

Southern Regional Model United Nations XX
Enhancing Global Commitments to Human Rights and Equality
November 19-21, 2009
Atlanta, GA
Email: las@srmun.org



Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2009 Southern Regional Model United Nations conference! Also, welcome to the League of Arab States committee. Please allow us to introduce ourselves, the committee, and contact information should you need any assistance between now and SRMUN.

I will be serving as the Director of the League of Arab States (LAS). I am currently a senior at Berry College working toward a degree in Government and Philosophy. I have been involved with Berry College Model United Nations for three years and have served as the club's President since 2008. I have attended SRMUN for three years prior, but I am excited to serve my first year on staff.

Our Assistant Director, Adam Garvey, currently attends Georgia State University where he is studying Political Science with a concentration in International Affairs. Adam has been a delegate and staff member at various Model UN Conferences for 5 years. This will be his fourth year of participation at SRMUN, and first year as a staff member.

The League of Arab States was formed from the 1944 Alexandria Protocol which was intended to promote economic, communication, cultural, legal, social, and health cooperation among its Member States. Since this point, the League's membership has expanded to 22 Member States which work collectively toward many goals from social and gender equality to combating transnational terrorism.

This year, the topics for the League of Arab States committee are:

- I. The 2007 Arab Peace Initiative: Moving Forward
- II. Evaluating the Political and Economic Impacts of Hawala
- III. Political Participation by Nontraditional Actors

Each delegation is required to submit one position paper which covers each of the three topics. Position papers should be not longer than 2 pages in length and single spaced. Position papers are intended to showcase your country's position on each of the topics and a course of action which your country would support in committee. It is vital that your position papers be concise, clear, and demonstrate insight into the policies and positions of your country to provide solutions to the challenge topics before the committee. Strong, well developed position papers are an excellent foundation for conference preparation. More detailed information about how to write position papers can be found at the SRMUN website (<http://www.srmun.org>). **All position papers MUST be submitted by October 23rd, 11:59pm EST using the submission system on the SRMUN website.**

I look forward to the opportunity to facilitate the League of Arab States committee at the 2009 Southern Regional Model United Nations conference. Adam and I look forward to meeting and working with you both prior to and during the conference. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.

Hether Scheel
Director
las@srmun.org

Adam Garvey
Assistant Director
las@srmun.org

Charles Keller
Deputy Director-General
ddg@srmun.org

History of the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (LAS) evolved from an idea put forth by Egypt during the drafting of the Alexandria Protocol in 1944, which outlined the basis for such a League to be created with the primary purpose of facilitating cooperation in the arenas of economics, communications, cultural matters, legal questions, social concerns, and health issues, while maintaining the sovereignty of each nation.¹ A year later, the Pact of the League of Arab States was signed, acting as the legal foundation that the organization was based upon.² The original seven members – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen – all agreed to collaborate to further foster cooperation amongst themselves, while also expressing a desire to work with all independent Arab States in such endeavors as future members of the League.³

The Cultural Treaty of the Arab League was signed a year later, promoting cooperation among areas such as arts, sports, sciences and academia.⁴ It endorsed the creation of organizations to support trading of cultural knowledge, joint sporting events, and academic exchanges to support the education and development of the Arab people.⁵ This treaty encouraged Arab States to work towards advancing literacy, preservation of cultural masterpieces, cultural development, and keeping pace with global intellectual movements.⁶ Through this treaty, the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization has been able to facilitate the cultural development of the Arab States through providing reference texts in Arabic, providing technical expertise, and hosting conferences of State Ministers in order to create strategies for educational and cultural development.⁷

In 1950, the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (JDECT) was signed by all Member States of the LAS as a response to the failure of Arab States to take effective joint military action during the violence that followed the establishment of the Israeli State in 1948.⁸ The treaty established the Joint Defense Council (JDC), which has binding power upon all Member States should a resolution be passed with a two-thirds majority.⁹ It also established a collective security agreement between all Member States to be upheld by the JDC and a Permanent Military Commission.¹⁰ This collective security agreement, as outlined in the second article of the JDECT, defines an attack on one Member of the Treaty as an attack on all Members.¹¹ This includes attacks from outside the League as well as attacks from within the League. The JDECT became the treaty most responsible for allowing the League to handle matters involving Arab peace and security with appropriate military force.

For decades, the League has continued to encourage the Arab States to work towards social harmony. In 1994, the League signed the Arab Charter on Human Rights to express an Arab perspective on human rights.¹² The treaty reaffirmed the rights set forth in such treaties as the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, while also noting several rights not previously outlined.¹³ Expanding upon its dedication to the cause of peace, the League pronounced its dedication to

¹ The Arab League, The Alexandria Protocol. October 7, 1944.

² The League of Arab States. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 22, 1945.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The League of Arab States. Cultural Treaty of the Arab League. League of Arab States. November 20, 1946.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "ALESCO Home Page." Arab League Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.

http://www.alecso.org.tn/lng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&lang=en&id=85&Itemid=0

⁸ "Historical Background." League of Arab States.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/print_page.jsp?art_id=1175

⁹ The League of Arab States. Article 6. Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty. League of Arab States. June 1950.

¹⁰ The League of Arab States. Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty. June 1950.

¹¹ The League of Arab States. Article 3. Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty. June 1950.

¹² The League of Arab States. Arab Charter on Human Rights. September 1994.

¹³ Ibid.

fighting terrorism in the region by signing the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism in 1998.¹⁴ This document established the framework for the means and methods for Arab States to fight terrorism, as well as solidifying the commitment of the League to combat terrorism on both a political and judicial level.¹⁵

The League's main goals, as stated in the Pact of the League of Arab States, have always been to enhance cooperation on several levels.¹⁶ The situation of existence of an Israeli state has also been a key concern of the League of Arab States. The League has long since granted Palestine Member status in its meetings, and the Annex to the Pact of the League recognizes Palestine as a state.¹⁷ In 2002, the Arab Peace Initiative, lead by Saudi Arabia and supported by all 22 members of the League, recognized the futility of a military option to the conflict and asked that Israel return to its 1967 borders in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁸ It also asked that Israel fully adopt a two-state solution to giving the Palestinian people and their territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip an independent state.¹⁹ In exchange, they offered Israel comprehensive peace with all Member States of the League.²⁰ Israel has done little to enact the plan, and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya has since proposed an alternate one-state solution, but states such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia still support the plan as the best course of action.^{21,22}

The principal organs of the League are the Council of the League, several special committees, and a Secretariat.²³ The Council of the League meets twice per year and is the main governing body of the League.²⁴ In the Council, and all subordinate bodies, Member States receive one vote, and resolutions are passed by simple majority.²⁵ All LAS resolutions that pass unanimously are considered binding on all members, while those that pass by simple majority are considered binding on those who voted in favor.²⁶ The Secretary-General drafts the budget of the League, and the Council of the League is responsible for approving it and determining the shares of the budget that Member States are responsible for.²⁷ The Council is also responsible for issues involving membership, as well as appointing the Secretary-General and other high officials within the Secretariat.²⁸ In addition to managing many of the internal affairs of the League, the Council is the supervising body of all other committees, and is responsible for upholding the major goals and principles of the league.²⁹ The Secretariat is then responsible for the bureaucratic and executive functions of the League. As dictated by the Charter, the permanent seat of the League is in Cairo, Egypt, and it is from there from which both the Council of the League and the Secretariat have traditionally operated.³⁰

The current members of the League of Arab States are:

ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN.³¹

¹⁴ The League of Arab States. Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. April 1998.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ The League of Arab States. Article 2. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

¹⁷ Annex on Palestine. Pact of the League of Arab States. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

¹⁸ Arab Peace Initiative. League of Arab States. 27 March 2002

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Muammar Qaddafi. "The One-State Solution" New York Times. January 22, 2009. p. A33.

²² Fuad Siniora. "Give the Arab Peace Initiative a Chance" New York Times. May 11, 2007.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/opinion/11siniora.html>

²³ Pact of the League of Arab States. League of Arab States. 22 March 1945

²⁴ The League of Arab States. Article 11. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

²⁵ The League of Arab States. Article 3. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

²⁶ The League of Arab States. Article 7. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

²⁷ The League of Arab States. Article 13. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

²⁸ The League of Arab States. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The League of Arab States. Article 10. Pact of the League of Arab States. March 1945.

³¹ "Member States." League of Arab States. http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/level2_en.jsp?level_id=11

I. The 2007 Arab Peace Initiative: Moving Forward

Introduction

The Arab Peace Initiative was first proposed at the 2002 Beirut Summit of the League of Arab States by Saudi Arabia's then-Crown Prince King Abdullah.³² The initiative took the form of a resolution calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state and an end to the oft-termed Arab-Israeli problem.³³ The proposal was a comprehensive peace initiative with the objective of reaching a long term solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the normalization of relations between the Arab world and the Zionist nation of Israel. The League's terms included Israel's complete withdrawal from the contested, occupied territories and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian population problem.³⁴ Disappointingly, the 2002 initiative did not have much support from the Arab world and, as such, was unable to make a substantial impact.³⁵ Tragically, the success of the Arab League's attempt to commit to meaningful and lasting peace in the Middle East was overshadowed by the fact that, on the very day of the plan's release, a Palestinian suicide bomber injured over 150 people and killed 20 in Netanya, Israel; Israel responded with a substantial military operation in the West Bank.³⁶ As is typical in the region, the renewal of conflict between the Israeli state and its Arab neighbors meant the Initiative itself was a temporary casualty of the conflict. Five years passed before the Arab community was ready to return to the issue with a seriousness of purpose and self-motivated autonomy; enduring peace in the Middle East was once again considered possible.

