

Dear Delegates,

I would like to take this time to welcome you to the Southern Regional United Nations Conference (SRMUN) XIX and to the Security Council. My name is Colleen Miller, and it is an honor for me to serve as the Director for the Security Council. This is my fifth tenure as a committee Director at a college-level Model United Nations conference. Currently, I am a fourth year PhD student in Political Science at the University of Minnesota. My research focuses on terrorism and security issues.

The Security Council carries the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. As such, it was deliberately made the most responsive and efficacious committee of the United Nations. Its membership and unique voting system also make it the most powerful. Within the UN system it is the highest honor for both individuals and nations to serve as a Security Council representative. We hope our SRMUN delegates share this sentiment. This year the selected topics help delegates appreciate the breadth of challenges dealt with by the Security Council at any given moment:

- I. State Sponsored Terrorism
- II. Intelligence Cooperation in the International Community
- III. Non-Peaceful Electoral Transitions in Political Hot Spots
- IV. Sustaining and Extending Security in Fragile States

This background guide is an excellent start for your research and should lead you to explore the topic yourself. Excellent delegations should be well versed in their country's position on the topic and general topic information as well. Researching each topic will enhance your position papers, better prepare you for committee debate and make the entire SRMUN experience more rewarding.

In addition, each delegation is required to submit a position paper for consideration. It should be no longer than two pages in length (single-spaced) and demonstrate your country's position, policies and recommendations on each of the three topics. For more information regarding the position papers, please visit the SRMUN website at <http://www.srmun.org>. **Position papers must be submitted on-line via the SRMUN website and will be due by 11:59PM EST on October 24, 2008.**

Colleen Miller
Director
sc@srmun.org

Blake Bommelje
Assistant Director
sc@srmun.org

Cardell Johnson
Director General
dg@srmun.org

History of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council is one of the five original and permanent organs of the United Nations, as established in the UN Charter.¹ It is the body responsible for international peace and security, and thus is substantially more powerful than any other UN body.² It can pass binding resolutions upon Member States and deploy peacekeeping forces to end or prevent conflicts.³ It can also recommend that the General Assembly suspend a Member State's membership privileges or be expelled from the United Nations.⁴ The Security Council consists of 15 members, five of which are permanent.⁵ The five permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom - the victors of WWII.⁶ The ten rotating members are elected by the General Assembly on the basis of regional blocs: three from Africa, two each from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Europe and one from Eastern Europe.⁷ The Security Council also has a rotating presidency, which changes every month according to the English alphabetical order of the states' names.⁸ Although the presidency is primarily an administrative position, it also carries some symbolic importance.⁹ During November of 2008, the Presidency will be held by Costa Rica.¹⁰

Article 7 of the UN Charter, which was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, called for the creation of a Security Council.¹¹ The first meeting of the Security Council took place on January 17, 1946 at Church House, London, only ten days after the first meeting of the UN General Assembly.¹² It was to meet there throughout the year before relocating to the new United Nations headquarters in Lake Success, New York.¹³ The original Security Council had eleven members: the five permanent members and six temporary members.¹⁴ Although its first meeting was only to adopt rules of procedure, it was not long before the Council had to deal with its first crisis and first deployment of UN forces.

Palestine was one of the states carved out of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI.¹⁵ Under British mandate, it had been an active target of Jewish immigration in the interwar period.¹⁶ Following the 1947 recommendation of the General Assembly that the territory ought to be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states, the State of Israel was

¹ "UN Security Council: Background." UN Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Membership of the Security Council." UN Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Security Council Presidency in 2007." UN Security Council. <http://www.un.org/sc/presidency.html>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

¹² "UN Milestones." History of the United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/milestones.htm>

¹³ "The Story of the United Nations Headquarters." UN Fact Sheet 23. July 2006. <http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/FS23.HTM>

¹⁴ "UN Security Council: Background." UN Security Council. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html

¹⁵ *The Question of Palestine and the United Nations*. United Nations Department of Public Information. DPI/2157/Rev.1: November 2002. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/>

¹⁶ Ibid.

declared on May 14, 1948.¹⁷ The next day neighboring Arab states sent in troops to support the Palestinian part of the population.¹⁸ A truce called by the Security Council took effect in June and established the force which would come to be known as the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).¹⁹ The failure of the ceasefire led to the Security Council declaring the Palestinian situation a threat to international security in July.²⁰ Although a series of agreements was signed throughout the course of 1949, the war ended with Israel in control of much of the territory allocated to the Arab Palestine in the partition agreement and the remainder under the authority of Jordan and Egypt.²¹ In August 1949, the Security Council authorized UNTSO to supervise the terms of the armistice – those terms remain in place to this day.²²

The first peacekeeping mission, meaning forces specifically under UN command deployed to prevent or end a specific conflict, was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), deployed in 1956 as a solution to the Suez Canal crisis and the seizure of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel.²³ UNEF I was dismantled in 1967 at the request of the Egyptian government.²⁴ War broke out again in 1967 and 1973, with the 1973 hostilities leading to the creation of the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) to supervise the peace agreement between Israel and Syria.²⁵ This force has also remained in place to the present day.²⁶

The other force deployed in the 1940's was UNMOGIP, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan²⁷. The independence of India and Pakistan from the British Empire in 1947 led to border disputes between the two new states, who both claimed the province of Kashmir.²⁸ Fighting ended in 1949, in part due to mediation by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, and UNMOGIP was established to monitor the border and maintain the ceasefire.²⁹ Despite the resumption of hostilities in 1971 and the establishment of a slightly altered border in 1972, UNMOGIP has continued its operations to the present day.³⁰ Kashmir continues to be a disputed region and is a major source of friction between the two nuclear states.

