



The Southern Regional Model United Nations—SRMUN XVII



Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the entire Southern Regional Model United Nations XVII staff, and myself I would like to welcome you to this year's conference and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). My name is R. Hawkins Herman, and I graduated with a Bachelor of Art in History from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in May of 2004. This is my first time serving on staff for Model UN, but I have previously participated for three years at SRMUN as well as several other conferences. I am currently studying Russian at the University of North Carolina in anticipation of a career with the U.S. Foreign Service.

NATO was established in 1949 as a mutual defense treaty to prevent aggression by the Soviet Union. Despite the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, NATO today is more active than ever before. A military body by nature, NATO has taken the lead in peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia, aided in the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and contributed to humanitarian relief efforts in the United States and Pakistan. Even as the Alliance reorients itself to confront new military threats, it continues to advance its mission of ensuring democracy and security in Europe. In view of the current state of the world, your Assistant Director, Sarah Hensley and I have selected a range of topics that we feel reflect the complex challenges and opportunities facing NATO today.

The NATO topics for SRMUN XVII are:

- I. Expanding NATO Membership;
- II. Operation Active Endeavour: Fighting Terrorism at Sea;
- III. NATO's Growing Ties with the Middle East Via the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group.

This background guide is designed to provide the essential information, which you will need in order to have meaningful discussions on the topics above. It is by no means intended to be the final word on any topic, and delegates are expected to thoroughly prepare their positions beyond the information presented in this guide. Feel free to explore any of the sources cited in our footnotes to help with your research. Remember that adequate preparation will not only improve your ability to debate the issues meaningfully, but it will also make the conference a great deal more fun.

Each delegation is also expected to prepare and submit a position paper outlining their nation's position on the three topics. Position papers should be no more than two pages in length and **should be submitted to Deputy-Director General Sarah Donnelly (srmunddg@yahoo.com) no later than 11:59pm (EST) of October 30, 2006**. You can visit the SRMUN website at www.srmun.org for more resources and formal specifications about position papers.

Please note that NATO is not a United Nations body and has its own unique set of rules and procedures. For instance, please keep in mind that all NATO decisions are to be made by unanimous vote only. I would strongly recommend that all delegates review the rules of the North Atlantic Council and the powers and limitations of NATO in the course of their research.

I wish everyone the best of luck in their preparations and look forward to a great conference. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.

Until November,

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History of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was born.¹ NATO's primary purpose is mutual defense, as established in Article 5 of the Treaty which states that "[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."² Such military action would be taken by all treaty members in accordance with the right of mutual defense as stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.³ All member states further agree to abide by the principles of the UN charter and to immediately report any collective defensive action to the Security Council. In this way, although NATO is a completely autonomous organization and is free to act without UN approval, most NATO operations are subject to voluntary UN oversight.⁴ Although it was understood at the time that Article 5 was intended to prevent military expansion by the Soviet Union, the provision was invoked for the first time in NATO history on September 12, 2001, after the September 11th attacks in the United States.⁵ Additionally, NATO took military action for the first time in its history on February 8, 1994 in an attempt to stabilize the situation in the collapsing Yugoslavia. Prior to 1994, NATO served entirely as a deterrent and defensive organization. It is a strange irony that although NATO had its origins in the circumstances of the Cold War, it has been much more active after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁶

NATO consists primarily of two parts: the North Atlantic Council and NATO Integrated Command under the authority of the Military Committee.⁷ The members of the North Atlantic Council are the senior members of their respective national delegations and are known as Permanent Representatives.⁸ Under special circumstances the Council may also meet at the level of Foreign Ministers or Heads of State. The Council is chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO, who is traditionally a European.⁹ The Council is responsible for political decision-making and all decisions must be made on the basis of consensus.¹⁰ The Military Committee is a body composed of the Military Representatives from each nation. It provides strategic guidance and represents the military consensus of the member states.¹¹ Actual military operations are guided by the two Strategic Commanders of NATO, who are traditionally both American military officers.¹² All military operations since 2003 are now under the command of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe) based in the town of Mons near Brussels, Belgium.¹³ Transformation of NATO forces to respond to novel threats is the responsibility of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) based in Norfolk, Virginia.¹⁴

Since its creation, NATO membership has grown from the original 12 states to 26.¹⁵ Since 1991 this expansion has included several former Communist countries.¹⁶ The sudden disappearance of its former enemy in 1991 left many wondering whether there was any necessity for NATO to continue to exist. NATO-led military interventions in the former Yugoslavia in 1994 and 1999 largely answered these questions as NATO redefined its purpose and took on the role of general peacekeeper for Europe. Its purpose underwent another revision in 2001 as the United States' invocation of Article 5 following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks added the War on Terror to NATO's duties.¹⁷ NATO forces currently play an active peacekeeping role in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur.¹⁸

¹ *North Atlantic Treaty*. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. April 4, 1949.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Charter of the United Nations*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

⁴ *North Atlantic Treaty*. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. April 4, 1949.

⁵ "NATO in the fight against terrorism." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html>

⁶ "NATO in the Balkans." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html>

⁷ "Civilian and military structure" North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/structur/structure.htm>

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ "North Atlantic Council." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nac/>

¹¹ "The Military Committee." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. http://www.nato.int/issues/military_committee/index.html

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ "New NATO command structure." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. http://www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.htm

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ "Enlargement." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/evolution.htm>

¹⁷ "NATO in the fight against terrorism." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html>

The current members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are:

BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, ITALY, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SPAIN, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. Expanding NATO Membership

Introduction

NATO membership has expanded greatly in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.¹⁹ Membership is deliberately open, as NATO considers growth to be key to its security mission.²⁰ NATO membership is open to “any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.”²¹ These principles, which are defined in the North Atlantic Treaty, are democracy, individual liberty and rule of law.²² The Treaty also contains a commitment to stability and well being in the North Atlantic area, collective defense and the preservation of peace.²³ NATO continues to grow even as it redefines its mission and evolves in its ability to respond to threats.

