.[9] These previous incarnations were formed during the 1960s as an answer to the inability of traditional UN committees to generate disarmament proposals that would be acceptable to both Eastern and Western powers.[10] In an answer to this deadlock, these exterior negotiating bodies would be made up of equal representation from active power blocs. While these committees were technically UN bodies, they were not under any of the Charter's organs. Instead, they acted as independent forums where complex treaties could be developed between

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[1] "Conference on Disarmament." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument

[2] "An Introduction to the Conference." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

[3] "Reaching Critical Will." Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html

[4] "An Introduction to the Conference." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] "Conference on Disarmament." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument

[10] "Arms Regulation and Disarmament - Initial efforts." Encyclopedia of the Nations. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/Arms-Regulation-and-Disarmament-INITIAL-EFFORTS.html

states or drafted for UN submission. In their combined two decades of operation, these committees produced few successful documents and mainly advised the GA on calls for limited action toward disarmament and on supporting the independent actions of the superpowers in trying to curtail the arms race.[11]

The current incarnation, the Conference on Disarmament, has succeeded in many disarmament measures that were previously unattainable. It has also absorbed all of the work of previous disarmament bodies which means that documents do not have to be re-submitted in order to be referenced in the Conference.[12] The CD has continued its role as an advisor to the GA on disarmament and security issues, but has also produced a vast amount of treaty work since its start in 1979. The CD and its predecessor organizations have been wholly responsible for: the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13] The CD has also contributed to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[14] While the CD does have input into these treaties after their creation, many measures have independent conventions established for implementation of the treaty, the managing of amendments, and the discussion of confidence building measures. This frees the CD to focus on continued work in the area of disarmament without the burden of constant review and monitoring. The body is currently discussing the major issues of preventing an arms race in space, negative security assurances, and a ban on the production of fissile material.[15] Proposals on these topics will take the form of CD treaties as opposed to UN resolutions.

The CD was created with a total of forty members which was then expanded over time to sixty-six.[16] In 2003, Yugoslavia was formally removed from membership reducing the total number to sixty-five.[17] Yugoslavia's constituent parts and any prospective UN Member States are still free to serve as observers in the CD's activities, although there is no current plan to expand the body's membership.

The Membership of the Conference on Disarmament is: ALGERIA, ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BANGLADESH, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CAMEROON, CANADA, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, CUBA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, ECUADOR, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAQ, IRELAND, ISLAMIC, REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KENYA, MALAYSIA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, MYANMAR, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NIGERIA, NORWAY, PAKISTAN, PERU, POLAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SENEGAL, SLOVAKIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SRI LANKA, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TUNISIA, TURKEY, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VENEZUELA, VIET NAM, ZIMBABWE.

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[11] Ibid

[12] "Rules of Procedure." Conference on Disarmament. http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/1F072EF4792B5587C12575DF003C845B/$file/RoP.pdf

[13] "Conference on Disarmament." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument

[14] "An Introduction to the Conference." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

[15] "Documents of the Conference." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/F3E7E3809FC77CF0C1257673003A7EAF?OpenDocument

[16] "An Introduction to the Conference." United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument

[17] Ibid

Topic I: Developing a Draft Convention on the Regulation of Small-Scale Nuclear Weapons and Radiological Devices

"The United Nations has worked for over half a century to eliminate nuclear weapons everywhere and to oppose their acquisition anywhere. Given the potential devastation from the use of even one nuclear weapon, I believe global nuclear disarmament must remain at the top of our agenda." Kofi Annan[18]

Introduction

On August 6, 1945, the age of nuclear warfare began when the United States carried out the first use of an atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Over seventy thousand died in the initial blast that destroyed over half of the bustling city.[19] A second weapon leveled the city of Nagasaki a few days later.[20] Although the use of nuclear weapons against these cities revealed just how devastating they actually were, a race for the technology to build them began. Within twenty years, four other United Nations Member States had succeeded in testing nuclear weapons.[21] With the increased tensions of the Cold War and the rise of even more devastating nuclear devices such as the hydrogen bomb, the international community began to address the issue of proliferation and disarmament for the first time. Despite the creation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[22] and the preliminary work on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[23], several more Member States have achieved status as a nuclear power. Additionally, new technology and increased security issues have given rise to a new set of questions regarding nuclear warfare. The most significant of these is the creation of several new weapons that complicate the divide between nuclear and conventional warfare. These include small-scale nuclear weapons, radiological devices, (often know as "dirty bombs") and depleted uranium. For the Conference on Disarmament (CD), these weapons pose many important questions that must be answered if the issue of small-scale nuclear weapons is to be addressed properly. The foremost question is whether these weapons should be classified as nuclear or conventional, or if they should be in their own distinct category. More importantly, the CD must decide on the legality of building, exporting, importing and deploying weapons on the battlefield. Lastly, the committee must also address the overarching issue of nuclear material and the role of security and disarmament in lessening the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Classifications of Terms

When discussing the issue of small-scale nuclear weapons and their counterparts, it is important for the committee to understand what these weapons actually are and how they are used or expected to be used. The term small-scale nuclear weapon was coined to describe weapons being developed whose explosive yield was five kilotons or less.[24] Unlike larger strategic nuclear warheads, these weapons were not designed to inflict huge casualties or destroy cities and military bases. Instead, small-scale nuclear weapons were designed to aid in the destruction of difficult targets and to assist directly on the battlefield.[25] These weapons are often classified under the term "tactical nuclear weapons," which are defined as," the use of nuclear weapons by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, or in support of the military commander's scheme of maneuver, usually limited to the area

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[18] Secretary-General Opening Statement. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1998/10/12_annan-1stcomm.htm

[19] Atomic Bomb Press Release. Harry S Truman Library & Museum. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/abomb.htm

[20] Ibid.

[21] Timeline of the Nuclear Age. Atomic Archive. http://www.atomicarchive.com/Timeline/Time1940.shtml

[22] Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/

[23] Treaty Text: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. CTBTO Preparatory Commission. http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/

[24] FAS Public Interest Report-Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/new_nuclear_weapons/loyieldearthpenwpnrpt.html

[25] Ibid.

of military operations."[26] The debate continues on exactly what role tactical nuclear weapons play, but their existence blurs the lines between those that are restricted under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conventional weapons.

Radiological devices are the second type of weaponry that this committee will address. This term is used to describe a conventional weapon that has nuclear material surrounding or attached to it. Alternatively, it can mean a device that simply disperses radioactive material into the wind. The purpose of such devices is to spread nuclear radiation over a small area. These devices are incapable of creating the reaction necessary for an atomic blast.[27] Often referred to as "radiological dispersion devices" or "dirty bombs," these weapons do not require advanced technical expertise like other types of nuclear-related weapons, as the radiation is dispersed by the explosion or carried by the wind.[28] This makes these devices a potential terrorist weapon as they can be both small in size and relatively easy to deploy. Additionally, the amount of nuclear material can vary both in quality and amount, which makes it considerably different from other nuclear-related weapons.[29] Therefore, the key issue with radiological devices is how to protect nuclear material from terrorist organizations and rogue states as well as regulate the trade in radioactive substances.

The last type of weaponry that this topic will address is depleted uranium (DP), which is actually not technically a nuclear weapon at all. DP is formed when raw uranium is enriched. Uranium itself is only a weak radioactive material in nature, but contains small amounts of two isotopes which are highly radioactive.[30] These isotopes, known as Uranium-235 and Uranium-234, are used in nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads due to their extremely explosive nature. The resulting waste from the enrichment process has a much lower radioactivity than even raw uranium, but the material does contain small amounts of both highly dangerous isotopes.[31] Nevertheless, DP has not been considered dangerous by the scientific and medical community and finds uses in both civilian and military products.[32] At the same time, some have questioned the use of DP in weaponry, citing environmental concerns and potential exposure to civilians in post-conflict zones.[33]

Small-Scale Nuclear Weapons

Small-scale nuclear weapons fill a void between strategic weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and conventional weapons. Developed mostly by the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, smaller nuclear devices are designed to have a tactical use. These nuclear devices were originally used in mines and small surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).[34] Since the end of the nuclear arms race, nuclear powers sought ways to use their nuclear arsenals in a more practical deployment. The most recent development is that of "bunker-busters." Designed to harness a nuclear explosion to destroy targets deep underground, they are many times less powerful than even the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[35] With such low yields, these small-scale weapons are legitimized by the argument that they would diminish the threat of nuclear fallout and minimize

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[26] Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf

[27] Radiological Attack: Dirty Bombs and Other Devices. National Academy of Sciences. http://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=11317

[28] Ibid.

[29] Radiological Devices: Weapons of Mass Dislocation." International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Radiolog_devices.html

[30] Depleted Uranium. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/

[31] Features: Depleted Uranium. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/DU/du_qaa.shtml#q4

[32] Depleted Uranium. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/

[33] Depleted Uranium 'threatens Balkan cancer epidemic'. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/408122.stm

[34] Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf

[35] FAS Public Interest Report-Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/new_nuclear_weapons/loyieldearthpenwpnrpt.html

civilian casualties.[36] Some scientists believe that when delivered from high altitudes, these weapons' blast can be contained completely underneath the surface. [37] Nevertheless, critics counter that their deployment on the battlefield creates two significant problems. First, the explosion from even a very small nuclear device would have to be buried much deeper than many conventional missiles or bombs would allow. Additionally, the crater itself would be exceedingly large and would still contain radioactive particles.[38] Several questions must therefore be addressed by this committee. Do these weapons actually pose a lesser threat? Or do they simply operate as a slightly less destructive nuclear weapon? Is the use of these weapons legitimate in warfare today? The second issue is what role the NPT has on this debate. Article I of this treaty declares,

> "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."[39]

Nonetheless, the treaty does not address the issue of what Member States can do with existing warheads and stockpiles within their own borders. Additionally, regional agreements do not always address the problems presented by small-scale nuclear weapons. This is evident with the SALT Agreements during the Cold War, which only concerned strategic nuclear weapons.[40] Altogether, the issue before the committee is whether these weapons are addressed adequately under the NPT, or if they somehow fall somewhere outside their jurisdiction. If the latter is the case, the committee must determine the legality of small-scale nuclear weapons and take the appropriate action.