In 2007, the Arab League returned to the issue with a greater commitment to reaching a permanent resolution to the conflict between the Arab world and the established Zionist state of Israel, while making remarkable strides in respecting the statehood of Israel and its right to exist.³⁷ The second iteration of the Arab Peace Initiative drew support from the majority of Member States within the Arab League and was viewed with optimism by the international community.³⁸ Of the 22 Member States, 21 sent delegates to the March 2007 summit; this represented the League's unity in addressing one of the greatest plagues to peace and prosperity in the Middle East.³⁹ To date, the volatile situation in the region, coupled with instability in Iraq and antagonistic relations with Israel, have resulted in significant roadblocks to achieving a meaningful and sustainable implementation of the Arab League's Peace Initiative. It should be noted that Israel's reaction has not been one of rejection; nor, however, has it been warmly embraced by the Israeli government.⁴⁰ Although then-Israeli Prime Minister Olmert voiced support for the plan, the official response from Jerusalem was that there were "several items in the Saudi-brokered plan which [were] unacceptable."⁴¹ Israel took umbrage at several specific aspects of the Initiative, as well as the way in which the Arab League called for a nuclear-free Middle East absent of double standards, "a reference to the Western powers' demand that Iran abandon its efforts to produce nuclear power plant fuel while ignoring Israel's production of nuclear weapons."⁴²

The specifics of the plan have often been a point of contention within the League as well; issues of language and characterization have long been a source of disagreement and frustration in the drafting of important documents

³² "The Middle East Peace Initiative." Al Jazeera. <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/01/200912764650608370.html>

³³ "The Arab Peace Initiative." The Arab League. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm>

³⁴ "Text: the Beirut Declaration." http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1899395.stm

³⁵ "The Middle East Peace Initiative." Al Jazeera. <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/01/200912764650608370.html>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "The Arab Peace Initiative versus Culture of Confrontation." Mideast Web. April 10, 2007. <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000580.htm>

³⁸ "Joint Statement of the Quartet: Press Release." US Department of State. May 30, 2007.

³⁹ "Israel Resists Arab Peace Plan Initiative." Green Left. April 13, 2007. <http://www.greenleft.org.au/2007/706/36669>

⁴⁰ "The Arab Peace Initiative." Middle East Progress. <http://middleeastprogress.org/2008/12/the-arab-peace-initiative/>

⁴¹ "The Middle East Peace Initiative." Al Jazeera. <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/01/200912764650608370.html>

⁴² "Israel Resists Arab Peace Plan Initiative." Green Left. April 13, 2007. <http://www.greenleft.org.au/2007/706/36669>

43

addressing Israel's role and existence in the Middle East. The document itself asks Israel to "reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well" while committing the League to establish "normal" diplomatic relations with the Zionist state upon Israel's acceptance of the 1967 borders and the realization of a "just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem," which would include the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state."⁴⁴

A Brief History of the Modern Arab-Israeli Situation

Since the founding of the Israeli state through its May 14, 1948 declaration of independence from the British Mandate for Palestine, lasting peace between the Arab community and the Israeli government has been fragile at best. The 1948 Arab-Israel war was a continuation of pre-independence conflicts between the Arab and Jewish populations on the disputed land. While the governments of the Arab world avoided direct involvement in the Palestinian Mandate, resentment over the situation ran high.⁴⁵ As the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, which would have established a Jewish and an Arab state existing side by side, was rejected and modern Israel established, five Arab states began offensive military actions against the Israeli government.⁴⁶ It must be noted that United Nations Resolution 181 retains an important place in the psyche of the Arab world, as some view the borders established by the Partition Plan as being the only acceptable guidelines for any lasting peace agreement with Israel. When the Partition Plan was abandoned and no Arab state was established in the area, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria coordinated offensive military attacks against the fledgling 'Zionist entity.' However, only Syrian and Egyptian forces invaded territory outside of the Arab section of the original Partition Plan, itself a meaningful gesture on the part of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon in their de facto acceptance of the border.⁴⁷ Within 24 hours of the beginning of hostilities, the Arab League, then consisting of seven members, released a statement asserting that "the only solution of the Palestinian problem is the establishment of a unitary Palestinian State... whereby its inhabitants will enjoy complete equality before the law... in accordance with the provisions of the provisions of the Covenants of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations."⁴⁸ The League, defending the humanitarian rights of the Palestinian population, asserted that "security and order in Palestine have become disrupted... result[ing] in the exodus of more than a quarter million of its Arab inhabitants from their homes and in their taking refuge in the neighboring Arab countries."⁴⁹ While the formal armed conflict was concluded in 1949 and marked by the 1949 Armistice Agreements, the Arab-Israeli conflict was far from over. The Middle East and the international community as a whole would face at least another sixty years of a vicious cycle of fragile peace, broken cease fires, all-out wars, brokered peace, tentative peace, and yet another gradual breakdown of that peace.

The next twenty years saw the 1956-1957 Suez Canal crisis, in which Egyptian President Gamal Nassar nationalized the Suez Canal, and its aftermath, including militarized conflict between the Arab world and the Israeli military; involvement by the French and British, as well as a peace brokered by the United States, exposed the degree to which the Arab-Israeli 'problem' was one of global concern, particularly to the developed West.⁵⁰ 1967's Six Days War between Arab forces and Israel resulted in large geopolitical gains for Israel, including possession of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. This resulted in a summer

⁴³ "Arab Peace Initiative Approval Momentous Opportunity for US and Israel." Israel Policy Forum.
<http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/press/arab-peace-initiative-approval-momentous-opportunity-us-and-israel>

⁴⁴ "The Arab Peace Initiative." The Arab League. <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02>

⁴⁵ Pappé, Ilan. *La guerre de 1948 en Palestine*. Paris, France: La Fabrique. 2000.

⁴⁶ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. *Future Government of Palestine*. General Assembly.

⁴⁷ Khalidi, Rashid. *The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure*. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). *The War for Palestine* (pp. 12–36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001.

⁴⁸ "Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine." May 15, 1948.
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/History/arab_invasion.html

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Aburish, S.K. *Nasser: The Last Arab*. New York, New York: Thomas Dunn Books. 2004.

1967 meeting of Arab leaders in Khartoum to discuss the Arab position toward the Israeli state.⁵¹ In the face of humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel's military, the Arab leaders released the 1967 Khartoum Resolution, which stated, in part, that "the Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and domestic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from Arab lands."⁵² The Arab leaders adopted their infamous three main principles: "namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people within their own country."⁵³ The unwillingness of the Arab world to engage in negotiations with Israel left only military means to address the problem.

The 1973 surprise attack from Egypt and Syria on the Jewish holiday and day of atonement -- Yom Kippur, which temporarily overwhelmed Israel, impressed upon the international community the Arab world's unwillingness to accept a Jewish state in its midst. The October War was unique, however, in that it was not solely a conflict between Arab forces and the Israeli military but also part of a larger proxy-war between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ It was this indirect confrontation between the Soviets and the Americans that resulted in increased American involvement in peace efforts. Fearful of the potential for a nuclear war as the tide began to turn against the Soviet-supported Arabs, the United States brokered a ceasefire between the Arab world and the Israelis on October 25, 1973.⁵⁵ This ushered in an era of active international participation in an attempt to find a long-term solution to the Arab-Israeli problem.

The Geneva Conference of 1973 was an early effort by the international community to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict at the behest of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338; the three-line Resolution called for a ceasefire in the October war through a joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, the conference was not successful and no compressive agreement was reached.⁵⁷ Later attempts in the following years to revive the conference proved similarly ineffective. American President Jimmy Carter committed his administration to the then-stalled Middle East peace progress.⁵⁸ Carter adopted a comprehensive, multilateral approach in contrast to early attempts, which had seen American diplomat Henry Kissinger's style focus on incremental, bilateral peace talks.⁵⁹ These efforts resulted in the Camp David talks, wherein Carter focused on building connections with relevant players to enact a meaningful peace.⁶⁰ A unique situation wherein both Egyptian and Israeli leaders were willing to discuss terms of peace resulted in a climate favorable to Carter's objectives. Egyptian President Sadat had famously declared that he would go anywhere, even Jerusalem, to discuss peace.⁶¹ In response, Israeli Prime Minister Begin's government declared that if they thought President Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would make such an invitation. This resulted in Sadat becoming the first Arab leader to implicitly recognize Israel as he visited the state and spoke at the Knesset.⁶² The speech touched on the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of the Occupied Territories; substantial backlash followed, as this tactic had substantial impact on Cold War power dynamics.⁶³ Closer to home, Sadat's actions angered allies Libya, Iraq, Syria, and other

⁵¹ "How did the 1967 Khartoum Summit of the Arab States affect Arab-Israeli relations?"

<http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/viewanswers.asp?questionID=000457>

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ "Arab-Israeli War of 1973." Encarta. http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761564886/Arab-Israeli_War_of_1973.html

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Geneva Peace Conference." Palestine Facts. http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_geneva_1973.php

⁵⁷ "Geneva Peace Conference." Israeli Knesset. http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/geneva_eng.htm

⁵⁸ "People and Events: Peace talks at Camp David, September 1978." PBS.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/peopleevents/e_peace.html

⁵⁹ "Biography of Jimmy Carter." United States White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/jimmycarter/>

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Feron, James. "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker." The New York Times. March 9, 2002.

⁶² "President Anwar Sadat's Address to Israeli Knesset." November 20, 1977.

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html

⁶³ Ibid.

Arab states, who viewed the move as an act of treason against the Arab community.⁶⁴ The speech, however, did have the desired impact of producing a willingness on the part of Begin to demonstrate a willingness to engage Sadat – i.e. Egypt and not the larger Arab community – in peace talks. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem became the first step toward Carter's Camp David Accords.

