

Southern Regional Model United Nations XIX
Promoting Partnerships for a Sustainable Future

November 20-22, 2008

Atlanta, GA

Email: gaplen@srmun.org



Dear Honorable Delegates,

I would like to welcome you all to the Southern Regional Model United Nations XIX conference. The League of Arab States committee has been hard at work to pick the best topics, allowing debate and diplomacy to flourish. My name is Sameer Kanal, and I will serve as the Director for the LAS. I graduated from the University of Washington, where I majored in Political Science and Economics. One of my interests in the Model United Nations organization is the occupation of Palestine. I have been involved with MUN for seven years, and recently founded the UW Model United Nations program. This is my first year at this conference, and he can't wait to get to Atlanta this November! My Assistant Director, Kristina Mader, and I worked hard to encompass the many aspects of the theme for SRMUN XIX: *Promoting Partnerships for a Sustainable Future*, into our topics. They are a great mix of controversial and groundbreaking subject matter that will allow for a better understanding of our global community:

Topic I: Conflicts and Natural Resource Management in the Arab Region

Topic II: For Women: Improving Rights and Access to Education for Development

Topic III: To The Future: Creating Peace In Iraq

Some of you that have been with the SRMUN conference over the years have noticed how far we've grown over the past 19 years. While this is my first experience with SRMUN, I can tell this is one of the best staffed and organized conferences I've had the privilege to be apart of, and this year proves to be not only our best, but also our biggest conference to date. The hallmark of this conference remains our devotion to education. As a training conference we are consistently impressed by the courage of first-time students to come and immerse themselves in their committees. This focus on training and learning makes this conference stand out a

I want you to know that I understand first-hand the amount of research and effort that each of you have put forth thus far and am eager to see these topics come to fruition. On that note, remember that position papers are due no later than MIDNIGHT EST on Friday, October 24, 2008. They should be submitted in Microsoft Word Format to LAS@srmun.org. Further specifications can be found on the SRMUN website. Late or improperly formatted position papers will no be considered for awards.

One of the best tools to prepare for this conference will be the SRMUN website (<http://www.srmun.org>), which is filled with links, position paper guidelines, and the highly important rules of procedure. The SRMUN website will prove to be very beneficial to your delegation's success, so use it to its full advantage! It is also important to note that you will serve on one of the few committees that comprises every member state, an impressive and essential aspect of the GA Plen.

If you have any questions along the way please feel free to contact Kristina or myself. We are here for you. It is with great pleasure and honor to once again welcome you to SRMUN XIX!

Sameer Kanal
Director
LAS@srmun.org

Kristina Mader
Assistant Director
LAS@srmun.org

Elizabeth Kayed
Deputy Director-General
DDG@srmun.org

The History of the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (LAS) was first proposed by Egypt, in 1943, as an effort to strengthen ties among the states in the Arab world without the loss of sovereignty and provide a way to promote common interests.¹ In 1945, at the end of World War II, the Arab League was founded in Cairo, Egypt.² This historic event included seven nations and a voting representative from Palestine.³ The purpose of the League as stated in Article II is to: “draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in the general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.”⁴ Within the Charter of the League it is also important to note that Palestine is recognized as an independent state.⁵ At the Second Summit of the LAS the organization praised the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.⁶

By 1942, the concept of Arab unity was already becoming a possible reality by Great Britain as the German Reich threatened to conquer Northern Africa including Egypt.⁷ In an effort to respond to the German threat and to encourage the Arab world to support the Allies, London would publicly support a united Arab world. The original Arab conference was held in Alexandria and the preliminary pact agreed on at that time would later act as the framework for the future of the League of Arab States.⁸ The Arab League was officially founded in 1945 with the signing of the *Pact of the League of Arab States*.⁹ One year later, the League adopted the *Cultural Treaty of the League of Arab States*, promoting cooperation between member States in education, sports, art, and science.¹⁰

The goals of the LAS for Arab States are to serve the common good, ensure better conditions, and guarantee their future.¹¹ To achieve these goals, the League has launched literacy campaigns, reproduced intellectual works, and has reproduced the modern technical vocabulary into Arabic for the use of member States.¹² It has also played a major role in establishing an education curriculum and youth exchange programs among the member States as well as helping advance the role of women in Arab societies. The LAS has on many occasions acted as a forum to address regional issues and limiting conflict. In 1945, the League supported Syria and Lebanon amid their disputes with France.¹³

The LAS has also been a player in forming landmark documents promoting economic integration, such as the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter, which provides the principles for economic activities among member states.¹⁴

¹ League of Arab States. *The League of Arab States*. <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm>

² Ibid.

³ *The History of the League of Arab States*. The League of Arab States
http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableague/english/search_en.jsp

⁴ *Pact of the League of Arab States (Arab League Charter)*, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm>

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Hiro, Dilip. *The Essential Middle East*. Carroll and Graf Publishers. 2003, p. 36 -40.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid

⁹ *Pact of the League of Arab States (Arab League Charter)*, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm>

¹⁰ League of Arab States. *Cultural Treaty of the League of Arab States*. November 20 1946. <http://faculty.winthrop.edu/haynese/mlas/CulTreaty.html>

¹¹ *The History of the League of Arab States*. The League of Arab States
http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableague/english/search_en.jsp

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Arab League. <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0804481.html>

¹⁴ *The Arab League*, The League of Arab States <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm>

There has been success in the LAS with the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter in its attempt to coordinate development with the League.¹⁵ Such accomplishments are the Arab Financial Organizations, Arab Telecommunications Union, the Arab Postal Union and the Arab Common Market.¹⁶ Shortly after the creation of the State of Israel, the LAS created the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty in an effort to coordinate military defense measures.¹⁷ In Article II of this treaty it defines aggression to one member state an act of aggression to all member states.¹⁸ The language throughout the treaty demonstrates that the League would continue to work with the international community as reinforced in Article 11.¹⁹

In 1994, the League adopted the *Arab Charter on Human Rights*, providing a non-Western definition of human rights applicable to the Arab world as well as promoting such a view in international discussions of human rights.²⁰ In 1998, the League drafted *The Arab Convention For The Suppression Of Terrorism*, a unique document that upholds Arab responsibility to suppress terrorism, outlines methods and includes one of the few multilaterally-determined definitions of terrorism.²¹ This document additionally outlines methods of cooperation among member States of the League in the suppression of terrorism, which by its nature is often carried out by non-State actors, and usually operates across (or with no regard to) State borders.²² In 2002, Saudi Arabia spearheaded the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative as a proposed solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.²³ The initiative was brought forth with the realization that a continued military solution could not achieve peace or security in the region. The goals of the initiative state that Israel must return to the 1967 borders, implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and solution to the refugee problem. However, some issues not addressed are use of water resources, fate of prisoners, and access to Jerusalem and its holy sites.²⁴ This is a step towards liable peace, but it was not gained an exceptional amount of momentum after its introduction.

The League is organized into a Council, special committees, and a permanent Secretariat. The committee also has 10 organizations within it to meet different specialized needs and has the ability under Article IV to set up technical committees to meet legal and explicit needs in co-operation.²⁵

Within the League of Arab States is the Council of the League which under the Charter is the governing body of the LAS.²⁶ The LAS meets twice a year and can convene in extraordinary sessions upon the request of two or more

¹⁵ *The History of the League of Arab States*. The League of Arab States http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableague/english/search_en.jsp

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The League of Arab States. *The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty*. February 16 1952. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arabjoin.htm>

¹⁸ The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty. The League of Arab States. February 16 1952. <http://faculty.winthrop.edu/haynese/mlas/DefEcoTr.html>

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ The League of Arab States. *Arab Charter on Human Rights*. September 15 1994. <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instreet/arabhrcharter.html>

²¹ The League of Arab States. *The Arab Convention For The Suppression Of Terrorism*. April 1998. http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_27.html

²² Ibid.

²³ *Arab Peace Initiative*, MidEastWeb <http://www.mideastweb.org/saudipeace.htm>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *The League of Arab States*. http://www.paris21.org1dir_partner_06/dir_partners_06_las.pdf

²⁶ *Internal System of the Council*, League of Arab States <http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/>

member states.²⁷ The Council is formed of representatives from each of the member states and is concerned with perusing the goals of the LAS. As stated in its charter “the LAS will coordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations; communication; cultural affairs; nationality, passports and visas; social affairs; and health affairs”.²⁸ Each member State has one vote and all resolutions are binding by a unanimous vote. Resolutions adopted by majority are only binding to those states that voted for it and in cases of financial and administrative issues only a two-third majority is needed and is binding to all members. If two states are in conflict the aggressor will not get a vote.²⁹ The Council has the power to do accept applications for membership as well as amendments to the Charter.³⁰ The Council has the duty of mediating conflict resolution between two member states or two-member states and a third party.³¹ The Council is responsible for drawing up statutes and appointing the Secretary-General and all other senior officials within the League.³²

The current members of the League of Arab States are:

ALGERIA, BAHRAIN, COMOROS, DJIBOUTI, EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MAURITANIA, MOROCCO, OMAN, PALESTINE, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, YEMEN³³

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *League of Arab States*. http://www.paris21.org/1dir_partner_06/dir_partners_06_las.pdf

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ *League of Arab States. Member States*. http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/level2_en.jsp?level_id=11

I. Conflicts and Natural Resource Management in the Arab Region

Introduction

In 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan “highlighted the connection between environment and conflict” in a report on the prevention of armed conflict by saying, “the implication of the scarcity of certain natural resources, of the mismanagement or depletion of natural resources and of the unequal access to natural resources as potential causes of conflicts need to be addressed.”³⁴

The Middle East and North Africa are endowed with many rich natural resources, but these resources, many non-renewable, if not managed correctly in the face of increasing climate change, can lead to not only environmental damage, but socio-economic issues, and even conflict. Throughout the Arab region, the negative consequences of climate change can already be seen. These consequences differ in severity and magnitude between the countries, but are prevalent throughout the region.³⁵ The three environmental issues which are most concerning include water scarcity, land and coastal degradation and desertification, urban and industrial pollution.³⁶ Management of natural resources, namely water, oil, and land, is critical in the region, due to its heavy reliance on natural resources for sustainable development.³⁷ The stability of these resources contributes to successful human development. Changes in the environment can also be detrimental to the stability of a State, and when combined with unstable political and economic situations, conflict can arise. Thus, natural resources have a dual role, serving both to fuel conflict and to prevent it.³⁸

Oil and Gas Production and Mining of Non-Renewable Natural Resources

³⁴ *Understanding Environment, Conflict and Cooperation*. United Nations Environmental Programme. 2004. <http://www.unep.org/PDF/ECC.pdf>

³⁵ “Environment - Middle East and North Africa.” World Bank. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/0,,contentMDK:20268731~menuPK:547590~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:244381,00.html>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “Issue Paper for the Session on Natural Resource Governance and Conflict Prevention.” Expert Group Meeting on Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Development. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. New York. United Nations. 2004. http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Action/DesaTaskForce/papers_egm20041115/egm_session1b_issues_paper.pdf

The Arab region has enormous oil and natural gas (NG) resources. Since oil extraction was developed in the 1930s, these resources have played a role in conflict throughout the region, both with outside states and between neighbors.³⁹ There are two features of petroleum which define the resource's close connection with conflict: 1) its "importance to the economy and military power of nations and 2) its irregular geographic distribution."⁴⁰ Since the development of extraction techniques, countries have proceeded to quarrel over borders and ownership of any area that may contain this profitable new resource.⁴¹ Today, borders have been drawn and agreed upon with the oil fields mapped and the location reserves successfully estimated.