Thus the first two major crises of the Security Council may be described as qualified successes. Although they failed to bring about the lasting peace and security that had been hoped for, timely action and mediation did manage to encourage a quick end to conflicts and prevent the worldwide escalation that many feared in the early Cold War period. As time goes on, the Security Council has become more confident and successful in the use of peacekeeping forces. For instance, ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo), the UN's first peacekeeping mission in

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ "First United Nations Emergency Force." Middle East UNEF. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unef1backgr1.html

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *The Question of Palestine and the United Nations*. United Nations Department of Public Information. DPI/2157/Rev.1: November 2002. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/>

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ "UNMOGIP – Background." United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmogip/background.html>

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

Africa, was a massive operation which required UN forces to take the lead in staving off the complete disintegration of the Congo.³¹ From 1960 to 1964, essentially the first years of independence after decolonization, the Republic of the Congo was both protected against external aggression and kept internally stable through the operations of nearly 20,000 troops drawn from the contributions of African and Asian Member States.³²

Of the 61 peacekeeping missions that the Council has authorized since 1948, 45 have been completed successfully. The three current operations in the Middle East region (UNTSO, UNDOF and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon or UNIFIL) are all long-lived and deal with seemingly intractable problems, but they are the exception to the overall picture of UN peacekeeping today. Missions in Cyprus, Western Sahara and Kosovo are working toward definite and achievable changes in political geography which will hopefully follow the sort of successes seen in Namibia and East Timor.³³ Peacekeeping forces have had a positive impact on the development of democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cambodia and Sierra Leone.³⁴ Some of the current UN missions are political follow-up and observer missions rather than standing peacekeeping forces; the missions in Georgia, Burundi and East Timor are composed entirely of civilians.³⁵ UNAMA and UNIOSIL, in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone respectively, are not even peacekeeping operations at all but are classified as political missions.³⁶ The Rand Corporation concluded in a 2005 survey that two-thirds of recent UN peacekeeping missions were successful, and that UN operations are more cost effective than US or other international military operations.³⁷

Questions remain, however, about the Council's effectiveness as an international body. Critics have questioned apparent inaction in cases of claimed genocide, such as in 1994 in Rwanda or the current situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. Others claim that the Security Council serves mostly to legitimize the use of force by the United States, as in Korea in 1950 or Iraq in 1991. Active groups within the United Nations have taken steps to expand the Security Council, either by adding more permanent members or by increasing the number of temporary members – both aiming to make the Council more representative of world opinion and less dominated by industrial powers. The challenge for the Security Council today is to simultaneously continue its efforts toward global stability while responding to criticism.

The current membership of the Security Council: BELGIUM, BURKINA FASO, CHINA, COSTA RICA, CROATIA, INDONESIA, ITALY, LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, PANAMA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SLOVAKIA, SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES, VIETNAM

³¹ "ONUC Background." Republic of Congo ONUC. <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm>

³² Ibid..

³³ "UN Peacekeeping FAQ." United Nations Peacekeeping. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q18.htm>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ "Background Note – UN Peacekeeping Operations." United Nations Peacekeeping. May 31, 2007. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "UN Peacekeeping FAQ." United Nations Peacekeeping. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q18.htm>

Topic I. State Sponsored Terrorism

Introduction

On September 28, 2001, the United Nations (UN) adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371 in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States of America.³⁸ This Resolution was evidence of the UN's commitment to irradiating terrorism in the international community. Efforts were developed to place barriers on the movement, organization, and fiscal activities of terrorist organizations Al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban regime.³⁹ Over time and through further UNSC resolutions, the United Nations and its Security Council focused on other terrorist groups around the globe. While there are working groups addressing terrorism and its consequences, the United Nations has not established its own definition of terrorism and its efforts are often challenged by the unwillingness of terrorism sponsoring States to cooperate.

In an effort to address the larger problem of terrorism, the UNSC has established the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which is composed of all current members of the UNSC divided into three sub-committees of five States each.⁴⁰ The Committee's mandate is derived from Security Council Resolution 1373, which "imposed certain obligations on Member States and called for additional measures in the area of counter-terrorism."⁴¹ While States' obligations and responsibilities include "the criminalization of terrorism-related activities and provision of assistance to carry out those acts, denial of funding and safe haven to terrorists and exchange of information on terrorist groups," the Committee is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the resolution by States and, if necessary, to "facilitate the provision of relevant technical assistance to Member States."⁴²

For more than forty years, the international community has existed under the cloud of the threat of terrorism. Most terrorism scholars agree that modern terrorism began with the July 23, 1968 hijacking of an El Al passenger jet by the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine. While there is no single official definition of terrorism in the international community, it can be generally be defined as "the premeditated use of or threat of violence by individuals or sub national groups to obtain political, religious, or ideological objectives through intimidation of a large audience usually beyond that of the immediate victim."⁴³ Terrorism is often a demonstrative act, intended as much to be seen by its audience as felt by its victims. Terrorism can be directed toward civilians, government officials, members of sovereign State militaries, and material objects.

While many modern terrorist groups are funded or aided by individual donors, affluent benefactors, and various other means, there are also terrorist groups who funded, at least partially, by sovereign States. This practice is known as state sponsored terrorism. The funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations by sovereign States is fundamentally illegal under international law.⁴⁴ Such funding often results in waging proxy battles against other States or undue involvement and influence upon another State or States. The use of terrorist groups by sovereign states represents a serious breach of international law and undermines trust in the international system. It can also result in increased tensions between states as well as provide states 'plausible' deniability for acts of aggression. Considering how States can be held accountable – and what form this deterrence or punishment would take – is an important question for the United Nations Security Council to address.

³⁸ S/Res/1373. *Resolution 1373*. United Nations Security Council. September 28, 2001. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1535

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council. "Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee." August 5, 2008. <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/composition.shtml>.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Arce, Daniel and Todd Sandler. (2005). "Counterterrorism: a Game Theoretic Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

⁴⁴ United Nations. *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*. September 9, 1999. <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/Conv12.pdf>

State sponsorship of terrorism can take many forms beyond financial assistance. Sovereign State governments may provide “supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-state terrorist organizations.”⁴⁵ This support can include providing physical ‘safe’ space for terrorists and their organization, as well as providing documentation for everything from personal identification to weapons purchases.⁴⁶ Safe haven alone can provide terrorists and terrorist organizations with immense benefits and de facto protection from prosecution from other States. State sponsorship of terrorist groups has proven hard to combat, as it is often very difficult to establish sponsorship and even more challenging to enact successful deterrents to state sponsorship. A State’s sponsorship of a terrorist organization often gives that State the freedom to undertake action and support political philosophies it would be unable to undertake or support publicly due to either international law or public opinion. For terrorist organizations, state sponsorship translates to a myriad of different types of support and security. For the international community, however, state sponsorship serves to further complicate and hamper efforts to establish and maintain peace throughout the world. As such, confronting the issue of state sponsored terrorism has substantial positive implications for obtaining the goals of the United Nations. As the United Nations Security Council, tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, the body would do well to turn its attention to this threat to the peace and security of the international community.

