



## I: Creating Sustainable Relations in Regards to Georgia and the Russian Federation

### *Overview*

On 7 August 2009, ceremonies were held in Gori, Georgia to commemorate the anniversary of last August's conflict.<sup>1</sup> Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, speaking at the ceremony, said that the conflict and its aftermath have only reinforced his desire for closer ties with NATO and the EU.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev maintains that Russia took military action only to maintain peace and prevent ethnic cleansing by Georgia.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, animosity remains between Russia and Georgia more than a year after the end of hostilities.

### *Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia*

Although Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's secessionist provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 26 August 2008, it has had trouble convincing other nations to follow suit. During a visit to Russia on 10 September 2009, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced that his country would recognize the independence of the two provinces.<sup>4</sup> Venezuela became only the third country to do so, following Russia and Nicaragua.<sup>5</sup> If other Latin American states follow Chavez's lead, it may help strengthen Russia's initiative to legally separate the provinces from Georgia.

### *Internally Displaced Persons*

As of August 2009 about 30,000 people, mostly ethnic Georgians, remained displaced from their homes due to last August's conflict according to Amnesty International.<sup>6</sup> That is out of approximately 192,000 initially displaced during the fighting.<sup>7</sup> About 18,500 ethnic Georgians who fled their homes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be permanently displaced as they are unable to return to the secessionist regions.<sup>8</sup> Although 36 new settlements have been built by the government of Georgia for these internally displaced persons, many of the settlements are reportedly located in remote areas with little access to medical facilities or job opportunities.<sup>9</sup>

### *Borders*

Russian attempts to close the borders between Georgia and the breakaway provinces as provided for in Russia's agreements with the two provinces have been complicated by the lack of clear demarcation on many sections of the border line.<sup>10</sup> Talks aimed at demarcating the border and regularizing border crossings have been met with resistance by the Georgian authorities, who do not recognize the secessionist regions as having legitimate borders.<sup>11</sup> The sea borders pose different problems: Georgian forces have been trying to enforce a blockade of the coastline claimed by Abkhazia.<sup>12</sup> Although Abkhazia does not appear to have any naval forces, the *de facto* Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh has threatened to destroy any Georgian ships that continue to enforce the blockade.<sup>13</sup> Sustainable and ultimately peaceful relations between Russia and Georgia will be difficult or impossible until these issues are negotiated.

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1 "Georgia marks anniversary of war." *BBC News*. 7 August 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8188904.stm>.

2 *Ibid*.

3 *Ibid*.

4 "Chavez recognizes Georgia rebels." *BBC News*. 10 September 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8248102.stm>.

5 *Ibid*.

6 "Civilians in the Aftermath of War: the Georgia-Russia Conflict One Year On." Amnesty International. 2009. p. 7.

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR04/001/2009/en/f9998486-b2d7-4356-843d-196a8a6c9486/eur040012009eng.pdf>.

7 *Ibid*. p. 9.

8 *Ibid*.

9 *Ibid*.

10 *Ibid*. p. 16.

11 *Ibid*.

12 "Abkhazia threatens Georgian ships." *BBC News*. 2 September 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8233544.stm>.

13 *Ibid*.

## II: Increasing Port Security to Combat Terrorism

The threat of terrorism is one that continues to have repercussions globally. Those seeking to cause international disturbances through their actions have increased their ability to bring illegal substances into ports. The contraband includes imports such as weapons, drugs, and one of the largest threats, nuclear arms and material.<sup>14</sup> The international community views increasing port security as a necessity, but, to date, has not collectively enforced the set standards to be met when cargo comes into a Member State's ports. Since the terror attacks on the United States in 2001, many Member States have increased measures to make their ports safer, but most are not measuring up to the standards set by previously.<sup>15</sup> The use of vessels to smuggle hazardous material is an on-going and seemingly endless problem, especially for developing nations that do not have the financial capacity to enforce security measures for their ports. Additionally, it has been established that less than six percent of ports, globally, adhere to the rules and regulations that the UN has put forth regarding terrorism.<sup>16</sup>