Forests

Forested land has a history of being over consumed in the Arab region due to the high demand for energy resources, population density and lack of institutional capacity and legislation that encourages and provides incentives for reforestation.⁴² Between 1990 and 2004, the percentage of land area covered by forests in the Arab region decreased from 7.4percent to 6.7percent, leading experts to believe the region as a whole would not meet the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals on environmental sustainability.⁴³ This target, which corresponds to MDG 7.1, sets a target of 10percent of land area covered by forests; as land area covered by forests decline, quality of the overall environment declines as well.⁴⁴ Forest clearing and burning leads to a "substantial loss in biodiversity," as forests currently account for over 80percent of terrestrial biodiversity; this would irreparably harm the "already fragile sites and critical watersheds."⁴⁵ Forests are predominantly found in the mountains, but with recent developments in agricultural practices, such as terracing (which creates a series of stair-step-like areas along a slope for use in farming where previously only trees could grow), and the increase in population and urban developments, even these areas are being affected.⁴⁶ In response, forest reserves have been declared in Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and efforts to "work on sand dune fixation, green belts, roadside plantations and urban forests have been intensified."⁴⁷

When the current situation of the forests is combined with conflict, environmental degradation has greatly accelerated.⁴⁸ In conflict situations, often enormous numbers of people become dislocated and end up having to inhabit areas that might have been otherwise occupied by forests or other natural vegetation. The lack of environmental governance with unstable or nonexistent governments can also lead to unchecked and uncontrolled deforestation.⁴⁹

³⁹ "Oil and conflict - a natural mix." BBC News. 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3625207.stm>

⁴⁰ "Oil Conflict." Program in Peace and World Security Studies. 2004. <http://pawss.hampshire.edu/topics/oil/index.html>

⁴¹ Adel Darwish. *The Next Major Conflict in the Middle East: Water Wars*. Geneva Conference on Environment and Quality of Life. June 1994. <http://www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm>

⁴² *The Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A Youth Lens*. United Nations & League of Arab States. New York. 2007. <http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/EducGeneral/MDGsArab07.pdf>

⁴³ *The Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A Youth Lens*. United Nations & League of Arab States. New York. 2007. <http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/EducGeneral/MDGsArab07.pdf>

⁴⁴ "Millennium Indicators: Goal 7; Indicator 7.1." United Nations. UNSTATS. <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=0&SeriesId=567>

⁴⁵ "Forests." Regional Office for West Asia (ROWA), United Nations Environment Programme. <http://www.unep.org/bh/Programmes/NaturalResource/forest/default.asp>

⁴⁶ "Natural Resources: Forests." Regional Office for West Asia. United Nations Environmental Programme. 2006. <http://www.unep.org/bh/Programmes/NaturalResource/forest/default.asp>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur: Implications for Peace and Recovery." Reuters AlertNet. July 15, 2008. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/HPN/d84e6c222542f3071f2f84880829872b.htm>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

The conflict in Darfur has seen enormous loss of natural resources due to the role timber plays in fueling the conflict as a source of income for those engaged in the conflict. At the same time, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in the region are for the most part located on the outskirts of market towns, “resulting in the destruction of shelter belts, forestry and farmland.”⁵⁰ Darfur’s economy is largely based on natural resources, thus “equitable and sustainable environmental governance at village and tribal levels needs to be restored as a foundation for economic development.”⁵¹ The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) has unequivocally stated that the peace process must address the environmental issues conflict has caused on a local and tribal level in order for sustainable development to begin to occur.⁵²

The Impact of Water Scarcity on Arab States

In the Arab States, predictions of water becoming the primary source of conflicts date back to the early 1990s, when former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali stated his belief that the next war in the region would be caused by disputes over water.⁵³ United Nations analysis from 1994 predicted that by 2025, eighteen Middle Eastern States (of which seventeen are members of the League of Arab States; the eighteenth, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, were evaluated as a single unit) will have water shortages.⁵⁴ With Egypt and Jordan both qualifying their agreements to peace deals with Israel with the declaration that water is an acceptable rationale for war, and Israeli extraterritorial control over their neighbors’ water expanding and gaining the status of *de facto* annexation, the issue of water scarcity’s importance and relation to conflict in the region cannot be understated.⁵⁵ In response to the global water crisis, the United Nations declared the years 2005-2015 as the “International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life.’”⁵⁶ The primary goal of the decade is to promote efforts to fulfill international commitments made on water and water-related issues, such as water scarcity and integrated water resource managements (IWRM).⁵⁷ Follow up on the water-related decisions reached at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, as well as the targets laid out in the Millennium Development Goals was delegated to UN-Water, a body made up of representatives of 24 UN organizations, as well as NGOs, who have a “significant role in tackling global water concerns.”⁵⁸ UN-Water was endorsed in 2003 to support Member states in their efforts to achieve these goals and targets.⁵⁹ In order to collaborate more effectively, UN-Water identified eleven themes on which to develop common positions. These themes are: pollution, trans boundary water issues, integrated water resources management, sanitation, water scarcity, capacity building, financing water, valuing water, risks related to extreme water-related events, water and women, and Sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁰ Because of the diversity of its members, UN-Water works on all levels of policy making to not only bring awareness to water related issues, but also to monitor the situation within UN member states. In order to achieve its goal of monitoring member states as well as the general status of water, UN-Water publishes “The World Water Development Report” and the “Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation Report.”⁶¹ These actions are indicative of the importance the

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Adel Darwish. *The Next Major Conflict in the Middle East: Water Wars*. Geneva Conference on Environment and Quality of Life. June 1994. <http://www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm>

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ “Water for Life Decade - Background.” United Nations. UN-WATER. 2005. <http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/background.html>

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ “About Us.” United Nations. UN-WATER. 2005. <http://www.unwater.org/about.html>

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ “Water Policies.” United Nations. UN-WATER. 2007. <http://www.unwater.org/policies.html>

⁶¹ “About Us.” United Nations. UN-WATER. 2005. <http://www.unwater.org/about.html>

international community places on water related issues, as well as the support the Arab region has going forward with their own targeted programs and initiatives.

The Arab States comprise 22 countries in Africa and western Asia, mostly in arid and semi-arid zones. Its current population is about 300 million and occupying a total area of 113 million square kilometers. More than 65percent of the renewable water resources of the Arab States countries emanates from outside the region flowing through shared rivers and aquifers. These countries are among the lowest in the world in their share per capita of fresh water, averaging about 1000 cubic meters per person, per year.⁶² The majority of the countries are significantly below this average and remain among the permanently water scarce countries.⁶³ A State is considered to be experiencing water stress when it has less than 1700 cubic meters of water per person, and water shortage when it has less than 1000 cubic meters per person; the average being at the latter level indicates that the region as a whole experiences chronic water shortage.⁶⁴ Efforts aimed at reducing the gap between demand and supply often include “desalination for drinking and domestic use and modern treatment plants for tertiary treated water for irrigation,” and other efforts. This water scarcity causes the region to be unable to feed itself and a dependence on imported food to feed its population, thus affecting its food security. The food security gap is steadily growing, drawing a larger share of foreign exchange earnings to the importation of basic food staples. About 20percent of the population lack access to clean drinking water and 35percent lack access to adequate sanitation despite massive public investments in the sector.⁶⁵ Many nations across the region are challenged by water scarcity both in North Africa and the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest nation in the region.

Saudi Arabia is rapidly approaching a dramatic crisis over water.⁶⁶ In Saudi Arabia’s case, however, the crisis stems from the country’s lack of rivers and permanent bodies of water, as a result of which it relies heavily upon underground water sources for its agricultural and potable water supply.⁶⁷ At present, 90percent of Saudi Arabia’s non-renewable deep-well water is utilized for agricultural purposes.⁶⁸ These resources have been significantly eroded in recent years as a consequence of the Persian Gulf conflict. Iraq’s burning of oil wells during the Gulf War further contaminated underground water resources already degraded by pollution seepage from agricultural activity, creating a deficit that has failed to be resolved to date, despite significant Saudi desalinization attempts.⁶⁹

Beyond environmental instability, there has been an impact on the Saudi regime. Though buoyed by oil revenues, which have facilitated massive desalinization efforts, the government has failed to adequately address its growing water concerns. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has begun to seek other water sources, a focus that has had pronounced effects on the region. Saudi Arabia’s extensive exploration into the underground aquifers in its Eastern Province has reduced the agriculture and water availability of Qatar and Bahrain.⁷⁰ The resulting political tension points to an emerging conflict over water resources in the Persian Gulf Peninsula, one that may engulf both Saudi Arabia and her neighbors. Disputes are also becoming visible between Saudi Arabia and Jordan over the Qa Disi Aquifer. Though currently utilized almost exclusively by Saudi Arabia, Jordanian vested interest in the aquifer, which runs beneath both countries, has increased in recent years, with Jordan’s Minister of Agriculture publicly accusing Saudi Arabia of overuse of the aquifer as far back as November 1992. Expanding Jordanian utilization of the aquifer, which is

⁶² Adel Darwish. *The Next Major Conflict in the Middle East: Water Wars*. Geneva Conference on Environment and Quality of Life. June 1994. <http://www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm>

⁶³ “Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur: Implications for Peace and Recovery.” Reuters AlertNet. July 15, 2008. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/HPN/d84e6c222542f3071f2f84880829872b.htm>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ “Environmental Degradation and Conflict in Darfur: Implications for Peace and Recovery.” Reuters AlertNet. July 15, 2008. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/HPN/d84e6c222542f3071f2f84880829872b.htm>

⁷⁰ Ibid.

likely in light of Jordan's looming water crisis, may emerge as a contentious issue between the parties in the near future.⁷¹

The Jordan River system has witnessed more conflict than any other river system in the Middle East.⁷² In 1964, Israel extended the National Water Carrier, a massive project that transfers water from the Sea of Galilee to the south. The extension entailed the annexation of the waters of the Sea of Galilee by damming its southern outlet without international agreement.⁷³ In retaliation, the League of Arab States and its members decided to divert the northern Jordan River's tributaries: the Hasbani River and Wazzani springs in south Lebanon and the Banias River on Syria's Golan Heights, through Syria and down to the Yarmuk. The Arab headwater diversion project began in 1965; Israel responded with a series of aircraft and artillery attacks on the diversion project, which in 1967 culminated in raids into Syria and an increase in water related hostility that set the stage for the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Israel's search for water security can be considered one of the principal causes of the 1967 war. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War resulted in an Israeli victory that increased existing Israeli fresh water reserves and ground aquifers (in the West Bank) and riparian rights over upstream tributaries to the Jordan by almost 50 percent.⁷⁴

A final important impact of water scarcity is that on the food supply, which can also have an impact on conflict in the region. Many Middle East governments are not able to fully support the growing populations that are expected to double within the next 20 years, and with the water resources in the current state they are in, it is doubtful they will be able to support such rapid growth as well.⁷⁵ The population growth rate in Syria alone, for example, is 3.8 percent.⁷⁶ General dissatisfaction with ineffective government actions and political unrest are the consequences. Disruptive population moves, both within countries and across borders, aggravate already volatile regional tensions. The increased lack of food resources contribute greatly to the numbers of regional refugees in both the Middle East and Africa. Food deficits resulting from insufficient agricultural production also increase the risk of political unrest and regional tension among countries sharing precious water resources.⁷⁷

Managing Water Resources for Conflict Prevention

For Arab States, water resource management has become a major regional issue due to the scarcity of the resource, as well as to its role in conflict prevention. The primary issues with regards to water management are: satisfying the demand for drinking water, and ensuring there is a sufficient supply of the resource for agricultural and industrial use. Arab states depend on several sources for their water, including the Nile River, Litani River, and the Sea of Galilee, in addition to vast underground aquifers, some of which is "fossil water."^{78, 79} Fossil water is water trapped since the ice age and therefore is non-renewable, which means that use of this particular source of water is only feasible in the short-term.⁸⁰

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Thomas Naff and Ruth C. Matson. *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?* Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1984.

⁷³ "World Water Crisis." BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2000/world_water_crisis/default.stm

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Mary E. Morris. "Water and Conflict in the Middle East." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Jan-Mar97. <http://web.macam.ac.il/>

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Adel Darwish. *The Next Major Conflict in the Middle East: Water Wars*. Geneva Conference on Environment and Quality of Life. June 1994. <http://www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm>

⁷⁹ "World Water Crisis." BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2000/world_water_crisis/default.stm

⁸⁰ Ibid.

To meet the ever growing crisis of water management the Arab Water Council (AWC) was formally inaugurated on April 14, 2004 in Cairo, Egypt.⁸¹ The AWC is a civil society, not-for-profit, regional organization dedicated to water issues in the Arab States. The mission of Arab Water Council is the Arab Water Council endeavors to promote better understanding and management of the water resources in the Arab States in a multi-disciplinary, non-political, professional and scientific manner; to disseminate knowledge, enhance sharing of experience and information for the rational and comprehensive water resources development of the region for the benefits of its inhabitants.⁸² The Founding Assembly elected Dr Mahmoud Abu-Zeid as the President of the Council and requested him to chair the Founding Committee tasked, inter alia, of completing the organizational structure of the AWC, formalizing its constitution, continuing the broadening of the membership, and preparation to hold the meeting of the First General Assembly. An interim General Secretariat is established in Cairo, and declared:

“The Arab Water Council is pioneering a new definition of the civil society and its role in the water affairs in the Arab States [...] The Arab countries are facing the greatest share of the water challenges in the world today. These challenges are driven by internal and external factors affecting its water and food security, threatening its economic, social, and environmental sustainability and hampering the development of a stable and secure region for its inhabitants.”⁸³

The Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) developed a vision for better management of water supply through its preparation activities leading up to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa.⁸⁴ The main elements of this vision include: better systems for monitoring, analyzing and disseminating relevant water data; building a comprehensive database for data exchange; development of systems which monitor non-conventional water supplies by using innovative technologies; formulation of effective water policies and strategies; encouragement of stakeholder participation; cooperation within the region on shared water resources; and creation and enforcement of water legislation.⁸⁵ Programs based on this strategy have been implemented in Egypt, Lebanon, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, with some limited success.⁸⁶ As it has been demonstrated though, effective management of resources, particularly water, is a crucial part of not only sustainable development, but also conflict prevention.