The Camp David talks took place between September 5 and September 17 in 1978, comprising of thirteen long, tense, and dramatic days of negotiations between the Egyptian and Israeli negotiating teams – as well as the leaders themselves.⁶⁵ Carter's deep determination to achieve peace and near refusal to allow either leader to leave the Camp without reaching an agreement are often cited as having played the decisive role in the success of the talks.⁶⁶ At many points in the process, both leaders desired to walk away from the negotiation table – often literally. Time and time again, personal appeals from Carter lured the men back to the talks. Carter spent much of the time shuttling between one on one meetings with Sadat to one on one meetings with Begin to achieve progress. After thirteen days, the Accords emerged: *A Proposal for Peace in the Middle East* and *A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel*. The latter laid the foundation for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed in March of 1979. *A Proposal for Peace in the Middle East* consisted of three parts. The first was a framework to establish an autonomous and self-governing authority in the Gaza strip and the West Bank, fully implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.⁶⁷ The document was vague regarding agreements concerning the Sinai, which later resulted in different interpretations by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The second portion of the document addressed Egyptian-Israeli relations, with most detail addressed in the second agreement, while the third portion of the document declared principles the parties advocated having applied to relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.⁶⁸ The Camp David Accords did not solve the Israeli-Arab problem, but it did signal a shift toward a problem more accurately described as the Israeli-Palestinian situation, as the Arab world moved away from coordinated military offensives toward the Israeli state. Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement in 1994, stipulating mutual cooperation, an end of hostilities, and a resolution of several other issues.⁶⁹

The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 eventually evolved into what became known as the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. The Oslo Peace Accords resulted in a plan outlining the necessary actions and conditions for a Palestinian state “on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338,” which set forth territorial boundaries of Israel a Palestinian state.⁷⁰ Officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, it was signed on September 13, 1993 and resulted in a Nobel Peace Prize for Rabin, Arafat, and Peres in 1994.⁷¹ Tragically, the assassination of Rabin in 1995 slowed the fledgling peace process to a sudden full stop.⁷² The security situation in Israel and the occupied territories devolved and the Israeli military took several steps away from the goals of the Oslo agreements while suicide bombings from Palestinian militant groups grew.⁷³ This regression to old behaviors resulted in conditions unfriendly to peace negotiations or progress toward stated goals. The 2000 Camp David Summit attempted to rekindle a commitment to peace in the Middle East as American President Bill Clinton brought Israeli Prime Minister Barak and Palestinian President Arafat together to attempt to develop a long-term agreement over disputed lands.⁷⁴ It was largely unsuccessful.

⁶⁴ “The Lessons of Camp David/” The Wall Street Journal.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123802187858741787.html#mod=djemEditorialPage>

⁶⁵ “Biography of Jimmy Carter.” United States White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/jimmycarter/>

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ “The Camp David Accords: the Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” The Jimmy Carter Library.

<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml>

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “The Jordan-Israeli Peace Treaty.” <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html>

⁷⁰ Eran, Oded. “Arab-Israel Peacemaking.” The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum. 2002.

⁷¹ “The Nobel Peace Prize 1994.” Nobel Prize Committee. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/

⁷² “The Assassination and Funeral of Yitzhak Rabin.” CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/rabin/umbrella/index.html>

⁷³ Greenberg, Joel. “Leah Rabin, Israeli First Lady and Peace Advocate, Dies at 72.” *The New York Times*. November 13, 2000. <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/13/world/leah-rabin-israeli-first-lady-and-peace-advocate-dies-at-72.html>

⁷⁴ “The Arab Peace Initiative is the Answer.” Talking Points Memo.

http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/11/22/the_arab_peace_initiative_is_t/

A 2002 attempt at peace overseen by the quartet of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia produced the so-called ‘roadmap’ to peace, which included an independent Palestinian state.⁷⁵ The roadmap called for independent action by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, putting off disputed issues until a rapport can be established between the actors. The first step requires the Palestinian Authority to “undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere,” as well as rebuild and “refocus [the] Palestinian Authority security apparatus” to ensure it can undertake “sustain, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.”⁷⁶ For its part, Israel was compelled to dismantle settlements established after March of 2001, to freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after September 28, 2000, end curfews and ease restriction on movements, and end restrictions on movements of persons and goods.⁷⁷ Neither side has reached these objectives to the satisfaction of the other, or the international community.

How the 2007 Initiative Was Different

The 2007 recommitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was significant in that it signaled a shift in the position of many League Member States. The 2002 proposal came from the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia during a League of Arab States conference in Beirut. The proposal was met with, at best, lukewarm enthusiasm. The timing of the proposal was frustrating, as it was revealed one day after the Passover Massacre, a devastating terrorist attack masterminded by the military wing of Hamas.⁷⁸ The summit in Beirut was closed without meaningful progress or adoption of the initiative of the Proposal by a plurality of Member States.

The Initiative was revisited in 2007 and the attitudes of many Arab leaders had drastically shifted. All members of the Arab League – with Libya as the sole exception – attended the March 2007 League of Arab States summit in Riyadh.⁷⁹ Calls for peace between the Arab world and the Israeli government found a much friendlier audience in Riyadh; at the conclusion of the summit, almost all Member States committed to the principles of the document.

This reaffirmed a significant turning of the tide of elite opinion in the Middle East with respect to the Israeli state and the Palestinian problem. However, significant negotiations on the contents of the initiative took place during the summit.⁸⁰ These areas of contention showcase the challenges that will face the Arab League as the peace process attempts to move forward.

One of the most frustrating challenges facing the Arab League as it seeks a permanent peace in the Middle East is the refusal of Hamas leaders to lend their agreement to even the conditional willingness to recognize Israel, although the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas expressed his support for the initiative.⁸¹ Pre-summit attempts to bridge the inter-Palestinian gap on issues of recognizing Israeli statehood lead diplomatic steps to achieve a Palestinian unity government, which was sworn in on March 17, 2007, after an agreement brokered in Mecca by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates. Guidelines for the unity government included detailed positions on topics including an obligation to establish a Palestinian state in the territories captured by Israel in 1967, as well as the recognition of previous Arab Summit conference resolutions.⁸² Recognition of Israel by Palestine was included, which once again Hamas refused to accept, while the organization also continued its demands for the right of return for all Palestinians who fled or were pushed out of modern day Israel during the

⁷⁵ “The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap: What a Settlement Freeze Means and Why it Matters.” July 23, 2003. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1660>.

⁷⁶ “The Roadmap: Full Text.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “Passover Suicide Bombing at Park Hotel In Netanya.” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/3/Passover%20suicide%20bombing%20at%20Park%20Hotel%20in%20Netanya

⁷⁹ “Israel Resists Arab Peace Plan Initiative.” Green Left. April 13, 2007. <http://www.greenleft.org.au/2007/706/36669>

⁸⁰ “Arab Summit 2007.” <http://www.mideastweb.org/arabsummit2007.htm>

⁸¹ “Hamas Shocked by Arab Peace Summit Backing.” <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/24/world/main3536793.shtml>

⁸² “Program of the Palestinian Unity Government.” <http://www.mideastweb.org/paunitygovernment.htm>

1948 Arab-Israeli War.⁸³ While Hamas has held a hardliner position on recognition of Israel, Palestinian officials have agreed they will not go against the peace plan. The internal power struggle within Palestinian territories between Hamas and Fatah frustrates the efforts of the Arab League to establish a Palestinian state and ensure peace in the region, as do the actions of rogue non-government military organizations. Each attack by an independent suicide bomber or group against Israel provokes a reaction that once again begins the spiral into chaos and violence.

Current Status

While the Arab Peace Initiative process is indicative of a significant step toward the goal of long-lasting peace in the region, there are very real concerns that the process has stalled.⁸⁴ The history of the peace process in the region is one of fits and starts, often motivated by the political goals of outside players.⁸⁵ The Arab Peace Initiative is unique in that it places the responsibility and control of the process in the hands of the League of Arab States and Israel.⁸⁶ Although this gives significant autonomy and a greater sense of accountability to the League in the peace process, it does mean that continued advancements down the road of lasting peace may easily be slowed as other events distract attention from the topic. The decay of ceasefires and the other domestic concerns often distract from the peace process. Actions by Israel can have a negative impact as well, with policy speeches occasionally providing fuel for the fire of Arab radicals who refuse peace with Israel on any condition.⁸⁷

Certain members of the Arab League have long been characterized by their leadership on the issue of peace with Israel, although the commitment of a Member State is often highly dependent upon its leadership; consider the contrast of Egypt under the leadership of Nasser versus Egypt under the leadership of Sadat. While Nasser took a hard-line approach toward the Israeli state and Western influence, Sadat was one of the first willing to engage Israel directly – although such willingness to come to the negotiation table cost him dearly. Those Member States who have recognized Israel – including Egypt and Jordan – have often paved the way for peace initiatives.⁸⁸ It should be noted that only three Member States – Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania – have officially recognized the statehood of Israel.⁸⁹ While Saudi Arabia has not officially recognized the statehood of the Zionist country, there are strong indicators of its willingness to do so.⁹⁰ Recognition of Israel is key to the success of any peace plan. Because of its willingness to dialogue with Israel and its stake in the security of Palestine, Egypt has often found itself in a leadership role on this issue.⁹¹

While progress toward peace in the Middle East can turn on a dime, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic that more progress can be made at present. The introduction of a new presidential administration in the United States has resulted in a renewed focus on the Palestinian-Israeli problem. The new administration in Washington has said that Israel should halt its settlement activities, including those which the Israeli government has classified as ‘natural growth.’⁹² The Obama administration has also been quoted as holding the position that the Israeli Prime Minister should recognize the two-state solution before resuming peace negotiations begun at the Annapolis Conference.⁹³

⁸³ “Hamas Shocked by Arab Peace Summit Backing.” <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/24/world/main3536793.shtml>

⁸⁴ “Putting the Arab Peace Initiative Into Action.” American Task Force on Palestine.
http://www.american taskforce.org/policy_and_analysis/policy_focus/2008/12/12/1235593351_2

⁸⁵ “The Arab Peace Initiative versus Culture of Confrontation.” Mideast Web. April 10, 2007.
<http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000580.htm>

⁸⁶ Siniora, Faud. “Give the Arab Peace Initiative a Chance.” *The New York Times*. May 11 2007.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/11/opinion/11siniora.html>

⁸⁷ “Islamic Jihad wants Arab Peace Process Initiative Withdrawal.”
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/15/content_11542307.htm

⁸⁸ “The Doha Summit: The Arab Peace Initiative and the Politics of Reconciliation.”
<http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/analysis/doha-summit-arab-peace-initiative-and-politics-reconciliation>

⁸⁹ “Report: Saudi Arabia Reaching Out to Israel.” <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3363991,00.html>

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ “The Doha Summit: The Arab Peace Initiative and the Politics of Reconciliation
<http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/analysis/doha-summit-arab-peace-initiative-and-politics-reconciliation>

⁹² “Program of the Palestinian Unity Government.” <http://www.mideastweb.org/paunitygovernment.htm>

⁹³ Ibid.