Several nations have independently developed their own measures to ensure that containers on vessels do not contain material that are illegal or could be used for acts of terror. On 1 September 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security and United States Coast Guard identified several foreign ports that were not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures at its ports. In reaction to the report, the United States government revamped its conditions for entry of vessels from the ports not practicing proper security measures.<sup>17</sup> Over the last year the United States government has increased agreements with nations establishing Container Security Initiative ports. These ports would "target and prescreen maritime cargo containers" that are destined for ports within the United States. The Container Security Initiative ports are also designed to protect maritime commerce by inspecting for radioactive and nuclear matter that could be smuggled aboard vessels.<sup>18</sup> The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is offering grant funding to ports identified to be at a high risk. The funds would be used to protect "critical port infrastructure from terrorism."<sup>19</sup>

### ***Container Control Programme***

Established in 2003, through the combined efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Container Control Programme (CCP) is charged with the task of increasing port security in developing nations.<sup>20</sup> The primary purpose of the Programme was to reduce and eliminate the occurrence of illicit and illegal substances being imported and exported through some of the world's weakest ports.<sup>21</sup> The issue at hand is the passage of illegal "containers," which are intended to be used as a means in which to transport goods internationally, and are often compromised with drugs, weapons, counterfeit goods.<sup>22</sup> The WCO is a unique international organization, comprised of 169 members with the mission of standardizing, protecting, and securing international ports, it is the only one of its kind, currently.<sup>23</sup> The UNODC and the WCO have comprised a list of ports that are more active and infamous for being locations where illegal substances are transported, not only are arms and materials to make arms available, but illegal drugs and contraband used to fund terrorism appearing in ports.<sup>24</sup> The CCP also established inter-agency port control units (PCUs), which combines the expertise and knowledge of security and port authority agents which work cohesively to define high-risk containers.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> US Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard. (2009). *Port Security Advisory*. Retrieved October 17, 2009, from <http://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi>

<sup>15</sup> Holguin, Jamie. "UN: Port Security Not Seaworthy." Associated Press. May 24, 2004. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/25/terror/main619510.shtml>

<sup>16</sup> Holguin, Jamie. "UN: Port Security Not Seaworthy." Associated Press. May 24, 2004. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/25/terror/main619510.shtml>

<sup>17</sup> US Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard. (2009). *Port Security Advisory*. Retrieved October 17, 2009, from <http://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi>

<sup>18</sup> Cargo Security International. Retrieved October 20, 2009, from <http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/channel.asp?cid=11>

<sup>19</sup> FEMA. FY 2009 Port Security Grant Program. Retrieved October 19, 2009, from <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/psgp/index.shtml>

<sup>20</sup> "The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Customs Organization. 2006. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/generalbrochureEN.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> "The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme." World Customs Organization. 2009. [http://www.wcoomd.org/home\\_wco\\_topics\\_epoverviewboxes\\_responsibilities\\_epunodcwcocontainercontrolprogramme.htm](http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_epoverviewboxes_responsibilities_epunodcwcocontainercontrolprogramme.htm)

<sup>23</sup> "The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme." World Customs Organization. 2009. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container\\_Programme\\_Progress\\_Report\\_June\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container_Programme_Progress_Report_June_2009.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

Due to the inability of some developing nations to meet maritime security measures, the unknown importation and exportation of these goods is an everyday occurrence. It is through this limited program, that success has been seen, but only within their means. With over 420 million containers shipped annually and the difficulty in securing these ports with even the most advanced technology has left the Security Council stressing need for this program, or one of the like, to be implemented on a larger scale.<sup>26</sup> The United Nations has addressed this issue in several forums besides the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<sup>27</sup> The focus for these forums is: security of items being shipped, detection of dangerous materials, and intelligence sharing among nations.<sup>28</sup> Currently, the work of the Programme can be seen in Ecuador, Senegal, Ghana and Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> Donor Member States Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom have aided in the success of the programs.<sup>30</sup> Additionally the Programme has received donations from Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ghana, Norway, Spain, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.<sup>31</sup>

On 14 October 2009 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made a statement in front of the United Nations task force that “we are far from reaching safer shores,” mentioning the very recent act of terror that have affected the United Nations and its member states.<sup>32</sup> United Nations officials hope that by implementing the global counter-terrorism strategy illegal arms and trafficking of drugs will decrease the acts of terror committed on civilians and officials alike. Current areas of opportunity for the CCP, while successful in the areas of deployment, include increased accommodations for law enforcement personnel, more regulated and relevant shipping information, and measures to strengthen the infrastructure of the Programme.<sup>33</sup>