Since its origin with 12 members in 1948, NATO has experienced five rounds of expansion to reach its current membership of 26.²⁴ Although the specific details vary for each aspirant country, some basic guidelines have been set up to help new countries through the process of joining the alliance.

States’ relationships with NATO can be defined into three categories: dialogue, partnership and membership.²⁵ Dialogue merely implies recognition of the existence of mutually beneficial goals. Partnership usually involves joint military exercises and sharing of intelligence.²⁶ Membership is a binding treaty commitment to mutual defense.²⁷ Within these three categories there remains a great deal of variation as states define a working relationship with the alliance.

NATO has a number of different frameworks in place to guide dialogue with neighboring countries. Dialogue countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia interact with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.²⁸ PfP, introduced in 1994, is a framework for individual dialogue between NATO and European partners.²⁹ The Euro-Atlantic Council is a forum for joint meetings with the 26 NATO countries, and any or all of the 20 countries who participate in the Council.³⁰ PfP is often seen as an important stepping-stone toward NATO membership, although not all PfP participants have necessarily stated any desire for membership.³¹ Similarly, non-European countries around the Mediterranean interact with NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue.³² Also established in 1994, this framework currently has seven members: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.³³

¹⁸ “Welcome to NATO.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/>

¹⁹ “NATO Topics – Enlargement.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “NATO Topics – Partnership for Peace.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.htm>

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² “NATO Topics – Mediterranean Dialogue.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/summary.htm>

³³ Ibid.

A further level of cooperation is available through Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP).³⁴ Introduced in 2002, IPAPs outline the nature and extent of cooperation between NATO and a permanent partner country that seems unlikely or unable to achieve membership.³⁵ It allows countries to deepen their relationship with NATO without any commitment on either side to membership.³⁶ Three countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) currently have IPAPs and two more are under development for Moldova and Kazakhstan.³⁷ A similar structure, though with a different name, governs NATO's interaction with Russia.³⁸ Since 2002, the NATO-Russia Council has met bi-annually to discuss areas of cooperation between the 26 NATO members and Russia.³⁹

The most concrete step toward NATO membership is the creation of a Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁴⁰ MAP countries submit an annual report to NATO detailing their progress in five key areas (Political/Economic, Defense, Resources, Security and Legal) as well as creating concrete goals for the following year.⁴¹ The MAP system has been in place since 1999. There are currently three countries with MAPs: Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Understanding the importance of expansion, NATO has created these plans to encourage dialogue for membership. However, "participation in the MAP does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership."⁴²

Each of these frameworks represents a commitment to growth for the NATO mission, and a desire to evolve the organization in a post-cold war world.

Recent Expansion

Since 1991, many of the new member states have been former Communist countries of Eastern Europe. The latest round of expansion, which occurred in March 2004, included the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.⁴³ All of this expansion has been viewed with hesitation by Russia, which, despite breaking from its own Communist past, continues to consider the former Communist bloc within its sphere of influence. Many Russians still identify the former Soviet Union states as the "Near Abroad." Russians, while of mixed opinion whether to consider themselves European, are nevertheless in agreement that a Europe which includes Russia is better than one in which Russia is marginalized. For this reason, Russia has pursued good relations with NATO and has expanded its influence in other organizations, such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Even with Russia's efforts to build a stronger relationship with NATO, Russia sees itself as both a partner and a rival to the organization. Russia is a partner with NATO in mutually beneficial security matters, but a rival in influence over the affairs of Europe. While pursuing a policy of open expansion, NATO must strive to maintain this balance and avoid alienating Russia, which continues to sustain Europe's largest military force and the 4th-largest military in the world.⁴⁴

Ukraine, a nation with Europe's second-largest military and the technology to build nuclear weapons, is clearly an important part of European security.⁴⁵ Its military influence gives Ukraine the appropriate criteria for meeting the definition of a good NATO candidate. It has also proven its ability to maintain a functioning democratic system

³⁴ "NATO Topics – Individual Partnership Action Plans." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/ipap/index.html>

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ "NATO Topics – NATO-Russia Council." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html>

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "NATO Topics – Membership Action Plan." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html>

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "NATO Topics – Membership Action Plan." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html>

⁴³ "NATO Topics – Enlargement." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html>

⁴⁴ "The Military Balance, 2003-2004." *The World Almanac 2005*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 2004

⁴⁵ Ibid.

despite disputed elections.⁴⁶ In contrast to many other CIS states, maintaining democracy is an attribute seen as a secondary qualification for membership. NATO has taken preliminary steps toward advancing membership to Ukraine but has yet to decide definitively on a timetable or even whether an invitation to join the alliance is likely to be forthcoming. The official NATO statement is that “an Intensified Dialogue is underway on Ukraine’s membership aspirations and related reforms” but that this “does not guarantee an invitation to join.”⁴⁷ Formerly a staunch supporter of Moscow and an active partner with Russia through the CIS, Ukraine has swung rapidly toward the West in the past year and President Viktor Yushchenko has moved forward on the previously stagnant goal of joining NATO. Russia views this as the result of Western interference and could react to closer Ukrainian-NATO alignment in any number of negative ways. Tools at Russia’s disposal include violations of Ukrainian airspace, economic sanctions or disruption of the gas supply. This last factor is of critical importance to Europe, as a significant portion of European gas comes from Russia via Ukraine. Ukraine carries immense economic and military importance to European stability, and conflict with Russia could have devastating effects.