Radiological Devices

Radiological devices will be the second concern for the Conference on Disarmament to address. As outlined before, these weapons operate on the simple principle of dispersion to accomplish their primary aims of mass panic and disruption. As Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies details, "Radiological weapons are generally felt to be suitable largely for terror, political, and area denial purposes, rather than mass killings. Unlike nuclear weapons, they spread radioactive material contaminating personnel, equipment, facilities, and terrain. The radioactive material acts as a toxic chemical to which exposure eventually proves harmful or fatal."[41] Therefore, they pose a significantly higher risk to many Member States as they do not require the expertise of other nuclear weapons, but they could potentially cripple the infrastructure of any State attacked. Radiological Weapons have only recently become an issue for the UN with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Terrorists as well as States could use these simple devices to contaminate hundreds of square kilometers and have deep psychological effects on soldiers and civilians.

Additionally, radiological devices can be developed without the high grade nuclear material that is necessary for all other forms of nuclear weapons. Many of these materials can be also be found from many non-military sources.[42] Among the most dangerous include strontium-90, which is used in thermo-electric generators, cobalt-60, used in industrial gauges and cesium-137, used in cancer therapy.[43] If devices containing these radioactive isotopes are abandoned or stolen they can pose a significant threat. One of the most applicable examples of this was the accident that occurred in Goiania, Brazil in 1987. An abandoned radiation therapy machine from a nearby hospital was

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[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm
[40] Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf
[41] Anthony H. Cordesman. Radiological Weapons as a Means of Attack. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/radiological%5B1%5D.pdf
[42] Radiological Attack: Dirty Bombs and Other Devices. National Academy of Sciences. http://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=11317
[43] Ibid.

discovered and broken into in a junkyard.[44] Attracted by the bright blue glow from the cesium -137, many locals took pieces of it home, spreading around the city. By the time the danger was discovered, four had died, hundreds sickened from radiation poisoning and several city blocks so contaminated they had to be demolished.[45] Similar incidents have occurred in Turkey, Thailand, and China.[46]

The risks that radiological devices pose to the international community are great, but one of the most important steps is the control of nuclear material. While nuclear weapons grade material is harder to obtain as they are normally under tighter security, the control of less radioactive substances is much less regulated. Overall, tighter control of all materials needs to be addressed and the Conference on Disarmament should also evaluate their role in this. In 2005 alone, there were 103 cases of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials.[47] Additionally, there were eighteen cases from 1993-2005 that involved enriched nuclear material.[48]

Depleted Uranium

The final concern for this committee is the radioactive material depleted uranium. DP has been widely debated in the international community for its use as dense armor-piercing ammunition rounds during wars in the First Gulf War and NATO's campaign in Serbia. As detailed before, DP is formed in the uranium enrichment process. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DP can be defined as uranium which contains less than 0.711 of isotope Uranium-235 per weight.[49] DP is extremely dense material and therefore found many uses. Among the most common are aircraft counterweights and radiation shields in medical machines as well as the most germane to this issue: its use in military weaponry.[50] According to a UN report on the use of DP in Kuwait, "DP is used in the manufacture of munitions used to pierce armour plating, such as that in tanks, in missile nose cones and as a component of armour for tanks. Armour made of DU is much more resistant to penetration by anti-armour munitions than conventional hard rolled steel armour plate."[51] DP has only recently been deployed on the battlefield. The First Gulf War was the first to see significant use of the material in war, when nearly 286 tons of it was used against the Iraqi Army.[52] Although the effectiveness of DP is rarely argued, the aftereffects of its use have sparked the issue that the CD must decide.

Since its deployment, medical authorities have kept a close eye on reports from the battlefield over exposure to DP. Even more recently the World Health Organization, the UN Environmental Programme, and the International Atomic Energy Agency have published articles pertaining the effects of DP.[53][54][55]

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[44] The Worst Nuclear Disasters. Time. http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1887705_1862268,00.html

[45] Marco Antonio Sperb Leite and L. David Roper, The Goiania Radiation Incident: A Failure of Science and Society. http://arts.bev.net/roperldavid/gri.htm

[46] Carolyn Mac Kenzie, Reducing the Risk from Radioactive Sources. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull472/pdfs/srs_toolkit.pdf

[47] Trafficking in Nuclear and Radioactive Material in 2005. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/traffickingstats2005.html

[48] Ibid.

[49] Tab C-Properties and Characteristics of DP. Environmental Exposure Report. http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/du_ii/du_ii_tabc.htm

[50] Depleted Uranium. World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs257/en/

[51] Conditions in Areas of Kuwait with Residues of Depleted Uranium. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1164_web.pdf

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Technical Support on the Capacity-Building for the Assessment of Depleted Uranium in Iraq. UN Environmental Programme. http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/Iraq_DU.pdf

[55] Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure, and Health Effects. World Health Organization. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2001/WHO_SDE_PHE_01.1.pdf

Previous UN Action on Small-Scale Nuclear and Radiological Devices

The United Nations has accomplished many difficult tasks concerning nuclear disarmament and weapons reduction agreements as one may see from the case studies found in the following pages. Nevertheless, the rise of the weapons that are the scope of this document has seen few concrete responses to their arrival. Most of the work has been carried out concerning the trade and transport of nuclear materials. Although this does not directly involve the issue of small-scale nuclear weapons, radiological devices, and depleted uranium, it does give the CD a basis for the UN's action concerning the materials that these weapons consist of. However, research has been carried out by numerous UN bodies and organizations and this is of significant value to the CD. These include the World Health Organization's *WHO Guidance on Exposure to Depleted Uranium*[56], the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's *High Consequence Radiological Terrorism Scenarios-U.N.*[57] and the International Atomic Energy Agency's annual *Nuclear Safety Review*[58]

Along with these publications, several agreements give the CD a basis on which to begin their work. The first of these is the Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Material.[59] This agreement addresses the trade and transport in nuclear material. The beginning of article 4 states," Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will be protected during the international nuclear transport"[60] However, this convention gives narrow definitions of nuclear material and would not be useful in limiting radiological terrorism.[61] This is truly an issue that has caused legal gaps in the transport of radioactive materials. As highlighted in the Goiania incident, materials that could be used in weapons are often found in many civilian and commercial devices. This Convention illustrates the difficult task of defining and regulating such materials, while still allowing their widespread uses in medicine and technology. Another important move by the UN was the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which regulates all aspects of nuclear material and supplies.[62] Although highly useful among the forty-six members, many States remain outside the agreement. This automatically hampers many of the UN efforts at reducing the trade and transport of radiological materials.

Lastly, the UN has produced one important resolution on the issue of nuclear material. UN Resolution 1640 was adopted in 2004 to address the issues created by non-nuclear weapons States receiving nuclear technology, advice, and supplies.[63] The first operative clause states, "Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."[64] Resolution 1640 is the basis for the control of nuclear and radioactive substances under UN auspices.

Case Study I: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

For the CD, the concept of addressing disarmament issues through a convention is not unusual. Both the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

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[56] WHO Guidance on Exposure to Depleted Uranium. World Health Organization. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2001/WHO_SDE_OEH_01.12.pdf

[57] High Consequence Radiological Terrorism Scenarios- U.N. UN Office on Drugs and Crime. http://books.google.com/

[58] Reports & Reviews. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/index.html

[59] The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. International Atomic Energy Agency. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] History. Nuclear Suppliers Group. http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-member.htm

[63] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1640. UN Security Council. http://www.un.org/sc/1540/index.shtml

[64] Resolution 1640 (2004). UN Security Council. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction were results of the Conference's work.[65] The convention that is being proposed by this Conference can benefit from these as well as the work of another significant document, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although it was written before the CD was officially formed, it provides a solid framework on how a nuclear material convention can be conceived.