Case Study: The Occupied Palestinian Territories

Water is a scarce resource throughout the entire Arab Region, but it has been increasingly evident that in the case of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt), successful peace talks will heavily rely on successful negotiation of water issues.⁸⁷ Not only does geography have a large impact on the distribution of water, but the disproportionate populations of the Israelis and the Palestinians also severely affect the availability of the resource. In 2007, the United Nations reported that the the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ (oPt) population was at 3.76 million, with 2.34 million living in the West Bank, and the remainder, around 1.42 million residing in the Gaza

⁸¹ “Arab Water Council Launched.” IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. <http://www.irc.nl/page/9319>

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ “The Role of ESCWA in Regional Preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development.” Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. <http://www.escwa.un.org/divisions/sdpd/wssd/role.html>

⁸⁵ “*Water Supply Management: ESCWA Briefing Paper No. 13*”. Economic and Social Council for Western Asia. New York. 2002. <http://www.escwa.un.org/divisions/sdpd/wssd/pdf/13.pdf>

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Maher Bitar. “Water and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Competition or Cooperation?” Foundation for Middle East Peace. 2005. http://www.fimep.org/analysis/articles/water_policy_maher.html

Strip.⁸⁸ The number of Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank (and until recently, the Gaza Strip) grew from 1,514 in 1970 to 76,000 in 1990.⁸⁹ By 2000 the population was 203, 067, and as of January 2008, the population is reported as 466,000.⁹⁰

Sources of water for both the Israeli's and Palestinians are extremely limited and are interdependent, with both populations relying heavily on the same groundwater sources, spring water, harvested rainwater, rivers and aquifers.⁹¹ Today most of the sources of water utilized by Israel, between 30-40 percent, come from areas which are now held under military occupation inside the borders of the oPt. The occupation by Israel of the West Bank has deprived Palestinians of control of a significant fraction of their available water supply in spite of the fact that the aquifers are replenished almost entirely by rainfall in the West Bank.⁹² The two main water sources which are by law supposed to be shared between Israel and the oPt are the Mountain Aquifer, and the upper Jordan River and its tributaries. Due to Israel's tight control over water in the region though, the oPt receives no water from the Jordan River.⁹³ The Mountain Aquifer, which lies under the West Bank but is distributed in such a way by the Israeli government, that 79 percent is allocated to the state of Israel, and 21 percent is utilized by the Palestinians, amounting to an insufficient 30 million cubic meters.⁹⁴ The other main aquifer, the Coastal Aquifer, is managed by the Coastal Aquifer Management Programme (CAMP), and is also used by Israel proper and those territories controlled by Israel.⁹⁵ This ground water supply is tapped extensively by Israel, primarily from within the boundaries of pre-1967 Israel, as was agreed to within the Oslo Accords which were signed in 1995.⁹⁶ The Oslo Accords established the Joint Water Committee (JWC), which is charged with approving all water and sewage projects in the West Bank and comprised of an "equal number of representatives from Israel and the Palestinian Authority."⁹⁷ In spite of these actions though, over the past decade, the controls set up by Israel within the JWC, such as requiring consensus for all decisions, has made projects difficult to initiative.⁹⁸ Israeli denial of water access to Palestinians and lack of Palestinian control over water from these aquifers is one of the primary sources of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

As of 2007, the water resource allocation was overall 90 percent to Israel and 10 percent to the oPt, which given the vastly different economic needs of the populations (agriculture makes up 30percent of the economy of the oPt), directly contravenes the 1997 UN Convention on Water Sharing, which states "water allotment should be equitable

⁸⁸ "OCHA-oPt Socio-Economic Fact Sheet." United Nations. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: occupied Palestinian territory. April 2008. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/OCHA_oPt_SocioEconomics_Fact_Sheet_April_2008_English.pdf

⁸⁹ *Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. United Nations Environmental Programme. 2002. <http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/INF-31-WebOPT.pdf>

⁹⁰ "West Bank Jewish settler population rises by 5.1 percent." Agence France-Presse. January 2008. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/KKAA-7B35UX?OpenDocument>

⁹¹ Al-Zagaibeh Heedier. *Water and War in the Middle East*. Global Security. New York. 1995. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/ah.htm>

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ "The Shared Water Sources and the Control over Them." B'Tselem. 2006. http://www.btselem.org/english/Water/Shared_Sources.asp

⁹⁴ Maher Bitar. "Water and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Competition or Cooperation?" Foundation for Middle East Peace. 2005. http://www.fmep.org/analysis/articles/water_policy_maher.html

⁹⁵ Al-Zagaibeh Heedier. *Water and War in the Middle East*. Global Security. New York. 1995. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/ah.htm>

⁹⁶ "Water Issues under the Oslo Accords." B'Tselem. 2006. http://www.btselem.org/english/water/oslo_accords.asp

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

and reasonable.”⁹⁹ The daily per capita allocation of water, which is controlled by Israel, is disproportionate to the population size, amount to 70 liters per day for Palestinians and 240 liters per day for Israelis. Given that out of 1,209 million cubic meters of water only 259 million cubic meters are allocated to the Palestinians, while their population is at least three times the size of the Israeli settlers, the cause for conflict is clear.¹⁰⁰ Exacerbating the already existing shortage, is the damage done by Israeli military action to the water supply and sewage infrastructure in the West Bank, which according to a group of UN agencies, amount to more than 7 million USD.¹⁰¹ The water policy that is now in use by Israel is beneficial to its own people in two ways, which they are reluctant to give up: 1) “preservation of the unequal division of the shared hared groundwater in the West Bank 's Western Aquifer and Northern Aquifer. This division was created prior to the occupation, a result of the gap between economic and technological development in Israel as opposed to the West Bank, and 2) Utilization of new water sources, to which Israel had no access prior to 1967, such as the Eastern Aquifer (in the West Bank) and the Gaza Aquifer, primarily to benefit Israeli settlements established in those areas.”¹⁰² These policies combined with Israel’s minimal investment in water infrastructure, including connections to rural communities and maintenance of existing infrastructure, has led to the deprivation of residents in the oPt of a vital natural resource.¹⁰³

Current efforts by regional organizations and international bodies aim at encouraging the development of desalination techniques and other technology by Israel, in hopes the state will then relax its restrictions on use of water in the oPt.¹⁰⁴ Israel’s water policy is now named as the primary reason for the water shortage in the oPt.¹⁰⁵ Among the unresolved questions are the extent to which the regional aquifers are to be used, who controls them and how they are to be managed. In addition, uncertainties remain about the effects on water quality of large withdrawals, and arguments over the yields that can be provided safely by existing water sources.

Case Study: The Tigris and Euphrates

The Tigris-Euphrates system is a water system consisting of two rivers, originating in Southeast Turkey and merging, as well as terminating, in the Iraqi delta of the Shatt al-Arab.¹⁰⁶ In Iraq, the two rivers are linked by the Thartar Canal.¹⁰⁷ Both rivers gain inflow from both Turkey and Iraq; the Tigris has additional inflow from Iran while the Euphrates also passes through Syria.¹⁰⁸ Conflict over the management of the rivers, specifically the Euphrates, has nearly caused war in both the 1960s and the 1980s between Turkey and its Arab neighbors.¹⁰⁹ Additionally,

⁹⁹ Christopher Meyer. “A water crisis in the making.” Middle East Economic Digest. April 2006. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-15212048_ITM

¹⁰⁰ Maher Bitar. “Water and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Competetion or Cooperation?” Foundation for Middle East Peace. 2005. http://www.fmep.org/analysis/articles/water_policy_maher.html

¹⁰¹ *Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*. United Nations Environmental Programme. 2002. <http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/INF-31-WebOPT.pdf>

¹⁰² “The Shared Water Sources and the Control over Them.” B’Tselem. 2006. http://www.btselem.org/english/Water/Shared_Sources.asp

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Martin Asser, “Obstacles to Peace: Water.” BBC. May 2007. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/water/2007/0523arabisrael.htm>

¹⁰⁵ “The Shared Water Sources and the Control over Them.” B’Tselem. 2006. http://www.btselem.org/english/Water/Shared_Sources.asp

¹⁰⁶ Kibaroglu, Ayşegül. *Water for Sustainable Development in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin*. <http://www.gap.metu.edu.tr/html/yayinlar/waterforsustainableAKibaroglu.pdf> Page 1

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

concerns over the Euphrates between Iraq and Syria resulted in dual troop movements on the border and had to be defused by Saudi and Soviet intervention.¹¹⁰

Development of the Euphrates River is the more contentious issue due to the scale of projects being implemented to divert and develop water resources by each of the three riparians. Most notable is Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project, or Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), which upon completion "may divert up to 30 percent of the average annual water flow of the Euphrates."¹¹¹ However, Syria and Iraq also have large scale projects that involve the potential use of up to 32 and 65 percent, respectively, of the Euphrates' waters; when combined with Turkey's projects and their potential use of 52 percent, the full scope of the projects will demand 149 percent of the water of the Euphrates, an impossibility.¹¹² The Euphrates has an annual flow of 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year at the Turkey-Syria border, and 32 bcm at the Syria-Iraq border.¹¹³ Thus 90 percent of the Euphrates's water originates in Turkey and 10 percent in Syria.¹¹⁴ Historically, Iraq, as the State who has used the Euphrates longest, has had acute anxiety towards both Syria and Turkey, and Syria joined Iraq in anxiety towards Turkey as Turkish proposals have increased in scope to tax the river, beginning with the Keban dam in the 1960s and extending to the GAP today.¹¹⁵

The GAP is the primary project forcing the issue back into world consciousness.¹¹⁶ It consists of 22 dams, 19 power plants, and a 1.7 million-hectare irrigation project using water from both the Tigris and Euphrates and covering 9 provinces in Southeastern Turkey.¹¹⁷ Of the total Tigris-Euphrates watershed within Turkey's borders, 42 percent is included in GAP.¹¹⁸

The primary legal point of contention, which applies to the Tigris controversy as well, is whether the Euphrates river "is an *international* watercourse," in which case all parties must share the entirety of the river, or a "*transboundary* river," which gives each State control and complete sovereignty over all portions of the river within their borders.¹¹⁹ Turkey, with its vested interest in control commensurate with its status as the *source* of the river, believes the Euphrates to be of a transboundary nature, which would give it access to the 90 percent inflow occurring within Turkey; Syria, who would have sovereignty over only 10 percent, and Iraq, which would have control over none at all, both support the international designation, which would imply an integrated approach.¹²⁰ Turkey is explicit in its declaration to ownership of the water: "In 1992, Turkey's Prime Minister Argued: 'Water resources are Turkey's and oil is theirs (Syria's and Iraq's). Since we do not tell them, 'look, we have a right to half your oil,' they cannot claim to what is ours.'"¹²¹

¹¹⁰ Swain, Ashok. *Managing Water conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. Routledge, 2004. Page 87.

¹¹¹ Alanda, et. al. (The Fletcher School). "The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: Mediating a Path Towards Regional Water Stability." *al Nakhlah*, Spring 2007. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-2.pdf Page 1.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Kibaroglu, Aysegul. *Water for Sustainable Development in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin*. <http://www.gap.metu.edu.tr/html/yayinlar/waterforsustainableAKibaroglu.pdf> Page 1

¹¹⁵ Ibid., page 2.

¹¹⁶ Alanda, et. al. (The Fletcher School). "The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: Mediating a Path Towards Regional Water Stability." *al Nakhlah*, Spring 2007. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-2.pdf Page 2.

¹¹⁷ Kibaroglu, Aysegul. *Water for Sustainable Development in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin*. <http://www.gap.metu.edu.tr/html/yayinlar/waterforsustainableAKibaroglu.pdf> Page 6

¹¹⁸ Alanda, et. al. (The Fletcher School). "The Tigris-Euphrates River Basin: Mediating a Path Towards Regional Water Stability." *al Nakhlah*, Spring 2007. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/spring2007/placht-2.pdf Pages 2-3.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., page 2.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Swain, Ashok. *Managing Water conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. Routledge, 2004. Page 88.

The issue is further complicated by Turkey's disagreement with Iraq over whether or not the Iraqi Tigris can be included in the Euphrates discussion; Iraq opposes strenuously the inclusion of the former river, with more favorable conditions of inflow within Iraqi borders than the latter.¹²² The issue is bound to remain unsolved without outside help, which all three States have opposed on principle while advocating for when disadvantaged in bilateral or trilateral negotiations. With similar need, but an aggregation of position and power within Turkey at the expense of Syria and Iraq, the wars averted previously may yet break out in the future.¹²³

¹²² Kibaroglu, Aysegul. Building a Regime for the Waters of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. Martinus Nijhoff, 2002. Page 224.