Ukraine: A Case Study

Ukraine began relations with NATO almost immediately following its independence from the Soviet Union in December of 1991.⁴⁸ Along with a number of other former Communist countries, it joined the newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).⁴⁹ This organization was designed as a way for NATO to reach out to nations of the former Warsaw Pact and as a forum for security negotiations between NATO and its new partner nations.⁵⁰ In 1997, the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which retained the same mission but with more sophisticated mechanisms for achieving it.⁵¹

In 1994, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP).⁵² Unlike the NACC, PfP was a program designed to allow for bilateral agreements between NATO and its various partner countries of the former Warsaw Pact.⁵³ It created individually tailored agreements for each partner based upon that nation’s political and security circumstances.⁵⁴ The overall goal of the PfP was to promote democracy in the former Communist countries by offering security incentives.⁵⁵ It also has served historically as an intermediate step toward NATO membership. Ukraine was the sixth state to join the PfP, but the first from the CIS.⁵⁶ It is also the only one of the first nine PfP members that has not yet become a full NATO member.⁵⁷

On July 9, 1997, NATO and Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.⁵⁸ This document, which serves as the basis for all future NATO-Ukraine relations, established a permanent NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) to discuss matters of mutual security interest and ensure implementation of the reforms called for in the Charter.⁵⁹ These include defense reform, civil emergency planning, strengthening civil society, strengthening rule of law and democratic reform.⁶⁰

⁴⁶ “NATO Topics – Ukraine-NATO Relations.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html>.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “Evolution of NATO-Ukraine Relations.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/evolution.html>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ “NATO Topics: The Euro-Atlantic Partnership.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index.html>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² “NATO Topics: Partnership for Peace.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ “NATO PfP Signatures by Date.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-date.htm>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ “NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine-e.pdf>

⁵⁹ “NATO Topics: NATO-Ukraine Commission.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/nuc/index.html>.

⁶⁰ “NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine-e.pdf>

Shortly before the 5th anniversary of the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership, President Leonid Kuchma announced Ukraine's intention to work toward full NATO membership.⁶¹ As a result, in November of that year, the two sides adopted the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, similar to a MAP but without the explicit goal of membership.⁶² This document sets out in detail the steps necessary to make Ukraine eligible for NATO membership. It also provides for the creation of Annual Target Plans, in which Ukraine sets out its goals for the coming year.⁶³ These goals are reviewed through biannual assessment meetings, as well as an annual progress report prepared by the NUC.⁶⁴ This process continued through 2003, but at the 2004 midyear assessment meeting NATO the Allies expressed their dissatisfaction with existing progress and stressed the need for Ukraine to take more drastic steps in reforming the media, courts and election systems.⁶⁵

It is only since the Orange Revolution of October 2005 that progress toward membership has begun to move forward without hesitation. A highly contested election between pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich and pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko led to weeks of street protests on both sides. President Yushchenko was invited to NATO headquarters only weeks after his February 2005 inauguration, at which time he agreed to make greater cooperation with NATO a priority for his government. At which point the 2005 intensified dialogue was launched.

At present time Ukraine still remains dedicated to its dialogue with NATO. Its 2006 Target Plan includes the goal of “pursu[ing] full integration into the Alliance” through better implementation of the existing frameworks, the Charter and Action Plan.⁶⁶ It also heavily stresses the need to continue democratic reforms and to resolve all existing border disputes. These requirements were also key elements of the decision to offer full membership in previous rounds of expansion for other states. At this point Ukraine has positioned itself as an excellent candidate for membership.

Now, NATO must consider its options in moving forward. The question facing NATO is how far to proceed with integrating Ukraine into NATO security structures. As a NATO partner, Ukraine already participates in joint military exercises and has taken part in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶⁷ Structures exist for diplomatic discussions between NATO and Ukraine, and Ukraine has already been recognized as having an unspecified special relationship with NATO through the use of the Distinctive Partnership label.⁶⁸ At this point, it is up to NATO to decide whether any additional benefit to the Alliance of granting Ukraine full membership would outweigh the potential risks associated with damage to relations with Russia.

NATO, Russia and Ukraine

Russia has so far taken a dim view of NATO expansion. It has done all in its power to prevent or slow NATO membership for the former Warsaw Pact countries, and especially for the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It has also publicly stated more than once that for Ukraine to join NATO it “will obviously not strengthen Russia's security. Nor will it improve our relations with Ukraine.”⁶⁹ Intent on preserving its leadership role in its former satellites, Russia fears the incursion of any outside organizations or commitments in its sphere of influence. It seems certain that Russia will not step by and lightly tolerate Ukraine joining NATO.

It is first necessary to consider what actions Russia is capable of taking. Past experiences with the Baltic States, as well as with Ukraine, reveals some possibilities. As a mutual defense organization, NATO has the commitment to act in defense of its members. For this reason the Alliance has historically placed a great deal of importance on the

⁶¹ “NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/action_plan.html.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Evolution of NATO-Ukraine Relations.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/evolution.html>.

⁶⁶ “NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for 2006.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b060407e.pdf>

⁶⁷ “Evolution of NATO-Ukraine Relations.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/evolution.html>.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “Interfax-Ukraine News Agency.” Interfax. <http://www.interfax.kiev.ua/eng/go.cgi?31.20060424001>

resolution of all regional tensions and border conflicts as a requirement before membership. Throughout the 1990s, Russia used this provision as an opportunity to delay NATO acceptance of the Baltic States by simply refusing to sign border agreements with the three countries requesting membership.⁷⁰ Estonia and Latvia demanded the return of territory annexed from their countries following their 1941 incorporation into the Soviet Union; Lithuania simply desired the confirmation of an ambiguous border.⁷¹ Russia deliberately delayed negotiations on these issues for years, effectively preventing the NATO bids. Today, Ukraine faces similar issues.