The development of the NPT came as a result of the tensions of nuclear conflict during the Cold War.[66] The nuclear powers at the time had realized that the increased proliferation of such weapons could lead to an active conflict that could quickly become nuclear. Additionally, if nuclear weapons were more widely distributed unnecessary or accidental use of nuclear weaponry could have devastating consequences.[67] This was even more evident after the fears of a disastrous nuclear conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.[68] The nuclear weapon states were now willing to negotiate the terms of an agreement to limit the production and use of nuclear weapons. Early attempts included the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1958, which provided the international community an organization to address the rising concerns over nuclear technology.[69]

The actual creation of the NPT focused heavily on how to encourage the growth of nuclear research and technology while limiting its use in the world's militaries. As stated at the beginning of the treaty, Member States believed, "that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war."[70] Therefore, the goal was to create a balance. The wording of the document illustrates this as the introduction stated the need for increased research in safeguarding "fissionable" material, while at the same time, "Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology…should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States."[71] In their final disclosure of the terms in which the treaty should take effect, nuclear powers agreed to stop the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, destroy their existing stockpiles, and remove them and the delivery systems from their militaries.[72]

In the actual articles of the NPT, the Member States desired to affect the current situation regarding nuclear weapons in three distinct ways. The first was the issue of the transfer of nuclear weapons and materials. Articles I and II address this, with the former declaring that each nuclear weapons state, "undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons…and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."[73] This article also cites the terms under which a non-nuclear weapon state may comply with the safeguards set forth by the IAEA. The latter article addresses the situation from the non-nuclear weapons states, restricting them from receiving weapons or assistance from nuclear weapon states.[74]

The second section of the NPT deals with the rights non-nuclear weapons States have in regards to the research and advantages of nuclear technology. Article III refers to the safeguards put in place that are designed to prevent the "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."[75] Articles IV and V declare that, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination

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[65] Introduction to the Conference. United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument
[66] Background Information. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html
[67] Timeline of the Nuclear Age. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/html_index.htm
[68] "Concerns Continue Over Nuclear Proliferation." National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=60703288
[69] Background Information. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/background.html
[70] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty."[76] Additionally, the NPT is firm in its protection of "exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."[77]

The third and final section of the NPT is concerned with the technicalities of ratification and amendments. Although normal for international treaties, the NPT has two aspects that are important and are of value to the Conference. First, it specifies in Article IX that regional agreements that are designed to be even more restrictive in nature.[78] Several regions of the world such as the Middle East have explored such options, with many Arab leaders calling for a "Mideast Nuclear Free Zone."[79] Second, the NPT clearly states that, "a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods."[80] Although it is common for treaties to be amended or successor treaties be adopted, the NPT was designed to be able to change with the situation at the time. The issue of amendments has become especially important with the success of the NPT having been challenged in recent years despite successes in South Africa, Libya, and the former Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukraine.[81]

Case Study II: The Biological Weapons Convention

The second and final case study that will be mentioned is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), it went into force in March 1975.[82] This convention was the work of the immediate predecessor to the CD, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.[83] The issue of banning biological weapons is one of importance to this committee as it has many similarities to our discussion especially on the topics of radiological devices and depleted uranium. Modern biological weapons came out of the experimental labs of Europe and Japan around the First World War.[84] Early biological agents included cholera, botulism, and anthrax.[85] These agents saw little use during the conflict and most of the development occurred before and during the Second World War.[86] Although none of these biological agents were deployed on a large scale, the threat they posed was great enough to push the international community into creating a convention banning their creation, stockpiling, and use.[87] Among the reasons for the creation of the BTWC were two reports, one by the World Health Organization and another by the CD predecessor, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Both of these stated that biological weapons were unpredictable and carried too many risks to be used in warfare.[88]

The Convention itself is a short document, much like the NPT. However, as a result of it being a product of a CD predecessor and its connection to the germane issues at hand, it is of great value to this committee. The BTWC begins with a general call for complete disarmament, and sees the issue of biological weapons as an opportunity for

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[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Dramatic Arab Appeal for a Nuclear Free Zone. IDN-InDepth News. http://www.indepthnews.net/news/news.php?key1=2010-04-03%2002:04:49&key2=1
[80] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html
[81] "Concerns Continue Over Nuclear Proliferation." National Public Radio. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=60703288
[82] Background. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. http://www.opbw.org/
[83] Introduction to the Conference. United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument
[84] James Martin, George W. Christopher, and Edward M. Eitzen. History of Biological Weapons: From Poison Darts To Intentional Epidemics Chapter 1. http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/biological_warfare/BW-ch01.pdf
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

the world to come together on the issue.[89] Nevertheless, the BTWC states the ultimate goal, "Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons" and, "Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk."[90] The convention proceeds to address four issues related to biological weapons.

The first issue is mentioned in Article I, stating that no State has the right to, "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, 2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."[91] This overarching description was essential to the success of this document, for the line between research and weapons could easily be blurred, like in our own case.

The second concern for the convention was that of destroying the current stockpiles of biological agents. In Article II, the BTWC declared that after it entered into force, all agents listed in Article I had to be destroyed within nine months. However, the convention was quick to protect the local population and environment within the article, an important issue when dealing with materials that can contaminate its surroundings. [92] Also addressed is the issue of transferring such agents to other States which is banned in Article III.[93]

The third concern for the BTWC was enforcement of the convention, which is one of the most difficult issues for any international treaty. Articles VI-VII focus on this issue, noting in Article VI that, "Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations."[94] The Security Council can also initiate any investigations should a legitimate concern arise.

The fourth and final aspect that the BTWC dealt with is the concern that the elimination of biological agents may have an adverse effect on biomedical research. Addressed in Article X, the convention agrees that the terms, "shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States…in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities…"[95] In each of these issues, the BTWC created a way for the safe implementation of the convention. The success of the convention is hard to measure, but the fact that only one complaint was filed under it is worth noting.[96]

Committee Directive

For delegates of the Conference on Disarmament, this topic will provide an opportunity to formulate an educated response to a class of potential weapons of mass destruction. However, delegates should be aware of three issues that will affect how the committee moves on this topic. First, the CD is a consensus body that requires delegates to consider all opinions that are discussed, not just that of the majority or allies. This is especially important when dealing with a topic of this magnitude because many potential issues have already been raised. Delegates must work together to find a universal answer to the problem, otherwise the committee will be unable to succeed at its work.

Second, delegates must focus on the issue of classifying small-scale nuclear weapons, radiological devices, and depleted uranium separate from other weapons. The purpose of this convention is to define where they are located

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[89] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Biological Weapons Convention Website. http://www.opbw.org/

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] James Martin, George W. Christopher, and Edward M. Eitzen. History of Biological Weapons: From Poison Darts To Intentional Epidemics Chapter 1. http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/biological_warfare/BW-ch01.pdf

on the legal and moral spectrum and not automatically label them as "Weapons of Mass Destruction." At the same time, delegates are not required to see these three weapons on equal terms. The committee may rule one way on radiological devices and depleted uranium and another on small scale nuclear weapons.

Finally, delegates must also address the issue of security and disposal of these materials. Stolen or lost radioactive material poses a real threat and the CD must look for ways to protect the trade and open research using these materials while finding a way to keep them from use in terrorist or illegitimate military uses.

Topic II. Evaluating the Restrictions on the Testing and Use of Ballistic Missiles

Introduction

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and their placement on the Caribbean Island of Cuba prompted one of the most studied events in American history, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. These missiles prompted the singular known escalation of the American DEFCON (Defense Condition) level until September 11. The Strategic Air Command was moved to DEFCON 2, one level shy of imminent or ongoing attack against the United States.[97] In "Two Treaties to Contain Missile Proliferation" by Graham and Misry has opened the floodgates concerning scholarly work on IRBMs, yet the issue still lacks international and scholarly consensus on the matter.[98] Hence, it is imperative the Conference on Disarmament consider the principles of the article that calls for universal ratification of the CTBT and an international agreement governing IRBMs. Current events and the policies of American President Obama have begun to bring IRBMs into the arms control treaty arena where only intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) once stood, especially under the Bush administration.[99] Given the growing concern over Iran to which the White House remarked, "the intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated.[100]" Within this work, the issue of IRBMs, the technical information regarding these devices, the states deploying such devices, and potential motives and solutions will be discussed.

Technical Definitions

In order to facilitate debate and discussion, the following technical definitions from the United States Department of Defense and employed in most international treaties will be employed within this article. IRBMs are delivery devices for weapons, either conventional or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs,) within a range of 3000-5500 kilometers or 1865-3420 miles. The terms employed by the American government are used solely because the terminology of IRBMs is related to the linguistic translations of the technical terminology. These missiles are placed between the range of middle-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) having a range of 1000-3000 kilometers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) having a range of greater than 5500 kilometers or 3500 miles.

Potential Uses and Locations of Current and Former IRBM Programs

While IRBMs have the capacity to deliver conventional warheads, the major fear from IRBMs relates to their capacity to deliver biological, chemical, or nuclear warheads. As will be seen in Table1, IRBMs are completely associated with the nuclear nine (N9,) however, these devices are of serious concern to all states. The major topic in missile defense and scholarship are ICBMs but IRBMs are the greater threat to direct regional security.[101] ICBMs

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[97] Twigge, Stephen, and Scott Len. "The Other Other Missiles of October: The Thor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *Electronic Journal of International History* . 2009. http://www.history.ac.uk/resources/e-journal-international-history/twigge-paper.

[98] Graham, Thomas and Dinshaw Mistry. "Two Treaties to Contain Missile Proliferation." Disarmament Diplomacy, 2006. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd82/82tgdm.htm.

[99] Gormley, Dennis A. "Winning on Ballistic Missiles but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle." *Arms Control Today*. 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_12/Gormley.

[100] Office of the Press Secretary. "Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy." September 17, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe.

[101] United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Russian Federation, People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK,) Israel and the Islamic Republic of

are mainly the concern of Cold War parties and those employing nuclear weapons as part of a collective security nuclear umbrella policy. While ICBMs were thought to have the capacity to destroy humanity by nuclear holocaust, IRBMs are more likely to trigger an end to mutually assured destruction (MAD) and regional instability.