¹²³ Kalpakian, Jack. Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in International River Systems. Ashgate, 2004. Page 20.

International and Regional Initiatives related to Natural Resources

In 2002, the League of Arab States adopted a “comprehensive regional approach” guided by the Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE) and other “specialized Ministerial Councils.”¹²⁴ This initiative outlines key goals and actions that need to be taken for sustainable resources management:

- Encouragement of integrated water resources;
- Protecting water resources from pollution;
- Supporting alternative water resources and new sources of technology for desalination;
- Supporting the development of national policies in the field of agricultural research;
- Supporting the implementation of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification;
- International support of integrated management of coastal zones and mountain areas;
- International support of the development of programs protecting biodiversity;
- Promotion of mechanisms which leads to cleaner and more efficient utilization of oil and natural gas and the development of carbon sinks through forestation;
- Implementation of the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and their mechanisms;
- Technical assistance to strengthen capacity in managing disasters.¹²⁵

The Initiative also calls for partnerships between developing countries, as called for in the Joint African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCRE)/CAMRE Declaration on Sustainable Development in 2002.¹²⁶ In addition, partnerships between industrial and developing countries and between states and civil society are also encouraged.¹²⁷ The program of action for this Initiative has its foundations in several other documents, including: the Jeddah Declaration on the Islamic Perspective for Environment (2002); the Abu Dhabi Declaration on the Islamic Perspective for Environment (2002); the Oman Declaration on Environmental and Sustainable Development (2001); the Abu Dhabi Declaration for Agricultural Development and Combating Desertification (2002); the General Framework of Islamic Agenda for Sustainable Development (2002); the Outcome of the Amman International Forum on Environment and Sustainable Development (2002); the Dubai Declaration on the Integrated Management of Water Resources in Arid Zones (2002); and the Muscat Declaration of the Oman International Conference for the Development and Management of Watercourses.¹²⁸ These guiding documents will serve as the framework for future efforts that aim to meet the goals of the Initiative. The Initiative also gave priority to three areas of focus: integrated water resources; land deterioration and combating desertification; and integrated management of coastal zones and marine resources.

With water serving as one of the most important natural resources in the Arab region, the right to this resource is important to establish. The only universal human rights document which explicitly discusses a right to water is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) where provision of adequate nutritious food and clean drinking water are specifically identified as responsibilities of State parties.¹²⁹ The Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) provides a basis for recognizing rights to water as a basic human right. The document recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing

¹²⁴ “Water Supply Management: ESCWA Briefing Paper No. 13” Economic and Social Council for Western Asia. New York. 2002. <http://www.escwa.un.org/divisions/sdpd/wssd/pdf/13.pdf>

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ *Sustainable Development Initiative in the Arab Region*. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development. 2002. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/activities_initiate/101202_sd_initiative_arab_region.pdf

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ *Sustainable Development Initiative in the Arab Region*. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development. 2002. http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/activities_initiate/101202_sd_initiative_arab_region.pdf

¹²⁹ Dr. D Roy Loifungbaun. “The Human Right to water: Necessity for action and discourse.” *Jubilee South*. 2003. <http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EpZyVVlyFygMevRBey.shtml>

and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”¹³⁰ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has a similar provision in, therefore lending legitimacy to the argument that right to water is a basic human right.¹³¹

Conclusion

The Arab Region is home to a host of various natural resource management challenges, each of which will necessitate a different solution. There is no fix for water shortages that will help with forestation, nor a solution to oil management that will rebuild infrastructure in conflict-ravaged Darfur. The solutions needed will also not come from single States or distant powers, but from the Arab States themselves. Delegates are encouraged to consider the following questions as they look towards finding solutions to the various management challenges their region faces.

Committee Directive

What are the sources of water in your State, and how stable are these sources? How is climate change affecting resource availability? What are the key resource imports and exports of your State? Do import sources have stable surpluses for trade in what your State imports? What are the likely sources of conflict in your State's region and how will these conflicts disrupt management? In what way can regional planning help to ease the negative impacts of these disruptions? How can the political conflicts, most notably between Israel and the Arab States, be excluded from the resource management question in order to ensure potable water for all?

II. For Women: Improving Rights and Access to Education for Development

Introduction

The advancement of women, particularly of women's rights, is viewed by the international community as a necessary component of sustainable development, one that has been in the subject of many international initiatives. Within the Arab world, the issue of human rights, and specifically the rights of women, is fused with complexity and colored with historical and cultural traditions. As the Arab nations continue to develop, education has become a cornerstone of any development efforts. In 2000 the Arab States joined together at the Regional Conference on Education for All (EFA).¹³² There it was unanimously affirmed that “learning is the key to human sustainable development and is the foundation for enlightened existence and the sustenance of all livelihoods.”¹³³ With women's education central to success in sustainable development endeavors, traditional values and current gender norms are liable to clash.¹³⁴

Internationally, the rights of women and access to education are inextricably linked in various initiatives and frameworks promoted by the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. They include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention on All Forms of Elimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA).¹³⁵ According to the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR), elimination of gender disparities in education both secures a fundamental human right and is

¹³⁰ “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” United Nations. 1966. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ceschr.htm

¹³¹ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. 1948. Article 3. <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

¹³² *The Arab Framework for Action to Ensure Basic Learning Needs in the Arab States in the Years 2000-2010*. Regional Conference on Education for All Arab States. January 27, 2000.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ “Statement by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, High Commissioner for Human Rights on International Women's Day.” International Womens Day. March 7, 2003. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/iwd/2003/mello.html>

essential for development. The UNHCHR has therefore been active in promoting the idea that investment in women and girls' education is one of the most effective ways to promote economic growth and social well-being.¹³⁶

In recent years, the League of Arab States (LAS) repeatedly renounced those values which breed unwillingness to grant women equal rights, such as immoderation, extremism and racism, while expressing its goal to boost an Arab identity based on a humanistic message of inclusion and tolerance.¹³⁷ Recently, LAS promoted education as a way to disseminate their identity, and made education a top priority along with the strengthening of human rights principles, stating that action taken within the area of education was partially, "inspired by the cultural and spiritual values of the Arab nation which reaffirm that education is an essential dimension of our cultural identity today and in the future."¹³⁸ According to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the status of women's human rights in the Arab world varies both among and within countries. The degree of awareness regarding these rights is based largely on a state's stability, the strength of civil society, and the commitment demonstrated by national governments to the fundamentals of gender equality.¹³⁹

The Right to Education

The right to education has been reaffirmed repeatedly in numerous international and regional initiatives, starting in 1948 with Article 26 of the UDHR, which states, "Everyone has the right to education."¹⁴⁰ Following in the path laid by the UDHR, the League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994. This document addresses education in Article 34, which states, "The eradication of illiteracy is a binding obligation and every citizen has a right to education. Primary education, at the very least, shall be compulsory and free and both secondary and university education shall be made easily accessible to all."¹⁴¹ These two documents serve as the foundation of human rights legislation in the Arab region, and have been built upon in various initiatives which address the education of specific populations, including children and women, as well as education in the context of broader cultural and economic rights.

When addressing children's rights, the international community has expressed its support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was passed in 1989 by the UN General Assembly. Article 28 of the CRC specifically recognizes the right of the child to education, particularly a free primary education, and equal opportunity to access all forms of secondary and higher education.¹⁴² Every Member State of the LAS has signed and ratified the CRC, although several have declared their reservations regarding any aspect of the Convention which are incompatible with preexisting national laws.¹⁴³ These reservations have not affected the general acceptance of the CRC in the region, and the document continues to be viewed as the foundation of children's rights efforts within Arab states.

Within the context of social and cultural rights, two documents in particular highlight education as fundamental to human development. The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) emphasizes in Article V that states shall eliminate,

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ *Riyadh Declaration*. League of Arab States. March 29, 2007.

¹³⁸ *The Arab Framework for Action to Ensure Basic Learning Needs in the Arab States in the Years 2000-2010*. Regional Conference on Education for All Arab States. January 27, 2000.

¹³⁹ "Women's Human Rights Program" United Nations Development Fund for Women. <http://www.unifem.org/jo/Pages/programinformation.aspx?pid=31>.

¹⁴⁰ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. United Nations General Assembly. December 10, 1948

¹⁴¹ *Arab Charter on Human Rights*. Arab League. 1994.

¹⁴² *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. United Nations General Assembly. November 20, 1989.

¹⁴³ "Status of the Convention on the Rights of the Child." Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/11.htm>.

“Racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of... economic, social and cultural rights, in particular...the right to education and training.”¹⁴⁴

The CERD has been ratified by most LAS member states.¹⁴⁵ Similar to the CERD, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) addresses education similarly, specifically in Articles 13 and 14, which recognizes the right of “everyone to education...and should enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations.”¹⁴⁶ Unlike the CERD, the CESCR has not been ratified by all members of the LAS. Specifically, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have not joined the Convention, and continue to state their refusal to do so due in light of inconsistencies between the document and other UN governing documents.¹⁴⁷

Additional initiatives which focus on education alone are the 1960 Convention Against Discrimination in Education (CDE) and the 1974 Recommendation on Education for International Understanding and Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Both these documents are built on the basic understanding that education is a right, and in turn serve as building blocks for current education policy frameworks. Such frameworks include the 1990 World Declaration on Education for All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs (EFA), 1997 Hamburg Declaration on Adult Learning, and the Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments (DFFA), which was approved in 2000 at the World Education Forum. The DFFA commits Member States to the same targets set forth in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), of achieving quality basic education by 2015, and in addition emphasizes girls’ and women’s education. The Declaration is unique in that it also commits donor countries and institutions to supporting all countries which are seriously committed to basic education, pledging that none of these states “will be thwarted in the achievement of this goal by lack of resources.”¹⁴⁸

International Frameworks for Education Reform

There are many instruments that have been developed and approved by the Member States of the UN which link women’s rights and the right to education. These instruments provide targets and goals that help shape action on global, regional, and local levels, as well as form a framework against which to measure a country or organization’s progress. The various agreements and strategies which address the issues of education and women are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA), the Jomtien Declaration on Education for All (EFA), the Dakar Framework for Action (DFFA), the Arab Framework for Action (AFA), the UN Decade for Literacy (UNDL), and the UN Decade for Education for Sustainable Development (DESD).

In 2000, the Millennium Declaration was signed by 189 world leaders, serving as a unified statement on a new global movement to prioritize the reduction of poverty. The education of girls was recognized within the Declaration as a “powerful and necessary tool in reducing poverty and achieving human rights.”¹⁴⁹ Educated

¹⁴⁴ *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*. United Nations General Assembly. December 21, 1965.

¹⁴⁵ “Ratification of Humans Rights Conventions: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR). <http://www.arabhumanrights.org/en/ratification/resarticle.asp?id=5>.

¹⁴⁶ *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. United Nations General Assembly. December 16, 1966.

¹⁴⁷ “Ratification of Humans Rights Conventions: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.” United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR). <http://www.arabhumanrights.org/en/ratification/resarticle.asp>.

¹⁴⁸ *The Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All, Meeting our Collective Commitments*. World Education Forum. April 28, 2000.

¹⁴⁹ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*. United Nations General Assembly. September 8, 2000.

women were identified as central to success in poverty reduction efforts by gaining economic independence and access to political representation, allowing women to be partners in development, and not just observers. The MDGs lay out eight areas of focus for the global community, with 21 targets measured by 60 indicators through which to gauge progress.¹⁵⁰ Goal 2, to achieve universal primary education, and Goal 3, promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, both address the need for education in order to eradicate poverty and sustainable development of nations.¹⁵¹ The MDGs have become universally accepted targets for almost all efforts globally, and have been instrumental in providing guidelines for measuring results in achieving gender equality.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (BPfA) address gender equality and education, among other issues such as poverty, economy, and basic human rights. These two instruments require states to ensure that there is gender equality at all levels of education, including primary, secondary, tertiary, and technical and vocational schools.¹⁵² In addition, this encompasses equality not only towards opportunity, but of continued support through all levels of education. This support should take the form of working to eliminate stereotypes in education, provide equal access to scholarships, and develop tools to ensure retention of girls equals that of their male counterparts.¹⁵³ The BPfA is more specific, and identifies six strategic objectives within the theme of women and education that need to be focused on. These objectives are: (1) Ensure equal access to education; (2) Eradicate illiteracy among women; (3) Improve women's access to vocational training, science and technology, and continuing education; (4) Develop non-discriminatory education and training; (5) Allocate sufficient resources for and monitor the implementation of educational reforms; and (6) Promote lifelong education and training for girls and women.¹⁵⁴ All but three LAS Member States have ratified or signed CEDAW. More than any other human rights legislation, CEDAW has been the force behind an enormous amount of pressure from human rights organizations in the region to highlight CEDAW as a key document to implement at all levels of government.