Tensions within the Palestinian population may prove a serious roadblock to establishing a meaningful path to peace. If the Palestinian population cannot come together in unity and peace, the Arab League will be hard pressed to convince Israel of Palestine's ability to hold up its end of the bargain in any peace agreement. Clashes between rival Palestinian groups undermine the ability of the Palestinian government to negotiate effectively and to claim any sort of monopoly on the use of force among its population.⁹⁴ As of June of 2009, the two warring political factions within the Palestinian population are unable to form a convincing government. While Fatah enjoys the backing of the West and favors peace talks with Israel, Hamas has maintained a hard-line stance against the Israeli government.⁹⁵ This fundamental policy difference is exasperated by the desire of each of the two major political parties to procure complete control of the Palestinian political landscape.⁹⁶ Lacking a unified Palestine, an Arab peace with Israel is highly unlikely.⁹⁷ This may prove to be a significant roadblock to the Arab League as it moves toward implementing a successful peace agreement with Israel. Additional sources of consternation include heightened tensions between Israel and Iran, as complicated relationships between all players can provide unintended consequences.⁹⁸ On the other hand, Iran may provide a common ground for the Arab League and Israel, as both entities are concerned by Iran's militarization and nuclear research.⁹⁹ An April 2009 summit of 17 Arab countries in Doha attempted to create an "official platform to show Arab publics that their leaders can work together toward peace and prosperity."¹⁰⁰ The Arab leaders were also hoping to catch the attention of new American President Barack Obama. However, deep divisions over Iran, the Palestinians, and Israel made the search for common ground a challenging one.¹⁰¹ The nuclear threat from Tehran is compounded by its support of Hezbollah and Hamas, both key political players in any Middle East peace progress.¹⁰² Internal League power struggles for regional influence, such as the one between Qatar and Egypt, are also detrimental to meaningful progress.¹⁰³

Signals from Israel are often confusing and in a near-constant state of flux. Public opinion, the perceived threat from Iran, the ability of Hamas and Fatah to control the Palestinian population, and threats from organizations such as Hezbollah are just a handful of the factors that can cause Israel to shift positions. However, the Arab League should take heart from the comments of Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman in Luxembourg on 15, June 2009. "We have our vision, we don't have any preconditions," he stated, referring to talks on the Palestinian question.¹⁰⁴ "We are open to sit with the Palestinians immediately, we are ready to sit with the Syrians immediately and with other countries the same without any preconditions," Lieberman told reporters after talks with EU officials. "We think that the solution must be the result of peaceful negotiations," just a day after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu for the first time endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state, albeit a demilitarized one.¹⁰⁵ The Arab League must seize this moment.

⁹⁴ "Six Palestinians Killed in West Bank Clashes." [http://www.inthenews.co.uk/news/world/autocodes/countries/israel-palestine/six-palestinians-killed-in-west-bank-clashes-\\$1299929.htm](http://www.inthenews.co.uk/news/world/autocodes/countries/israel-palestine/six-palestinians-killed-in-west-bank-clashes-$1299929.htm)

⁹⁵ "Hamas Jail Death in West Bank Stokes Palestinian Feud." July 23, 2003. <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE55E2DN20090615>

⁹⁶ "Efforts to Defuse Fatah, Hamas Tensions Underway." June 6, 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/06/content_11499621.htm

⁹⁷ "Carter: Israeli-Palestinian Peace Not Possible Without Hamas Involvement." Fox News Corporation. June 11, 2009 <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/06/11/carter-israeli-palestinian-peace-possible-hamas-involvement/>

⁹⁸ "Israel Risks Losing Local Arab Support Against Iran." Kuwait Times. 25 April 2009. http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTQ1MjUwMTk3

⁹⁹ "Report: Saudi Arabia Reaching Out to Israel." Israel News. 2 December 2007. <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3363991,00.html>

¹⁰⁰ "The Doha Summit: The Arab Peace Initiative and the Politics of Reconciliation." <http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/analysis/doha-summit-arab-peace-initiative-and-politics-reconciliation>

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ "Israel Risks Losing Arab Support Against Iran." Kuwait Times. April 25, 2009. http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTQ1MjUwMTk3

¹⁰⁴ "AFP: Israel ready for 'Talks without Preconditions' with Arab World." June 15, 2009. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iU2J3iB_P_8HCigTtPoqSPqm2Dmg

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Conclusion: Moving Forward toward Peace

Meaningful and lasting peace in the region will require cooperation of all actors. The Arab community has consistently taken steps to engage the Israeli government in developing a long-term solution to the conflict and has found support from the new American administration.¹⁰⁶ Successful implementation of the Initiative will require the thoughtful and genuine engagement of all Arab League Member States. However, real progress will remain elusive without the cooperation of the Israeli government. It is important to note the great strides the Arab community has already achieved. The Arab League must take control of its own destiny and prepare to craft its own peace in the Middle East without reliance upon the international community. While the United Nations and its Member States can play a vital role in assisting with the development of and long term commitment to peace in the region, in the final analysis, it is the Arab League and the Israeli government who must take responsibility to ensure such a peace.

Committee Directive

The Arab League has a unique opportunity to actualize its stated desires for peace with the Israeli government with a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian situation. More than sixty years of violence, frustration, and international oversight can be erased by regional cooperation and a willingness to engage with Israel. If the members of the Arab League can work with Israel without the oversight and direction of the international community, a strong message will be sent regarding the autonomy and seriousness of purpose of the Arab world: the Arab League and its members do not require the oversight of the international community to conduct its own affairs. Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian situation will give the Arab League and its Member States the freedom to turn its attention to other pressing problems in the region. Regional cooperation can continue in areas including the Gulf Cooperation Council, oil production and sales, and promoting sustainable development in economically depressed areas. For too long, the situation with the Zionist government of Israel has been a dark cloud over the promising future of the region. Delegates must remain abreast of current event developments in the Arab Peace Initiative, as this is a particularly dynamic topic to be discussing. It is also important to consider regional power dynamics among Member States, as well as the history of the conflict and how it informs current positions of League members.

II. Evaluating the Political and Economic Impacts of Hawala

Introduction

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, many Western states have more closely scrutinized the Middle East. In this scrutiny, traditional methods of Informal Funds Transfer (IFT) have been examined as possible avenues for money laundering funds that could be used in another terrorist attack.¹⁰⁷ IFT has also been seen by these states as a facilitator of smuggling, illegal remittances and bribery. There have also been concerns raised about its economic impact. Systems that do not record the movement of funds across borders can inadvertently increase the money supply of a state receiving such funds, and as such reduce the control of the government over the economy.¹⁰⁸ Further, as informal transactions cannot be properly monitored and taxed, government revenue is negatively affected by the loss of taxes on remittances.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ "Egypt, Saudi Arabia Threaten to Rescind Arab Peace Plan." Haaretz. June 6, 2009. <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/1091590.html>

¹⁰⁷ Edwina A. Thompson. "An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala." *Journal of the History of International Law*. January 2008. pp. 83-118.

¹⁰⁸ Mohammed El-Qorchi. "Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?" International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

There are, however, positive effects of IFT. Hundreds of millions of dollars of humanitarian aid have been successfully transferred to unstable locations where banking institutions may not be as effective.¹¹⁰ Further, the costs and expediency of such transactions have allowed individuals to more easily send remittances home to their families.¹¹¹

Hawala

Hawala is an ancient system of IFT through which Hawala dealers, or Hawaladars, transfer money across great distances without actually moving it.¹¹² Hawaladars handle their business through private debt to each other, and settle their debt through trade in other debts and discounting on goods, enabling them to pay each other without directly sending money across borders.¹¹³ Hawala is prevalent in the Middle East and South Asia, and is now widely used as Hawaladars are utilized to facilitate the movement of remittances across the world.¹¹⁴

Hawala works on a system of trust. When a customer asks a Hawaladar to transfer money over to a friend or family member, the Hawaladar charges a percentage, much like any other transfer system.¹¹⁵ The Hawaladar then contacts another Hawaladar, a business associate in the location that the funds are to be transferred to, in order to tell him how much is to be transferred and a method of identification for this particular transfer, such as a code.¹¹⁶ This Hawaladar then pays the person who is to receive the transfer directly out of his own funds; usually in the local currency so as to effectively offer a cheap money exchange service.¹¹⁷ The Hawaladars keep record only of how much they owe each other, and settle the debts independently.¹¹⁸ This essentially moves a debt from two private citizens to two Hawaladars, who do not charge interest against each other and use a variety of methods to settle the debt without directly giving money to one another.¹¹⁹ The transfers are not regulated or taxed, and the informality of the transfer often allows the funds to be available within 24 hours.¹²⁰ This allows such transactions to be offered at costs and speeds much more appealing than those offered by international banking institutions.

Hawaladars have several methods of settling their debts to each other. The most obvious and prominent method, as well as the least controversial, is called "Reverse Hawala."¹²¹ In such transactions, debts cancel each other out.¹²² A Hawaladar may use a contact who owes him money to directly settle a debt, or may contact a third party who owes him money to contact the Hawaladar in the area where the money needs to be, effectively transferring a debt to

¹¹⁰ Edwina A. Thompson. "An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala." *Journal of the History of International Law*. January 2008. pp. 83-118.

¹¹¹ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering." Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000.
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Mohammed El-Qorchi. "Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?" International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering." Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000.
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Mohammed El-Qorchi. "Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?" International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹²² Ibid.

another Hawaladar.¹²³ Through these methods, Hawaladars can easily move money around without any funds actually traveling across borders.¹²⁴

Hawaladars also use the international trade of goods to settle debts through their involvement in the import/export trade.¹²⁵ Hawaladars often manipulate invoices of imported and exported goods to reflect settlement of debts owed between the traders without record.¹²⁶ For example, a Hawaladar exporting goods might increase the price of the goods on the invoice to settle a debt owed to him, or decrease it to settle one he owes. Many times, Hawaladar debt settlement is done through the manipulation of such invoices in the trade of gold across borders.¹²⁷ It is such invoice manipulation that allows for large amounts of funding to be illegally transferred across borders by Hawaladars.