The 2006 Target Plan calls for Ukraine to delineate its sea borders with Russia and to firmly demarcate the land border.⁷² It also indicates the need for a border treaty with Belarus and for the stabilization and democratization of the Transdnister region in neighboring Moldova.⁷³ Not mentioned, but also a potential sticking point, is the issue of rent payments for Russia's Black Sea Fleet, which is stationed in Ukrainian harbors.⁷⁴ Russia could delay negotiations on any or all of these issues and could pressure Belarus and Transdnister, which act as Russian satellites, to do the same.

Russia's constitution includes a provision outlining Russia's role as a protector for its "compatriots." This term has been used to justify Russian intervention in favor of ethnic Russians in other countries, even those who are not Russian citizens. Using this provision as justification, Russia could encourage violence in the predominantly Russian Transdnister region, causing Ukraine's borders to appear insecure.⁷⁵ It could also encourage the calls, heard on both sides of the Russia-Ukraine border, for Ukraine to return the Crimean Autonomous Republic to Russia. This region is approximately 60% Russian,⁷⁶ which has led some Russian nationalists to demand that Russia "take back" the area in response to recent Ukrainian alignment away from Moscow.⁷⁷ The region is the location of much of the Black Sea fleet. Crimea briefly declared independence in 1992 but received no help from the hands-off government of Boris Yeltsin.⁷⁸ Putin is much more active in his foreign policy and could potentially lend military aid to Crimea in the same way he has to Transdnister.⁷⁹ Although it is unlikely that the Russian government considers this a feasible option, even the threat of military action or an active independence movement is enough to cause NATO to approach Ukrainian membership with caution.

Russian energy supply is another potential issue for Ukrainian NATO membership. Russia has already signaled its willingness to use its gas supply as a lever in Ukraine and Georgia, for instance by cutting off gas supplies in the winter of 2005. Russia is also a major provider of oil. Russian oil companies are increasingly under the authority of the state and tend to act in response to state needs. Ukrainian membership in NATO could cause an increase in oil and gas prices or random shutoffs in energy delivery as Moscow prompts state-owned companies like Gazprom to exact retribution. This in turn would cause shortages in Europe and cause a jump in the global prices of oil and gas. In an age of great energy dependence, disruptions in oil or gas supplies have the potential to do great damage to western economies.

Finally, Russia could simply refuse to continue its partnership with NATO. Russian assistance has been an important factor in negotiations with Iran and North Korea concerning the respective nuclear programs of those two countries. Russia is seen by many as sympathetic to the needs of developing countries and as an important moderator between the West and the Middle East. Any disruption in Russian relations with NATO could impair the ability of the Alliance to negotiate with Iran and North Korea, as well as destabilizing Eastern Europe. Russia's relationship with NATO is crucial to the organization. Thus the problem becomes negotiating a solution that will answer Ukraine's membership ambitions without alienating Russia.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ "Population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC)" Crimean Government.

<http://www.crimea-portal.gov.ua/index.php?v=9>

⁷⁷ "Autonomous Republic of Crimea." Global Security: Military. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/arc.htm>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ "Transdnister." Global Security: Military. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/transdnister.htm>

Conclusion

Although Ukraine is only one example, it serves to illustrate the difficulties facing questions of NATO expansion. Having now encompassed the nations of Western Europe and the large, stable nations of Eastern Europe, further NATO expansion would have to accommodate much smaller, less stable members than in the past. It would also have to deal with issues of resistance from Russia and other countries opposed to NATO. The Alliance must ask itself how much more expansion it really desires and whether the benefits of further expansion outweigh the impediments.

Committee Directive

The key questions for the Alliance to consider are: Would NATO be more stable with or without Ukraine as a member? If Ukraine does not join NATO, what alternative partnerships could be created to maintain the good working relationship that the two sides have forged in the past 15 years? Should Ukraine be seen as a strategic partner on par with Russia or as a lesser partner? If NATO does decide to allow membership, how closely should the Allies insist upon internal security and border agreements? In terms of broader issue of expansion consider the following: How active should NATO be in encouraging new members? To what extent is NATO willing to let relations with non-members affect its internal decision-making? What does the Alliance stand to gain from further expansion?

The delegate should consider the following issues: what is your country's relationship with Ukraine? What is your country's relationship with Russia? How does your country feel about NATO expansion in general? What does your country consider to be NATO's greatest priorities?

II: Operation Active Endeavour: Fighting Terrorism at Sea

Introduction

The September 11th terror attacks in New York and Washington D.C. significantly changed the network of international relations. It also marked a watershed in the continuing evolution of NATO's mission and identity. On the 12th of September, the United States declared the event as a military attack and asked for collective-defense support as provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.⁸⁰ This was the first time that Article 5 had been invoked in the history of the organization.⁸¹ After an investigation, on October 4th, 2001 the North Atlantic Council declared that the attacks had been planned outside the United States and directed at that country, therefore qualifying the attacks as armed action.⁸² The Council approved 8 measures in support of the United States, one of which was the naval operation later to be named Active Endeavour.⁸³

The potential danger from seaborne terrorist attacks is great. Unlike aircraft, watercraft are relatively cheap to purchase and easy to learn to pilot. Even a small fishing boat could potentially carry a large enough package of explosives to sink or seriously damage a large ship. Ports are traditionally busy and crowded with hundreds or thousands of ships at a time. It can be difficult to track what ships are coming in and out and what their cargo is. Passenger ships have less strict regulations on ticketing and luggage than those on airplanes. Therefore, watercraft, ports and passenger ships remain highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and to be used as tools for those attacks.