History of Problem

State sponsored terrorism reached a high point during the Cold War era (1945-1990).⁴⁷ Such sponsorship was a less risky way for the superpower States of the Soviet Union and the United States to engage in proxy wars while avoiding full scale war or a possible nuclear exchange.⁴⁸ Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and South America all found themselves in play in this ideological battle. While official Soviet policy condemned terrorism as both futile and elitist, “the Soviets had a strong tradition of supporting various dissident and terrorist groups in Europe directly or indirectly through Warsaw pact states and friendly Arab powers such as Libya and Syria.”⁴⁹ The United States also indulged in State supported terrorism with its financial support of the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during President Reagan’s administration. The Contras were battling a long-time United States foe, Cuba. Describing the Contras as “the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers,” Reagan procured funding and training for the group through government resources.⁵⁰ Against the restrictions of the United States Congress’ Boland Amendment, the Reagan administration continued to use government funds and Central Intelligence Agency resources to train the group much of the international community had labeled as terrorists.⁵¹ These are but two examples of Cold War use of State sponsored terrorism to fight ideological battles by proxy.

By its very nature, state sponsorship of terrorism can be difficult to establish. In most situations, States are loath to acknowledge their sponsorship of known terrorist organizations. However, there are exceptions to this, particularly with respect to more passive acts of sponsorship. Actions such as the refusal to honor extradition treaties for suspected terrorists indicate state sponsorship of terrorism. Cuba is an example of a State that may not explicitly support terrorism; however, the Cuban government has a long history of refusing to extradite U.S. fugitives, in addition to hosting members of terrorist organizations.⁵² In addition, Cuba has been accused of providing limited support to “designated foreign terrorist organizations, as well as [served as a] safe haven for terrorists, such as

⁴⁵ “State Sponsored Terrorism.” Terrorism Research. <http://www.terrorism-research.com/state/>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Dugdale-Pointon, TDP. “State Sponsored Terrorism.” April 6, 2001. http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/concepts_statesponsoredterror.html

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Wolf, Julie. “People and Events: the Iran-Contra Affair.” August 5, 2008. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/peopleevents/pande08.html>

⁵¹ Brody, Reed. “New York Times Letter to the Editor: ‘Contra’ Terrorism is, Unfortunately, True.” April 17, 1985. <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E7DA1F38F935A15757C0A963948260>

⁵² Council on Foreign Relations. “State Sponsors: Cuba.” January 23, 2008. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9359/state_sponsors.html

members of the Basque terrorist group ETA – despite a November 2003 public request from the Spanish government to deny them sanctuary.”⁵³ The U.S. State Department maintains that Cuba allows both the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to continue their permanent presence in the island State.⁵⁴ It should be noted that several of these allegations have not been adopted by all members of the international community and Cuba has challenged the legitimacy of some of these allegations in recent years.

Halfway across the globe, terrorism rooted in Islamic fundamentalism has found significant State support over the past sixty years. Again, this support has taken a myriad of forms and is often done in support of violent extremists who take issue with either the State of Israel’s existence or frustrations with the West and its values. While a coherent and widely accepted rationalization behind a campaign of terror against non-Islamic countries remains illusive, such terrorist groups have found wide ranging State support in the Middle East region from many different States. Saudi Arabia has been linked to charitable organizations alleged to be ‘front’ organizations for groups such as Al Qaeda.⁵⁵ Iran has been accused of supporting the terrorist and political group Hezbollah while “Syria has been implicated in the assassination of several key political figures in Lebanon, including former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri” while supporting groups included Hezbollah and HAMAS.⁵⁶

The United Nations Security Council does not have an extensive history of taking action on the specific issue area of state sponsored terrorism. The UNSC has given much attention to the topic of terrorism more generally, as discussed in brief above. However, as described above, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 “applies to the offence of direct involvement or complicity in the international and unlawful provision of funds, whether attempted or actual, with the intention or knowledge that any part of the funds may be used to carry out any of the offences described in the Conventions listed in the Annex” and “requires each State Party to take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the detection and freezing, seizure or forfeiture of any funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing the offences described.”⁵⁷ While there have been several other conventions and treaties developed by the United Nations, there is a gap with respect to the issue of contemporary State sponsorship in its many forms.⁵⁸

Current Situation

At the present time, the international community has identified several situations wherein sovereign States are sponsoring terrorism, terrorists, and terrorism organization. While the United Nations does not maintain its own list of terrorist-sponsoring States for obvious reasons, several States have found themselves identified by other organizations and States as being sponsors of terrorism or specific groups themselves categorized as terrorists. Most notably, the United States Department of State maintains a list of States which it believes to be engaging in various forms of state sponsored terrorism. In the list’s last iteration, which was released in 2007, five states were named: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.⁵⁹ This list is motivated by the interests of the United States government, as well as its perception of the definitions of both terrorism and sponsorship itself. Other States that have been accused of sponsorship of terrorists or terrorist organizations at one time or another include Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, China, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979-2003).⁶⁰ The degree of support, as well as the type, varies

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Bronson, Rachel. “Terror in Saudi Arabia: Does the Government Have a Grip?” June 6, 2004. http://www.cfr.org/publication/7087/terror_in_saudi_arabia.html.

⁵⁶ Thomas, Gary. “State Sponsored Terrorism Thrives.” April 19, 2006. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/2006-04-19-voa60.cfm>

⁵⁷ United Nations. “United Nations Treaty Collection: Treaty Event – Multilateral Treaties on Terrorism.” August 5, 2008. <http://untreaty.un.org/English/tersumen.htm#4>

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ “State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview.” United States Department of State. August 5, 2008. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103711.htm>

⁶⁰ “Terrorist Sponsors: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China.” Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3841

greatly across these States. Equally important, the targets and ideological motivations of the terrorists they support diverge, as do the methods employed by the terrorist groups. However, the majority of State sponsors of terrorism do have something in common: they are covert and attempt both discretion and plausible deniability in their support.

Conclusion

The issue of state sponsorship of terrorist groups is a very important one for the United Nations Security Council to address. However, it is not without significant challenges. The United Nations recognizes the sovereignty of each Member States and it is not the place of the UNSC to undermine this sovereignty. At the same time, the UNSC is charged with establishing and maintaining a peaceful international community. Sponsorship of terrorism in any form undermines this objective. The UNSC must consider ways in which it can make state sponsorship of terrorism an undesirable and unacceptable choice for States to make. The Council must also consider the most effective ways of combating the more operational aspects of terrorism, which state sponsorship is most likely to aid.