Hawala is also mentioned in Islamic law, or Sharia. It is a law often noted in the Hadiths, the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded by his contemporaries.¹²⁸ The Hadiths tell scholars that the Prophet said, “Whenever a person transfers his debt upon a rich man, and the creditor assents to the same, then let the claim be made upon the rich man.”¹²⁹ This has been interpreted by many as a holy endorsement of debt transfer systems, and this passage has been expanded on by various authorities of religious law.¹³⁰ Many of them devise regulations for exactly what is permissible in a Hawala debt transfer, and many Islamic legal texts, or fiqh, have been written on the subject.¹³¹ The fact that most Muslims have the right to decide which religious school or authority to subscribe to for interpretations of the Sharia causes variations in the methods Hawaladars use to gain legitimacy in Islamic law. Such methods are so well protected by Islamic tradition that Grand Ayatollah Ali Seestani recently decreed that Hawala is permissible in Sharia even when local secular law does not permit such action.¹³²

Hawala is also favorable for Muslims because of its lack of interest charges. Usury, or the collection of interest on a loan, is a severe crime in Islamic law, and it is believed that the service charge of Hawaladars evolved out of this forbiddance.¹³³ While other forms of remittances may charge interest as a loan is made and eventually paid off, Hawala only charges a one-time overhead fee that is seen as a just cost of transferring the debt.¹³⁴ Hawala is seen within the Muslim community as a way to secure the distribution of income in the money exchange as well as protect the needy that may need to move funds and transfer debts.¹³⁵ Although this has not been a problem in many Arab states, local law can sometimes forbid or limit Hawala in states where Arabs might be working and using Hawala to send home remittances.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. “The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering.” Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000.

<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹²⁵ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. “The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering.” Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000.

<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Maryam Razavy. “Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social phenomenon?” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 44.3 (2005): 277-299.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² “Letters” Board of Istifta, Office of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. 2005

¹³³ Maryam Razavy. “Hawala: An underground haven for terrorists or social phenomenon?” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 44.3 (2005): 277-299.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

Political Influences of Hawala

Hawala has been a politically charged subject for quite some time - especially after it was noted in the report of the United States' 9/11 Commission.¹³⁶ This report indicated Al Qaeda had often used Hawala systems to move funding for their illicit actions overseas.¹³⁷ Despite the fact that it has mostly been used as a peaceful method of transferring funds for legitimate purposes, it has been observed by Western powers to be a potential avenue of laundering money for illicit purposes.¹³⁸ For example, Hawala has been cited as a means of hiding the trails of money from illicit drug trafficking by obfuscating the transfers of these illicit funds between Asia and Europe..¹³⁹ It has also been used as a means of transferring remittances across borders when normal, legal methods are unavailable to the customer.¹⁴⁰ A state might not allow transfers of funds to certain states, may limit the amount of funds transferred, or may not have the proper banking institutions in place to transfer money to a particular state.¹⁴¹ This allows illegal migrant workers to send and receive remittances in circumstances where local laws forbid the transfer.¹⁴² Further, Hawala has been linked to the cover-up of money given to government officials in corruption scandals.¹⁴³

The government of the United States of America has also attempted to place blame on Hawala for the funding of international terrorism. The Report of the 9/11 Commission accuses Hawala of being the primary method used by the terrorist organization Al Qaeda for transferring funds.¹⁴⁴ Despite this report, a subsequent report by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation found that, while Hawala was used by Al Qaeda, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were not funded by such methods.¹⁴⁵ Terrorist attacks are often very cheap, and terrorist organizations find it unnecessary to move such large amounts of money in order to achieve their goals.¹⁴⁶ The terrorists responsible for the World Trade Center attacks, for instance, cost Al Qaeda approximately \$12,000 per operative per year over an 18 – 24 month period.¹⁴⁷ This included the cost of living as well as flight school, international travel and other terrorist training.¹⁴⁸ Due to this low cost, the 9/11 Commission concluded that, in the time period of the World Trade Center attacks, Hawala was used to move money into and out of Afghanistan, but not to directly fund the terrorists themselves.¹⁴⁹

In contrast, Hawala has also been used to a significant extent to improve the state of communities where the practice is active. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have successfully transferred large sums of money for humanitarian aid through Hawaladars, aiding in the development of communities and protecting their funds from being overtaxed by the transfer process.¹⁵⁰ Between 2004 and 2005, an estimated \$1.3 billion was sent by NGOs

¹³⁶ Mohammed El-Qorchi. "Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?" International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹³⁷ The 9/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering." Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000. <http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹⁴⁰ James Casey. "Dealing with Hawala." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*. 1 Feb 2007 pp. 10-14

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering." Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000. <http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹⁴⁴ The 9/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004.

¹⁴⁵ James Casey. "Dealing with Hawala." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*. 1 Feb 2007 pp. 10-14

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ The 9/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004

¹⁵⁰ Edwina A. Thompson. "An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala." *Journal of the History of International Law*. January 2008. pp. 83-118.

into Afghanistan.¹⁵¹ In a state where 80 to 90 percent of financial transactions are informal, Hawala is currently the most functional, and sometimes the only, method of moving funds into or around Afghanistan, making it a vital part of non-governmental humanitarian operations there.¹⁵² Such funds have vastly improved the ability of humanitarian efforts to succeed, as such money was used:

“to ensure the smooth running of the first national democratic elections in more than three decades, the construction of hundreds of kilometres of road that had fallen into disrepair, the implementation of agricultural assistance programmes, and the building of educational facilities in a country suffering from some of the lowest literacy rates in the world, and where less than half the children aged 7-12 years are enrolled in school.”¹⁵³

Hawala has also been used as the primary banking transfer system in some areas where local infrastructure simply does not allow for more formal means to be feasible.¹⁵⁴ In Somalia, Hawala has been used to great effect, acting as the primary money transfer system in an area where political instability has led to a lack of formal banking infrastructure.¹⁵⁵

It has also been used to great effect in refugee camps where banks do not operate, such as the Aceh Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps formed after the 2005 tsunami in Southeast Asia, where it was used by family members living outside of the disaster area to transfer money to IDPs.¹⁵⁶ Hawaladars in Aceh, a special territory of Indonesia, used a local mobile phone system to help IDPs establish communications with family living outside of the affected area.¹⁵⁷

Economic Effects of Hawala

Hawala is most commonly used as a method of transferring remittances across borders.¹⁵⁸ In such cases, Hawaladars are preferable to more formal transfer institutions due to their low cost and free currency exchange, as well as their established trust in the community - especially in states where Hawala is a common practice, such as those in the Arab world.¹⁵⁹ Often, it is easier and faster for Arab migrant workers to send money to their families through trusted Hawaladars than through formal systems such as banks.¹⁶⁰ As many Arab states are both hosts of migrant workers and recipient states of remittances, it is important that Arabs have access to competitive transfer systems.¹⁶¹

Remittances, however, are important to track – especially in large sums. Many states count remittances as a vital part of the influx of currency to their state.¹⁶² Tracking this influx is key to keeping accurate economic reports as well as tracking potential tax revenue for state governments.¹⁶³ Bypassing the formal system of transfers makes

¹⁵¹ Edwina A. Thompson. “The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in Afghanistan” Afghanistan's drug industry : structure, functioning, dynamics, and implications for counter-narcotics policy. Ed. Doris Buddenberg et. al. Washington, D.C. World Bank. 2006, Chapter 6.

¹⁵² “Afghanistan - State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty.” The World Bank. 2005.

¹⁵³ Edwina A. Thompson. “An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala.” Journal of the History of International Law. January 2008. pp. 83-118.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Mohammed El-Qorchi. “Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?” International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ UN/POP/EGM/2006/02 Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. 17 May 2006.

¹⁶² Mohammed El-Qorchi. “Hawala: How does this informal funds transfer system work, and should it be regulated?” International Monetary Fund. December 2002. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>

¹⁶³ Ibid.

tracking and taxing remittances difficult at best. Without registering Hawala, remittances will remain untracked. Estimates place the number of unregistered Hawaladars in Afghanistan at anywhere between 500 and 2,000, a figure which makes tracking of Hawala impossible without increasing registration.¹⁶⁴ Although there are approximately 300 registered and self-regulated Hawaladars in Afghanistan, registration there is costly and ineffective at this time.¹⁶⁵ Attempts to register Hawaladars without interfering with the process in any significant way have been made, with notable trials in the United Arab Emirates, although these trials are designed not to interfere with the process of Hawala.¹⁶⁶ The trials emphasize a system of registering Hawaladars with the UAE Central Bank and encouraging regular reports of activity to the Central Bank.¹⁶⁷ They also establish communication links with registered Hawaladars to report suspicious transfers and customers.¹⁶⁸

Hawala also can have a significant impact on a state's money supply. In many situations, the only funds that actually travel across international borders are those funds that Hawaladars use to settle their debts to each other.¹⁶⁹ If such debts are settled through the manipulation of invoices, then the state that the debtor is in effectively has an unregistered drain on their money supply, while the state that the creditor is in has an equal increase in their money supply. While a single manipulation may seem harmless, the rate that remittances are sent through Hawala ensures that the transactions have the potential to build up to a significant change in both states' money supplies. Many states attempt to control their money supplies in order to keep their economies stable.¹⁷⁰ The money supply in a state is directly linked to the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment.¹⁷¹ States with large informal sectors therefore use faulty figures based on the formal sector to formulate their monetary and exchange rate policy, greatly affecting the effectiveness of the state government with the economy.¹⁷² This could also affect the formal sector by encouraging banks to offer more attractive interest rates to customers that might reduce the ability of the formal institution to thrive in the economy.¹⁷³

Hawala in the Arab World Today

The Arab world has taken steps to reduce the effectiveness of Hawala as a tool for money laundering while still maintaining its utility to the common citizen, such as charging the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), created in 2004, with the task of developing and promoting methods of combating money laundering in the region on both a national and international scale.¹⁷⁴ MENAFATF has released several recommendations on the best course of action for handling Hawala in the region.¹⁷⁵ These recommendations emphasize the necessity of educating the populace on identifying illicit practices, registering Hawaladars, and enforcing the keeping of records.¹⁷⁶ They also suggest that authorities perform audits without warning on both

¹⁶⁴ S.M. Maimbo, "The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan". World Bank. 2003, pp. 8.

¹⁶⁵ Mohammed El Qorchi, et al. Occasional Paper 222: Informal Funds Transfer Systems – An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 2003.

¹⁶⁶ Best practices issued by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Concerning the Hawala. Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. December 2005.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering." Interpol General Secretariat. January 2000.

<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp#2>

¹⁷⁰ "Open Market Operations." Federal Reserve Board. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm>

¹⁷¹ Cheryl L. Edwards. "Open Market Operations in the 1990s." Federal Reserve Bulletin. November 1997. pp. 859-874.