Table 1: IRBMs by Country and Status

Missile Name/Range	**Country**	**Status**
Agni III (3500-5500km)	India	Active
Agni II (1800km)	India	Active
Jericho-IIB (2800km)	Israel	Active
No-Dong-B/Musudan (3000-4000km)	DPRK	Active[102]
Shahab-3	Islamic Republic of Iran	Active
PGM-17 Thor (1850-3700km)	USA/UK	Decommissioned
DF-3 (2500km)	People's Republic of China	Decommissioned
DF-3A (4000km)	People's Republic of China	Decommissioned
RSD-10 Pioneer/SS-20 (5500km)	USSR	Decommissioned
S2 IRBM (2750km)	France	Decommissioned
S3 IRBM (3500km)	France	Decommissioned
Ghauri-III (3500km)	Pakistan	Under Development
Shaheen-III (4500km)	Pakistan	Under Development
Shahab-5 (4000-5000km)	Islamic Republic of Iran	Under Development

These delivery devices pose a serious threat to regional and international security because of their ability to deliver non-conventional weapons. One of the major concerns regarding a nuclear Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is their capacity to deploy IRBMs which could strike targets outside the States in which it is traditionally in conflict with.[103] While the global hegemonic power and the States with interests in the Pacific region are concerned over the DPRK's acquisition of nuclear weapons and IRBMs, IRBMs have created the greatest potential for regional stability in conflict-proven regions of the Middle East and South Asia. These weapons are possessed by the N9 and they still pose a serious security risk for all states. IRBMs fall into the class of 'theatre missiles' which are mainly designed for usage within the developer's geo-strategic region. Additionally, a significant amount of scholarly research concerns the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia. It is believed that India developed nuclear weapons independently because of concerns over the Chinese nuclear threat.[104] Indian nuclear capacity prompted the Pakistani development of nuclear weapons. Within the region, IRBMs pose the greatest concern because the missiles are targeted toward or intended for regional enemies.

Missile Control Regimes

Scholarly work concerning the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) of 1987 has determined that this treaty to control ballistic missiles has seriously limited the capacity of regional powers to develop ballistic missiles by preventing them from gaining the needed technologies. In its first decade, MTCR prevented several regional powers in achieving their ballistic missile ambitions including: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Syria, and Taiwan yet the MTCR failed in the cases of India, Iran, Israel, DPRK, and Pakistan as seen

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Iran will define the N9. These are the States known to possess, are currently developing/believed to be developing, or nuclear ambiguous states.

[102] In 2004, the DPRK was reported by Cho Young-gil, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea to have deployed IRBMs and continue engine tests on these devices.

[103] Pinkston, Daniel A. United States of America. *North Korean Ballistic Missile Program*. 2008.

[104] India" *Historic Overview*. NTI, October 2009. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/index.html

in Table 1.[105] These States were legally allowed to develop IRBMs but the MTCR prevented the transfer of the necessary technologies. In the opinion of the MTCR parties, it has been a success as several of the State prevented from their development ambitions have joined the MTCR. The MTCR has failed in this ability to cripple independent development problems.

The topic of IRBMs is remarkably complex. In an effort to enlighten the motives for obtaining IRBMs, below four case studies will be discussed. These case studies are intended to illuminate the state's need to develop IRBMs to mediate the security risk of the developers. While these case studies are specific, they display the general trend of states attempting to circumvent their security dilemma by developing IRBMs. Any document would need to broadly address the security concerns to truly prevent further IRBM proliferation and development. Furthermore, any international solution for IRBMs would need to address these cases and allow for disarmament processes within these states. The four case studies have been selected because under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT,) these States are either non-signatories, withdrawn Parties, or believed to be in violation of NPT; furthermore the nuclear weapons and IRBMs of these States are believed to contribute the most to international and regional insecurity.

Case Study: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The DPRK is the second most active user and developer of IRBMs; as will be reviewed later, it is also a primary supplier to Pakistan and Iran.[106] The ballistic missiles of the DPRK are grouped into three classes; each class is based on a specific Soviet missile type. The Hwa-Song V and VI are based on the R-11 Scud missile, the No Dong A is a derivative of the R-21 Sark, and the No Dong B from the R-27 Serb. The DPRK's development of IRBMs has been primarily an element of its strategy of "blackmailing" the international community, Republic of Korea and United States for concessions. However, DPRK has become a major supplier of IRBMs to what many consider to be "rogue States."[107] The case of DPRK, while brief, raises two serious questions that a resolution on the proliferation of IRBMs must address. The primary concern of the regime would need to be enforcement and discipline measures. Any competent regime would be capable of addressing the position of "rogue States" and states outside the general international system.

Case Study: Israel

The Israeli government began to develop a ballistic missile program in the late 1960s with assistance from the French and American governments. The first program product was the Jericho missile which was replaced by the MRBM, Jericho II. Some reports indicate that Israel has developed the Jericho IIB, a novel generation of the Jericho II IRBM. During the 1970s, Israel is believed to have cooperated with the South African government and the pre-Revolutionary Iranian government.[108]

The development of Israeli IRBMs poses important questions for future regime establishment. Given the fact that the Israeli program was assisted by foreign governments and cooperate with others to assist in their IRBM development, should governments be held equally responsible for the actions of assisted States with IRBMs? Secondly, the Israeli program was long known exclusively from satellite images; hence the status of covert observation technology is questioned as well as the reporting of IRBM locations to regime parties.

Case Study: Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran is currently developing the next generation of the Shahab missile systems. The Shahab IRBM program developed following the 1991 Iran-Iraq Persian Gulf Conflict where Iranian targets were destroyed by Iraqi FROG-7 and SS-1 Scud missiles.[109] The Iranians began to develop a homegrown program for IRBMs

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[105] Mistry, Dinshaw. "Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation." *International Security*. 2003. 119-149.

[106] North Korea - Missile." *Country Overview*. NTI, December 2009. http://nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/musudan.html.

[107] Kopp, Carlo. "Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Systems." Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Systems. June 10 2010. http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-BMD-Survey.html.

[108] Carus, Seth, and Zov Zakheim. System Planning Corporation. *North Africa/Israel*. 1998.

[109] Pedro, B. D., and Tom Cooper. "Shahab 3: an Advanced IRBM." *Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database*. Air Combat Information Group. December 18 2003. http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_396.shtml.

which was necessary to continue its development as a regional power.[110] An Iranian IRBM program was necessary given the fact that regional competitors had developed these devices and these devices had been used in the region against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The first missile to be developed for this program was the Shahab-3, a MRBM.[111] While the Shahab program was an Iranian based program, it was likely conducted with the cooperation and assistance of other nations, a serious concern for the Conference on Disarmament and any treaty concerning IRBMs;[112] what necessary protocol would need to be established for open IRBM technology transfers. An example of this international cooperation is the combination of Iranian Shahab-3 and the Dirk's BM-25 missile platform.[113]

The Iranian program raises a series of important questions that should be considered by any individual or state attempting to establish an IRBM control regime. The first major concern is that of international cooperation and technology transfer allowing for the quasi-independent development of IRBMs. Adoption of IAEA or NPT rules regarding technology transfers of ballistic missile technologies could address this concern with a treaty regime. However, the major element leading to the proliferation of IRBMs in the Iranian case is the motivation of the Iranian government, regional security concerns and regional hegemony. The Middle East and Persian Gulf are conflict-prone regions and Iran is a majority Shi'ite state in conflict with Sunni Iraq and other states in the region. In order to remove the need of Iranian IRBMs, it would be imperative to address the regional security concerns of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, in general and specifically for ballistic missile attack. As aforementioned, IRBMs are theatre devices. Furthermore, the Iranian desire for IRBMs could stem from American involvement in the region, increased tension between Iran and the US, and the stationing of US carrier divisions in the Persian Gulf. A treaty or international policy governing IRBMs would need to redress the matters leading to Iranian IRBM development.

Case Study: India/Pakistan

The first IRBMs tested in the South Asian region was the Agni of India in May 1989. The Agni is a two stage missile incorporating satellite launch vehicles and space travel technologies.[114] While the threat of Indian IRBMs did not directly prompt Pakistani development of the Ghanaian-III and Sharleen-III, it was certainly a driving force. In 1999, the Pakistani government tested the Ghanaian-III engine which appears to be a derivative of the Dirk's Periodontal-I missile program.[115] However, until the development of Pakistani IRBMs, the regional IRBM primacy was exclusively Indian. Between 1989 and 1994, India tested its IRBM three times; it was eventually persuaded by the United States to end testing. The United States believed the Indian development to violate the MTCR and it further raised issues of Indian non-ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT;) India began the CTBT ratification process in 1996.[116] Returning to Pakistan, the development of a nuclear Pakistan has never been officially declared as a response or reaction to Indian nuclear capacity; however, it is difficult for Pakistan's nuclear ambitions to be seen otherwise. Further complicating the issue of South Asian politics is the looming specter of the People's Republic of China. China's major Asian rival is India and while Chinese assistance with Pakistan's nuclear and missile program are not exclusively directed to India, regional balancing is certainly a matter of policy. China has assisted and directly contributed to Pakistan's nuclear status and its development of IRBMs by providing DPRK missiles and technology.[117]

Conversely, in the case of South Asia, the questions regarding IRBMs are quite different. In the Iranian case, the need to develop IRBMs is directly related to repeated aggregation by regional enemies with conventional force. While Pakistan and India have repeatedly engaged in armed conflict, missile strikes were not always involved. The Pakistan-India conflict is primarily concerned with nuclear weapons and despite their continued conflict, these States have never employed the nuclear option. Secondly, the India-Pakistan conflict highlights the role of powerful regional hegemonies attempting to prevent the ascension of other regional hegemonic powers. Kaila, PhD also

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[110] National Air Intelligence Center, . "MRBMs and IRBMs." *Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat*. Federation of American Scientists. June 10 2010. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part04.htm.

[111] Pedro

[112] National Air Intelligence Center

[113] "Iran Assembles IRBMs that include Shihab." *Middle East Newslines*. March 20 2006. http://www.menewsline.com/article-12440-IRAN-ASSEMBLES-IRBMs-THAT-INCLUDE.aspx.

[114] "Agni." Global Security. June 10 2010. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/agni.htm.

[115] "Ghauri-III/Abdali. Global Security. June 10 2010. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/abdali.htm.

