

Dear Delegates,

It is my distinct pleasure to welcome you to the Southern Regional Model United Nations (SRMUN) XVI. My name is Tonya Thornton-Neaves, and it is my honor to be serving you as the Director of the Security Council. I currently attend Mississippi State University where I am earning a Master's Degree in Public Policy and Administration with an emphasis in Environmental Policy. I completed my Bachelor's Degree in Political Science this past year at Mississippi State. I also served as the University's Secretary General for the Model U.N. Program which is known as the Mississippi Model Security Council. While there, I held positions as a general delegate, vice-president and president. This is my fourth year at SRMUN, and it is my second year on staff. Last year I was the Assistant Director of the Security Council. Previously, I was selected to be the Rapporteur for the African Union at SRMUN XIII and Rapporteur for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at SRMUN XIV. The Assistant Director for the Security Council this year is Lowell Baudouin, III. He is a current graduate from the University of West Florida with a B.A. in Political Science/Pre-Law. He will be beginning his first year of law school in pursuit of a J.D. degree with a concentration in International and Comparative Law this fall. SRMUN XVI will be his first year on staff.

For those of you who are new to Model UN (MUN) and may be anxious about attending SRMUN, do not be worried. A common misconception about MUN programs is that you already have to be an expert about the United Nations. While you should prepare, research and be as knowledgeable as possible, most delegates find that the best way to learn about the United Nations is to first experience it, meaning participating in one of the various Model UN conferences that are held throughout the nation each year. Please be aware, though, that serving on the Security Council is quite different from other committee. Many delegates find that while the Security Council is very exciting but also challenging and demanding. Please familiarize yourselves with the unique characteristics of the Security Council. First of all, there will be an **OPEN AGENDA** in which delegate are allowed to discuss any agenda item that is relevant to the Security Council's mandate. As a delegate, you will be able to choose whether or not to discuss the topics that Lowell and I have written about or instead discuss any other topic that pertains to the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore you must be prepared for a variety of topics that may be placed on the agenda. The topics that Lowell and I prepare for you will try to indicate some of the potential ones that may arise during the sessions.

The background guide for the Security Council for SRMUN XVI will focus on UN Reform from a Security Council perspective. The background guide will cover the following areas: UN Reform; the Danger Imposed to International Peace Concerning Rapid Militarization; Conflict Prevention; the Security Council's Response to Terrorism and Genocide; Democratization's Impact on Regional Stability; and the Legitimacy of Military Pre-emption.

The Security Council is the only committee at SRMUN with an open agenda. The open agenda also impacts position papers for the Security Council. Again, **ONLY** in Security Council, you should write your position paper discussing the three topics that fall under the mandate of the Security Council that your country believes should be addressed by the Security Council. Security Council position papers should be sent by e-mail to Brian Halma, the Director General of SRMUN (dg@srmun.org), no later than **11:59 pm on October 29, 2005**.

Another unique aspect about the Security Council is that the committee may be faced with a crisis situation that may arise during one of the sessions. Finally, because of its special nature, the Security Council operates differently from other United Nations' bodies. Please do not forget to familiarize yourself with its rules of procedure before the conference begins. I emphasize learning these rules because you will find them most helpful when trying to communicate to both the dais and among other delegates. Communication is a key instrument when working together with other Member States during sessions as well as caucuses. Most delegations find that failure to communicate will hinder any efforts made on behalf of your own country as well as others.

If you should have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact myself or Lowell. We will be more than willing to help you in your endeavors. Also, should you have any questions regarding the format specifications for the position papers, please refer to the SRMUN website at www.srmun.org.

Though it is a lot of work and commitment, the students who serve on the Security Council do find it to be one of the most rewarding experiences. With that, I wish you the best of luck, and I look forward to meeting you in November.