Topic II: Intelligence Cooperation in the International Community

Introduction

Perhaps the most valuable tool the international community has in its many fights against terrorism, violent extremism, and threats to international peace and security is that of information. The international intelligence community plays a key role in obtaining and analyzing information regarding security threats to States and the globe at large. However, the intelligence community does not always live up to its immense potential; perhaps the most significant reason for this is a lack of institutionalized cooperation within the intelligence community.⁶¹ While much has been made of this issue at the national level, the situation is only exasperated at the international level. Intelligence information can prove a great aid in combating threats to peace and security; at the same time, it is a double-edged sword in the international community. The right information in the wrong hands can lead to violations of human rights, reduced security of dangerous weaponry, and threats to domestic or regional security. Such risks have caused States to be possessive of their intelligence resources and the information yielded.⁶² With the international reach of nefarious individuals and organizations extending through increased globalization, it is more important than ever that States develop relationships that allow for the sharing of key intelligence information and build the capacity for coordinated efforts in utilizing such information to secure peace and prosperity.

While the term ‘intelligence’ has many applicable definitions, it has a particular implied meaning within the international community and international security scholarship. This meaning has not resulted in a single, uniformly adopted definition. Definitions have included a Webster’s Dictionary definition describing intelligence as “the gathering of secret information, as for military purposes.”⁶³ While accurate, this definition misses some of the nuances of intelligence collection and utilization in the new millennium. Intelligence collection has moved out of the realm of the military in many States and evolved into its own bureaucratic entity. Overlap does, of course, exist but intelligence has become much more than a tool of the military. A more contemporary and comprehensive definition of intelligence from Jeffrey T. Richelson, stating that it is “the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning” encompasses the wide range of tactics and utility of the practice known as ‘intelligence.’⁶⁴ Within the area of intelligence collections, there are at least three distinct types of collection: human intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. Human intelligence relies upon individuals for the collection of information, through observation, informants, and interrogation, among other methods involving interpersonal contact. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization defines human intelligence as “a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.”⁶⁵ Signals intelligence consists of the interception of signals, either between people or machines – as well as any combination of the two.⁶⁶ Signals intelligence often also involves the area of cryptography, as sensitive information is placed in codes and encrypted. Imagery intelligence utilizes satellite imagery and other sources to detect things such as troop movements, missile stockpiles, and other geographically referenced activities.⁶⁷ Each method has its strengths and weaknesses, with human intelligence proving the most subjective of the three.

While it is important for States to maintain their sovereignty and take actions to protect themselves in an international system often characterized by anarchy and without true accountability, international cooperation within

⁶¹ Richard J. Aldrich. “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation.” *International Affairs*. Vol. 80, No. 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ John M. Nomikos. “European Intelligence Cooperation Beyond the Nation State: A Necessity for the European Union to Confront Global Terrorism.” Presented at the 2007 International Studies Association Conference. Available online at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/0/7/0/pages180704/p180704-1.php

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ “NATO Glossary of Terms.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. <http://www.nato.int>.

⁶⁶ “Signals Intelligence Homepage.” National Security Agency. <http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.cfm>.

⁶⁷ “National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Homepage.” *National Geospatial Intelligence Agency*. <http://www.nga.mil>.

the intelligence community has the potential to increase the security of individual States, as well as the international system as a whole. Many peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations have exposed the costs that can result when “information and analysis systems are not established in time or functioning effectively.”⁶⁸ Coordination and cooperation are key in increasing the ability of the international community to respond to threats.

History of Problem

States are traditionally very territorial with respect to intelligence information, largely as a result of concerns regarding more traditional security issues.⁶⁹ The sharing of intelligence information can result in increased vulnerability for a State. States attempting to establish cooperative agreements in the area of intelligence can also face domestic bureaucratic and legal roadblocks in the process; these roadblocks can include domestic vested interests, bureaucratic culture issues, and institutional entrepreneurship.⁷⁰ Bureaucratic culture can be a problem both with respect to the question of who has control over information, how that information is collected, and how it is utilized, as well as the organizational culture of the bureau. This can include issues such as the leadership structure, relationship with the State executive, and internal accountability.⁷¹ Often these are issues even at the domestic issues in States with less unified intelligence bureaus and communities. In the territorial environment of intelligence, these problems are often compounded. As such, it is necessary to develop ways in which States believe they can safely share resources and information, perhaps even collaborate with respect to the collection of information or actions reacting to such information.

The ways in which States have worked to establish international intelligence cooperation have included formalized bureaucratic cooperation and informal information sharing on a regular, sporadic, or even one-time basis. The two largest and most formalized programs facilitating cooperation are the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Police Office (EUROPOL). Both of these organizations function as international organizations and both are located in Europe, with INTERPOL in Lyon and EUROPOL in the Hague, the Netherlands. The organizations are committed to combating transnational criminal activity and, to differing degrees, facilitating the sharing of relevant information.

INTERPOL describes itself as “the world’s largest international police organization, with 186 member countries.”⁷² Established in 1923, INTERPOL “facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime.”⁷³ However, INTERPOL is somewhat limited by its constitution, which does not allow it to become involved in crimes that do not include several member countries, in addition to removing itself from any cases involving political, military, religious, or racial crimes.⁷⁴ Despite this, INTERPOL has directed its annual budget of approximately US \$60 million toward fighting terrorism, organized crime, drug production, human trafficking, internet crime, and identity fraud internationally. Perhaps most importantly, “INTERPOL aims to facilitate international police cooperation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of

⁶⁸ “Information and Intelligence Cooperation in Multifunctional International Operations: March 25 to April 1, 2006.” Folke Bernadotte Academy. <http://www.folkebernadotteacademy.se>.

⁶⁹ Richard J. Aldrich. “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation.” *International Affairs*. Vol. 80, No. 4.