¹⁷² Mohammed El Qorchi, et al. Occasional Paper 222: Informal Funds Transfer Systems – An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 2003.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ "About MENAFATF" Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.

<http://www.menafatf.org/categoryList.asp?cType=about>

¹⁷⁵ Best practices issued by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Concerning the Hawala. Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. December 2005.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

registered transfer services and suspected unauthorized agencies.¹⁷⁷ Despite this seemingly strict recommendation, MENAFATF also emphasizes the importance of ensuring that regulations are not so strong as to force Hawaladars into a much more illicit, hidden sector of the economy.¹⁷⁸ Doing so is only likely to ensure that Hawala is even more difficult to track.

To continue this work, the United Arab Emirates has hosted four International Conferences on Hawala in Abu Dhabi since 2002, focusing on what actions the international community should take to uphold the principles of this traditional system while combating the negative effects.¹⁷⁹ These conferences identified many of the main problems in handling Hawala, including the lack of resources for authorities to manage the issue.¹⁸⁰ Conference attendees also worked to ensure that authorities do not take actions that would drive Hawaladars underground.¹⁸¹ The conferences also emphasized the need to limit the impediments to cost-effective regulated monetary transfer systems so that they can better compete with informal systems.¹⁸²

In the first of the International Conferences on Hawala, the Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala was created, which encouraged states to adopt the 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and the Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.¹⁸³ Both of these sets of recommendations were proposed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that MENAFATF was based upon.¹⁸⁴ Although there were only eight Special recommendations at the time of the Declaration, a ninth was adopted by the FATF two years later.¹⁸⁵

The 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering include several regulations on what kind of methods should be used by competent authorities, and the suggestion of creating state Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).¹⁸⁶ These FIUs are designed to have access to all records necessary to analyze suspicious transaction reports. Another idea presented in the recommendations that involves the responsibility of financial institutions and money transfer services to report suspicious activity.¹⁸⁷

The Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing also emphasized the need for regulation of money transfer systems, such as wire transfer systems and money couriers, as well as stricter regulation of organizations sending money through unregulated systems.¹⁸⁸ The recommendations also place emphasis on adherence to the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.¹⁸⁹ The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, among other things, calls for parties to the treaty to regulate, license, and supervise financial institutions and money transfer agencies within their state, so as to maintain detailed records of financial transactions for at least five years.¹⁹⁰ Resolution 1373 then added additional provisions for combating terrorism, but only referred to the convention in regard to money transfer systems.¹⁹¹

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Press Release. Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates. 20 March 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Press Release Regarding 2nd International Conference On Hawala
Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates. 5 April 2004.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala. International Conference on Hawala. 16 May 2002.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ “9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF).” Financial Action Task Force.

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,2340,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html

¹⁸⁶ “40 Recommendations on Money Laundering.” Financial Action Task Force.

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.htm

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ “9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF).” Financial Action Task Force.

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,2340,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1_1_1_1,00.html

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Article 18. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 10 January 2000.

¹⁹¹ UNSC RES/1373. Combating Terrorism. United Nations Security Council. September 28, 2001.

Conclusion

Hawala is still highly regarded in the Arab world, and elimination of such an ingrained system would not be possible even if it were desirable. The system has had many publicized negative consequences, but it also has many positive effects that should be considered. Despite its use as a tool for money laundering, it has also proven to be a major aspect of the financial foundation of states ranging from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Its uses for the social and humanitarian benefit of the Arab people cannot be ignored and cannot be easily replaced.

With these important aspects of Hawala in mind, the negative consequences of an unregulated money transfer system must also be considered. In the 2009 economic climate, international transactions of such quantities must be monitored to protect the stability of the international economy. Further, the problems of unregulated systems regarding the movement of funds for illicit purposes are too great to continue unchecked.

The Arab world is continually evolving to respond to the negative aspects of these traditional systems. Hawala is a system that has worked for centuries, and the leaders of the Arab world intend to keep the tradition alive and well. They are regularly working towards a solution that will allow the system to thrive while addressing the concerns of the international community in regard to the potential for misuse. With all this progress in mind, implementation is still the primary issue. The ability of states to regulate what is treated as a private matter between as few as two business operators per transaction relies entirely on the effectiveness of their law enforcement agencies and their willingness to impose regulation.

Committee Directive

While this topic has been widely discussed over the course of the past decade, the work on reducing the negative impacts of Hawala has only begun. Delegates should be familiar with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering, and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing in addition to the Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala and the work of MENAFATF, the FATF, and the International Conferences on Hawala. Delegates should also be well versed in their state's usage of Hawala and the local customs regarding the implementation of Hawala in Sharia law. Delegates should keep in mind the protections Sharia law grants to Hawala, and the sanctity of the institution to the Arab people.

Delegates should focus on emphasizing the positive outcomes of the system while working to reduce the negative consequences of the informality. Delegates should ask themselves how their own government and religious institutions have worked toward protecting the economy and the political stability of their state. How have they worked to implement the recommendations, the international convention, and other international agreements regarding informal monetary transfer systems? How can the League act to assist in the implementation of favorable ideas towards reducing the effectiveness of Hawala as a method of money laundering? How can the League protect the economic stability of states using Hawala? How can the League downplay the negative effect of Hawala on the western view of the Arab world? How can the international community cooperate in the monitoring of such systems? With the necessity of having a League-wide policy on Hawala in mind, focusing on implementation and expansion of current efforts should be the committee's top priority.

III. Political Participation by Non-traditional Actors

“This is Hezbollah's preferred mode of operation: benefiting from the cover of the legitimate multicomunal Lebanese republic, while maintaining enough military and political influence to be left alone. The problem for Hezbollah is that this model does not translate easily into national office and plays badly on an international stage.”

- Paul Salem: Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Center¹⁹²

Introduction

The twentieth century has brought many changes to the political scene in the Middle East. The rise of what some would consider “radical” Islamic groups has introduced new debates, new ideas and new challenges for the more traditional branches of politics in the States of the League of Arab States (LAS). Arab states are also facing the arrival of women in their institutions, and with them, a new way of making politics, preoccupations, and priorities in the matters of state. Member States of the LAS are now faced with the more and more prominent presence of those non-traditional political actors.

Extremist groups range from moderate and mainstream to extremist. While the first category remains a conservative force in the Arab world, they are not considered “non-traditional” when it comes to politics. A religious alternative has always been offered to the peoples of the League’s Member States. In this matter, the League will be dealing with the political participation of groups and organizations that are considered more extreme in their actions, ideas and political positions. One cannot talk about the influence of such radical political formations without trying to understand the political participation of terrorist groups in some countries of the League. This guide will focus on the study of two major groups considered extremist by the Western world, Hezbollah and Hamas. These cases are to be considered examples and not as the only groups that the committee can study during its debates.

We must also clarify the situation pertaining to religious groups as non-traditional actors in the political world of the League of Arab States. A religious minority in the League is defined as a religious group that does not follow the religious principles of Islam. Since these populations are generally represented in very small numbers, they cannot constitute a political force by themselves. In order to be represented and used as a political force, these groups need to make alliances and use the means and presence of major political actors. Further in this study, we will see how the Christian minority was integrated into a larger group and contributed to the rise of a non-traditional political actor in the region.

The other group to be considered in this debate is the newly rising political contribution of women. The Arab society, while remaining very attached to the predominance of men in the matters of the state, is also evolving towards a greater inclusion of women in the political life of the different countries of the LAS. With recent elections in different parts of the League, it became obvious that the participation and role of women in steadily increasing towards a greater inclusion in the political organizations of the various members of the League.

Extremist groups in Arab States

In Arab politics as viewed by Western analysts, several groups can be identified as extremists or even terrorists. As a general fact, those groups have both a political spectrum of activities as well as armed factions that undertake military and terrorist actions in their respective territories. Analysts have theorized that the main attraction factor of these extremist groups is the various social programs that they offer to the general public as an alternative to government-run programs.¹⁹³ The definition of non-traditional actors in the political world cannot be complete

¹⁹² “Why Hezbollah Doesn't Really Want to Win.” Paul Salem. Foreign Policy. June 2009.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4976

¹⁹³ United States Institute of Peace, Islamic Extremists How do they mobilize support ? July 2002.

without researching the perception of such groups by the international community since their very existence as political groups depends on whether or not they are perceived as such by other actors or just listed as terrorist factions. This guide will concentrate on the analysis of two major extremist groups of the Middle East and the League of Arab States. Hezbollah and Hamas will serve as example of non-traditional political actors in the region.

One of the most prominent figures of this category of political is the Lebanese Hezbollah. Founded in 1982 in response the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the group has since then been present in the political scenery of the Middle East as an influential actor in Lebanon as well as in several other locations throughout the region and the world.¹⁹⁴ The group is in fact a coalition of various organizations that act under the financial protection of Iran.¹⁹⁵ The main objectives of the organization are: the creation of an Islamic State of Lebanon and the destruction of Israel. Hezbollah also fight against the influence of Western cultures in the Middle East.¹⁹⁶ It is currently considered one of the main armed groups in the region as well as an important political force.¹⁹⁷ The principal document in which the ideology of the Hezbollah is exposed is called “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program”. The group listed three main objectives. The first objective was the end of colonization in Lebanon by French, American and other entities. The second was to bring the perpetrators of crimes against the Muslims to justice. The third objective summarized the ideology of the group in a very strong way:

*“To permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any future tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration onto our country.”*¹⁹⁸

The organization has been officially recognized as a terrorist organization by several countries and organizations. Israel always condemned the organization and added it to its blacklist in the early days of the conflict. The United States of America placed Hezbollah on his black list of terrorist organizations in 1999.¹⁹⁹ Canada followed the United States soon after and added it to its list of terrorist groups in 2002.²⁰⁰ Australia had a partial approach on the categorization as a terrorist group since it only placed one branch of the organization on its black list. The External Security Organization is the only part of Hezbollah to have been listed in 2003 and re-listed in 2005, 2007 and 2009.²⁰¹ The United Kingdom also listed one part of Hezbollah: the military arm branch was added to the government’s blacklist in 2008.²⁰² In addition to these countries, the European Union has condemned actions of the organization but has never officially added it to its list of dangerous groups.