### III: The Situation in Cyprus

#### *Continuing Talks*

Cyprus President Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, as well as their representatives, continue to meet regularly to discuss the unification of Cyprus.<sup>34</sup> Topics of discussion since the two sides committed to the long-term goal of unification in May 2008 have included citizenship, aliens, immigration, governance, and executive power.<sup>35</sup> The two leaders are now meeting in person approximately two times a week and President Christofias has said, “the proposals are, in any case, improved,” since negotiations began in September 2008.<sup>36</sup> But despite the pace and range of the talks, there has been little substantial agreement on what Mr. Talat has described as “the last chance for a solution.”<sup>37</sup> In particular, property rights for Greek Cypriots wishing to return to their homes in the Turkish-controlled north has been a divisive issue which the two sides have mostly avoided.<sup>38</sup>

#### *Turkey, the EU, and NATO*

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<sup>26</sup> “The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme.” World Customs Organization. 2009.

[http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-](http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container_Programme_Progress_Report_June_2009.pdf)

[crime/containerprogramme/Container\\_Programme\\_Progress\\_Report\\_June\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container_Programme_Progress_Report_June_2009.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> United Nations. (2009) Ten Stories the World Should Know About. *Crime In a Box: Ports Crack Down on Trafficking of Arms, Drugs, and Human Beings*. Retrieved October 17, 2009. [www.un.org/events/tenstories/07](http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/07)

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations. (2009) Ten Stories the World Should Know About. *Crime In a Box: Ports Crack Down on Trafficking of Arms, Drugs, and Human Beings*. Retrieved October 17, 2009, from <http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/crime.shtml>

<sup>30</sup> “The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme.” World Customs Organization. 2009.

[http://www.wcoomd.org/home\\_wco\\_topics\\_epoverviewboxes\\_responsibilities\\_epunodcwcocontainercontrolprogramme.htm](http://www.wcoomd.org/home_wco_topics_epoverviewboxes_responsibilities_epunodcwcocontainercontrolprogramme.htm)

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> UN News Centre. (2009, October 14). *Ban Warns of Long Journey in Battle Against Terrorism*. October 20, 2009.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32548&Cr=terror&Cr1=>

<sup>33</sup> “The UNODC-WCO Container Control Programme.” World Customs Organization. 2009.

[http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-](http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container_Programme_Progress_Report_June_2009.pdf)

[crime/containerprogramme/Container\\_Programme\\_Progress\\_Report\\_June\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/containerprogramme/Container_Programme_Progress_Report_June_2009.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> “Cyprus leaders discuss executive of united country at UN-backed talks.” *UN News Centre*. 10 September 2009.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32007&Cr=cyprus&Cr1=>

<sup>35</sup> “Cyprus leaders make good progress in unity talks, UN envoy reports.” *UN News Centre*. 6 August 2009.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31697&Cr=cyprus&Cr1=>

<sup>36</sup> “Cyprus President: Turkish side shifts stance on the powers of the executive.” *Financialmirror.com News*. 17 September 2009.

[http://www.financialmirror.com/News/Cyprus\\_and\\_World\\_News/17393](http://www.financialmirror.com/News/Cyprus_and_World_News/17393).

<sup>37</sup> “Turkish Cypriot leader gloomy on UN talks.” *Financial Times*. 17 September 2009. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/40c46272-a1ef-11de-81a6-00144feabdc0.html>.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

Turkey first applied for membership in the European Community (later to become the European Union) in 1959.<sup>39</sup> Since that time, Turkey has moved slowly and unevenly toward membership, most significantly when the EU voted in 2004 to formally begin accession talks.<sup>40</sup> That same year, Cyprus joined the Europe-wide body and has since posed one of the most significant obstacles to Turkey's bid.<sup>41</sup> Any agreement to move Turkey's accession forward must be unanimous, giving Cyprus absolute power to delay or deny membership for Turkey.<sup>42</sup> Discussions in eight of the 35 areas required for Turkey to gain membership in the EU are currently blocked by Cyprus.<sup>43</sup> This is in response to Turkey's refusal to allow Cypriot ships to dock in Turkish ports.<sup>44</sup> The cycle of distrust between Cyprus and Turkey is long-standing and mutual, dating back to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974.<sup>45</sup> Recently, Turkey has urged the UN to take a more active role in the ongoing Cyprus reunification talks in the hope that a unified Cyprus would allow both sides to end their mutual hostility.<sup>46</sup>