⁷⁰ Bjorn Fagersten. “Organizational Characteristics and International Intelligence Cooperation: Vested Interests, Bureaucratic Culture, and Institutional Entrepreneurs.” Presented at the 2007 International Studies Association. Available online at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180706_index.html.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² “About INTERPOL.” International Criminal Policy Organization.” <http://www.interpol.int>.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

existing laws of different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”⁷⁵ It has been suggested that as many as 3,500 people were resulted as a result of INTERPOL’s ‘red notices’ in 2005.⁷⁶

European Union integration, particularly after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, has given its members a unique method in which to share information and combat threats together. It was the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that developed the framework for EUROPOL, which became operational on July 1, 1999.⁷⁷ This criminal intelligence organization was established with a mission of making “a significant contribution to the European Union’s law enforcement action against organized crime and terrorism with an emphasis on targeting criminal organizations.”⁷⁸ In contrast with INTERPOL, EUROPOL is smaller, but has a greater operating budget (US \$90 million) and a mandate that allows the institution greater power and less oversight.⁷⁹ Its explicit mandate, supporting the law enforcement activities of its Member States in the areas of illicit drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks, terrorism, forgery of monies and papers, and various other areas, casts a wider net – albeit over a smaller geographical area – than INTERPOL.⁸⁰ Like INTERPOL, EUROPOL only involves itself in cases that involve more than one Member State, thereby resisting from impinging upon the law enforcement or intelligence network in a single State.⁸¹ The organization facilitates the exchange of information between itself and the liaison officers of Member States, all of whom act in accordance with their national laws.

Organizations such EUROPOL and INTERPOL are often designed to combat traditional threats and criminals. The evolution of threats to global security and peace has resulted in a far more challenging foe for these organizations, one they are not always equipped to effectively combat. They can be limited by the fact that information is shared with the organization voluntarily and the organization may have limited enforcement capabilities. As the last decade has shown, security threats have become much more diverse, well-funded, and dispersed all over the globe.

Current Situation

While formal ties through international bureaucratic organizations have realized significant achievements with respect to sharing intelligence information and fighting illicit activities, as stated above, concerns about sovereignty and the ways in which information will be utilized has seriously hampered such efforts. One way in which some of these concerns have been overcome has been through bilateral relationships between two States. By reducing the number of players involved, the amount of available information may decrease, but concerns over proprietary information and security can be significantly mitigated. In some cases, this will be a long-term, wide-ranging cooperative effort while other relationships are built around a single policy area or event.

One of the strongest bilateral relationships in international intelligence cooperation is that between the United States and the United Kingdom. While the two States have long been known for their close relationship in the arena of foreign affairs, they have also worked together in the collection and application of intelligence information. It has been alleged that there exists a secret United Kingdom – United States agreement on code, decryption, and electronic espionage “between the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and its ‘junior partner,’ the British Government Communications Headquarters, whose budget is partially paid for by the NSA, which also has a hand in GCHQ personnel tasking.”⁸² It is further alleged that the arrangement was well-known within the intelligence community as a “cornerstone” of the Cold War and has continued as an active alliance in the post-Cold War world.⁸³

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶ “International Criminal Police Organization.” *Wikipedia*. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol>.

⁷⁷ “Europol at a Glance.” European Police Office. <http://www.europol.europa.eu>.

⁷⁸ “Europol: Frequently Asked Questions.” European Police Office. <http://www.europol.europa.eu>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² “USA/Great Britain: Joined At the Hip Intelligence Cooperation.” *Intelligence*. October 7, 1996.

⁸³ Ibid.

With the United Kingdom and the United States facing similar threats during both the Cold War and the contemporary ‘global war on terrorism,’ this relationship holds the potential to have significant impact on each State’s security. The United States has less established, more ad-hoc relationships with other States. The United States has worked with Pakistan in an effort to combat Al Qaeda terrorism efforts in the West, as well as their practice of guerilla warfare in the less populous areas of Pakistan. During Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani’s July 2008 visit to the United States, he and United States President George W. Bush discussed intelligence sharing and combating terrorism.⁸⁴ As in many situations, concerns over domestic terrorist threats and self-interest appeared to have pushed the Pakistanis to engage the United States in talks about intelligence sharing. It is difficult to determine just how many such bilateral agreements or arrangements exist around the globe.

Conclusion

As the events of September 11 in New York, March 11 in Barcelona, and July 11 in London, it has become painfully clear that international cooperation in the intelligence sphere is necessary to secure peace and prosperity in the world. Frustratingly, the very nature of the intelligence community means that much of its work is done in a covert fashion. Indeed, it is possible that there is more informal sharing of information than believed. However, the United Nations Security Council can aid this process through establishing formal ways in which to facilitate the sharing the fruit of international intelligence collection, as well as the burdens of obtaining such information. These methods must be sensitive to national sovereignty and the sensitive nature of the information involved.

Topic III. Non-Peaceful Electoral Transitions in Political Hotspots

Introduction

Ever since the end of the Cold War, there has been a general move towards democracy, particularly in the former non-aligned States. However, these transitions to democracy are not always peaceful: often States undergo struggles, particularly with a close or contested election. Any one of a number of factors in an electoral transition can destabilize a democracy, budding or established, including: leaders who do not want to abdicate power,⁸⁵ corrupt elections,⁸⁶ and opposition party violence,⁸⁷ among others. In any democracy, these challenges can quickly send a State into turmoil. To abate the situation, the Security Council has tools at its disposal, such as peacekeepers, sanctions, embargos, and public statements which it can use to help affect the condition of a State prior to, during, and post Election, which ultimately help secure peace and stability for the region and the globe.

History

Having a peaceful electoral transition is pivotal to the success of a State, without it the democracy can lose legitimacy and disrupt the internal institutions long enough to make a government ineffective. Electoral transitions are also more deserving of international care because of how rapidly they can transform a State from peace into civil war. When the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) held their first free and fair elections in 40 years, as defined by the Inter Parliamentary Union,⁸⁸ as the result of a power-sharing agreement between the military junta

⁸⁴ “Pakistan, US to discuss defense, intelligence cooperation: PM.” Islamic Republic News Agency. July 26, 2008.