The Mediterranean Sea covers almost a million square miles and is bordered by a total of 22 countries. In 2000, short sea shipping from the Mediterranean to European Union (EU) Member States alone accounted for 662 million tons of cargo.⁸⁴ Seaborne shipping in the Mediterranean is a major source of trade to NATO nations, and with

⁸⁰ "NATO in the Fight Against Terrorism." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve_a.html

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "Operation Active Endeavour: How did it evolve?" North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/evolution.htm

⁸⁴ "Eurostat: Short Sea Shipping: 2000 Data." Destatis. http://www.eds-destatis.de/en/downloads/sif/nz_03_03.pdf

maritime traffic having increased an average of 4% per year since 1985, it is even more important to examine terrorism at sea.⁸⁵

Underwater pipelines are another source of potential attacks. In terms of energy alone, 65% of the oil and natural gas supplies to reach Europe each year travel under the Mediterranean.⁸⁶ Disruption of an oil or gas pipeline could cause dramatic increases in energy prices, destabilizing the economy of Western Europe. Therefore whether above the sea or below it, NATO faces challenges to securing sea-trade and activity with the emergence of new terrorist threats.

Terror at Sea: Case Studies

Examples of seaborne terrorist attacks in the past can give some understanding to the potential dangers NATO members face today. SuperFerry 14, a large passenger ferry, was bombed in the Philippines in 2004.⁸⁷ The bomb consisted of about 8 lbs of TNT, which had been taken on board inside a hollowed out TV.⁸⁸ When the bomb exploded, 116 people were killed, making this the worst terrorist attack in Filipino history.⁸⁹ Later reports placed the responsibility for the attack on Abu Sayyaf, a militant group suspected to have links to Al Qaeda.⁹⁰

A similar story emerges involving the two major terrorist attacks in the Yemeni port city of Aden. The first of these, the 2000 bombing of the USS *Cole*, was conducted by two men in a small inflatable raft.⁹¹ The attack occurred while the *Cole* was in port for refueling.⁹² The explosion, which caused no permanent damage to the *Cole*, resulted in the deaths of 17 US sailors as well as the two suicide bombers and the injury of 39 others.⁹³ Another attempt at a similar attack against the USS *The Sullivans* earlier in the year had failed when the bombers' craft was overloaded with explosives and capsized.⁹⁴

Despite safety precautions put into place after the bombing of the *Cole*, a similar attack took place against the French oil tanker *Limburg* in 2002.⁹⁵ In this case, a dinghy laden with explosives detonated against the hull of the ship while it was still miles from its intended port at Aden.⁹⁶ The attack resulted in one death, 12 injuries and approximately \$45 million worth of damages.⁹⁷ It also caused 90,000 barrels of oil to leak into the Gulf of Aden.⁹⁸ As with the previous attack at Aden, credit was claimed by Al Qaeda, and in particular by an Al Qaeda leader named Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.⁹⁹

Also of note are two major terrorist attacks on ships to take place in the Mediterranean itself, both linked to Palestinian militants. In 1985, a cruise liner named the *Achille Lauro* was hijacked by four armed men, later found to be members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), off the coast of Egypt.¹⁰⁰ After their demands for the release of Palestinian prisoners were rejected, they shot one Jewish passenger and attempted to escape by plane.¹⁰¹ The plane was diverted by US Navy fighters and the men were arrested at the NATO port of Sigonella.¹⁰²

⁸⁵ "UNEP: Plan Bleu." Plan Bleu Regional Activity Centre. <http://www.planbleu.org/themes/transportUk.html>

⁸⁶ "Operation Active Endeavour: What does this mean in practice?" North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/in_practice.html

⁸⁷ "Bomb caused Philippine ferry fire." British Broadcasting Company. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3732356.stm>

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ "USS Cole Bombing: Introduction." Yemen Gateway. <http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm>

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ "Yemenis Sentenced Over Bombing." British Broadcasting Company. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/3607312.stm

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ "MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base." MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. <http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=5617>

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

A more serious attack took place in 1988. The *City of Poros*, a ferry in the Greek isles, was boarded by three armed men who came aboard as ticketed passengers.¹⁰³ Three miles out to sea the men attacked other passengers with automatic weapons and hand grenades, killing nine and injuring 98.¹⁰⁴ Shortly afterward they evacuated the ship for a small speedboat piloted by other members of their group.¹⁰⁵ This attack was apparently a backup plan after an attempt to blow up the ship at the dock had failed earlier in the day.¹⁰⁶ Blame eventually rested on the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), a terrorist group that at the time was backed by Libya.¹⁰⁷ The men involved in the attack were never caught.¹⁰⁸

Although far from complete, this summary serves to show the potential dangers involved in seaborne terrorism. Suicide attacks; hijackings and planted bombs are all viable avenues for attack. Small amounts of explosives (as in SuperFerry 14) or small numbers of men (as in all five cases) can potentially kill hundreds of people and cause millions of dollars worth of damage. Bombs could be placed aboard ships as part of normal cargo or attackers could board ships as normal ticketed passengers with weapons in their luggage. The case studies also show that while terrorism at sea is not a new phenomenon, the frequency of attacks has increased with technological advances and has the opportunity to become more deadly. It is from attacks such as these that NATO established Operation Active Endeavor.