The group started its political activities at the beginning of the 1990s. Instead of constantly fighting the legitimate political power, Hezbollah decided to take part of the process and try to reach its goals while using the system. In order to create its own path in the political institutions of Lebanon, the organization made an alliance with the Lebanese Christians as well as other religious groups in the country. The first electoral success of the group was a by-election in 1992 in which it won the 12 seats in election. This victory was mainly attributed to a program aimed

<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr89.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization Profile : Hezbollah. March 2008. http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3101

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Author Unknown. The Hizballah Program. Fall 1998. <http://acsa.net/hizballah.htm>

¹⁹⁹ United States Department of State, Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 1999 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>

²⁰⁰ Government of Canada, Current list of terrorist organizations. 2009 <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx#Hizballah%23Hizballah>

²⁰¹ Australian Government, Listing of Terrorism Organisations. 2009. <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/7986D1536C0FFD5FCA256FCD001BE859?OpenDocument>

²⁰² BBC News, UK ban on Hezbollah military arm. 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7485213.stm

at the liberation of Lebanese land from Zionist occupation, abolishment of political sectarianism, ensuring political and media freedom of amending in electoral law to make it more representative of the population.

The influence of the group is increasing as time passes. During the last elections in Lebanon, leading the March 8 Alliance alongside Amal, Hezbollah won 57 seats in Parliament rallying not only its traditional supporters, but also members of the broader population of the country such as Christians, and Shi'ite factions.²⁰³ Even though in this last election, the number of seats granted to the Hezbollah-led coalition, the influence of the party was never questioned.²⁰⁴ Following an agreement with the government in place in 2008, the organization was granted a veto power and a third of the seats in the cabinet.^{205 206} This fact alone places Hezbollah in a very prominent position in the political life of Lebanon since the party has effective control over the decisions of the Parliament.²⁰⁷ But as for many political extremist groups in the region, the social programs developed for the population are an attraction factor and gives the group a tremendous importance as a political actor in Lebanon.²⁰⁸ The most recent intelligence reports that the group currently operates several hospitals, clinics, and schools, as well as agricultural training centers.²⁰⁹ According to some analysts, the development of those services with the financial support of Iran and Syria was at first shield hiding recruitment of new members of the armed forces.²¹⁰

Founded in 1987, Hamas also corresponds to the definition of an extremist group given above.²¹¹ The organization is committed to the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamist state in replacement of the current Palestinian Authority.²¹² The radical aspect of the group might come from the early history linking it to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.²¹³ While other terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, tried in an early stage to integrate the political life of their country, Hamas only officially participated in legislative elections in 2006 for the first time. It was however very present in municipal elections throughout the Palestinian Authority's territory but especially in Gaza.²¹⁴

In the same way Hezbollah is considered a social development force in Lebanon, Hamas also runs social programs throughout Palestinian territory.²¹⁵ While many authors consider the different activities of the Hamas to belong to separate organizations, recent studies showed that this group possesses an integrated structure.²¹⁶ The main outbreak for Hamas occurred during the 2006 legislative elections in the Palestinian Authority. The organization won by a

²⁰³ Reuters, Hezbollah accepts election loss, U.S. backs allies. June 2009.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE55609720090608>

²⁰⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, Gauging Hezbollah After the Vote. June 2009.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/19580/>

²⁰⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, Hezbollah. June 2009.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/hezbollah.html?breadcrumb=%2F>

²⁰⁶ BBC News. Who are Hezbollah ?. May 2008.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4314423.stm

²⁰⁷ Council on Foreign Relations. Hezbollah: Most Powerful Political Movement in Lebanon. May 2008.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/16378/powerful_movement.html?breadcrumb=%2F

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, LEBANON: The many hands and faces of Hezbollah, March 2006.

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26242>

²¹⁰ Hussain Abdul-Hussain, Hudson Institute, Center of Islam, Democracy and the future of the Muslim World, Hezbollah: The State within a State. May 2009.

<http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/hezbollah-the-state-within-a-state>

²¹¹ Council of Foreign Relations, Hamas. January 2009.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/>

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization Profile: Hamas.

March 2008. http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=49

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Council of Foreign Relations, Hamas. January 2009.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/>

²¹⁶ Matthew Levitt. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. Yale University Press. 2006.

majority of 74 seats out of the 132 available in the chamber.²¹⁷ Following the elections, Hamas renewed its promises to cease-fire for a 10 years period. The truce was never truly honored and the hostile climate in the region persisted even after the constitution of a national unity government. In its quest for the creation of an Islamist state, the Hamas opposes the more moderate organization Fatah. The conflict between the two Palestinian organizations ruled the political life of the Palestinian Authority for the past few years. After two outbreaks of violence in 2006 and 2007, the national unity government was dissolved and Fatah took over the power on June 14th 2007.

Many governments have studied the question of the international recognition of Hamas as a terrorist group. While the organization is recognized as a political force in the territory of the Palestinian Authority, members of the international community still debate its dual nature. The United States, Canada and Japan have official positions on the matter and qualify Hamas as a terrorist organization.^{218 219 220} In a more radical way, Jordan simply banned Hamas in 1999. The United Kingdom and Australia only listed the military wing of the organization, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades as a terrorist group.²²¹

Both Hamas and Hezbollah are good examples of how extremist groups can participate in the legitimate political life of their countries. According to many analysts, the evolution of such groups into legitimate political forces is a natural evolution in the achievement of their goals. However, these organizations and others like them must evaluate their tactics and their public image as they transform themselves from “radical extremists” to government bureaucrats. The more authority these groups gain through political processes and negotiation, the less opportunity they have to continue activities considered “extreme” by the international community.

Rise of women in the political life of Arab States

Traditionally first, and under the influence of Islam in later years, women have stood aside from the political sphere in many parts of the Arab world. While in some early Arab tribes women were also allowed to access important positions in politics, for most of them, the idea of working as a politician was not permissible. For most of them, the first towards a political role in their countries was the battle for the right to vote. Women were granted the right to vote on a universal and equal basis in Djibouti in 1946, in Lebanon in 1952, in Syria in 1949 and without restrictions or conditions in 1953, in Egypt, Somalia and Comoros in 1956, in Tunisia in 1959, in Mauritania in 1961, in Algeria in 1962, in Morocco in 1963, in Libya and Sudan in 1964, in Yemen partly in 1967 and with full rights in 1970, in Bahrain in 1973, in Jordan in 1974, in Iraq in 1980, in Oman partly in 1994 and with full rights in 2003, and in Kuwait in 2005.²²²

Now that the right to vote is a battle won for most women in the Arab World, women have to try and win the elected positions that will give them access to the higher functions in their government. According to the Interparliamentary Union, the level of participation of women in the political of their countries in the Arab World remains at 6.5% while the world average is 16.5%.²²³ In some countries, women are only represented in the lower chamber of

²¹⁷ Central elections commission – Palestine, The final results of the second PLC elections. January 2006.

<http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=291>

²¹⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism - United States Department of State, Country reports on terrorism 2005, April 2006. p 196. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf>

²¹⁹ Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Keeping Canadians Safe, Listed entities, June 2009 <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp>

²²⁰ Government of Japan, Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook 2005. 2005. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2005/ch3-a.pdf>

²²¹ Australian Government, Listing of Terrorism Organisations, 2009 <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/7986D1536C0FFD5FCA256FCD001BE859?OpenDocument>

²²² Interparliamentary Union, A World Chronology of the Recognition of Women's Rights to Vote and to Stand for Election. <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm>

²²³ Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). 2005. 'Women in National Parliaments: Situation as of 31 January 2005'. <http://www.ipu.org>

parliament and do not have access to the higher chamber. As a consequence of this weak representation of women in legislatures, changes benefiting women rights and dealing with related issues are difficult if not impossible.²²⁴ Progress in this subject matter cannot be denied. Breakthroughs are observed in several countries of the Arab world. The increase, however still below the world average, remains important. In five years between 2000 and 2005 the average percentage in the region jumped from 3.5% to 6.5%.²²⁵ Initiatives such as the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Center for Arab Women Training and Research (CAWTAR) have proved helpful in raising the political participation of women in the region.²²⁶

The same observation can be made with another program run by UNDP. The Program on Governance in the Arab Region also includes a Gender & Citizenship Initiative.²²⁷ Launched in 2001, this initiative has started its second phase in 2006 to support research-informed policy debate and dialogue on women's citizenship in selected countries in the Arab region, to raise public and media awareness about the scale and implications of gender inequalities inherent in key legislation, to build the capacity of Arab women's NGOs in networking and advocacy to lobby for policy changes, and to build partnerships between women's NGOs and parliamentarians.²²⁸ The program also listed regional and country based policy dialogues with key decision makers and stakeholders, country-based challenges which may obstruct legal reforms, public awareness and country specific legal reform initiatives related to Arab nationality Laws amongst its priorities.²²⁹ In its Arab Human Development Report of 2005 entitled "The Rise of Women in the Arab World," UNDP notes that "realizing the full potential of Arab women is an indispensable prerequisite for development in all Arab states."²³⁰ The organization further notes that women "have undoubtedly secured some gains in political participation [in the past years]."²³¹

Even though the region has made notable progress, obstacles still stand in the way of a complete recognition of women as political actors. Restricted access to higher positions in both legislative and executive institutions, security issues and lack of empowerment are of great concern for observers.²³²

Conclusion

As different groups that were at first set aside in the political life of the Arab world, we can expect changes to occur in the political scenery as well as in the relations between the countries of the region and the rest of the international community. The different ideas promoted by group considered as extremist as well as the new visions brought forth by women can have an effect on the decision-making process and outcome of long-lasting debates and conflicts in the region.

After decades of conflict between Israel and Palestine, the progressive integration and participation of movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah might lead to an understanding and, eventually, a peaceful solution. However, such an understanding would only be effective if both organizations were to abandon radical positions and actions.

²²⁴ Amal Sabbagh, *The Arab States: Enhancing Women's Political Participation*. p 58-59.

http://www.idea.int/publications/wip2/upload/Arab_World.pdf

²²⁵ BBC News. Arab women increase MP presence. March 2005.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4314211.stm

²²⁶ Center for Arab Women Training and Research.

<http://www.cawtar.org/>

²²⁷ Program on Governance in the Arab Region.

<http://www.pogar.org/>

²²⁸ UNDP – POGAR : Gender and Citizenship Initiative, 2007.