⁸⁵Thomas Omestad. “Zimbabwe’s Corrupt Ruler Users Violence to Hold Onto Power.” US News & World Report. June 13, 2008. <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/06/13/zimbabwes-corrupt-ruler-uses-violence-to-hold-onto-power.html>

⁸⁶ “Robert Mugabe Stole Zimbabwe Election, Prime Minister Harper Says.” The Canadian Press via Yahoo! News. June 27, 2007. http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/080627/national/harper_zimbabwe

⁸⁷ “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud.” Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2007. <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm>

⁸⁸ “Declaration on Free and Fair Elections.” Inter-Parliamentary Union. March 26, 1994. <http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm>

and remnant democratic institutions which had developed over the development of the country⁸⁹ United Nations (UN) peacekeepers were on high alert.⁹⁰ The UN predicted that there would be a non-peaceful transition for two reasons: primarily, it was the first opportunity by the people to exert their vote⁹¹ which meant the losing party may lose faith in the Democratic system from the onset; secondly, the outcome of the election was set to have such a great impact on the locals and the region⁹² that the losing party might feel the next election cycle would be too late to have their voices heard. These are both common issues in developing countries where democracy has not proven itself to the people as a mechanism for providing for the average citizen and important flags for predicting a non-peaceful electoral transition. The elections in the DRC turned out to be peaceful but the time directly after was spotted with conflict so UN Soldiers remained in place.⁹³

However, not every non-peaceful transition is a question of pan-global concern such as would involve the United Nations peacekeeping forces. In the DRC, peacekeepers were already in place and their readiness level was raised in order to accommodate the potential ramifications of the election that was so important to international peace and security.⁹⁴ In Pakistan there is an obvious example of violence concerning the 2008 Presidential elections when former Prime Minister and Pakistani People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated leading up to the 2008 Presidential elections.⁹⁵ In addition to the violence, there were attempts to stop an election from taking place⁹⁶ as they were postponed, first indefinitely,⁹⁷ and then until February 2008.⁹⁸ While these conditions certainly indicated a non-peaceful electoral transition in a politically active area of the world where a State's destabilization could go so far as to allowing the escape of nuclear weapons or giving a terrorist organization greater reign, forceful actions such as peacekeepers or sanctions were not taken by the international community to encourage peace in the State.

Current Situation

On 29 March 2008, citizens of Zimbabwe went to the polling stations to vote in regular Presidential elections.⁹⁹ Zimbabwe became officially independent of the United Kingdom in 1980 and has since held regular elections;¹⁰⁰

⁸⁹ "Congo, Democratic Republic of the." Columbia Encyclopedia. 6 Ed. 2001-7.
<http://www.bartleby.com/65/co/Congo-Kin.html>

⁹⁰ "Imminent Release of Election Results in DR Congo puts UN Peacekeepers on High Alert." UN News Service. August 18, 2006.
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/08/mil-060818-unnews05.htm>

⁹¹ Ibid

⁹² Ibid

⁹³ "Post Election Violence in the DRC." Kongo Central. February 22, 2007.
<http://otabenga.org/node/11>

⁹⁴ "Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2007.
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm>

⁹⁵ "Pakistan Blast Toll Rises to 27." CNN. February 15, 2008.
<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/pakistan.blast/index.html>

⁹⁶ "Timeline: Pakistan Emergency Rule." BBC. November 4, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7076992.stm

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ "Chronology – Pakistan's Election Postponed." Reuters. January 2, 2008. <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL02100974>

⁹⁹ "Zimbabwe's Opposition Party Claims Early Election Lead." March 30, 2008.
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/30/africa/AF-POL-Zimbabwe-Elections.php>

¹⁰⁰ "Zimbabwe's History: Key Dates." BBC. December 2, 1998. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/12/98/zimbabwe/226542.stm

however, in 28 years of elections there has not been a shift in the ruling party.¹⁰¹ In 2002, elections nearly took the ruling ZANU-PF party from power and the 2008 elections were expected to be just as close.¹⁰² Despite the closeness of the elections, the first round was reported to be peaceful¹⁰³ but a run-off had to be scheduled because of the four candidates, none received a clear majority¹⁰⁴ (50%+1) that is necessary to be declared victor in Zimbabwe's system.¹⁰⁵ Despite peaceful elections, the tone was then set for the next few months of this State's life during the 35 days leading up to the announcement of the results of the Presidential race which involved fighting,¹⁰⁶ legal battles,¹⁰⁷ and even accusations of treason.¹⁰⁸

From May 2, 2008 until June 27, 2008 when the second round of elections were held, Zimbabwe stayed in a state of turmoil and on the international community's mind. Days later, international support was being considered by the African Union on what was being called the "crisis" in Zimbabwe over the election¹⁰⁹ while the Security Council was being briefed by the Under-Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Zimbabwe¹¹⁰. At the same time, 40,000 Zimbabwean farmers were fleeing their homes due to violence stemming from the election results.¹¹¹ During this period, violence erupted about the country,¹¹² party members were arrested¹¹³, and the opposition leader was forced to take refuge in the Dutch Embassy.¹¹⁴ All the conflict prompted the Human Rights Watch to warn that free and fair run-off elections in Zimbabwe were no longer possible.¹¹⁵ This culminated in the opposition leader

¹⁰¹ "Zimbabwe's Opposition Party Claims Early Election Lead." March 30, 2008. <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/03/30/africa/AF-POL-Zimbabwe-Elections.php>

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid

¹⁰⁴ "Zimbabwe Announces Poll Result." BBC. May 2, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7380445.stm>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ "Zimbabwe Violence Round-Up." BBC. April 23, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361031.stm>

¹⁰⁷ "Legal Fight over Zimbabwe Recount." BBC. April 13, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7345097.stm>

¹⁰⁸ "Mugabe Rival Accused of Treason." BBC. April 17, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7352048.stm>

¹⁰⁹ "African Talks on Zimbabwe Crisis." BBC. May 6, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7385248.stm>

¹¹⁰ "Zimbabwe Historical Chronology." Security Council Report. July 31, 2008. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gKWLeMTIsG/b.2850633/>

¹¹¹ "Farm Workers Flee Zimbabwe Homes." BBC. May 8, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7390799.stm>

¹¹² "Zimbabwe 'too violent for poll.'" BBC. May 8, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7389446.stm>

¹¹³ "Mugabe Pldges to Fight 'Lackeys.'" BBC. June 14, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7454569.stm>

¹¹⁴ Neil MacFarquhar. "Security Council Urges Zimbabwe to Halt Violence." New York Times. June 24, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/world/africa/24zimbabwe.html>

¹¹⁵ "Zimbabwe Vote not 'Free and Fair.'" BBC. June 9, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7443214.stm>

pulling out of the race for president¹¹⁶ making the race a one-party event. The Council then declared that the violence in the country must stop if free and fair elections are to be possible.¹¹⁷