Sincerely,

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History of the Security Council

Representatives from China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States who met for the initial discussions at Dumbarton Oaks that would lead to the creation of the United Nations were mindful of the failure of the League of Nations to ensure that the guiding principles of the League Covenant were followed. There was broad agreement that it was necessary to establish a principle organ within the newly proposed international organization tasked specifically with promoting international peace and security. Though many felt that the League of Nations had the capacity to discuss significant international affairs, the body was not constructed in such a way that it could produce successful measures to deter aggression and prevent conflict. First of all, a major global power, the United States, did not join the organization, which led the organization to the fullest possible financial backing and political support. Secondly, there was no clear division of duties between the League's Assembly and Council committees. So, needless to say, tasks were often mismanaged. Additionally, in order for a resolution to be passed, it had to be done unanimously. Since there was no clear sense of collective security, individual Member States continued the policy of pursuing narrowly defined interests of their own country's foreign policy.¹ After careful consideration at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, delegates from countries that would become the first Member States of the United Nations came to the conclusion that a smaller body acting as the United Nations defense advisor and operations executioner, specifically charged with "the maintenance of international peace and security" should be commissioned.²

The Security Council is comprised of fifteen member states, with five nations holding permanent seats and ten holding rotating elected seats. The permanent five members are China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. These countries are known as the P-5 Members and retain special privileges known as the veto power.³ These permanent members were given veto powers primarily to ensure that no P-5 member would attack another P-5 Member as well as to ensure that the leading nations were in unanimity before taking action on a particular issue, thereby acting like a coalition.⁴ The ten nonpermanent member states are elected for a period of two year terms with five rotating out each December. These states are represented geographically, whereby there are three African, two Latin American, one Arab, one Asian, one Eastern European and two Western European states on the Security Council at any given time.⁵ Furthermore, Member States on the Council are mandated by the United Nations Charter to have a representative from each of their states present at the organization's headquarters in New York City so that the Council may operate "continuously" without delay or hesitation.⁶ Current members of the Security Council include: Permanent Seats: China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States; Elected Seats: Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Denmark, Greece, Japan, Philippines, Romania and Tanzania.

Security Council Members must be ready to deliberate at any given time to decide on "the fate of governments, establish peacekeeping missions, create tribunals to try persons accused of war crimes, and in extreme cases declare a nation to be fare game for corrective action by other member state."⁷ This legislative right was granted to the Security Council through the UN Charter and is apparent in the associations between Articles 37 and 39, which allow the Council to settle a particular dispute and make its accords compulsory on any parties involved or on the international community as a whole, hence, becoming international binding documents. Therefore, it is in this regard that the Security Council has the capability and authority to exercise powers from existing international law or by creating binding resolutions.⁸

Progress of the Security Council has been rather varied. During the late 1940s, the Security Council was quite effective in dealing with many issues that arose.⁹ Most affairs the Council encountered dealt typically with conflicts

¹ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

² Article 24. *United Nations Charter*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

³ Karen Mingst. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1999.

⁴ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *United Nations Security Council*. The United Nations. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html

⁷ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Karen Mingst. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1999.

centered on decolonization.¹⁰ However, as time went on, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, and the Council faced setbacks.¹¹ This stalemate period was particularly due to the frequent use of the veto by the Soviet Union which blocked many efforts.¹² The other P-5 Members also utilized the veto as well. For example, both France and Great Britain vetoed resolutions during the Suez crisis of 1956.¹³ Despite the frequent use of the veto during this period, the Security Council was able to take action and settle conflicts in South Asia,¹⁴ the crisis in the Congo and the successful execution of the ceasefire agreement in Cyprus.¹⁵ As the Cold War dissolved in the late 1980s, significant changes were incorporated within the Security Council's working methods.¹⁶ It had become apparent that every conflict was beginning to present new and "unique set[s] of circumstances."¹⁷

One of the main reasons for its creation, size and power was to enable the Security Council to rapidly respond to international crises as they arise. The Security Council is tasked with "transforming disaster into constructive development [which] requires a conceptual model different from the traditional, linear model of economic development which assumes a stable administrative system."¹⁸ Alternatively, the Security Council must devise a strategy that is specifically aimed at the conflict. Before the Security Council can deal with a crisis, the Council must have a clear concept of the underlying problems causing the conflict and those who are affected by it.¹⁹ Another way the Security Council may prepare for a crisis is to be proactive in their planning, whereby "the parties carefully think about everything that could happen and then develop detailed plans."²⁰ However, the Security Council often finds that at too many times there is insufficient international will to provide the funds, troops and resources necessary to handle the crisis, and it must make due with limited resources.²¹

The Security Council primarily operates under the mandate of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VI is titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" and mandates actions which may include peace talks, summit meetings, mediations and negotiations.²² For instance, sovereignty over the Kashmir region in South Asia has been disputed by Pakistan and India. While mediation efforts have yet to find resolution to the issue, the Security Council has been involved and monitoring the situation, particularly now that the conflict could produce a conflict that leads to nuclear war.