In 1990, the World Education Forum adopted the Jomtien Declaration on Education for All: Meeting Basic Learning Needs. The Declaration laid out ten objectives for the world to meet in the coming decade, ranging from setting goals for universal access to education, meeting basic learning needs, focusing on quality of education, mobilizing resources, and strengthening international cooperation and solidarity.¹⁵⁵ Based on the framework laid by the Jomtien Declaration, the DFFA reaffirms the commitments made in the Jomtien Declaration as well as to underline that the countries who attended were committed to achieving education for “every citizen in every society.”¹⁵⁶ In order to address the targets within the Declaration, education is increasingly emphasized as having a crucial role in the development of youth, which make up the majority of the population of many Arab states. In particular, in a statement made at the Fifth Arab Education Forum, attendees stated that Member States needed to “enhance the role of educational institutions as the driving force for modernization and progress, for civic values and democracy, for improved development indicators, and for promoting entrepreneurship and responsibility among our youth.”¹⁵⁷ Renewed attention on youth, and girls’ education in particular has resulted in improvements throughout the region. Which has lead the UN to state that the Arab region will meet the targets set forth in the MDGs, thus making progress that will allow women in particular to fully realize their right to education in the region.

Prior to this conference, regional conferences were held around the world, providing a space for nations to develop their own frameworks addressing the issues in the context of their specific needs. In 2000, the Regional Conference

¹⁵⁰ “About the Millennium Development Goals.” United Nations Development Program. <http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml>

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Waldorf, Lee. *Pathway to Equality: CEDAW, Beijing and the MDGs*. New York: UNIFEM. 2007.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ *Beijing Platform for Action*. Fourth World Conference on Women. September 1995.

¹⁵⁵ *Jomtien Declaration on Education for All*. World Education Forum. March 9, 1990.

¹⁵⁶ *The Dakar Framework for Action: Education for All, Meeting our Collective Commitments*. World Education Forum. April 28, 2000.

¹⁵⁷ “King Mohammad VI of Morocco’s Address to the Fifth Arab Education Forum.” Fifth Arab Education Forum. April 2, 2008.

on Education for All for the Arab States created the Arab Framework for Action to Ensure Basic Learning Needs in the Arab States in the Years 2000-2010 (AFfA). The document stated that a major goal of the region was continued emphasis on the role of education in achieving sustainable development by encouraging the creation of “educational programs that would bring the region into a position of world prominence in the next century.”¹⁵⁸ Two areas in particular which were identified as in need of special attention were the problem of illiteracy and the quality of education.¹⁵⁹ The AFfA resulted in the creation of a new blueprint for education in the Arab region, in response to current needs and issues that would supplement other goals. The seven additional objectives address issues ranging from vocational education to the improvement of educational governance and management. Objective 6 addresses women in particular, stating as its goal: “Full equality and effective participation in basic education for girls and women, and the elimination of gender biases and disparities in all schools and education systems.”¹⁶⁰

In order to assess progress being made towards the AFfA in particular, as well as other education related goals, the fifth Arab Education Forum (AEF) was held in April, 2008, and was sponsored by the Arab Thought Foundation, the Arab League for Education, Science & Culture (ALESCO), and the Islamic Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (ISESCO). Held in Skhirat, Morocco, the theme of the forum was the impact of globalization on education in the Arab region. Presenters focused on the fact that in spite of the widely held understanding that education is the “fundamental societal institution to disseminate knowledge between humans,” over 70 million Arab people, mostly women, are illiterate. This gap in awareness and measurable results was linked to several core issues, including globalization, conflict, and inadequate resources.¹⁶¹

In 2002, the UN Literacy Decade (UNLD) was established to be 2003-2012, with the passage of UN General Assembly resolution 56/116. The UNLD Plan of Action, which is executed by UNESCO, links the decade to human development by laying out the specific themes to focus on, such as gender, sustainable development, health, empowerment and peace. In 2007, Qatar hosted a regional conference entitled “Literacy Challenges in the Arab Region - Building Partnerships and Promoting Innovative Approaches.”¹⁶² This conference triggered a new commitment for literacy in the Arab states, particularly for the issues of: the right to literacy for all, with special regard for women and girls; the need for support to be extended to countries affected by conflict; the responsibility of a wide range of ministries and partners, in particular NGOs such as the Qatar Foundation, in promoting adult literacy; and the need for additional resources to achieve the literacy goals.¹⁶³

Poverty and Its Impact on Access to Education

Poverty is both a “cause of a lack of education, as well as an effect.”¹⁶⁴ Social and economic development is aided greatly by education, and it has long been established that education and literacy are “crucial for improving lives of people living in poverty.”¹⁶⁵ In addition, education can help alleviate “poverty by affecting labor productivity.”¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ *The Arab Framework for Action to Ensure Basic Learning Needs in the Arab States in the Years 2000-2010*. Regional Conference on Education for All Arab States. January 27, 2000.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ “Fifth Arab Education Forum - Skhirat, Morocco - April 2-4, 2008.” The Arab Thought Foundation. http://www.arabthought.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=325&Itemid=84&lang=en.

¹⁶² “Literacy Challenges in the Arab Region - Building Partners and Promoting Innovative Approaches.” UNESCO Regional Conferences. <https://www.e2mevents002.com/client/viewEvent.do?alias=IIE2007>.

¹⁶³ 177 EX/8. *United Nations Literacy Decade (2003-2012): Progress Report 2006-2007*. UNESCO. August 3, 2007.

¹⁶⁴ *The Arab Human Development Report 2005*. United Nations Development Program. 2006.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

Data has shown that the numbers of girls and women out of school increase in times of poverty and social crisis.¹⁶⁷ Families that are impoverished often need the women and girls to stay home and work domestically to contribute to the family's income, due to their own unemployment.¹⁶⁸ Unemployment is linked to education as well, because often there is not enough work available which does not require higher levels of schooling, leaving women and girls, as well as men, unable to find employment.¹⁶⁹ As a result of the lack of income, parents are also unable to pay for education.¹⁷⁰ In addition, children living in poverty often have a weaker performance than those who are not impoverished, leading governments to shift funds elsewhere; but a recent study done by a British NGO, showed that this is in large part due to the poorer quality of their schools.¹⁷¹

The UN has recommended several strategies to counteract the negative impact of poverty on women and girls, such as the targeting of poorer children for stipends and other educational support programs.¹⁷² In addition, it was also recommended that the poorest 20-25 percent of households should be prioritized in the distribution of funds for primary education, and the poorest 50 percent should be prioritized for support of secondary education.¹⁷³ At the secondary level, stipends to cover examination fees, as well as special courses on important vocational skills, have been shown to increase girls' enrollment.

In the Arab region, although girls' education has improved tremendously, according to the 2005 Arab Human Development Report, "women remain poorly prepared to participate effectively and fruitfully in public life," as a result of their inability to access education.¹⁷⁴ With the direct link between access to education and the eradication of poverty efforts within the Arab Region can have a dual purpose, indeed, a triple purpose in also assisting with improving gender equality, as improving education has been shown to do, if integrated together into development strategies.

Challenges to Providing Access during Times of Conflict or Emergency

According to the United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), over 70 countries are currently exposed to conflict, disaster, and/or instability.¹⁷⁵ Women and children are impacted disproportionately in all of these situations, many times as refugees or displaced persons. A basic problem when a crisis occurs is the destruction of a nation's infrastructure, including schools, as well as the inability of many nations to focus on education, when in the early stages of rebuilding.¹⁷⁶ Natural disasters can have as devastating effect on a nation, such as was seen in Mozambique in 1998, when a hurricane left over 280,000 children without access to schooling.¹⁷⁷ If education is still available, often learning instruments, such as books and school supplies, are

¹⁶⁷ "Education & Gender." United Nations Girls' Education Initiative. 2005.
http://www.ungei.org/news/index_687.html.

¹⁶⁸ *The Arab Human Development Report 2005*. United Nations Development Program. 2006.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ "Conflict and Crises: UNESCO Education." United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization. http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=14054&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

¹⁷⁶ "Scale of the problem: UNESCO Education." United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization." http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15621&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

unavailable, and instability can prevent students from accessing schools for fear of being caught in the middle of violence.¹⁷⁸

Palestine provides a rich example of a country which is currently attempting to develop an education system in the midst of a conflict. The gender inequality is greater in Palestine than in most other Arab countries, with only 15 percent of women employed, while 52 percent of men were employed in 2006.¹⁷⁹ According to the UN, gender equality is taken seriously within the Palestinian Ministry of Education, resulting in roughly 6 out of 10 women between the ages of 15 to 24 being enrolled in school. In spite of this, the numbers of women in the labor force or in public life have not risen significantly, with only 4.5 percent of young women being employed, compared to 29 percent of young men.¹⁸⁰

In spite of the general agreement by the Palestinian government over the right to education for women, the occupation significantly impacts the ability of the government to ensure this right is enjoyed. The UN Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has been successful in ensuring gender equality within its own education programs, but the organization reports a very high dropout rate for women, and general female involvement in education at a decline. This, as well as the overall collapse of Gaza's education system and education standards, has been attributed by UNRWA to the "cumulative effects of the occupation, closures, poverty and violence."¹⁸¹

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that primary school enrollment has fallen since 2001, from 98 percent to 92 percent, and in a theme commonly seen throughout developing countries, the gap between girls completing primary school (95 percent) and those completing secondary school (77 percent) is large.¹⁸² UNRWA, in its efforts to reinforce the crumbling education system and target women and girls in their programs, provided access to 250,000 girls to elementary and secondary schools, as well as gave 75 percent of all small education scholarships to girls.¹⁸³ UNICEF recently reported that schools have fallen far behind on their curriculum due to military operations, curfews and closures, both of which restrict residents' movement, closures, and a lack of resources.¹⁸⁴

In 2008, the UN reported that women and girls' access to education in Palestine was addressed with a small amount of success through several programs run by the World Bank (WB), the World Food Program (WFP), and UNIFEM. The WB supported the Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) which built schools for girls specifically, as well as constructed and rehabilitated community buildings and kindergartens¹⁸⁵ The WFP and UNIFEM partnered in a West Bank school feeding project which provided thousands of children, half of them girls, with a healthy midday snack which in turn is produced by over 200 disadvantaged women.¹⁸⁶

There are many other similar programs aimed at providing access to education in the midst of the conflict, but in spite of the success of their efforts, many more plans are being halted due to the inability of the international community to access the areas in most need. For example, over one million dollars worth of supplies are being barred from entering Gaza, and have been for months, because the Israeli government fears supplying groups within

¹⁷⁸ "Scale of the problem: UNESCO Education." United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization." http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15621&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

¹⁷⁹ E/CN.6/2006/6. *Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women*. Commission on the Status of Women. December 3, 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ "UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update: oPt - April 4, 2008." UN Children's Fund. http://www.unicef.org/oPt/HAU_4_April_full_report.pdf.

¹⁸⁵ E/CN.6/2006/6. *Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women*. Commission on the Status of Women. December 3, 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

Palestine.¹⁸⁷ In addition, factional violence within Gaza and the West Bank often prevents supplies from arriving where they are needed. Conflict situations, such as the one in Palestine, pose difficult challenges to the international community. This in turn encourages special attention given to marginalized groups, such as women and children in all stages of reconstruction.¹⁸⁸

Conclusion

The root cause of the denial of women and girls' right to education is gender inequality. Women and men have prescribed roles based in societal expectations, which often can be challenged when women attempt to gain an education, resulting in a negative reaction from members of society who are resistant to change. With the application of international human rights norms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to the Arab world, critics have raised several significant issues. The biggest issue that has been voiced within Arab states is that the concept of "women's empowerment" which is what application of the UDHR results in is being imposed by the West and has not organically emerged from either the realities or needs of Arab societies.¹⁸⁹ The adoption of gender perspectives into policy in many Arab States has therefore been difficult and slow, owing to the fragile balance between what is seen as global norms and fundamental human rights and the historical perception of these ideals by the Arab world.¹⁹⁰

According to the United Nations, the Arab region as a whole has made solid progress towards providing equal access to education, and is on track towards meeting their goals by the year 2015.¹⁹¹ Between 1980 and 2001, the region had the highest average annual rate of increase in net enrolment/attendance ratios.¹⁹² By 2005, Arab states will have around 94 girls to every 100 boys in school.¹⁹³ Broadly generalizing this region can be misleading though, because the regional data in particular often masks wider gaps in educational equality in specific countries or sub-regions. In 2003, a little less than 50 percent of the region's population was estimated to be illiterate, representing one of the highest female illiteracy rates in the world, but in Yemen only 30 percent of women were found to be literate, compared with 70 percent of men. The greatest success in closing the gender gap can be found in the countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These nations lead the region, with not only the highest literacy rates, but the highest enrollment rates at all levels of education, from primary to tertiary, significantly influencing the region's appearance of overall success in this area.¹⁹⁴

Gender parity has been achieved at the primary education level in the GCC countries, and is almost closed in the Mashreq (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syrian Arab Republic) and Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, and Tunisia).¹⁹⁵ The Arab Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs), which is Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, are still behind the rest of the region. As in the rest of the world, the gender disparity grows in higher levels of education. In the Arab LDCs, according to the UN, only 8 girls receive secondary education, compared to 10 boys. The other three sub-regions have attained close to parity, if

¹⁸⁷ "UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update: oPT - April 4, 2008." UN Children's Fund. http://www.unicef.org/oPt/HAU_4_April_full_report.pdf.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ *The Arab Human Development Report 2005*. United Nations Development Program. 2006.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ *Gender Achievements and Prospects in Education - The GAP Report*. UNICEF. New York: UNICEF. 2005.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ *The Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2005*. United Nations. 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

not parity itself at the secondary level, and some Mashreq countries register gender parity greater than 1 at the tertiary level.¹⁹⁶

Progress towards achieving the various goals the Arab states have set for themselves is going to be slow and uneven across the region. The need for gender equality is pervasive within all aspects of society, not just education, because in order to ensure women are enjoying their rights equally in one area, women must be able to access their rights in others. The challenges that the Arab region faces are complex, but the framework has been laid out, and the tools are ready to be used. Women have been repeatedly shown to be invaluable members of society; therefore their full participation will only help the Arab region in their social and economic development in years to come.