Separate but related issues have interfered with military cooperation between the EU and NATO.<sup>47</sup> Partially, it is a dispute between Cyprus, which is a member of the EU but not NATO, and Turkey, which is a member of NATO but not the EU.<sup>48</sup> Unlike the other non-NATO members of the EU (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden), Cyprus is not a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP).<sup>49</sup> This means that Cyprus is not allowed to view classified NATO security documents.<sup>50</sup> On those occasions when Cyprus insists on being present at joint EU-NATO meetings, the assembled ministers cannot discuss peacekeeping in Afghanistan, where the two organizations have separate missions.<sup>51</sup> As Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary-General of NATO, has said, "It's absurd."<sup>52</sup> Just as Cyprus has absolute power to block Turkish membership in the EU, Turkey has the same power to prevent Cypriot cooperation with NATO. The net result is a harder struggle in Afghanistan and a diminished ability for the EU and NATO to cooperate on issues of European security and anti-terrorism.

## II. Women in Peace and Security

Through the work of Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (NGOWG), significant strides have been made towards enhancing the protection of women in times of conflict. While groundbreaking in its development and radical in its focus, the work established in this resolution has not been fully realized, and with the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of SCR 1325 in October 2010, efforts have increased to ensure progress is made by all stakeholders.<sup>53</sup>

### *SCR 1888*

On 30 September 2009 under the Presidency of the United States and chair of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1888 – the third resolution adopted by the Council under the agenda item of "Women, Peace and Security", following resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008).<sup>54</sup> Like SCR 1820, SCR 1888 is primarily focused on addressing and preventing sexual violence in conflict. It follows the August 2009 Open Debate on women, peace and security and considers the Secretary-General's report on resolution 1820 (2008) referencing many of the recommendations contained in that report. The resolution brings attention to the lack of female representation in regards to mediation and ceasefires and the need for such representation in formal peace processes, noting that women are often not put in roles of Chief or Lead in UN-sponsored peace relations. It notes that not only are women not represented in peace

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<sup>39</sup> Leo Cendrowicz. "Fifty Years on, Turkey Still Pines to Become European." *Time Magazine*. 8 September 2009. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1920882,00.html>.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> "EU urged to freeze Turkey talks." *BBC News*. 29 November 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6194492.stm>.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> "Turkey to push UN to speed up Cypriot talks." *Hurriyet Daily News*. 15 September 2009. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-push-un-for-speeding-up-cypriot-talks-2009-09-15>.

<sup>47</sup> Judy Dempsey. "EU and NATO bound in a perilous rivalry." *The New York Times*. 4 October 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/04/world/europe/04iht-defense.3031359.html>.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> "NATO Topics: NATO'S Relations with the European Union." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 10 March 2009. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html>.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> "Fogh in the Aegean." *The Economist*. 10 September 2009. [http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=14416843&fsrc=rss](http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14416843&fsrc=rss).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

processes, but issues such as sexual violence are not addressed within the peace agreements themselves.<sup>55</sup>

Further to that cause, SCR1888 recommends the creation of a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) who will work cohesively with UN bodies, organizations, and Member States to address current obstacles, specifically in regards to sexual violence during times of armed conflict. The SRSG will work closely with United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action), a joint initiative established on International Women's Day, 8 March 2007.

Additionally, SCR 1888 requests that the Secretary General “identifies and deploys a “team of experts” to situations of particular concern with respect to sexual violence.”<sup>56</sup> This team will serve several functions, including the assistance of government in “preventing conflict-related sexual violence and addressing impunity, through strengthening civilian and military justice systems and enhancing national capacity, responsiveness to victims and judicial capacity.”<sup>57</sup> Another groundbreaking aspect of SCR, similar to the work of the Security Council on the issue of Children and Armed Conflict in recently passed SCR 1878, SCR 1888 request that “Women's Protection Advisors” (WPA) be utilized within UN Peacekeeping Missions to serve alongside existing gender advisors and human rights protection officers.<sup>58</sup>