<http://gender.pogar.org/>

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report : The Rise of Women in the Arab World*, 2005, p I.

<http://arabstates.undp.org/contents/file/ArabHumanDevelopRep2005En.pdf>

²³¹ Ibid, p 202.

²³² Ibid, p 203.

Academics in the field of political behavior often questioned the difference between men and women in the political process. In a part of the world where women have long been denied the right to participate in the political life of their own country, could the rising of Arab women to power represent a new step in the political development of the countries of the League of Arab States as questioned by the UNDP? For Western analysts accustomed to the growing presence of women in high levels of the State, solutions can appear obvious. It is the work of an organization such as the League of Arab States to reconcile the requirements of modern human rights with the traditions and beliefs of the culture it defends and represents in the international community.

Committee Directive

Delegates should note that the research provided in this guide will serve as examples on which to base their own studies and research. Representatives of countries other than those cited in this guide can bring their own examples and problems to the table for discussion. The committee should focus on policies and ways to encourage or encompass the integration of non-traditional actors in the political life of their respective countries and of the League of Arab States. Since several initiatives have already been proposed by international organizations such as UNDP, the committee could start the work from those proposals and devise their own approach on the question. Among the research paths for the delegates to work on, it is possible to try and understand how and why the integration of extremist groups in the regular political process can be a contributing factor for the peace in the countries of the Arab world. Considering the different social programs instated by those groups, how can they serve the interests of the populations of the League's Member States?

Studying the specific issues related to female integration in the political life of the Member States, delegates can develop their own approach to the support programs and policies described in the guide. As research on the topic shows, such politics and programs tend to be either oriented toward one specific state or proposed by a universal international organization. Bringing to the table a policy or program developed by the League of Arab States would certainly reveal other issues specific to the Arabic culture while considering this question.

I. The 2007 Arab Peace Initiative: Moving Forward

“The Arab Peace Initiative.” The Arab League.

<http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm>

This is the cornerstone to the 2007 Arab Peace Initiative which was written in 2002 at the Beirut Summit. The document found on this site is the official translation which will be extremely valuable to delegates as you begin your research and understanding of the complications with and surrounding a peace agreement in the Middle East which will be beneficial to all Member States in the region. This site also contains links to documents from Member States which delegates may find extremely valuable in the research process.

General Assembly Resolution 181. Future Government of Palestine. General Assembly. 29 November 1947.

<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253>

A/RES/181(II) is the foundation of United Nations action within the Middle East. Because it is so to Member States in the Middle East for a Middle Eastern Peace Initiative, delegates should be well versed and familiar with this resolution. This is the full-text of the document which outlines all actions that should have been carried out for a Palestinian State but many have yet to be seen to date.

“A Performance Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/media/main/roadmap122002.html>

This is another document introduced by the United Nations as a proposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. It is a supplement to the information in the 2007 Arab Peace Initiative that calls for cooperation between Israel and Palestine by requiring an end of violence and resettlement by both parties. Although none of the recommendations in the this roadmap have been implemented, it provides a good foundation for research as delegates may find it useful for some debate direction.

“The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap: What a Settlement Freeze Means and Why it Matters.” July 23, 2003.

International Crisis Group: Middle East Report. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1660>

This document from the International Crisis Group provides an excellent resource into the complications and intentions to creating an independent Palestinian state. It outlines problems that are faced by expansion of Israeli settlements and calls for solutions to successfully implement A/RES/181(II). Delegates may find this useful in reviewing the current situation with the 2007 Arab Peace Initiative.

“The 5 Percent Solution” David Makovsky and Eran Benedek. *Foreign Policy*, No. 138 (Sep. - Oct., 2003), 26-27.

This article provides an interesting perspective on redrawing the borders between Palestine and Israel. Although it does not relate directly to the Arab Peace Initiative, it provides an interesting compromise that would call for adaptation and flexibility among Member States as they compromise for a Middle Eastern Peace Plan.

II. Evaluating the Political and Economic Impacts of Hawala

“Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU)” Central Bank of the UAE.

<http://www.centralbank.ae/AMLSU.php>

This web page is that of the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the Central Bank of the UAE. As this unit has been the principle actor in the creation of the International Conferences on Hawala in Abu Dhabi, many of these press releases deal with Hawala, money laundering and terrorist financing. They include what this principle actor has done to achieve goals within its own borders as well as abroad. They also include recommendations for what can and should be done in the future to prevent Hawala from being used to launder money.

Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating: Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)

Joint Progress Report on the Work of the World Bank and the IMF World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 10 September 2002.

[http://www-](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/17/000090341_20041117091546/Rendered/PDF/306660DC200200022.pdf)

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/17/000090341_20041117091546/Rendered/PDF/306660DC200200022.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/11/17/000090341_20041117091546/Rendered/PDF/306660DC200200022.pdf)

This publication includes an analysis of how efforts to contain Hawala work in the frame of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). Part VI includes a summary of research into IFT systems and how they can be aggravated by coercive AML/CFT efforts. This should provide an example of what difficulties arise in regulating Hawala and what can and can't be done in the situation.

John F. Wilson. Hawala and other Informal Payments Systems: An Economic Perspective. 16 May 2002.

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf>

This is a transcript of a speech made to emphasize many of the economic aspects of Hawala. In this speech, the currency exchange is addressed alongside such economic problems as capital flight. The immeasurability of Hawala is also addressed and the major impact of unregulated Hawala on the international economy is called to attention. This speech will aid understanding in exactly what economic problems arise in a system where Hawala is dominant.

“Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations.” Financial Action Task Force. 27 February 2004. [http://www.fatf-](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf)

[gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/40339628.pdf)

This document thoroughly details the methodology for assessments regarding the FATF 40 recommendations and the FATF 9 special recommendations. It outlines the standards for compliance with all FATF recommendations, and has been agreed upon and endorsed by members of the FATF, including all members of MENAFATF. This document will prove useful in analyzing exactly how implementation of the recommendations should take place on an international scale, and to what standards member states should hold each other.

“The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan.” World Bank. 23 June 2003. [http://www-](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341_20031016085357/Rendered/PDF/269720PAPER0Money0exchange0dealers.pdf)

[wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341_20031016085357/Rendered/PDF/269720PAPER0Money0exchange0dealers.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341_20031016085357/Rendered/PDF/269720PAPER0Money0exchange0dealers.pdf)

This is a detailed case study of Hawala in Afghanistan. It outlines international and domestic use, usage by international aid organizations and NGOs, as well as some regulatory and supervisory options. As

Afghanistan is not an Arab state, it should provide an objective example of how Hawala can fit into a society that accepts it as normal. This document will also provide understanding as to how Hawala is used on a daily basis, and how it is used to improve the community, while equally presenting the negative consequences it has had on Afghanistan.

“Mutual Evaluation.” Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.

<http://www.menafatf.org/TopicList.asp?cType=train>

This web page has links to 9 Mutual Evaluation Reports of MENAFATF members, as well as links to the resources used to standardize these reports, such as a standardized handbook and a questionnaire. Such tools will be useful to analyze how LAS members have responded to the FATF recommendations, as well as providing the tools necessary to understand how such analyses can be made. With these tools, states are more readily able to determine how to work towards compliance.

Samuel Munzele Maimbo. The Regulation and Supervision of Informal Remittance Systems: Emerging Oversight Strategies. Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law. 24 November 2004.

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/maimbo.pdf>

This report is a detailed analysis of methods used by the international community to regulate and supervise IFT systems. It analyzes a system of accountability, reporting, and auditing as well as development of economic sectors and how to handle the social aspect of Hawala. It provides several examples of how remittance systems can be handled through these regulatory and supervisory plans and improves the understanding of how to work with the Hawala system.

“Typologies Report on Existing / Emerging Cross Border Payment Methods and their vulnerabilities to ML/TF 2007” Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. 2007.

<http://www.menafatf.org/Linkcounter.asp?rid=722&attached=TypologiesCross-BorderEng.pdf>

This document includes several definitions to identify various methods of international funds transfer, analyses of state's responses to a MENAFATF questionnaire, and several examples in part IV to explain how states can most effectively combat the usage of IFT as a means of money laundering and terrorist financing through cooperation with banks and remittance services. The examples are case studies that will help delegates see success in application of agreed-upon methods. These examples will show exactly how the mechanisms suggested should work in order to better understand how to combat these negative aspects of Hawala.

III. Political Participation by Non-traditional Actors

United States Institute of Peace, Islamic Extremists How do they mobilize support ? July 2002.

<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr89.pdf>

This report examines how Islamic extremists operate with special attention to terrorist groups in Pakistan, South Asia, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories. With a broader focus, this report will provide a more general idea about terrorist organizations and their supporters through out the international community, as well as a more specific, relevant examination of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. Delegates will find this useful in understanding how these non-traditional actors gain legitimacy among their supporters.

“Terrorist Groups and Political Legitimacy.” Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10159/>

This report examines several identified terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and their political legitimacy within their states. It provides a good

overview of how these organizations achieve political legitimacy and power. Delegates should use this information as a supplement to the information provided in the Background Guide to gain further insight into the political legitimacy and power that organizations, such as Hezbollah, have gained and the effects of such power.

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism - United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, April 2006. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf>

This extensive report provides information regarding terrorist organizations by region with individual case studies. Delegates will not only gain a very diverse understanding of global terrorism but they should find this report extremely beneficial when examining their country's position and relationship with potential terrorist organizations, as well as any terrorist activity in their countries.

“Homepage.” Interparliamentary Union. <http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm>

The Interparliamentary Union provides up- to- date information about political participation through the international community. It has unparalleled resources on the political involvement on women in political power worldwide. It provides meeting notes, publications, links, and a “Women in Politics” database which delegate should utilize to understand the extent to which females are involved in politics in their respective countries.

UNDP – POGAR : Gender and Citizenship Initiative, 2007. <http://gender.pogar.org/>

This source provides region-specific information, statistics, and reports, as well as individual country information pertaining to the Gender and Citizenship Initiative to promote female empowerment in the Arab region. This information, through the United Nations Development Programme, is extremely valuable to understanding to political involvement and equality within the Middle East. Delegates should use the country-specific information to understand their country's position on the political involvement of women, as well as gender equality, which are vital to this topic of non-traditional political actors.