Committee Directive

In discussing ways to improve access to education, what best practices can you identify that have already been proven to be successful in the Arab region? Can these practices be scaled up? How can information communication technology (ICT) and media be utilized effectively to ensure women are enjoying their rights? What efforts are being made to address the specific needs of refugees and internally displaced persons? What programs and policies have been developed as a result of the Dakar framework, particularly in the Arab region? How can education initiatives be linked to other development issues, particularly those addressed in the MDGs, such as health and the environment?

III. To the Future: Creating Peace In Iraq

Introduction

Iraq has been at the center of conflict for decades; whether due to conflict over oil, power, land, or some combination of the three, Iraq's people have endured war, violence, and occupations that have at times left them with no government of their own, dependent on Western nations. Since the chaos which seemed to define Iraqi society in 2006 and part of 2007, violence is down by over 90percent, with civilian deaths at an all time low of 700 per month.¹⁹⁷ Although promising, Iraq's history of instability causes much concern, as does the example set by Afghanistan as a state struggling to rebuild post-U.S. involvement.

The major issues facing Iraq as the state works to create peace are (1) its deep-rooted divisions between major groups, such as the Shiias and the Sunnis; (2) the relationship with the U.S. and other Western allies; (3) improvement of an already weak relationship with the Arab League and other major Arab states; and (4) relations with Iran. The complexity of the country's history colored with the current challenges facing the nation create a situation that will not be solved overnight, but if addressed properly can improve in such a way that will provide stability to the people of Iraq, and some semblance of peace in one corner of the Arab world.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Stephen Biddle. "How to Leave a Stable Iraq: Building on Progress." Council on Foreign Relations. September/October 2008. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87503-p20/stephen-biddle-michael-e-o-hanlon-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq.htm>

History of Iraq since 1917

Following the end of World War I, the predecessor to the United Nations, the League of Nations “gave the United Kingdom a mandate to administer Iraq,” a decision which was resented by many Iraqis.¹⁹⁸ To the population’s great relief, Iraq became a sovereign state on October 13, 1932, and soon after, a member of the League of Nations.¹⁹⁹ The young state was plagued with a “complex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts,” which were impacted by the “imposition of fixed boundaries [which] triggered intense competition for power of the new entity.”²⁰⁰ All of these factors severely “retarded the process of state formation,” and led to the British-imposed political system being overwhelmed by conflicting demands from the various factions within Iraq, including Sunnis, Shi'a, Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi nationalists.²⁰¹

King Faisal, the reigning monarch of Iraq, died in 1933, causing instability within the nation and leading to the first military coup d'état in the modern Arab world in 1936.²⁰² In 1939, King Ghazi, who had assumed the throne following the death of King Faisal, was killed in a car accident.²⁰³ The country’s situation became even more unstable until the overthrow of the entire monarchical system of government on July 14, 1958 by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade, under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al karim Qasim and Colonel Abd as Aalaam Arif.²⁰⁴ According to historians, the July 14 Revolution was:

“The culmination of a series of uprisings and coup attempts that began with the 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup and included the 1941 Rashid Ali military movement, the 1948 Wathbah Uprising, and the 1952 and 1956 protests. The revolution radically altered Iraq's social structure, destroying the power of the landed sheikhs and the absentee landlords while enhancing the position of the urban workers, the peasants, and the middle class. In altering the old power structure, however, the revolution revived long-suppressed sectarian, tribal, and ethnic conflicts. The strongest of these conflicts were those between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shi'a.”²⁰⁵

In 1968, following several other coups, General Ahmen Hassan Al-Bakr became President of Iraq with the aid of the Baath party and military officers.²⁰⁶ Less than a decade later, Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq with the goal of making Iraq, in light of Egypt’s isolation following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, a leader in the Arab world.²⁰⁷ Saddam’s rule is marked with conflict namely that external conflict with Iran, a neighboring state they invaded in 1979, as well as the internal violence inflicted upon the Kurdish people.²⁰⁸ The war between Iran and

¹⁹⁸ “About Iraq.” Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2003. <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/aboutiraq/default.aspx?pageid=38>

¹⁹⁹ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. “Iraq as an Independent Republic.” *Iraq: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 1990. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+iq0020\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0020))

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ “About Iraq.” Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2003. <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/aboutiraq/default.aspx?pageid=38>

²⁰⁴ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. “Republican Iraq.” *Iraq: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 1990. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+iq0021\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0021))

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ “About Iraq.” Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2003. <http://www.mofa.gov.iq/english/aboutiraq/default.aspx?pageid=38>

²⁰⁷ Helen Chapin Metz, ed. “The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79.” *Iraq: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 1990. [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+iq0023\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0023))

²⁰⁸ *Country Profile: Iraq*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress - Federal Research Division. 2006. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Iraq.pdf>

Iraq killed between 500,000 and 1 million people, and lasted until 1988.²⁰⁹ In 1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait, triggering the Gulf War in which a US led force organized by the UN forced Iraq to withdraw.²¹⁰ Arms restrictions that occurred as a result of the Gulf War lasted until the early 2000s and “became the subject of international controversy.”²¹¹

The 1990’s “were marked by new moves towards autonomy by the Kurds, periodic Iraqi resistance to arms inspections and ‘no fly’ restrictions in northern and southern Iraq, and progressive deterioration of living standards in Iraq because of international sanctions.”²¹² During this time period, several UN programs attempted to relieve the crisis domestically, such as the UN Oil-for-Food program, but marred with corruption charges, most of these programs were not successful.²¹³ Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. “reassessed” their policy towards many Arab states, including Iraq, due in part to their belief that Iraq had supported the 2001 attacks. In spite of the agreement of Iraq to an “unconditional arms inspection” in 2002, the U.S. led a “coalition force” which invaded Iraq in 2003 and subsequently removed Saddam Hussein from power.²¹⁴

With the removal of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority was established in mid-2003 by the U.S., and renamed an interim Coalition Governing Council of Iraqis.²¹⁵ In spite of “insurgent and terrorist activities” which blocked the “normalization of government and services, primarily in Sunni-dominated central Iraq, a provisional Iraqi government assumed nominal control in mid-2004.”²¹⁶ Throughout 2005, preparations were made for a national referendum on the new constitution, and in October 2005, following the approval of the Constitution by Iraqi voters, a permanent parliament was established.²¹⁷ Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki was approved in June 2006 following vigorous debate over power distribution within the parliament.²¹⁸

Arab League Involvement in Iraq

In 2003, with the beginning of the Iraq War, the Arab League split into the same lines that had divided the Arab world during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.²¹⁹ The divisions were between both those who either refused to “publicly object to the U.S.-led military deployments” or outright supported the war, which included the states of the Arabian Gulf, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and those who opposed the war, namely Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.²²⁰ In September 2003, diplomatic recognition was extended to the interim government in Iraq, and in 2006 the League formally opened its diplomatic mission in Baghdad, followed by the opening of embassies from many Arab League states. The lack of embassies from either the League or its members was an issue that had caused tension for years between the Iraqi government and its fellow Arab states.²²¹

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Michael Moran. “The Arab League and Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations. October 20, 2005. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9061/arab_league_and_iraq.html

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ “Arab League names new envoy to Iraq.” Xinhuanet News Agency. July 31, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/31/content_8881960.htm

In spite of the diplomatic overtures made by the Arab League, the Government of Iraq has repeatedly expressed frustration at the Arab League's inaction and lack of assistance in the months following the fall of Saddam Hussein.²²² This lack of assistance "underscored ethnic and religious suspicions that Iraqi Kurds and Shiites feel toward the Arab League, most of whose twenty-two member states are ruled by Sunni Arabs."²²³ Exacerbating this opinion within Iraq were demands made by the Arab League over the past several years regarding Iraq's constitution - demands many felt were biased towards Islam and only targeted at Iraq and not other states, such as Sudan, who were also in the process of drafting a new constitution.²²⁴ The League backed up their demands by voicing concern for what they view as a "Shiite bias on the part of Iraq's Shiite-led government."²²⁵ In 2007, members of the League emphasized this opinion by issuing "the strongest statement yet that they blame the Iraqi government for the country's sectarian strife," saying, "the Iraqi government is responsible for defusing the sectarian violence tearing the country apart and should redraft the constitution and rescind laws that give preferential treatment to Shiites and Kurds."²²⁶

Accompanying this statement were four recommendations from League members to the Government of Iraq: (1) expansion of the political process to achieve broader participation of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds; (2) confrontation of sectarian tensions and working to eliminate them; (3) speeding up constitutional reform; and (4) ensuring the equal distribution of wealth.²²⁷ In addition, the states "called for revoking an Iraqi law that dismissed members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party from the government and urged the government to pass a law that specifically says Iraqis should be treated equally based on their citizenship, not their religion or ethnicity."²²⁸ The statement also "called on the Iraqi government to disband Shiite militias, end armed demonstrations and decide on a specific timeframe for the withdrawal of foreign troops."²²⁹ Finally, since the beginning of the Iraq War, the Arab League repeatedly looked to the UN Security Council as a "mechanism for ending strife," and once again reiterated this belief to the Iraqi Government in the statement.²³⁰

Despite Arabs feeling increasingly "more and more cut off from Iraq, to the point that some Arab diplomats now acknowledge that Iraq is lost to Iran for many years to come," the League continues to make diplomatic overtures in hopes that their presence will inspire a shift in opinion both in and out of Iraq.²³¹ Ambassador Hani Khallaf, an Egyptian diplomat, was named as Arab League Envoy in July 2008, following the resignation of Moukhtar Lamani of Morocco in 2007.²³² Ambassador Lamani stated upon leaving his post that "there was no profound and effective political will on the part of Arab countries to support the declared wish to help Iraqis out," and his leaving as very much based in "security concerns and a lack of Arab interest in promoting relations with Iraq."²³³ Arab League Spokesman Abdel-Aleem al-Abyad, counteracted this statement in 2008 by arguing that the decision to appoint a

²²² Michael Moran. "The Arab League and Iraq." Council on Foreign Relations. October 20, 2005. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9061/arab_league_and_iraq.html

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Salah Nasrawi. "Arab League: Iraq Must Defuse Conflict." The Washington Post. March 4, 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/AR2007030400878.html>

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Dina Ezzat. "Baghdad's new arrival." Al-Ahram Weekly. August 2008. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/909/re62.htm>

²³² Salah Nasrawi. "Arab League: Iraq Must Defuse Conflict." The Washington Post. March 4, 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/AR2007030400878.html>

²³³ Dina Ezzat. "Baghdad's new arrival." Al-Ahram Weekly. August 2008. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/909/re62.htm>

new envoy “is a step forward to enhance the Arab presence in Iraq. It means the organization is keen on boosting ties with various factions in Iraq and offering more help for Iraqis” and not, as Ambassador Lamani stated, lacking political will or motivation.²³⁴ Ambassador Khalif, who has repeatedly articulated that he is “not at all worried” about Lamani’s experience in Iraq, laid out the relationship he felt would be possible between the Arab League and Iraq in June 2008, saying that focusing on the “developmental and economic dimensions” of Iraq are key.²³⁵ Specifically, discovering ways to “deliver Arab and international aid to all Iraqis in a more practical manner, regardless of political, sectarian or ethnic considerations,” would hopefully be a priority in coming months, as long as political and security situations remained stable.²³⁶ In March 2008, the stability of the Arab League and its relationship with Iraq was called into question with the end of the annual League Summit, held this year in Damascus, Syria.²³⁷

At the final session, Iraqi Vice-President Adil Abdul-Menhi said “Iraq was formally expressing its reservations” about the final summit declaration, indicating it was different than what had been agreed to during the closed session. His biggest concern was that it “failed to pledge support for the Iraqi government in its efforts toward national reconciliation or to condemn terrorism and violence.”²³⁸ Although the objections were noted, no changes were made to the document, which called for “Iraq to disband all militias and work to speed up the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country.”²³⁹ This new event has brought to light the fact that there are still deep divisions between the Arab League and the Iraqi Government which need to be addressed in order for future efforts to be successful.