[116] Agni

[117] Kapila, Subhash. "United States Strategically Confronted with China-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Triangle." South Asia Analysis Group, January 27 2010. http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3628.html.

claims Chinese involvement in Pakistan is directly related to its desire to approach the power of the United States and limit American leverage in Pakistan and the Asian continent.[118] This type of regional hegemonic action and arising hegemonic competition is predicted by Mearshimer in much of this work concerning the establishment and survival of hegemons.[119] The India-Pakistan case raises primary question of the control of nuclear weapons and the NPT. Furthermore, other missile treaties such as the CTBT and MTCR are highlighted as groundwork for future action concerning IRBMs. Any successful regime will develop an enforcement mechanism that can circumvent the UNSC should a veto or potential veto power be involved.

Case Study: Triangular Diplomacy – Theatre Missiles in Cold War Europe

The final case study shall analyze the historic events concerning theatre missiles on the European continent during the Cold War. During the Cold War years, the United States and Soviet Union were engaged in an arm races and the developing technology of the IRBMs was at the foreground of the race. The United States had developed the Pershing MGM-31 missile[120]while the Soviet Union had developed the SS-20. These superpowers already negotiated and signed the Strategic Arms Limitations Talk (SALT I and II.) The SALT I and II talks resulted in limiting the size of the American and Soviet arsenals. Following these talks, the United States and Soviet Union began to have issues of the placement of US missile on the territories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and France. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies began to build-up nuclear capacity in Europe[121] in late 1977 with the SS-20. Through regional security talks, NATO and the European ministers agreed to the deployment of US Pershing II missile systems in Europe yet by 1981, the missile systems had not been deployed.[122] This missile deployment became a bargaining chip for the Reagan administration demanding the dismantling of 1200 SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s; in modern scholarship this was known as the zero-option. Reagan's diplomats backed this option for two years until the Soviet delegation walked out of negotiations in Geneva in November of 1983; the Pershing II missiles were deployed as a direct result. In 1986, the historic Reykjavik Summit began the process of creating the INF.[123] Additionally, a triangular diplomacy between the regional hegemonic diplomatic and military powers of Western Europe (Great Britain, France, and Western Germany) developed to circumvent superpower game play in Europe.[124] This nuclear build-up and the resulting actions led to détente. Détente was abandoned with the election of Reagan in 1980 because several clear flaws in the plan. During the Reagan years, the IRBM threat in Europe was addressed with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) which according to the observation of Prime Minister Thatcher was the result of "strength…leading to peace.[125]" Reagan's administration continued the installation of American Pershing II missiles and other systems in Europe which, in her opinion, forced the Soviet Union to engage in "genuine arms-control negotiations and wider peace negotiations.[126]" Additionally, SALT I became the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) under Reagan.[127]

While the specifics of the evolution of détente from an IRBM crisis are briefly discussed within, the general principles and knowledge that can be gathered from it apply to current IRBM concerns. Firstly, the situation leading to the development of détente was composed of superpowers interested in expanding their influence and range of nuclear capacity. Many have argued that both sides were seeking to develop a first strike capacity. First strike capacity is the ability of one nuclear power to attack and destroy the nuclear retaliation capacity of another nuclear power, thus ending MAD. Regardless, the targeting of IRBMs at one another resulted in one of the longest periods of peaceful and cooperative US-Soviet interaction, however one can imagine how easily the situation could have been shifted in the opposite direction. From this case study, the dynamic and often dangerous nature of IRBMs is easily understood. Yet, in the process of attempting to develop a control treaty, it illuminates the requirement for

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[118] Kapila
[119] Mearshimer, John. "The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful At All." *The Australian*. November 18 2005.
[120] The Pershing MGM-31 missile has been classified as both a IRBM and MRBM. This case study is specific to the international and regional action concerning theatre missiles. It is intended to provide an understanding of diplomatic solutions to the threat of theatre weapons, hence its classification is less important.
[121] "SALT I." United States History. http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1799.html
[122] Graham
[123] Grahman
[124] Markham, James M. "Missile Diplomacy, Europe Prepares." *New York Times.* April 2 1987.
[125] Thatcher, Margaret. "Reagan's Leadership, America's Recovery." *Flashback.* June 5 2004.
[126] Thatcher
[127] SALT I

balancing consideration as seen by the diplomatic actions of Great Britain, France, and West Germany and most significantly the danger of unregulated IRBM targeting. While the INF was a bilateral agreement between two superpowers, the importance of the INF will be discussed in the next section and its potential for expansion to the global system.

Previous International Action

In order to best facilitate debate, it is imperative to review the previous actions of the United Nations and other international regime concerning IRBMs. Importantly, the NPT, Biological Weapons Convention (BWC,) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as well as the Ottawa Convention provide examples of the international community developing a specific treaty to outlaw specific weapons and weapons types. Meanwhile, mechanisms such as the CTBT prevent states from fully developing IRBMs. The CTBT has been pointed to repeatedly by the international community at the highest level of government as the singular existing document regime with the existing capacity to address IRBMs. [128] In the case of the Indian Agni missile, it took the first two Agni test in order to fully correct design errors for the third and final test. While the CTBT has entered into force, a serious flaw is the lack of ratification by regional hegemonies.

Finally the nearest example to an anti-IRBM proliferation regime is the MTCR and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation (HCoC.[129]) The MTCR is a voluntary and informal regime begun in 1987 by the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada and the regime now totals thirty-four members. The MTCR exists by the States implementing common export policy guidelines upon equipment, software, and technologies. Similarly to the Conference on Disarmament, the MTCR is a consensus regime.[130] On a bilateral note, the US and USSR in 1987 signed the INF which eliminated nuclear and conventional ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500-5500km.[131] [132] In further General Assembly meetings, the Russian Federation directly called for an expansion of the INF.[133] In order to establish a governance regime for IRBMs, it is imperative that novel and creative solutions be developed in conjunction with the international precedent above listed.

Conclusion

In summary, these four cases highlight the key concerns in regards to IRBMs and the potential issues of IRBM proliferation regime would need to address. IRBMs are most tacitly employed as a theatre device and therefore a major contributor to regional instability. The cases studies of Iran, Israel and India/Pakistan highlight the potential danger of IRBMs. Effective control regimes that existed upon a voluntary basis and amongst IRBM possessing and producing states served the international system well in the past but the modern world requires an IRBM control regime composed of states for a diversity of geographic and economic regions.

Committee Directive

Before the international system can address the concerns of IRBMs, it is imperative that the international community via a consensus body as the Conference on Disarmament define IRBMs. The standard usage definition is that used above of the United States Department of Defense. However, a mere range definition creates grey areas of limits as seen in the Pershing Missile case study. The first question after determining the nature of an IRBM, is should States be allowed to process and develop IRBMs and should they be able to transfer IRBMs? Upon determining the answer to the former question, should an IRBM regime be developed from or the expansion of existing treaties and regimes such as the INF and MTCR? In a broader sense to address the motives for development, should the

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[128] GA/DIS/3392. *Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapons States 'Cost-Free' for Nuclear Powers, But They Have Refrained from Taking These Commitments, Committee Told.* First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.

[129] Graham

[130] "Introduction." Missile Technology Control Regime. June 10 2010. http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html.

131 *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty.* United States of America and United Soviet Socialist Republics. 1987.

[132] GA/DIS/3392. *Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapons States 'Cost-Free' for Nuclear Powers, But They Have Refrained from Taking These Commitments, Committee Told.* First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.

[133] GA/DIS/3352. *Russian Federation, United States Call on States to Join Treaty Regime Rejecting Intermediate-Range, Short-Range Missiles, in First Committee Debate.* First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.

international community work to address the security concerns driving the development of IRBMs. Should states engage in direct IRBM transfers or technology transfers, and, if so, are the states responsible for the action in which the recipients engage? Should a state in breach of its treaty obligations, what enforcement, detection, and punishment mechanisms should exist and can those mechanisms address the P5 or regional hegemonies? Finally and most importantly, IRBMs and other missile system are developed because of regional security concerns, can these security dilemmas be addressed without IRBMs?

Topic III: Addressing the Need for Small Arms Control in Post-Conflict Zones

"Peace, security and stability are the necessary conditions if there is to be long-term development that benefits everyone…let peace spring from the ashes of these weapons." –Kofi Annan[134]

Introduction

Since the advent of the modern warfare, the threat of large scale conflict has often been characterized by the mushroom cloud, long-range ballistic missiles, or even attacks from space. However, the largest loss of life in war is often dealt by the simplest of weapons systems, the machine gun, the grenade, and the rifle. With more than 500 million in existence, they are among the most prolific weapons available.[135] They also rank as one of the most deadly. According to UN estimates, more than 300,000 people a year die as a result of these weapons.[136] Unfortunately, the majority of these deaths often come from civilians and not actually combatants.[137] Collectively known as small arms, they have been used in one hundred and one conflicts worldwide in years 1989-1996.[138] Even more remarkable, during the 1990s more than ninety percent of conflicts were fought with small arms exclusively.[139]

There are many reasons for this proliferation, but the most important include the fact that small arms are among the easiest weapons to acquire, to maintain, and to use. They also remain one of the least regulated weapons internationally.[140] Often transferred from previous conflicts, many states offer few controls on the transfer or collection of such weapons. As a result of this "recycling", conflicts will often reappear or spread and the overall stability of the region is weakened as these weapons become the instruments of enforcement by non-state actors.[141] At the same time, the issue of intra-state conflict has been hampered by the presence of small arms. This is evident in the state of Burundi, where remaining stockpiles of small arms have supported the continuing rebel campaign against the government.[142] The ease in which these weapons are obtained has also increased the overall crime in the area. As one local activist stated, ""Killing, rape, harassment at gunpoint, injuries - small arms claim a victim each day."[143]