The events taking place in Zimbabwe are the definition of a non-peaceful electoral transition. A once seemingly stable democracy has descended into violence and internal conflict at the strong possibility of a change in administration. The African Union and United Nations, in addition to individual States, have taken steps to condemn the violence and considered sanctions to put international pressure on Zimbabwe to stop the violence while simultaneously removing weapons supply in case a civil war erupts.¹¹⁸

Conclusion

In areas of the world divided by racial or religious tensions, a losing party in a small country's elections can rally supporters from around the globe. This means that no longer are elections just the concern of the people casting a vote; they are now the concern of the international community. A conflicted election can easily lead to an exodus of displaced peoples: consider the example of the Zimbabwe farmers above¹¹⁹ or the situation in Sudan where a local issue quickly escalated into a regional problem as refugees flee the country and burden neighboring States.¹²⁰

One of the primary issues in this topic is that of sovereignty. Until a State fails or the internal violence bleeds out into the rest of the world, with few exceptions, the Security Council cannot interfere with domestic politics, even violent aftermath of an election. It is necessary for the international community and the Security Council to consider specific conditions in a non-peaceful election constitute a threat to international peace and security and the best method for handling those threats. Also, as is seen in Zimbabwe, an electoral transition conflict can quickly turn a stable State into a battleground, so it is necessary for the Council to determine which factors of the transition can be most efficiently addressed via peacekeepers, sanctions, and public decree while preserving sovereignty to help re-instill stability within the State and not undermine the effectiveness of the elections. This cannot become a situation where the Council deploys peacekeepers to every seemingly non-peaceful electoral transitions because then the international community becomes the equivalent of a rogue militia within the State.

Topic IV: Sustaining and Extending Security in Fragile States

Introduction

A fragile State is a State on the precipice on becoming failed but for which preventative action is still a possibility¹²¹. The Crisis States Research Center (CSRC) defines a fragile State to be weak in one or more areas of political stability, social responsibility and institutions (like health and education), economic institutions (such as property

¹¹⁶ Neil MacFarquhar. "Security Council Urges Zimbabwe to Halt Violence." New York Times. June 24, 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/world/africa/24zimbabwe.html>

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ "Security Council Draft Resolution." United Nations Security Council. July 8, 2008. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Zim%20S%202008%20447.doc>

¹¹⁹ "Farm Workers Flee Zimbabwe Homes." BBC. May 8, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7390799.stm>

¹²⁰ "UN Responds to Crisis in Darfur: A Timeline." United Nations. http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/scripts/darfur_formatted.htm

¹²¹ "Beyond the Fragile State." Agence Française de Développement. November 2005. <http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/users/administrateur/public/publications/documents-de-travail/dt4-etats-fragiles-VA.pdf>

rights), or extremely fragmented security organizations (such as an ineffective or unruly military).¹²² Fragile States often have ongoing conflicts that are not preventable by the central government.¹²³ It is also common that the citizens of a fragile State have low levels of confidence in their governments and thus not participate in the political processes.¹²⁴ These types of States can, through a wide range of avenues, become security threats for their region and internationally because instability and insecurity do not stay confined to political borders.

History

The developing world is a term used to describe a very wide range of States. A special subset of the developing world is that of failed States. A failed State is any State where the government does not have control over the internationally accepted borders; it is fraught with conflict, has morally bankrupt politicians, and is not able to provide services for its citizens.¹²⁵ What separates a fragile State from a failed State is that, for the most part, the government still controls all territory and at times does make progress. A fragile State is not past the point of no return and, with intervention, a fragile State can become more firmly stable. Within the category of fragile State there is even so much variety that some sources even go so far as to separate out failed State in a gradient from being close to failed to being nearly stable.¹²⁶

The United Nations Security Council has several measures for maintaining stability and security: the use of UN peacekeepers,¹²⁷ economic sanctions and their repeal, and public declarations are three commonly used strategies. UN Peacekeepers are deployed as “a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace.”¹²⁸ They are also effective, being able to cite situations such as the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) and the ability of Peacekeepers to smooth border tensions and create stability between the two countries as proof that peacekeepers can create stability and security in an area.¹²⁹ Another positive is in Haiti where, between 2004 and 2007, UN Peacekeepers “decimated violent gangs, calmed teeming slums, and provided breathing room for a fledgling [democratic] government.”¹³⁰ However, UN peacekeeping operations are always changing to be able to maximize effectiveness: as proof, the UN Department of Peacekeeping (UNDPKO) publishes a Peacekeeping Best Practices which considers lessons learned from all previous peacekeeping missions as a way of constantly improving themselves.¹³¹ These are only minor changes in structure, however, and do not provide for fundamental shifts in peacekeeping operations which may be necessary to have truly effective peacekeepers. In an article published by the Daily Telegraph in 2002, author John Keegan described how UN Peacekeepers needed to have a

¹²² “Crisis, Fragile, and Failed States Definitions used by the CSRC.” Crisis States Research Center. March 2006. <http://www.crisisStates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf>

¹²³ “Fragile States Strategy.” USAID. January 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf

¹²⁴ Ibid

¹²⁵ Daniel Thürer “The Failed State and International Law.” International Review of the Red Cross. December 1999. <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList314/438B7C44BDEAC7A3C1256B66005DCAAB>

¹²⁶ “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States.” Department for International Development. January 2005. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragileStates-paper.pdf>

¹²⁷ “United Nations Peacekeeping.” United Nations. <http://un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ “Iraq/Kuwait – UNIKOM – Action.” United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission. 2003. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unikom/background.html>

¹³⁰ “UN Peacekeeping Role Envolving Haiti.” Miami Harold. August 2007. http://www.hemisferio.org/al-eeuu/boletines/02/80/pol_19.pdf

¹³¹ “Peacekeeping Best Practices.” <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>

more fundamentally active and well-supported role, have a stronger mission with a focused agenda, and have a clear chain of command: in short, function like an army instead of an honor guard.¹³²

Another common way to improve peace and stability is with economic sanctions and their repeal. Liberia it is a fragile State that has come under fire several times and been the subject of Security Council economic sanctions on key cash crops¹³³ because they were in support of a rebel group in Sierra Leone. For a fragile State, an embargo on economic staples can cause even more harm to the country, so despite that the sanctions were put in place for an unrelated reason, the government of Liberia asked the Security Council to repeal the sanctions in June of 2004 after it had made significant improvements in its own infrastructure but had come to a stand-still without the added benefit of timber and diamonds industries.¹³⁴ Liberia also has its own peacekeeping mission, established 2003, to help facilitate the peace process and implement a ceasefire,¹³⁵ which the delegate reported as successful and another reason why the country should be allowed to open up economically.¹³⁶ Here it is important to see that the Security Council cannot sanction a country for what is happening within its own sovereign bounds (with exceptions like genocide) but it can help encourage positive growth by repealing pre-existing sanctions and providing peacekeeping support. It is a method of positive reinforcement instead of negative sanctions.