The top priorities of the Arab League in the coming years center on the resurrection of the comprehensive Iraq Reconciliation Plan, “with major and effective participation on the part of the Arab League,” as well as the achievement of an “agreement of understanding on areas of common interest to be agreed upon” with all regional and international parties, including Iran, Turkey, the United States, Britain and Syria.²⁴⁰ In addition, according to Ambassador Khallaf, “secure communication channels to reach and approach all groups and all political, religious, sectarian and ethnic strata” will be developed to facilitate the League’s achievement of its goals.²⁴¹ He emphasized that with the current situation as it is, the Arab League has an opportunity to grow as an organization, but can only do so by communicating openly with the Iraqi people the “fully integrated decisions, approaches, expectations, and hopes” the League has, as well as how Iraqis can be involved in implementing decisions made at the regional level.²⁴² A final priority for the organization is the creation of an agreement surrounding a mechanism for dealing with neighboring and other countries which will be uniform throughout the Arab League, allowing for broader consensus building.²⁴³

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Abdul-Sattar Ibrahim. “Arab League Outlines Priorities in Iraq.” Asharaq Alawsat Newspaper. June 8, 2008. <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=13642>

²³⁶ Abdul-Sattar Ibrahim. “Arab League Outlines Priorities in Iraq.” Asharaq Alawsat Newspaper. June 8, 2008. <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=13642>

²³⁷ Challiss McDonough. “Arab Summit Closes Amid Sharp Divisions.” Voice of America. March 30, 2008. <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2008-03/2008-03-30-voa15.cfm?CFID=26446786&CFTOKEN=95402723>

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Abdul-Sattar Ibrahim. “Arab League Outlines Priorities in Iraq.” Asharaq Alawsat Newspaper. June 8, 2008. <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=13642>

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

In line with the Arab League's goal to address the developmental and economic dimensions of Iraq, is a "massive campaign" launched in early 2008 along with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).²⁴⁴ The campaign is aimed at helping the over 4.2 million Iraqi refugees through fundraising and public awareness raising, and is called "Arabs Hand-in-Hand with Iraqis."²⁴⁵ The UNHCR estimates that more than 2 million Iraqis are "currently displaced within their own country, while over 2 million others have fled to other countries," mainly Syria and Jordan, particularly in the urban areas of Damascus and Amman.²⁴⁶ Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa, commented that the program was above all else a "show of support and solidarity for displaced Iraqis."²⁴⁷ He continued on to say that the League was hoping and counting on "the generosity of Arabs to lend a supporting hand to the most vulnerable of Iraqis in neighboring countries."²⁴⁸ In an unprecedented move, the League began collecting funds for Iraqi refugees in September 2007, a sign that the issues between Iraq and the League were, if not being worked out, being set aside in order to concentrate on the needs of the people of Iraq.²⁴⁹ Beyond assistance to the refugees, the program also assists governments in the region to "cope" with the massive amount of refugees who are straining already fragile social services, such as education and health, and other basic infrastructure systems.²⁵⁰

Historical Relations with Iran

It has been suggested that Iraq shares a conflict with Iran, its neighbor to the East, which dates back centuries and is founded in the ethnic conflict between Persian Iran and Arab Iraq, and the religious conflict between the Shi'a majority in Iran and the Sunni leadership in Iraq.²⁵¹ However, much of the recent scholarship related to Iranian-Iraqi relations instead argues that the two States could coexist and that the conflicts of recent decades are symptoms not of longstanding geopolitical disputes but consequences of similarly recent events.²⁵² The political and religious elements of recent history between the States help to explain why the relationship between Iraq and Iran are as complicated, and strained, as they are today.

Prior to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran was one of the United States' "twin pillars," along with Saudi Arabia, that promoted Western influence in the region.²⁵³ In July 1979, Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq, and a few months later, the Iranian revolution brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power and the current Islamic Republic of Iran into existence.²⁵⁴ From 1965 to 1978, Khomeini had lived in the Shi'a holy city of Najaf in Iraq, and grew to have a mistrust of the ruling Iraqi Ba'ath Party, of which Hussein was also a part of; upon taking over in

²⁴⁴ "Arab League to launch massive campaign for Iraqi refugees with UN help." UN News Centre. January 10, 2008. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25258&Cr=Iraq&Cr1>

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ "Arab League to launch massive campaign for Iraqi refugees with UN help." UN News Centre. January 10, 2008. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25258&Cr=Iraq&Cr1>

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ "Arab League to launch massive campaign for Iraqi refugees with UN help." UN News Centre. January 10, 2008. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25258&Cr=Iraq&Cr1>

²⁵¹ Corey Flintoff. "Religion, History Shape Iraq's Relationship with Iran." National Public Radio. August 2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=13863435>

²⁵² Anoushiravan Ehteshami. "Iran-Iraq Relations After Saddam." The Washington Quarterly. 2003: pp. 1-2.

²⁵³ Mjr. Randy B. Bell. "Expansion of American Persian Gulf Policy." Global Security. 1990. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/BRB.htm>

²⁵⁴ Anoushiravan Ehteshami. "Iran-Iraq Relations After Saddam." The Washington Quarterly. 2003: pp. 1-2.

late 1979, and despite Hussein's lesser role in Iraq during his time there, Khomeini distrusted Hussein personally.²⁵⁵ Iraq began shelling into Iran within months of the transitions, and in September 1980 invaded Iran.

Hussein's secular-nationalist leanings, when contrasted with Khomeini's theocratic ideology, as well as the Ayatollah's overthrow of key American ally Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (whereas Saddam had merely succeeded another member of the same party), led to the United States and its allies upending the "twin pillars" doctrine of US President Richard Nixon, and under former US President Ronald Reagan began supporting the Iraqi government during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.²⁵⁶ In December 1983, Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld, finalized an agreement with Hussein for Iraq to receive American support during the war.²⁵⁷ France also aided Iraq by giving it access to an anti-ship weapons system, which Iraq used extensively against Iran's Gulf shipping during the war.²⁵⁸ The American support of the Shah and of Iraq during the war, despite a brief addendum to American policy in the form of American support of Iran during the Iran-Contra affair, form the foundations of current Iranian mistrust of the West; the Iraq-Iran War's impact has yet to fade on modern Iraqi-Iranian relations.²⁵⁹

The religious majorities of both States' populations is Shi'a, but to a lesser extent in Iraq. Eighty-nine percent of Iranians are Shi'a, while nine percent are Sunni.²⁶⁰ By contrast, between sixty-two and sixty-seven percent of Iraqis are Shi'a and thirty-two to thirty-seven percent are Sunni.²⁶¹ This helps to illuminate the key contradiction in the history of Iranian-Iraqi relations; even as the governments have historically had negative relations with one another, the countries share a religious tie that led Shi'a of both States to go to the other country. Khomeini visited Iraq in the 1970s, and current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was exiled to Iran during the later reign of Saddam Hussein.²⁶² Some of the primary opponents to American intervention and military presence in Iraq have also spent time in Iran; most notable among these is Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army.²⁶³ The contradiction is that despite these religious ties among the opposition to America and the Iraqi government of al-Maliki and his post-Saddam predecessors, the anti-nationalist nature of Iranian backing has negative consequences as well; the example of al-Sadr's support declining since his self-imposed exile to Iran fits here as well.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ "Rumsfeld-Hussein Handshake." December 20, 1983. <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2763509924114159191>

²⁵⁸ "Rumsfeld-Hussein Handshake." Wall Street Journal. 1983. http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OB-AC875_handsh_20060908163855.jpg

²⁵⁹ Anoushiravan Ehteshami. "Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam." The Washington Quarterly. 2003: p. 3.

²⁶⁰ "Iran." World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. August 7, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>

²⁶¹ "Iraq." World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. August 7, 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>

²⁶² Lionel Beehner. "Iran's Involvement in Iraq." Council on Foreign Relations. March 3, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/>

²⁶³ Stephen Biddle. "How to Leave a Stable Iraq: Building on Progress." Council on Foreign Relations. September/October 2008. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87503-p20/stephen-biddle-michael-e-o-hanlon-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq.htm>

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

Relations with and Influence from the United States and Iran

Iran and Iraq have diplomatic ties, and have spoken frequently with one another over issues primarily related to their shared border; the highest level these conversations reached took place in August 2007, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinajad visited Iraq and met with Prime Minister al-Maliki.²⁶⁵ Conversations between Iran and the United States regarding Iraqi security have taken place at a lower level as well, between the US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi; this latter discussion and its exclusion of Iraqi representation met with disapproval by the Iraqi government.²⁶⁶

Relations are volatile, however, between the States due to allegations of Iranian influence in the Iraqi government and interference in Iraqi affairs, including “material support” for destabilizing activities, leveled at the Iranians by both the Iraqi and American governments.²⁶⁷ American officials have accused Iran of supplying Shi’a militias with arms, and of training some militias directly through a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.²⁶⁸ Additionally, both Iraq (under the government of Ayad Allawi) and the United States have accused Iran of influencing Iraqi elections through pressure placed on religious institutions in majority-Shi’a areas by sending students belonging to Iranian intelligence, ostensibly to visit Shi’a religious sites in Iraq.²⁶⁹ The allegations of an American analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Mounir Elkhamri, also include the mass migration of Shi’a into Iraq to obtain citizenship and vote themselves in Iraqi elections.²⁷⁰ The Iraqi government has its own concerns with Iran as well; al-Maliki said he “[did] not know” if Iran was doing all it could do to ensure stability in Iraq, its stated goal for its neighbor.²⁷¹ The Sunni groups are often more blunt about their greater mistrust of majority-Shi’a Iran; Alla Mekki of the Accordance Front, a coalition of Sunni political parties, stated flatly, “The evidences of interference are many.”²⁷²

Less violent influence is also exerted upon Iraq by Iran, according to the United States, including a free-trade zone in southern Iraq where the Iranian rial is accepted currency.²⁷³ Iran also intends to build a national bank branch in Baghdad, and a highway to link some of its western-most cities with Basra.²⁷⁴ Social ties are also a means of influence; while the American government has cited these as methods through which influence is used, the Iraqi government itself has not made any statements of opposition to these more innocuous forms of Iranian influence over its neighbor.²⁷⁵

Despite these allegations and mistrust, the official policy of both Iran and Iraq is that there must be a partnership between both States to ensure Iraqi stability; Iran’s President has called for regional involvement in Iraq

²⁶⁵ Corey Flintoff. “Religion, History Shape Iraq’s Relationship with Iran.” National Public Radio. August 2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=13863435>

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Lionel Beehner. “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 3, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/>

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Mounir Elkhamri. “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq.” The Jamestown Foundation. January 2007. <http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-IranContributionIraq.pdf>

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Corey Flintoff. “Religion, History Shape Iraq’s Relationship with Iran.” National Public Radio. August 2007. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=13863435>

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Lionel Beehner. “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 3, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/>

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Lionel Beehner. “Iran’s Involvement in Iraq.” Council on Foreign Relations. March 3, 2008. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12521/>

stabilization, including the use of neighboring countries' troops once the United States ends its presence in Iraq.²⁷⁶ Ahmadinajad noted, however, that while he has "never said" Iran would send in troops to stabilize Iraq after the American withdrawal, all neighboring States "must protect the State of Iraq."²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ C. Onut Ant. "Iran: regional countries should help Iraq." Associated Press. August 16, 2008. http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gdmglKkfijwZ7VZRq0CMR_eOTH_wD92IOCFG0

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

Conclusion

Since the American-led invasion into Iraq in 2003, instability in Iraq has been the only constant. In order to stabilize Iraq, it will be necessary to neutralize internal elements such as sectarian militias, terrorist groups and pro-secession Kurdish groups. It will also be necessary to work with Iran to settle the final relationship of the two States, and to settle the final outcome of the American military presence in Iraq. For the League of Arab States, this has been a challenging endeavor; the League's policy towards Iraq has changed in notable ways, but it will be up to the League to adapt their policy in the future to achieve a lasting, sustainable peace in Iraq.