Finally, SCR 1888 establishes the request for the Secretary General to systematically report on “incidents of sexual violence” in all relevant reports to the Secretary-General, which in turn will allow the Security Council to address the issue of sexual violence, and issues related to women, peace and security, in all mandate renewals, and resolutions on thematic or country situations.<sup>59</sup> The systematic reporting of sexual violence is integral in order for sexual violence to truly be addressed, and resolution 1888 emphasizes the need for this reporting through the inclusion of sexual violence in all reports submitted on peacekeeping missions, other Special Representatives and Rapporteurs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Chairperson(s) of UN Action, and other thematic reports to the Council. In addition, the resolution calls for an additional report to be submitted within 3 months on how to more effectively address sexual violence both on the field and within the UN system. This report in particular will be an opportunity to keep these issues on the agenda of the Security Council and the UN and ensure that sexual violence continues to be prioritized.

One last important note is this resolution also identifies the link between the new UN gender architecture established in a recent General Assembly resolution A/RES/63/311 and the work of the Security Council on sexual violence and women, peace and security. Resolution 63/311 established a new gender entity under an Under-Secretary General, which would consolidate the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues (OSAGI), the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), and UN-INSTRAW. According to Charlotte Bunch, a leader of Gender Equality Architecture Reform (GEAR) Campaign, “the vision for this new body is for it to be much more than just a combination of what exists now. The goal is to have a powerful agency with the heft of UNICEF that can raise the global profile of women's rights and escalate efforts to realize them locally, both through strategic programming on the ground and by driving forward gender mainstreaming in the rest of the UN's work in areas from development and health, to human rights, peace and security.”<sup>60</sup>

### **SCR 1889**

The ninth Anniversary of the adoption of SCR 1325 was marked by an Open Debate of the Security Council on 5 October 2009. The outcome of this session was the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1889 on women, peace and security – the fourth resolution of the Council under this agenda item. This Open Debate focused on “post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding” which is reflected in SCR 1889, a marked difference from its predecessors in SCR 1325, 1820 and 1888. SCR 1889 addresses one of the key reasons that women's needs are not addressed in post-conflict peacebuilding, which is the “exclusion of women and of their interests from the early stages of these processes and from the institutions that are central to them.”<sup>61</sup> SCR 1889 contains several provisions that will go far towards improving the monitoring and reporting of all resolutions on women, peace and security more generally by addressing the need for mechanisms that hold the Security Council, UN System, and Member States accountable.

First, in stronger language than previously seen, the Secretary-General is requested to ensure that all of his country reports to the Council “provide information on the impact of situations of armed conflict on women and girls, their particular needs

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<sup>55</sup> SC Res 1888. United Nations Security Council. September 2009.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid

<sup>59</sup> SC Res 1888. United Nations Security Council. September 2009.

<sup>60</sup> <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/charlotte-bunch/powerful-womens-agencywill-un-deliver>

<sup>61</sup> SC Res 1889. United Nations Security Council. October 2009.

in post-conflict situations and obstacles to obtaining those needs.”<sup>62</sup> In addition, SCR 1889 “requests that the report on the implementation of 1325 expected in October 2010 includes an assessment of the process by which the Security Council receives, analyses and takes action on information pertinent to resolution 1325 (2000).”<sup>63</sup> This information been a longstanding request by civil society (particularly during advocacy efforts leading up to SCR 1820) and it is hoped that this assessment will then prompt real improvement in information flows to the Council and then hopefully lead to significant improvements in the response of the Council to women, peace and security issues.<sup>64</sup>

Another critical element of SCR 1889 is the “request for the Secretary-General to submit (by early April 2010) a set of global indicators to track implementation of SCR 1325 (see OP17) and to thus serve as a basis for reporting by the UN and other entities on 1325 implementation.”<sup>65</sup> Civil society and Member States who are supportive of SCR 1325 are hoping that the Secretary-General ensures that all relevant UN agencies are part of this effort and that provision is also made for the means by which these indicators will be tracked and monitored.<sup>66</sup>