Small arms also pose a significant threat because of their durability and reparability. Weapons like these can be kept in working condition for years. For instance, assault rifles can last through over twenty years of conflict.[144] Finally,

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[134] Congo: Small Arms Continue to Threaten Political Transition and National Stability. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58955&Country=Yes

[135] Small Arms. Report by the UN General Assembly. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/242/48/PDF/N9924248.pdf?OpenElement

[136] "Development Held Hostage" Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Development. UN Development Programme. http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/sa_control/development_held_hostage.pdf

[137] The Proliferation of Small Arms: A Threat to International Human Rights. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/w_papers_pdf/DP/DP_HumanRights.htm

[138] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

[139] Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html

[140] [140] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

[141] Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html

[142] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid.

small arms are easy to operate; meaning recruits and especially children can become deadly almost instantly.[145] According to one report from UNA-Canada, there are over 300,000 child soldiers currently fighting, some as young as eight years old. Many of these children were forced into fighting by the same types of weapons they would then use themselves.[146]

UN Previous Action on Small Arms Control

To address the rising threat of small arms, the United Nations (UN) has accomplished much work on the issue, both on the international level through action programs and agreements and through local and regional efforts. The UN first made attempts to address the proliferation of small arms in 1995 through a General Assembly resolution. It stated, "That arms obtained through the illicit arms trade are most likely to be used for violent purposes and that even small arms when so obtained…can pose a danger to regional and international security, and certainly to the security and political stability of the countries affected."[147] Additionally, this resolution also requested that a report be ordered that would give important background information on the current situation surrounding small arms. This was commissioned by the Secretary-General and two reports were published.

The first report was finished in 1997 and addressed small arms under the idea of complete disarmament. The Secretary-General stated in the reports, "Readily available and easy to use, small arms and light weapons have been the primary or sole tools of violence in almost every recent conflict dealt with by the United Nations."[148] Included in the report was a list of suggestions by an expert panel on how to reduce the number of weapons on the ground and keep more from arriving.[149] The panelists also noted, "That while there are some agreed global norms and standards against weapons of mass destruction, there are no such norms or standards that can be used in reducing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons."[150] The second report was published in 1999 and was concerned with the progress of implementing the 1997 report's recommendations.[151] The panel of this report found significant progress in implementing the twenty-four recommendations, with most of them having at least been delegated to UN Member States and extensive research carried out on specific issues such as marking and explosives.[152] Additionally, the UN Security Council published several resolutions (Resolutions 1196, 1161, 1237) pertaining the 1997 report.[153]

The next major achievement related to small arms was the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. The conference was successful in publishing an action plan for Member States on the issue of small arms and proliferation.[154] Known as the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, it offers suggestions on myriad of topics but was not able to serve as a binding document.[155] Among the topics were the, "marking of small arms and light weapons in order to facilitate their tracing, reinforcement of United Nations Security Council arms embargoes, destruction of confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons, stockpile management to prevent theft or loss, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants."[156] To encourage the

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[145] Child Soldiers. UNA-Canada. http://www.unac.org/en/link_learn/monitoring/Childrights_solders.asp
[146] Ibid.
[147] Resolution A/RES/50/70B. United Nations General Assembly. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/760/63/PDF/N9676063.pdf?OpenElement
[148] General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms. Report by the UN General Assembly. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/226/20/PDF/N9722620.pdf?OpenElement
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Small Arms. Report by the UN General Assembly. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/242/48/PDF/N9924248.pdf?OpenElement
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.
[154] United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Respects. International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JREP
[155] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952
[156] United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Respects. International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JREP

continued support of the action plan, biannual meetings were established with the first being held in 2003, a second followed in 2005.[157] The UN has also created three other working groups, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on marking and tracing, the Open-Ended Working Group, and the Firearms Protocol.[158]

On the local and regional level, the UN has proven to be successful in implementing several programs. Most of these were started through the 1997 report and included the World Bank establishment of, "a post-conflict

unit to clarify and facilitate ways in which countries might be assisted technically and financially in the transition from war to peace."[159] Additionally, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs (DDRs) were also created to assist in the post-conflict assistance offered to many states.[160] Finally, regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) passed resolutions on small arms issues in part from the UN's report.[161]

Current Small Arms Concerns

Although there has been much progress on the issue as mentioned before, the continued threat of small arms especially in post-conflict zones remains unresolved. Many of the current measures instituted by the UN have seen success, but overarching disarmament is still in its early stages. For instance, in the Republic of the Congo, several caches of weapons and ammunition have been destroyed but as of 2006, more than 34,000 weapons were still in the country illegally.[162] Additionally, the effectiveness of the UN action plan adopted in 2001 has been challenged by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross for failing to adopt an enforcement mechanism within the framework of the document.[163] As a result, the urgency of the situation demands that more action needs to be taken. Analyzing the state of small arms control internationally reveals four significant areas that cause the continued instability in states emerging from war. These are the lack of effective enforcement and legislative measures, the lack of security of existing small arms stockpiles, the lack of a widespread implementation of weapons destruction and removal, and the continued transfer of small arms to these areas. Each of these areas will be discussed in detail to address the individual issues within them.

Enforcement and Legislative Measures

The idea of enforcement in international agreements has always stood as a significant roadblock to successful implementation. Most documents that are both comprehensive in addressing the issues and balanced in terms of punishments are often metered out quickly by the international community as too tough or controversial. This is especially true in the case of small arms control. While there has been much work devoted towards combating small arms proliferation, many of the international agreements lack any form of enforcement.[164] On the other end, regional agreements often have stronger enforcement written into their agreements but cannot control the proliferation that often occur outside of those states that have signed onto it.[165]

There are three major concerns within the greater topic of enforcement. The first is arms embargoes. Often applied to States in conflict, they are often unenforced and rarely handed out either. In an eleven year period starting in 1990, only eight embargoes were adopted, out of fifty-seven germane conflicts.[166] More alarming, every embargo

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[157] Disarmament: Small Arms and Light Weapons. UN Office in Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/D987C5EFC8A87B41C1257180004B1B31?OpenDocument
[158] Ibid.
[159] General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms. Report by the UN General Assembly. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/226/20/PDF/N9722620.pdf?OpenElement
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Congo: Small Arms Continue to Threaten Political Transition and National Stability. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58955&Country=Yes
[163] Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Respects. International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JREP
[164] Ibid.
[165] Small Arms, Large Problem: The The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067
[166] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News.

adopted in the last ten years has been violated without a single Member State or non-State actor having been held responsible.[167] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reiterated this by stating, "Such embargoes are usually late and blunt instruments…therefore, arms embargoes cannot be deployed effectively as an instrument by the UN to prevent illicit arms trafficking, without better national controls on international arms transfers. These controls are woefully inadequate."[168]

Second, enforcement concerns include other issues other than the idea of patrolling signatories to abide by their agreements. These include loopholes within enforcement and between international, regional, and national agreements. Many Member States control the importing of small arms into their territories, but gaps in legislation between countries cause significant problems as arms traffickers move from States with weak import laws.[169] In addition, only about fifty percent of Member States have a system of controls over arms production, flooding the market with weapons.[170] Within this problem is the issue of high demands for small arms which in turn drives States to continue to produce them. Finally, less a third of UN Members have laws on their books that control small arms transfers through their boundaries.[171]

The final issue within enforcement is the international position on arms brokering. Arms brokering includes, "negotiating, arranging or otherwise facilitating the transfers of weapons that are neither necessarily in the ownership of the broker, nor necessarily originate in the country from which the broker operates."[172] Although completely legal all over the world, brokering is much more difficult to distinguish between illegal and legal arms trades. There are also no international standards for arms brokering[173] and only about forty countries have national laws concerning controls on this practice.[174] Calls for an international standard have been made and the European Union became the first to attempt to regulate arms brokering on a multi-national scale.[175] However, with over three hundred small arms suppliers and many states with weak legislation on arms brokering, regional agreements remain only partially successful.[176] A UN report echoed this, stating that arms brokering are, "typically conducted through intricate arrangements involving complex transportation routes and opaque financial transfers… (arms brokers) have been an important factor in violations of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations Security Council."[177]

Security of Existing Stockpiles

Security of weapons controlled by these states is the next issue for the Conference. Government arsenals are often targets for paramilitary groups, terrorists and other non-state actors.[178] This is especially the case for post-conflict zones. The government's hold on these weapons can be tenuous and few states have the legal framework to protect their stockpiles of weapons. A 2005 study by the Arms Control Association found that fewer than a hundred governments had a system for managing their weapons stockpiles and even fewer could state that they regularly reviewed their counts of weapons.[179] The security of these weapons is crucial as even the temporary loss of control

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http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

[167] Ibid.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Small Arms, Large Problem: The The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Arms Brokers. International Action Network on Small Arms. http://www.iansa.org/issues/arms_brokers.htm

[173] Ibid.