Nevertheless, when measures of this stature fall short to be effective, the Security Council has the capacity to incorporate the use of sanctions.²³ Sanctions have long been used throughout history to correct or punish nations for actions considered contrary to the established norms of international behavior. Sanctions represent a step short of armed intervention, and the Security Council may attempt to isolate an aggressor by severing some or all relations with a nation in view of trying to alter offensive behavior. These actions consist of the "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Nevertheless, when the Security Council chooses to implement

¹⁰ Cameron R. Hume. "The Security Council in the Twenty-First Century." *The U.N. Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project from the International Peace Academy, edited by David M. Malone. Boulder, CO. May 2004.

¹¹ Karen Mingst. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1999.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Brian Urquhart. *A Life in Peace and War*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1987.

¹⁴ This refers to some of the early conflicts between India and Pakistan.

¹⁵ Stanley Meisler. *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press. 1995.

¹⁶ David M. Malone. "Conclusion." *The U.N. Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project from the International Peace Academy, edited by David M. Malone. Boulder, CO. May 2004.

¹⁷ Briefing of Post Conflict Peace-building. *United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*. February 17, 2004.

¹⁸ *United Nations Secretariat*. The United Nations. July 12, 1995.

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000751.pdf>

¹⁹ Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng. *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. 1998.

²⁰ *Crisis Management*. Conflict Research Consortium. Boulder: University of Colorado. 1998.

²¹ Adam Roberts. "The Use of Force." *The U.N. Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project from the International Peace Academy, edited by David M. Malone. Boulder, CO. May 2004.

²² Chapter VI. *United Nations Charter*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

²³ Ibid.

sanctions as a form of non-forcible enforcement, it is often combined with incentives, such as humanitarian aid, as part of a bargaining process to resolve conflict and encourage compliance.²⁴

Though sanctions may seem like ideal measures to use, this is an area of much controversy. Many international organizations and agencies feel that at too many times sanctions cause civilian populations to suffer while only meeting with limited success in coercing the government of the country in question to alter its position. One alternative is the use of “smart sanctions” which are sanctions that can be formulated in such a way as to minimize the detrimental effects on civilian population. Instead, these sanctions are designed to apply pressure directly on those regimes that pose a threat to international peace and security as well as human rights.²⁵ An alternative to these two measures which may follow if the other two methods prove ineffective is the use of force. The Security Council may invoke Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which calls for the Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and make recommendations as to how “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”²⁶ When the Security Council finds no other measures sufficient of deterring such behaviors, it is under Chapter VII that the Security Council finds the authority to use force.²⁷

The role of Secretary General is two-fold. While the position of Secretary General is a leadership one whereby the person who serves it acts as “chief administrator,” the position does not have any battalions of its own.²⁸ He or she that fulfills this office cannot offer any resolutions or amendments to resolutions.²⁹ Instead, the Secretary General is to remain neutral, offering only his or her counsel on global affairs. However, the Secretary General may be requested by the Security Council to show interest in a particular issue so that it may be seen by the international community as a pertinent matter that requires special attention. Typically, the issues that Secretary General follows have come to include: maintaining a developmental focus on the continent of Africa; ensuring that there are adequate financial resources, military supplies, personnel, and political motivation to effectively manage peace operations and humanitarian catastrophes; and, promoting socio-economic needs through globalization so that all “the world’s people [can] share [its] benefits.”³⁰ Likewise, the position of the Secretary General is viewed among member states and the international community as a central figure of common interests and ideals that the United Nations embodies.

In the past few years, the Security Council has become under scrutiny as to whether or not it will be able sustain its legitimacy among the growing international community.³¹ Many of these attitudes have stemmed from a large portion of member states who wish to see the compositional arrangement of the Security Council reformed.³² However, other reform attitudes have come from within the United Nations. According to the Brahimi Report of 2000, the document suggested that United Nations was beginning to encounter a vast number of limitations in the struggle against war and violence.³³ The report insisted that in order for the United Nations to overcome these “shortcomings,” there must be “an ongoing effort for [its] institutional change.”³⁴ Since the inception of the United Nations, over a hundred countries have joined the organization, including Japan and Germany which are the second and third largest financial contributors to the UN budget.³⁵ Many reform supporters agree that in order for the Security Council to remain effective and legitimate in years to come, it must grow to be more “reflective of today’s

²⁴ “Use of Sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.” Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General. January 2005. www.un.org/News/press/docs/2005/sgsm1000.sgsm1000.htm

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Chapter VI. *United Nations Charter*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

²⁷ Chapter VII. *United Nations Charter*. The United Nations. June 26, 1945.