History of the NATO Operations

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires all NATO members to respond to “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America” with collective defensive action.¹⁰⁹ Article 6 goes on to define the sorts of attacks that qualify under Article 5.¹¹⁰ These include attacks “on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe and North America” and “on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories.”¹¹¹ In neither article, nor anywhere in the Treaty, is there a requirement that the attack should be planned or directed by a state entity.¹¹² Therefore, the United States was justified in claiming the September 11th terror attacks as armed attacks falling under the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty.¹¹³ On September 12th, NATO released a statement agreeing with the US claim in principle and committing to assist in the defense of the United States “if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States.”¹¹⁴

As a result of this statement, an investigation was launched in the United States as to the origin and cause of the attacks.¹¹⁵ The results of this investigation were presented to the North Atlantic Council on October 2nd by US Ambassador Frank Taylor.¹¹⁶ This information allowed the Council to determine that the September 11th attacks qualified as an armed attack against the United States and therefore obligated NATO to assist in defensive action.¹¹⁷ As a result, on October 4th the alliance revealed a program of eight measures to fight terrorism.¹¹⁸ These measures were: enhanced intelligence sharing; agreement to defend any states that may be targets for future attacks; increased security for US facilities; greater funding for existing NATO projects which deter terrorism; blanket flight clearance for US missions directed against terrorism; US access to ports and airfields of NATO nations; deployment of NATO standing naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean; and deployment of NATO Airborne Early Warning Force.¹¹⁹

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ *North Atlantic Treaty*. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. April 4, 1949.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ “NATO Press Release (2001) 124.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ “NATO in the Fight Against Terrorism.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm)

[124e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm)

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

Thus the first use of NATO forces operating under Article 5 was Operation Eagle Assist, a deployment of NATO radar aircraft that lasted until May 2002.¹²⁰ This was followed shortly afterward by Active Endeavour. NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) was participating in Exercise Destined Glory off the coast of Spain at the time and was immediately reassigned to conduct surveillance operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.¹²¹ As it became clear that the operation would be required to operate for a prolonged period of time, the standing naval forces were restructured. The former STANAVFORLANT, or Standing Naval Force in the Atlantic, was reassigned to the Mediterranean.¹²² The two forces have since rotated responsibility for Operation Active Endeavour every three months.¹²³ As of January 1, 2005, STANAVFORLANT was renamed SNMG1 (Standing NATO Maritime Group 1) while STANAVFORMED became SNMG2 as part of a larger restructuring of NATO forces.¹²⁴

Since 2001, the responsibilities of Active Endeavour have steadily expanded even as the size of the force has remained the same. These seven to ten ships are now asked to patrol the entire Mediterranean and conduct boardings of all suspicious ships.¹²⁵ They are responsible for keeping the waters and ports safe, controlling any suspicious ships and protecting millions of tons of shipping.¹²⁶ In addition to all of this, Active Endeavour ships have intervened more than once to help stranded sailors and have provided assistance to security forces during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.¹²⁷

Operation Active Endeavour

The mission of Active Endeavour is to prevent terrorist attacks by monitoring important shipping lanes. Originally limited only to the Eastern Mediterranean, the operation was expanded in March 2004 to include the whole of the Mediterranean.¹²⁸ The duties of the operation have also expanded to include escorting ships through the Straits of Gibraltar (since March 2003) and voluntary boardings of suspect ships (since April 2003).¹²⁹ Recently, Russia and Ukraine have expressed their support for the operation, leading to the possibility that it may be expanded into the Black Sea, although the details of their support are still under negotiation.¹³⁰

Current Active Endeavour forces are contributed mostly by Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey.¹³¹ Some fast boats used for Gibraltar escorts are from Germany, Denmark and Norway.¹³² Logistical support is provided by all Mediterranean NATO members.¹³³ Operational responsibility rotates between Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 (SNMG1 and SNMG2). SNMG1 is composed of eight to ten ships while SNMG2 contains seven ships.¹³⁴ Thus at any given time Active Endeavour commands the use of between seven and ten ships.

Over the course of its existence, the ships of Active Endeavour have monitored over 75,000 ships, boarded more than 100 to search for illegal goods or weapons and given escorts to more than 480.¹³⁵ At the same time, the operation has improved military cooperation with the nations of the Mediterranean Dialogue: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ "Operation Active Endeavour." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ "Operation Active Endeavour: What does this mean in practice?" North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/in_practice.html

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ "Operation Active Endeavour." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ "Standing NRF Maritime Group 1." NATO OTAN. <http://www.manw.nato.int/manw/pages/organisation/snmg1.htm>

¹³⁵ "Operation Active Endeavour: What does this mean in practice?" North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/in_practice.html

Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.¹³⁶ Most importantly, the operation has achieved its primary goal of showing solidarity in the fight against terrorism and creating a NATO presence in that fight.¹³⁷ At the same time, it has obviously not eliminated the threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean area, and some have argued that the current forces and level of funding are insufficient given the scale of the tasks at hand. NATO continues to evaluate its operation and hopes it can be as successful in the future.

Conclusion

Despite the high level of security, which Operation Active Endeavour has brought to the Mediterranean area, it is clear that more remains to be done. Recent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London have revealed that terrorists are still able to travel and attack European targets. Drug trafficking and piracy, which are often used to fund terrorist organizations, continue to exist as threats to shipping. At the same time, the largest seaborne terrorist attack in history, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, took place far from the Mediterranean. However one thing is certain, how much the Mediterranean will be a target in the future is contingent upon the preparation in securing the area today.

Committee Directive

As part of its continued efforts at restructuring to increase effectiveness, NATO has considered proposals to expand Operation Active Endeavour in both force size and area of responsibility. The Mediterranean Dialogue countries as well as Russia and Ukraine have expressed an interest in contributing forces to the operation. So far these proposals have not been finalized. The questions for the committee to consider are: Should Active Endeavour be expanded, either in terms of force size, responsibility or geographic area? What kind of contribution is your nation willing to commit to support expansion? Should non-NATO forces be incorporated into the forces of the operation and if so what should their role be? How could the operation's mission be made more effective without violating the international naval law that forbids non-compulsory searches in international waters?