The next step is to ensure that issues related to women and gender are included in every discussion and mentioned in all resolutions passed by the Security Council, as is requested in SCR 1325. The NGOWG has launched a yearlong project supported by many Member States, including Switzerland, Canada, Liechtenstein, Belgium, and Austria, that holds the Security Council accountable by highlighting key entry points for Council members on items on their agenda.<sup>67</sup> This project, called the Security Council Monthly Action Points (MAP) Project, was launched the end of October 2009 and intends to be a significant advocacy tool for Member States and Civil Society actors alike in the lead up to the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of SCR 1325.<sup>68</sup>

## V: Human Rights Violations in Myanmar

### *Trial of Aung San Suu Kyi*

In July 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon made a personal visit to Myanmar.<sup>69</sup> His objective was to discuss with Myanmar's leadership a number of political concerns, including the continued detention and trial of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.<sup>70</sup> Secretary-General Ban was not permitted to meet with Ms. Suu Kyi, which he called a “deep disappointment” but an issue that alone “should not define our efforts.”<sup>71</sup> In his report to the Security Council, Secretary-General Ban argued that the key issue for the UN's engagement with Myanmar was “the creation of conditions conducive to credible and legitimate elections” in 2010.<sup>72</sup> In his response to the Secretary-General, Myanmar's permanent representative to the UN, Than Swe, claimed that “our Head of State himself was willing to arrange the meeting” between Secretary-General Ban and Ms. Suu Kyi.<sup>73</sup> He blamed the fact that the meeting did not take place on the interference of the Special Court which was trying Ms. Suu Kyi's case, claiming the court had “independent jurisdiction over the matter.”<sup>74</sup>

On 11 August 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to an additional three years of hard labor.<sup>75</sup> Her sentence was commuted to 18 months house arrest, ensuring that she will be unable to participate in national elections in Spring 2010.<sup>76</sup> Although the verdict was widely expected, many nations, both in the west and in southeast Asia, responded with

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Cook, Sam. “Resolutions Promise Change.” PeaceWomen. Issue 11. September 2009. <http://www.peacewomen.org/news/1325News/Issue112.html>

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Cook, Sam. “Resolutions Promise Change.” PeaceWomen. Issue 11. September 2009. <http://www.peacewomen.org/news/1325News/Issue112.html>

<sup>67</sup> “Security Council Monthly Action Points.” NGO Working Group for Women, Peace and Security. October 2009. <http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/advocacy/map/>

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> “Burma junta leader snubs UN chief.” *BBC News*. 4 July 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8134061.stm>.

<sup>70</sup> “Secretary-General, briefing Security Council, calls Myanmar's refusal to grant meeting with jailed opposition leader a lost opportunity.” United Nations Department of Public Information. 13 July 2009. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9704.doc.htm>.

<sup>71</sup> S/PV.6161. United Nations Security Council. 13 July 2009. p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid p. 4.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> “Burma court finds Suu Kyi guilty.” *BBC News*. 11 August 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8194596.stm>.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

disappointment and anger.<sup>77</sup> Secretary-General Ban said he was “deeply disappointed” with the verdict<sup>78</sup> and the Security Council released a statement “expressing serious concern.”<sup>79</sup> John Yettaw, the man whose arrival at Ms. Suu Kyi's house provided the justification for the trial, was sentenced to seven years in prison.<sup>80</sup> Mr. Yettaw, who is a US citizen, was released after a visit to the country by US Senator Jim Webb.<sup>81</sup>

### ***Contacts with North Korea***

On 25 May 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear device in violation of Security Council Resolution 1718 and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>82</sup> In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 1874, calling on all states to monitor and seize any shipments of weapons to or from North Korea.<sup>83</sup> The first test of Resolution 1874 was a ship called the Kang Nam I.<sup>84</sup> The Kang Nam set out from the North Korean port of Nampo on 17 June 2009, with its destination unclear.<sup>85</sup> As it was being trailed by the *USS John McCain*, a US Navy destroyer, reports surfaced indicating that the Kang Nam was carrying either conventional weapons or missile components to Myanmar.<sup>86</sup> The Myanmar government denied the allegations.<sup>87</sup> Although the ship did eventually turn back without delivering its cargo, the incident brought to light potentially dangerous contacts between Myanmar and North Korea.<sup>88</sup> There have also been reports that North Korea has sent experts to help construct a series of secret tunnels under the Myanmar capital of Naypyidaw.<sup>89</sup> These connections between the two countries may be an important factor in considering the extent to which Myanmar poses a threat to international peace and security.

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