[174] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

[175] Small Arms, Large Problem: The The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067

[176] Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html

[177] The Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Respects. UN General Assembly. http://disarmament.un.org/Library.nsf/e5e236cc645fcd048525731d006514e5/e5a2985db185d4b885257344004966e2/$FILE/a-62-163.pdf

[178] Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067

[179] Ibid.

can have long-range consequences. In 1997, Albania's government collapsed, losing control of the military and the stockpiles they used and protected. Civilians soon overran many of the army depots and carried off four-fifths of the country's arsenal including an estimated 100,000 Kalashnikov-47 assault rifles.[180] The temporary loss of security in Albania continued as a result of the lost weapons, but the surrounding area suffered as well. Arms were carried across the border into Kosovo, where small arms are regularly available in a region awash with conflict.[181] Some of these weapons even made it to Rwanda, where they followed the conflict into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[182] In addition, some government arsenals sell their excess weapons sold to non-state actors or unstable governments.[183] These weapons subsequently worsen the problems experienced in post-conflict zones. This problem is not unique to small, more unstable states as many weapons have been stolen or disappeared from Member states such as Canada, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom according to reports by the Small Arms Survey.[184] Security of existing weapons also includes civilian gun control which is widespread throughout the world. There are thirty-seven weapons for every one hundred Yemeni civilians and that type of large scale proliferation makes tracking and controlling these weapons very difficult.[185] Recently, international pressure has called for the marking of all new small arms produced. This would make these weapons easier to track and would stifle their usefulness on the black market.[186] However, this system is often difficult to put into place and would have no effect on all weapons currently in existence.

Implementation of Weapons Destruction and Removal

Alongside the need for weapons security is the issue of weapons removal. With vast stockpiles already on the black market as well as in the hands of rebels and terrorists, the need for collecting and destroying these weapons is a top priority for the international community. Weapons destruction, however, must be a multi-faceted operation. Small arms must be collected and destroyed in post-conflict zones themselves but also in States exporting existing stocks. This is the case in Eastern Europe and Latin America, where excess arms are often sold for profit to regimes in need of weapons.[187] During the long civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, exports from Western Europe added 180 tons of small arms to the governments there despite UN embargos.[188] Attempts have been made to destroy these post-Cold War stockpiles before they further aid in conflicts worldwide. One of the most successful programs resulted from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plan and destroyed four and half million small arms.[189]

The other major facet of weapons destruction is removing weapons from post-conflict zones themselves. This is often a difficult task as it requires connections with the former combatants as well as approval from the government. As mentioned before, some programs have seen progress such as the one in the Republic of the Congo.[190] The majority of weapons removal programs are known as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program (DDRs). The DDRs are long-term and often work within UN peacekeeping missions.[191] The three step program begins with registering former and current combatants and collecting and destroying their weapons. Arms management programs may also be implemented.[192] The demobilization phase is generally designed to remove

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[180] Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html
[181] Ibid.
[182] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952
[183] Ibid.
[184] Stockpiles and Inventory Dynamics. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/inventories/dynamic.html#guntheft
[185] Civilian Inventories. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/inventories/civinventor.html
[186] Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html
[187] Small Arms, Large Problem: The The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067
[188] Ibid.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Congo: Small Arms Continue to Threaten Political Transition and National Stability. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58955&Country=Yes
[191] Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12650/disarmament_demobilization_and_reintegration_ddr_in_africa.html
[192] Ibid.

soldiers from a conflict-dominated mindset. They are given temporary living areas, offered counseling, and supplied with basic needs. Lower-level soldiers are often separated from their superiors to prevent armed groups from being able to reorganize after going through the DDR program.[193] The final phase in DDRs is known as reintegration. This supplies former combatants with job training, small monetary sums and other assistance to help them return and stay in civilian life.[194]DDRs are used in fourteen Member States around the world including the last seven UN peacekeeping missions.[195]

There are several inherent risks and problems within the framework of DDRs and it is necessary to mention them. First, these programs often run out of the funds necessary to support all three phases. As a result, reintegration is often shortened and former combatants are not always given everything they need to avoid relapse.[196] Additionally, some former combatants will take weapons and go through a DDR program multiple times. This drains already low levels of funds.[197] Finally, DDR programs must be able to offer some type of employment afterwards or humanitarian situation in the post-conflict zone will worsen. As one DDR participant stated, "We risked our lives to hand in our weapons, "We are incapable of feeding our families and cannot even pay the rent. The solution is for these people to give us our weapons back."[198] Despite these short-comings, the DDR programs that have been implemented are an important step. Although only one phase directly involves disarmament, the importance of providing long-term humanitarian assistance to those who have left their weapons cannot be overlooked.

Transfer of Small Arms to Post-Conflict Zones

The final facet of small arms control that should be addressed by the committee is the transfer of these weapons into post-conflict zones. Despite the fact that these weapons will only exacerbate the situation on the ground, these weapons often are imported by armed groups and other non-state actors. They can also be imported by the government illegally to increase their own military capability. As mentioned before, the lack of exporting controls as well as the unregulated industry of arms brokers have created a system here through which many unstable regions have been able to successful secure arms shipments.[199] Within the region itself, transfers between governments and non-state actors can be especially dangerous as pointed out in the Albanian case.

Exporting States (whether arms producers or existing stocks liquidators) must also verify that the arms being delivered arrive at the right location. Diverting small arms onto the black market enable non-state actors like rebel groups and terrorists to receive the weapons needed for their operations.[200] Amazingly, over eighty percent of black market weapons were originally part of the legal arms trade and amounts to around a one billion US dollar industry.[201] Additionally, falsified documents can divert legal transfers of fund. This occurred in 2001 when Columbian narco-terrorists were able to create a fake supply order for three thousand Kalahnikov-47 assault rifles. The supplier was unable to recognize the false report and the order was delivered.[202]

Case Study I: Long-Term Small Arms Proliferation in Afghanistan

To better understand the threat small arms cause in post-conflict zones, it is imperative to examine two case studies on the topic. The first will be the state of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's long history of small arms conflict dates back to 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded the country.[203] Vast amounts of weapons were brought into the country to

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[193] Ibid.
[194] Ibid.
[195] What is DDRs? UN DDR Resource Centre. http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php#9
[196] Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/12650/disarmament_demobilization_and_reintegration_ddr_in_africa.html
[197] Ibid.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952
[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2067
[203] Afghanistan Country Profile. BBC News.

prevent a Communist government from holding power. These were handed out to tribal and militia leaders who were willing to fight against the Soviets. As a result, the previous tribal conflicts were heightened and the ensuing fighting crippled the already destitute infrastructure and economy. When the conflict officially ended in 1989, no attempts were made to collect and dispose the weapons distributed across Afghanistan.[204] As Deputy Minister of Information and Culture, Abdul Hamid Mubarez stated, "Hundreds of illegal armed groups affiliated to various tribal, ethnic and political parties with separate military organisations stored huge amounts of weapons."[205] With over 100,000 illegal weapons in the country, the countryside was wracked with widespread conflict and killings. Small arms became essential for general protection and a culture of violence erupted. One local analyst made this point by declaring, "The history of conflict, combined with weak governments and strong local loyalties, has led to a culture where guns are perceived to be as necessary as a cooking pot or a mule."[206]

With all of the inherent difficulties presented above, the task of disarming groups that have been involved in conflict for so long is immense. Additionally, the rugged terrain allows for arsenals to be easily hidden. Moreover, the fact that most civilians were carrying weapons themselves, attempts at disarmament were going to be inherently slow.[207] In 2001, the Taliban was disposed from power under the invasion of the United States and NATO with the help of opposition group, the Northern Alliance.[208] Although an attempt to rid support for terrorist organization Al Qaeda, it had the inevitable concern of bringing militia leaders within the Northern Alliance to power. Many of these commanders were still loyal to local tribal and ethnic ties. This conflict of interest complicated disarmament further as the local leaders on the ground who would be essential for the success of any disarmament project were some of the very people that would have to be disarmed.[209]

After the Taliban was removed from power, plans were made for a DDR program to be established in Afghanistan. In summary, they had to address the widespread proliferation among civilians and non-state actors, the culture of violence deeply imbedded in society and finally the militarization of the government itself. In 2003 the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme was started and it lasted two years.[210] It was launched in five phases and successfully reintegrated over 60,000 soldiers from the Afghan military and confiscated tens of thousands of weapons. It also helped remove tribal and ethnic checkpoints that heightened the intra-state conflict.[211]

Nevertheless, concerns remain over the small arms situation in Afghanistan. First the program was not able to address the connection between the large opium crop and small arms proliferation. One commenter stated, "To ensure long-term success, only a big national project for both counter-narcotics and disarmament should take place. These will only succeed if people benefit from them - like provision of alternative livelihoods."[212] Additionally, weapons surrendered by local leaders may represent the cheapest and least effective ones in their arsenals, meaning disarmament was practically in name only.[213] Finally, disarmament must also reach those armed groups currently not working within the Afghan military.[214] Despite these concerns, renewed efforts have continued under a successor program that is designed to break tribal-governmental ties. Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan remains urgent, the progress of these DDR programs have helped ease the instability within the government itself.[215]

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_profiles/1162668.stm

[204] Afghanistan: Where the Rule of the Gun Continues. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34289&Country=Yes

[205] Ibid.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid.

[208] DDR in Afghanistan. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2009/ENG/Chapter-9-summary.pdf

[209] Ibid.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid.

[212] Afghanistan: Where the Rule of the Gun Continues. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34289&Country=Yes

[213] Ibid.

[214] DDR in Afghanistan. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2009/ENG/Chapter-9-summary.pdf

[215] Ibid.

Case Study II: Nigeria and Regional Small Arms Proliferation

The issue of small arms proliferation is well documented in West Africa, where decades of civil unrest and open conflict have flooded the region with weapons. The particular case of Nigeria is a solid example of a state which has not experienced large scale open conflict in decades but are hampered by the both the past and the present situation in the region.[216] Home to one of the largest oil reserves in the world, Nigeria is plagued by armed insurgents in the Niger River Delta. Supplied with weapons using oil stolen from pipelines, these combatants receive their small arms from all over West Africa relying on illegal arms from brokers and smugglers.[217] One militia leader was quoted saying, "We are very close to international waters, and it's very easy to get weapons from ships. We have AK-47s, general-purpose machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades."[218] Additionally, small arms were never collected from the civil war in the southeastern portion of the country originally known as Biafra and these guns remain a factor for all insurgent groups in Nigeria.