III: NATO's Growing Ties with the Middle East via the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group

Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's founding document, defines the Alliance's role as both a defensive and diplomatic organization concerned with the affairs of Europe.¹³⁸ Consequently, for most of the organization's history, the Middle East has been outside of NATO's area of interest. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has begun to redefine its role as an actively defensive organization and at the same time has begun to look beyond the borders of Europe to protect European security. As part of its efforts to expand NATO influence into areas of key security importance, in recent years the Alliance has increased its activities, both military and diplomatic, in the Middle East.

For a variety of reasons, the Middle East region is of key importance for the security of Europe. In terms of energy, the Middle East is a vital source of petroleum and natural gas. Disruption of energy supplies has the potential to both negatively affect the European economy and to significantly impair the ability of NATO members to respond to security threats. For this reason alone, the region may be considered of strategic importance to the security of Europe. At the same time, the Middle East is the home base for a number of terrorist groups, which pose a security threat to European nations and the world. NATO committed to the fight against terrorism through its Article 5 collective defense response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.¹³⁹ NATO is fully justified in taking any military action, which its members consider to be necessary to their collective defense against terrorism.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ *North Atlantic Treaty*. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. April 4, 1949.

¹³⁹ "NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

<http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html>

In order to prevent the insecurity of the Middle East region from negatively affecting the security of Europe, NATO has begun the process of engaging the countries of the region. Through bilateral security agreements as well as multinational forums, NATO hopes to increase the overall level of security within the Middle East region.¹⁴⁰ This would hopefully ensure continuity of trade and prevent the rise of international conflicts. At the same time, the Alliance seeks support and cooperation from the countries of the region in pursuing its fight against its terrorist opponents.

On the other hand, NATO's involvement with the Middle East in general marks a significant change from its previous defensive role. There is no question that greater involvement in the Middle East has brought NATO forces into situations that before 1991 would be considered unthinkable. At this time it is important to consider the Alliance's entire history of interaction with the Greater Middle East and determine what changes need to be made in order to ensure European stability in the long term.

Peacekeeping Concerns In and Around the Middle East

Much of NATO's history of interaction with the Greater Middle East and Islamic world has been through various peacekeeping efforts. In Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO forces have worked toward greater stability and peace for the region. The results of their efforts have been more than two decades of experience fighting insurgents, training military forces and stabilizing difficult situations. This makes NATO an important source of experience for other countries looking to reform their security services to respond to the new threats of the 21st century.¹⁴¹ It has also demonstrated to the world NATO's commitment to security and peace wherever it may find it necessary to act.

NATO's first formal interaction with Muslim countries stemmed from its involvement in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Among the ethnic conflicts involved was the oppression and massacre of Bosnian Muslims by the dominant Serb ethnic group. NATO's role, in general terms, was to stabilize the situation and prevent ethnic violence. This occurred first through the Implementation Force (IFOR), which implemented the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords during the period 1995-96.¹⁴² Following the end of fighting, IFOR was replaced with the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was responsible for keeping the peace in the long term.¹⁴³ IFOR remained in place until the progress made by 2004 resulted in troops being considered no longer necessary.¹⁴⁴ This was a good experience for relations with the Muslim world as well as increasing the Alliance's standing in world opinion. NATO's actions in the Balkans demonstrated the commitment to peacekeeping and reconstruction without partiality. NATO was also instrumental to capturing and trying war crime suspects and developing a national infrastructure.¹⁴⁵

The invasion of Afghanistan was conducted by a United States led coalition of many countries, some of which were NATO members and some of which were not.¹⁴⁶ Following the fall of the Taliban regime, NATO began taking an active role in stabilizing the country and training Afghani security forces. Again, this experience demonstrated to the world NATO's commitment to security and peacekeeping. In its role as the administrator of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO took on its first mission outside the borders of Europe beginning in 2003.¹⁴⁷ Its operation started with a small area surrounding Kabul but has since expanded so that NATO is currently responsible for peacekeeping over approximately 75% of the country.¹⁴⁸ This has given NATO forces and administrators the experience necessary to train and cooperate with the forces responsible for anti-terrorist actions in other countries.

NATO had no role in the invasion of Iraq, although it did take diplomatic efforts to prevent disagreement between

¹⁴⁰ "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): Reaching out to the broader Middle East." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. January 9, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html>

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "NATO Topics – Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-1996)." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. June 9, 2005. <http://www.nato.int/issues/ifor/index.html>

¹⁴³ "NATO Topics – The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. February 28, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ "NATO Topics – Afghanistan." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>

¹⁴⁷ "NATO Topics – Afghanistan." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

Turkey and other Alliance members concerning the use of Turkish airspace during the invasion.¹⁴⁹ It also took military steps to protect Turkey in the event of a military counterattack by Iraq.¹⁵⁰ NATO has not undertaken any peacekeeping mission in Iraq but since 2004 has been involved in the training of Iraqi security forces and has committed to the long-term stability of Iraq.¹⁵¹ It has also been involved in providing infrastructure and administrative support to Alliance member Poland in its peacekeeping sector.¹⁵² The Alliance's experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq has created an important resource for its partner countries, especially those dealing with terrorist enemies similar to the groups in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another level of NATO interaction with the Middle East has been through disaster relief. NATO undertook an unusual humanitarian mission during the relief effort following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.¹⁵³ The Alliance is not a humanitarian organization, and does not intend to make humanitarian relief a habitual part of its operations. However, what makes NATO's involvement in Pakistan unique was not only the expressed need to respond to a disaster of such an extreme nature but also because Pakistan is considered part of the Greater Middle East region. NATO felt its actions could only contribute to its ongoing efforts to improve relations in the region.¹⁵⁴ NATO planes airlifted about 3500 tons of emergency supplies to Pakistan, as well as medical specialists and medical equipment.¹⁵⁵ The mission came to an end as scheduled in February 2006.¹⁵⁶ Again, this period was important in demonstrating NATO's goodwill and commitment toward the nations of the Greater Middle East and the Islamic world.

Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The simplest and least committed level of interaction, which the Alliance conducts with other countries, is referred to as dialogue.¹⁵⁷ NATO has a number of different frameworks in place to guide dialogue with neighboring countries. Dialogue countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia interact with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.¹⁵⁸ The PfP, introduced in 1994, is a framework for individual dialogue between NATO and European partners.¹⁵⁹ The Euro-Atlantic Council is a forum for joint meetings with the 26 NATO countries and any or all of the 20 countries who participate in the Council.¹⁶⁰ These two frameworks currently include the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.¹⁶¹ These nations fall within the greater Middle East region, are all primarily Muslim and have ethnic and diplomatic ties with Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Turkey.

Similarly, non-European countries around the Mediterranean interact with NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue.¹⁶² Also established in 1994, this framework currently has seven members: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁶³ The PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue have proven as important forums for NATO interaction with the Greater Middle East region and could serve as a model for further diplomatic efforts in Muslim countries. Response from the nations involved has been positive and the Mediterranean Dialogue has provided one of the few international forums that foster useful dialogue between countries like Israel and Egypt.¹⁶⁴ The Mediterranean Dialogue was strengthened in 2004 at the same time as the launching of the Istanbul Cooperation

¹⁴⁹ "NATO Topics – NATO's Assistance to Iraq." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/index.html>

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ "Enlargement." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.html>

¹⁵⁸ "NATO Topics – Partnership for Peace." North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.htm>

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Initiative.¹⁶⁵

Current diplomatic efforts toward the Middle East are focused on the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which was initiated in 2004.¹⁶⁶ Based on discussions held in Istanbul during the 2004 NATO summit with the mediation of the Turkish government, it aims to create a structure similar to the PfP or the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would facilitate interaction with the nations of the Persian Gulf.¹⁶⁷ The eventual goal of the program is to create a set of bilateral security agreements between NATO and each individual country to provide stability to the region.¹⁶⁸ Each participating country may choose to negotiate agreements in any or all of 6 different topical areas of NATO: defense reform advice, military-to-military cooperation, anti-terrorist intelligence sharing, anti-proliferation measures, border security and emergency relief planning.¹⁶⁹ The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group is the committee within NATO that governs the activities of the ICI, including decisions on future membership. The original invitation was made to the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Four countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates) have already joined the ICI and two others (Oman and Saudi Arabia) have expressed interest.¹⁷⁰ In the long term, the framework is open to all interested countries in the region. NATO has also noted that the use of the term “country” does not exclude the eventual participation of the Palestinian Authority in the ICI.¹⁷¹ If the group grows as hoped, this framework could provide NATO with diplomatic ties and established relationships with all the nations of the Greater Middle East. This creates the potential for large-scale coordination of security and peacekeeping efforts across borders.

Conclusions

As NATO redefines its mission and comes to understand the importance of matters outside the boundaries of Europe, it has moved slowly toward greater interaction with the Middle East. Many believe this to be a geographic, cultural, security and economic necessity and an inevitable part of NATO's ongoing realignment. What is in question is the way in which NATO chooses to interact with the Middle East and the extent to which the nations of that region are amenable to NATO overtures. The most important question facing NATO in this area is how to structure its interaction with the region to allow for relations with more countries and how best to build on the trust already established in order to encourage a higher level of cooperation.¹⁷² Peacekeeping efforts in the region have in general been positively received. Humanitarian efforts have shown that the Alliance's commitment to the Middle East does not begin and end with soldiers. Various multilateral interaction forums have allowed the Alliance to create relationships of one sort or another with virtually every country in the region. Progress in this area has been largely successful, but the effort is not yet over.

On the other hand, NATO's involvement with the Middle East in general marks a significant change from its previous defensive role. There are many, both within and without NATO that view this expansion in a negative light. Some have even questioned the extent to which current NATO operations are in line with the limitations imposed by the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO justifies its operations both in terms of collective defense in response to the new threat of terrorism and in the interests of the long-term stability of Europe, which is the Alliance's primary concern. There is no question that greater involvement in the Middle East has brought NATO forces into situations that before 1991 would be considered unthinkable. Everything has happened extremely fast and without any clear guiding force. It is important at this time for the Alliance to step back, consider all that has happened so far and establish a clear road map for its intentions in the future.

¹⁶⁵ “NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. April 21, 2005. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm>

¹⁶⁶ “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI): Reaching out to the broader Middle East.” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. January 9, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html>

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

Committee Directive

As you begin your research and your work during the conference, the Committee should consider several of the following questions: Should NATO's interaction with the countries of the Middle East be primarily individual or collective through organizations like the ICI? What is NATO's long-term role in Afghanistan and Iraq - how should the Alliance go about either increasing or decreasing its activity in those countries in order to reach its long-term objectives? How much is the Alliance willing to offer in terms of incentives to encourage the goodwill of the Middle East? What is the Alliance's position on key regional issues, especially the future of the Palestinian territories? How willing is NATO to be involved in future conflicts in the region?

Specifically regarding the ICI: Should NATO attempt to expand the ICI into a forum for interaction with the entire Greater Middle East, replacing current interaction through PfP and the Mediterranean Dialogue? How much collaboration, in terms of security forces, intelligence, etc, is NATO willing to extend as a part of ICI membership? What is the long-term purpose of the ICI and how likely is it to meet its stated objectives?