Finally, the Security Council is most commonly known for their public statements about what a State should or should not be doing. On April 14, 2008 the Security Council made a statement about Haiti, condemning the killing of a Nigerian policeman on its soil.¹³⁷ Again on June 25, 2008, the Security Council complimented Iraq on opening up its borders to accept the Kuwaiti ambassador and its continued re-establishment of national institutions.¹³⁸ While these two statements did not physically affect the State in question, they do bring international attention to an issue and leave the State with a sense of probation with or congratulations and recognition by the international community.

Current Situation

There are many fragile States but few fit the presented criteria as well as Somalia. Somalia has had a very unstable history: colonization fractured the country into a number of clans,¹³⁹ which were separated by language barriers, resource competition, and ethnic boundaries; combined, these and lack of external aid as it was not recognized as a State for the early part of its existence have made maintaining an effective national government difficult.¹⁴⁰ The most recent example of an attempt at a national government was a 275-member elected parliament that was forced

¹³² John Keegan. “‘Deterrence by Presence’ is no Deterrence at all.” Daily Telegraph. April 2002. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/lessons/sreb.htm>

¹³³ “Security Council Extends Sanctions Against Liberia Until 7 May 2004.” United Nations Security Council Press Release. May 2003. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7752.doc.htm>

¹³⁴ “Chairman of Transitional Government Asks Security Council to Lift Sanctions on Liberia.” United Nations Security Council Press Release. June 2004. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8110.doc.htm>

¹³⁵ “United Nations Mission in Liberia.” United Nations. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/>

¹³⁶ “Chairman of Transitional Government Asks Security Council to Lift Sanctions on Liberia.” United Nations Security Council Press Release. June 2004. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8110.doc.htm>

¹³⁷ “Security Council Press Statement on Haiti.” United Nations Security Council. April 14, 2008. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9298.doc.htm>

¹³⁸ “Security Council Press Statement on Iraq-Kuwait.” United Nations Security Council. June 25, 2008. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9375.doc.htm>

¹³⁹ “Somalia – History.” Arab German Consulting. <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/somalihis.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

meet externally due to the insecurities of the State.¹⁴¹ The parliament was then removed by a military government that was able to successfully control pieces of the country.¹⁴² Somalia is obviously one of the more severe fragile States as demonstrated by the rapid overturn of governments and their inability to control large portions of the country. To help establish security within the region, both the African Union¹⁴³ and the United Nations¹⁴⁴ have put peacekeepers in the Somalia to thwart internal conflict; the UN goes so far as to warn that Somalia is “lurching towards a war that could suck in several of its neighbors.”¹⁴⁵ Having the African Union employ peacekeepers sets the tone for just how dire the situation and how disruptive a fragile State can be on the region; the support of the United Nations proves just how important this is to the world to maintain stability within that region.

Peacekeepers are being deployed to help end the civil war and create conditions so that the Somalians can put in their own government.¹⁴⁶ The African Union sees instability within this one State as an epidemic issue one that can destabilize a region, then a continent.¹⁴⁷ The most important impact in both the African Union’s and United Nations’ deployment of peacekeepers is that they are part of a larger roadmap to peace in Somalia.¹⁴⁸ Peacekeepers, in this and other fragile States, are not enough to maintain security and sustainability indefinitely: they must be a part of a larger plan for peace and stability.

Conclusion

In modern times, State, regional, and international security have become almost interchangeable.¹⁴⁹ It would behoove the Security Council to have a plan in place for addressing security and stability within fragile States to minimize the negative impacts on the rest of the world. Sovereignty is always of the utmost concern, but in many fragile State situations such as Somalia, there are exiled governments and leading councils who sit outside the borders of the State, making the situation of international concern by default. Further, these policies will be needed as standards for continued evaluation of current and future peacekeeping endeavors of fragile areas.

The first thing that the Council will need to do is decide on how to classify fragile States. Some States would view being labeled as fragile derogatory and would fight the term, being counterproductive to the mission of this Council. Thus a set of definable criteria is a necessity to avoid international conflict over the term. Next, the Council will need to decide on policy and how to use all available resources (sanctions, peacekeepers, public statements) to encourage stability and security in the fragile State. Finally, within policy, both short term, stop-gap methods and long-term policy will need to be developed.

¹⁴¹ “Somalia.” Infoplease. Pearson Education: 2007.
<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107979.html>

¹⁴² Ibid

¹⁴³ “AU African Troop Plea for Somalia.” BBC. January 2007.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6300465.stm>

¹⁴⁴ “Security Council Planning for UN Peacekeepers in Somalia.” Associated Press. May 2008. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/somalia/2008/0515unsomalia.htm>

¹⁴⁵ Mark Tran. “Looming Somalia War Menaces Whole Region – UN.” The Guardian. December 14, 2006.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/14/marktran>

¹⁴⁶ “Somalia Calls for Deployment of Peacekeepers in Troubled Land.” M&C. June 2008. http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/article_1419012.php/Somalia_calls_for_deployment_of_peacekeepers_in_its_trouble_land

¹⁴⁷ “AU African Troop Plea for Somalia.” BBC. January 2007.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6300465.stm>

¹⁴⁸ Peter Heinlein. “African Union Unveils Roadmap to Peace in Somalia.” Voices of America News. January 2008. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-01/2008-01-24-voa1.cfm?CFID=17176509&CFTOKEN=87364220>

¹⁴⁹ “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States.” Department for International Development.” January 2005.
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragileStates-paper.pdf>

Finally, it is also necessary to stay within the bounds of the Security Council. The Security Council is in charge of peacekeepers, but not economic aid organizations such as the World Bank. It is an organization geared towards punitive measures and crisis situations but, particularly long term solutions, will require both the carrot and the stick.