The neighboring conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia have also reached Nigeria with small arms coming straight across the border. Rebels from other African conflicts have even made their way into the country acting almost as mercenaries.[219] The situation illustrates the widespread dangers of small arms proliferation as borders rarely stop the trade in weapons. The case in Nigeria also points towards the fact that conflict will often spread by following the trail of small arms throughout a region. Realizing these threats, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) adopted a moratorium on the manufacture, import and export of small arms, one of the strongest actions against the spread of these weapons to date.[220] Nigeria put into place their own disarmament commission and have used it to collect and destroy weapons with over 15,000 removed so far.[221] The Nigerian president also spoke to the international community stating that, "The availability and wide circulation of small arms and light weapons pose the greatest danger to peace and security, especially in our region…these weapons have helped to prolong conflicts, undermined stability, social peace and security and have wrought devastation on the economies of affected states.". He also called for, "a legally binding international instrument that will regulate, control and monitor the illicit trade in small arms, including their transfer to non-state actors."[222] As mentioned before, this was attempted at the 2001 UN Conference, but was highly controversial and was discussed with no action taken on the issue.[223]

Committee Directive

Delegates of the Conference on Disarmament should once again be reminded that as a consensus body, they should work on resolutions that are open to all suggestions by Members of the body. A single no vote can destroy countless hours of work, so delegates must learn to cooperate and consider the entire picture and not just the individual points they want in the comprehensive document. This is especially true on the topic of small arms as much work has been attempted but little successfully accomplished. Previous work was very controversial and delegates should expect the same on this topic. Finally, delegates should look to previous reports, resolutions, and speeches to glean positive ideas to bring to the committee. There is an enormous amount of information on the topic of small arms in post-conflict zones and it will need to be utilized for this topic to be addressed properly.

On the individual issues, delegates should look for ways to reinforce and strengthen DDR programs to make them more comprehensive and widespread. Additionally, solid answers will need to be made on issues like international arms brokering, arms transfers across borders, and marking and tracing of new weapons. Issues like arms embargoes and humanitarian aid can be mentioned in documents and ideas recommended but these fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies within the UN and should be mostly left for those committees.

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[216] Nigeria: Widespread Availability of Small Arms a Major Security Issue. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58954&Country=Yes
[217] Ibid
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.
[223] United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Respects. International Committee of the Red Cross. http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JREP

Finally, delegates have the option of writing resolutions on individual ideas or composing a convention on a range of related issues. Resolutions are often easier to write and pass as they include fewer issues, but conventions can define entire small arms concerns. Delegates must balance their ideas with the time available to create the best possible work for the Conference.

Technical Appendix Guide

Topic I: Draft Convention on the Regulation of Small Scale Nuclear Weapons and Radiological Devices

Amy F. Woolf. "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons." Congressional Research Service.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf

This article is one of the best to introduce the topic nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It gives the history of these weapons through the Cold War as well as recent developments. It also breaks down the differences between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear devices. Delegates should examine this difference as the line between small-scale nuclear weapons and nonstrategic ones can be confusing. Nevertheless, the article does have the shortcoming of addressing American and Russian nuclear programs only.

Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure, and Health Effects. World Health Organization.
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2001/WHO_SDE_PHE_01.1.pdf

This WHO report is one of the most comprehensive reports on the subject of depleted uranium. Not only does it provide definitions for all terms surrounding DP it all goes in-depth on scientific work on the radioactive material. This includes the effects of DP on the environment and the human body. They also include statistics on the effects of DP used in the former Yugoslavia. Additional information that would be useful includes the common uses for DP in industrial and military uses. Delegates should read the applicable sections and at least skim the rest.

Radiological Attack: Dirty Bombs and other Devices. National Academies.
http://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=11317

Radiological Devices are relatively new to the international community and the threat posed by these weapons is not fully understood. However, this four-page article is one of the best to introduce to the terms and ideas surrounding them. It mentions common materials used in these devices and explains the purposes and tactics of radiological attack clearly. Delegates should read the entire article and be prepared to use this material in building their State's opinion on the legality of these devices.

Introduction to Radiological Terrorism. Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/index.html

This multi-chapter website is another great source on the issue of radiological devices. Although specifically designed for terrorism awareness, the advantages are the same when using these weapons. Among the most important chapter for delegates to cover are: the introduction, history of radiological terrorism, why do terrorists choose radiological terrorism, and prevention of radiological attack. Again, radiological devices can best be evaluated through the effects of radioactivity.

Feature: Depleted Uranium. International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/DU/index.shtml

The IAEA's archive on depleted uranium is another excellent resource for the delegates of CD. Although no longer updated with recent information, the archive includes articles and studies on the use of DP in Kuwait, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also includes an excellent FAQ for use within committee. Delegates should be able to access any information collected by the UN on military uses of DP from this resource.

Victor Sidel et al,. The Threat of Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons to Civilian Populations: Nuclear "Bunker Busters" and Their Medical Consequences. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20620/Threat_of_EP_nukes_to_civilans.pdf

This article not found in the BGG evaluates in detail the threat of low-yield nuclear weapons which for the purposes of this committee will be synonymous with small scale nuclear weapons. The article discusses the development of these weapons, the characteristics that make them controversial and the effects of below ground radiation on humans. Delegates should note the strong negative approach that this article presents and should take all information as is and make their own conclusions based upon their country's position.

Topic II: Evaluating the Restrictions on the Testing and Use of Ballistic Missiles

Twigge, Stephen and Len Scott. "The Other Other Missiles of October: The Thor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Electronic Journal of International History. http://www.history.ac.uk/resources/e-journal-international-history/twigge-paper

This article provides delegates a great way to evaluate the nature and effectiveness of IRBMs in a practical case study. The article provides background into the Cuban missile crisis as well as detailing for delegates the specific IRBMs that were in use during the time period – some of which are in use today.

Nuclear Threat Initiative. "North Korea: Musudan". December 2009. http://nuclearthreatinitiative.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/musudan.html

The Musudan is an IRBM used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This article provides delegates with the specifications for the device as well as its potential threat level and effectiveness. Delegates can use this information to determine what, if any, missiles of this type to regulate on the international market.

Gormley, Dennis S. "Winning on Ballistic Missiles but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle". Arms Control Association. December 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_12/Gormley

This article provides delegates a strong background in the general status of missile proliferation throughout the world. Delegates can use this information to assess on behalf of their state any potential threat, and how best to regulate that threat on the international stage. The table at the end of the article provides delegates specifications for a variety of common missiles that they may wish to develop regulations around.

Topic III: Addressing the Need for Small Arms Control in Post-Conflict Zones

Global: Small Arms, The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction. IRIN News. http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=58952

This article is actually an in-depth series of reports of the issue of small arms proliferation published by IRIN News which is affiliated with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In addition to an informative introductory article, there is a special article on small arms and gender violence. There are also a dozen case studies on individual Member States that cover the various issues facing the proliferation of these arms including arms transfers, illegal weapons production, and DDR programs. The report also lists several interviews with former combatants and UN officials. This source is exceptionally useful for delegates to begin their research with.

United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. United Nations. http://www.unddr.org/index.php

This website is designed to provide information on all of the UN's DDR programs. Although the FAQ is cited in the BGG, the remainder of the website is also very useful for research. The website offers Country Programme pages which detail the individual achievements in each location. It also lists the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) for DDRs. These are policies regarding the application of these programs. Finally, the Documents directory includes 530 papers on a range of DDR topics. This would be an excellent resource for delegates looking to reform the disarmament aspect of DDRs.

Small Arms Survey. The Graduate Institute-Geneva.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.html

This vast resource provides hard statistics on the situation of small arms around the world. It breaks down important issues such as ammunition, MANPADS (portable air defense systems), arms brokering, as well as country profiles. Statistics are also compiles on arms production, transfers, and global inventories. All of these resources are crucial when understanding small arms proliferation. Delegates should examine the research that the survey has done when developing their ideas for work in the committee.

Home Page. International Action Network on Small Arms
http://www.iansa.org/index.htm

The IANSA is global movement of civil society organizations who work against the proliferation of small arms. They publish reports in topics like marking and tracing, arms brokering and weapons destruction. This broad resource brings together activists from 120 countries. They also publish reports on the progress of UN programs. The UANSA website is a good overall resource but should be evaluated with all other resources on the issue.

Disarmament: Small Arms and Light Weapons. UN Office in Geneva.
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/D987C5EFC8A87B41C1257180004B1B31?OpenDocument

The UN office website provides a brief description of major accomplishments the UN has made on the issue of small arms proliferation. However, its links to important UN documents is vital for delegates to research. Both early reports, published in 1997 and 1999 are attached to this website and should be examined by delegates. These reports give twenty-four recommendations and how the progress on these. Additionally, they give plenty of background information on regional agreements and UN opinion on numerous small arms topics.

Home Page. Arms Control Association.
http://www.armscontrol.org/

Another solid website dedicated to information on all types of arms control. The most helpful sources are the country profiles for investigating individual needs and case studies and subject issues which include export controls, arms brokering, and arms treaty work. This site also has a comprehensive list of treaties and agreements on all arms related topics. In addition to small arms issues, it will also be helpful on the other two topics in the committee. Although less in depth on the overarching issues, the Arms Control Association publishes much work on specific topics with small arms proliferation. Delegates are encouraged to look here for specific cases to back of their ideas.