Committee Directive

What is your State's diplomatic relationship with Iraq? With the United States? With Iran? What is your State's trade relationship with Iraq? What is your State's position on Iranian involvement in Iraq? What is your State's position on the American military presence in Iraq? How does your State view elections, and how does your State view the fairness of Iraqi elections? What is the religious makeup of your population? Did your State historically support the Iraqis or the American-led coalition during the Gulf War in 1990-91? Is your State more unified by religious, national or ethnic ties, and how does your State believe Iraq should be unified? How can Iraqi stability be supported by the Arab League while maintaining popular support in Iraq? How can non-LAS foreign involvement in Iraq be limited while achieving this goal?

Technical Appendix Guide

Topic I: Conflicts and Natural Resource Management in the Arab Region

United Nations Development Program. (2006). *Human Development Report 2006*. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr06-complete.pdf>

The Human Development Report is a valuable resource, as it frames debates within the international community on some of the most important current global issues. The 2006 Report is focused on the “Global Water Crisis.” Among some of the issues addressed, are the links between poverty, power and inequality which cause the crisis, as well as the economic forces which drive the shortage. This resource is useful in gaining a global perspective on the water crisis.

World Water Week Secretariat. (2007). *World Water Week Synthesis Report: Progress and Prospects on Water - Striving for Sustainability in a Changing World*. http://www.worldwaterweek.org/Downloads/Synthesis_07_web.pdf

This document, produced by the Secretariat of the World Water Week in collaboration with the Stockholm international Water Institute, synthesizes a wide range of issues, ideas and viewpoints addressed throughout the week. The document contains the overarching consultations from the 2007 week, commentary from attendees, recommendations from seminars and workshops, and summaries of important thematic issues addressed. This document is a great resource for anyone wanting to gain a better handle on the current discourse in the field of water management.

World Water Council. (2008). <http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=6>

This website provides a rich abundance of resources on water, from issues such as “Financing Water for All” to the Right to Water to Water Politics. In addition, as the overarching organization in charge of organizing the World Water Forum, the Council has links to previous forums, and documents from the events, such as reports and presentations. This website should be a major resource for delegates doing research on water policy.

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. (2007). “Sustainable Development and Productivity.” <http://www.escwa.un.org/divisions/teams.asp?teams=Water%20and%20Environment%20Issues&division=SDPD>

This website is hosted by the UN Economic & Social Commission for Western Asia (ECSWA) in an effort to bring attention to the importance these issues have in the Arab Region. The website notes that the region suffers from pressures and deficiencies in regard to natural resources, and action is being taken regionally to address these deficiencies. The website is useful in highlighting Arab specific programs and initiatives that are helpful in researching what is being implemented on a regional level in regards to water management.

Environmental Literacy Council. (2008). “Conflict & Natural Resources.” <http://www.enviroliteracy.org/subcategory.php/222.html>

This document provides a foundation for further research on the issue of conflict and natural resources. Beyond the basic information provided, the article delves into the multi-faceted ways in which natural resources are used in conflict, such as weapons. This source is relevant for any delegate doing research on these issues and should be one of the websites visited.

American University. (2004). "The Inventory of Conflict & the Environment." <http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/ice.htm>

This website is an invaluable resource for research on the issue of conflict and natural resources. The website provides over 200 case studies of occurrences of conflict over environmental issues. Although the case studies were mostly written before 2004, the abundance of the studies as well as the comprehensiveness of them are invaluable when researching Arab-specific conflicts in particular.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (2008). "Environmental Change & Security Program." http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1413&fuseaction=topics.categoryview&categoryid=C993E018-B6AE-0AB8-503B7CFEF89B59C0

The Environmental Change & Security Program has as its goal to explore the connections among major environmental challenges, such as water scarcity and resource depletion, and conflict, human insecurity and foreign policy. The Middle East section of the program is very useful when researching this issue due to the updated information available on the website, as well as to the large number of publications on the issue that are available. This resource is key when doing research on conflict and natural resources.

United Nations Environment Program. (2008). "Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch." <http://postconflict.unep.ch/>

The Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch (PCDMB) of the UN Environmental Program works in situations where the environment is impacted by conflicts and disasters, or where the environment is a factor contributing to conflicts and disaster impacts. The major areas of focus include several states in the Arab region, namely Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. The website provides a large number of resources on post-conflict environmental management in those specific areas, which is very useful for future delegate research.

II. For Women: Improving Rights and Access to Education for Development

Akanksha A. Marphatia. (2005). *Creating an enabling environment for girls' and women's participation in education.*

This report details the recent efforts of the international community in developing and implementing policy which aims to reduce inequality in education. The document begins by summarizing key international agreements, such as the MDGs, CEDAW and the BPfA, then begins to link education with other important global issues, such as health and the economy. This report is very useful in gaining a broader perspective of the issue as well as a better understanding of how education impacts all other aspects of life for women in developing countries.

Center of Arab Women for Training and Research (CAWTAR). (2003). *Arab Adolescent Girls: Reality and Prospects.*

This report is the second issue of the Arab Women Development Report and aims to address the complex situation of Arab women and girls when going through or dealing with adolescence. The document contains a general framework for the issue at hand, case studies, analysis and recommendations for future action. This report is useful for research on girls and the roadblocks facing.

Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia. (2005). *The MDGs in the Arab Region.*

This resource is the report of a collaborative effort between the UN and regional bodies as a way document progress made in reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for the 2005 World Summit. Not only does the report provide an overview of progress in the Arab region towards the targets, but it also highlights key challenges and current issues facing the region. The document is relevant for this topic due to its information regarding the goals which focus on education as well as for its broad look at the current economic and social situation in the Arab region.

Marina Ottaway. (2004). *Women's Rights and Democracy in the Arab World*.

This report was published by the Carnegie Endowment as a way to clarify for interested persons, the rights of women and the status of democracy in the Arab world. The document highlights current trends in the region, and suggests ways for improvement in America's policy towards the area. Although this document is not about education, it does provide its reader a better understanding of basic rights afforded to women in the region, which in turn will help when researching women's specific rights and education.

Mr. V. Munoz Villalobos. (2006). *Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Girls' right to education (E/CN.4/2006/45)*.

This report focuses on the basic right of girls to education within a framework of international agreements and initiatives, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA). This document gives an overview of obstacles to girls' attainment of an education, as well as the underlying social issues, such as patriachalism and discrimination, which prevent girls from enjoying their rights equally with boys. This document should be one of the first documents referred to by delegates because of the comprehensive overview it provides as well as the information provided on aspects of this topic not usually discussed.

Save the Children. (2005). *State of the World's Mothers 2005*.

This report was published in commemoration of Mother's Day and is the sixth in an annual series written by the Save the Children organization. The document focuses on girls' education in recognition of the importance education plays in women's lives around the world. The document is useful to delegates because it provides recommendations and analysis for future action on the issue.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. (2005). *'Scaling up' good practices in girls' education*.

This report was published by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with the goal of identifying and exploring strategies utilized by states in meeting international targets and national goals for "universalizing" girls' access to, retention in and completion of quality education. In addition, the document refers to the Education for All (EFA) framework and focuses attention on using the EFA movement as a pathway to greater attention and funding of girls' education initiatives around the world. This document is very useful in developing a deeper understanding of what is current in terms of girls' and women's education efforts.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. (2008). *Gender Parity in Education: Not There Yet*.

This document was published in an effort to address the current status of the global community in achieving gender parity in education by 2015. The document is a "snapshot" of the current progress around the world and highlights the enormous work there still needs to be done in reducing gender disparities in education. This document is useful in that it contains the most recent data on women and education around the world.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2006). *Education of Women and Girls*.

This document was published in 2006 by UNESCO as a way to outline the key issues facing women in the field of education. The factsheet provides a short overview of how education can be a tool in reducing poverty for women, UNESCO's activities in this area, and regional efforts. This document should be a core resource for any delegate researching women and education and can be utilized as a jumping off point for future research.

United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women. (2007). *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of and assistance to Palestinian women (E/CN.6/2008/6)*.

This document is a report put forth by the UN Secretary-General in accordance with Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution 2007/7. The report summarizes the situation of Palestinian women from late

2006 to late 2007 with special attention to the assistance provided by members of the UN system in addition to detailed information regarding humanitarian assistance, economic activities, education and training, health and the human rights of women. This document also contains recommendations for further action, which is very useful when examining Palestinian women as a case study within the topic of Arab women and education.

Topic III: To the Future: Creating Peace In Iraq

Pan, Esther. (2004). "Iraq: The Egypt Conference." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/7629/iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D3%26id%3D405%26filter%3D2004

This article outlines the proceedings of the conference held in Egypt in 2004 which discussed the future of Iraq as well as other regional challenges. Within the document, the attendees, key issues discussed, and the outcomes are detailed. This source is helpful in gaining a deeper understanding of the relationship between Iraq and the rest of the Arab states as well as another perspective on key actors' positions on Iraq, such as the U.S. and Great Britain.

Beehner, Lionel. (2006). "Iran's Goals in Iraq." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9930/irans_goals_in_iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26type%3Dbackgrounder%26filter%3D405%26page%3D3

This document gives a comprehensive overview of Iran's main goals in Iraq, ranging from their interest in Iraq's form of government, religious practices, and economy. This article, although written in 2006, provides a detailed analysis of Iran's policy and what impact it is having in Iraq as their government is forming. This piece is particularly useful for delegates when researching additional information concerning Iraq and regional neighbors, particularly Iran, and the influence they can have on the young government.

Bruno, Greg. (2008). "What are Iraq's Benchmarks?" Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/13333/what_are_iraqs_benchmarks.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26type%3Dbackgrounder%26filter%3D405%26page%3D2

This article is a result of several reports written in 2007 which articulate the need for further clarification regarding "benchmarks" which measure Iraqi progress. Within this article are definitions and explanations of the benchmarks used by the international community as well as an accounting of what might occur if Iraq does not meet the benchmarks set out for them. This source is particularly useful when researching the overall progress of the Iraqi government in developing a stable, efficient plan for governance.

Beehner, Lionel. (2007). "Al-Queda in Iraq: Restructuring or Splintering?" Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/13007/alqaeda_in_iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26type%3Dbackgrounder%26filter%3D405%26page%3D2

This article discusses the situation of Al-Queda in Iraq and where the organization is heading in the near future. Not only does this source outline the evolution of the organization, and its funding and main allies, but also the public support for Al-Queda in Iraq, and the feasibility for its continued strong presence. This document is useful when researching the underlying divisions within Iraqi society which continue to cause instability within the region.

Beehner, Lionel. (2007). "What Model Should Iraq Follow after U.S. Forces Withdraw?" Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/13667/what_model_should_iraq_follow_after_us_forces_withdraw.html

[breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26type%3Dbackgrounder%26filter%3D405%26page%3D1](#)

This fascinating article gives an overview of possible scenarios which might occur following U.S. force withdrawal in coming years. The article delves into examples from South Korea, Vietnam, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Lebanon, all of which had a conflict which was impacted by involvement from external forces, followed by varying degrees of success in rebuilding post-conflict. This article is very useful when researching overall chances for peace in Iraq, and provides a solid background on the possible long-lasting U.S. impact in Iraq.

“United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.” United Nations. <http://www.uniraq.org/>

This website is a hub for all international organizations which are currently active in Iraq. Run through the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), this site provides extensive information regarding almost every aspect of the post-conflict rebuilding process, including refugee statistics, economic growth information, and special UN reports on the humanitarian situation. This site is crucial when doing basic research on the current situation in Iraq.

Serwer, Daniel. (2007). “Iraq: Time for a Change.” United States Institute for Peace. http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0909_iraq_change.html

This article is an overview of the current challenges facing Iraq, and suggestions for its future. Detailed within the document is information regarding the security situation, the likelihood of continued political support both within Iraq and the U.S. as well as the impact a prolonged conflict could have on U.S. public opinion of the government. This document is important when researching the broad topic of peace in Iraq, and for delegates wanting to continue building a deeper understanding of all perspectives on the issue.

“Middle East.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/index.cfm?fa=proj&id=107&proj=zme>

The website for the Middle East Program within the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is an extensive collection of articles and publications written by the organization focused on all aspects of the Middle East. Of special interest are the sections on Middle East Regional Order, Iraq, and Arab Diplomacy. This source is extremely useful when delegates are doing research on the Middle East as a region, and more specifically on current trends in broader Arab politics.

“Iraq War Debate - 2002/2007.” University of Michigan. <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/iraqwar.html>

This website is an comprehensive list of documents and resources associated with the Iraq War Debate which occurred between 2002 - 2007 globally. This website provides links to the following sub-topics: strategies, threat assessments, containment strategies, military issues, aspects of war, projected political aftermath of war, U.S. occupation, transitional government, permanent government, Saddam Hussein capture, interest groups, primary players, and related web pages. This website is a key resource when doing research on any aspect of this topic because it provides links to multiple sources which provide if not a comprehensive, then basic foundation for further research and study.