²⁸ Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder. *Essential Readings in World Politics*. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 2001.

²⁹ *United Nations Secretary General: The Office*. The United Nations. <http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2005/sgsm1000.sgsm1000.htm>

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ *United Nations Secretariat*. The United Nations. July 12, 1995.

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000751.pdf>

³² William Boston, et al. “Is There a Better Model For the U.N.?” *Time*. Vol. 164, Issue 24. December 13, 2004.

³³ William J. Durch, et al. “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations.” <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pubs.cfm?ID=90>

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

international realities.”³⁶ Any change in the composition of the Security Council would require an amendment to the United Nations Charter. Any prospective change faces a significant hurdle; the permanent members must unanimously agree on it. The primary hesitance among the P-5 Members is that even though “reform is a loaded word and its meaning is often subjective” any significant change in permanent status may disrupt or even destabilize power relationships among many of the Member States.³⁷ While reform has yet to happen, it is certain that the topic will remain prevalent for years to come.

UN Reform

*“The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”*³⁸

The United Nations is regarded as the world’s leading institution building towards a larger freedom for all peoples and all nations on the matters of development, security and human rights.³⁹ This year marks the fifth year anniversary since member states of the United Nations adopted the Millennium Declaration in 2000. While the major bodies of the United Nations have experienced many achievements, collective security challenges still remain. The threats to peace and security include not only international war and conflict, but also civil violence, terrorism and genocide which can have equally catastrophic consequences.⁴⁰

The Security Council is a political organ of the United Nations specifically charged with maintaining international peace and security under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter.⁴¹ The body is heavily relied upon for settling various disputes between and among countries. At times, however, Council members find themselves entangled with issues centering on evidence and legal argument. Though member states may refer legal questions of international law to the International Court of Justice, and now perhaps to the International Criminal Court, the Council has been willing to wade in matters of this in the past. Nevertheless, it must be maintained that the Security Council acts principally for political reasons and is not required not to make legal judgments.

The legitimacy of recommendations and actions taken by the Security Council has been at stake since shortly after the inception of the organization in 1945. During the Cold War, the international political conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States blocked many potential actions by the Security Council. The end of the Cold War enabled the Security Council to demonstrate a high degree of activism for the first time, and the Security Council encountered numerous multi-faceted problems which each presented distinct and difficult situations. These conflicting situations became rather precarious and accelerated a trend of uncertainty among the international community. Furthermore, many wondered about the extent of the Council’s powers, and how far the body could expand the scope of its activities.⁴² This uncertainty has been extended into today. Since the Security Council “plays a far more active role than in the past, its shortcomings are more evident,” thereby causing it to come under scrutiny for its insufficiencies regarding security.⁴³

To date, there have been at least two fundamental challenges recognized within the United Nations that have put the legitimacy of the Security Council at risk: the ever-growing complexity of conflicts and the compositional arrangement of the Security Council. If this embodiment of the United Nations lacks a sense of international support and trust, it will fail to secure the proper authority to adequately deal with pressing issues such as terrorism and genocide that pose grave threats and dangers.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary-General. March 21, 2005. Article IV, Section C. United Nations. 2005. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html>

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Charter of the United Nations*. United Nations. June 26, 1945.

⁴² Bardo Fassbender. “Review Essay: *Quis judicabit?* The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control.” *European Journal of International Law*. Vol. 11, No. 1. 2005.

⁴³ James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Theses.htm>

Since the establishment of the United Nations, there has always been disagreement over the compositional arrangement of the Security Council. In its infancy, the body consisted of eleven member states. Five of those nations held permanent seats, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Known as the “P5,” these countries were selected to be lasting members on the Council under the basis that they were a reflection of world power at the time and were portrayed as being the five policemen to patrol the globe.⁴⁴ At that time, there were also six non-permanent member states representing the rest of the world, which were selected upon the basis of geographic distribution and are rotationally elected every two years. It was not until 1965 that the Security Council accepted amendments to Article 23, 27 and 61 in *Resolution 1990* that would enlarge the non-permanent membership seats from six to ten, while maintaining its original guidelines on selection. Two-thirds of the General Assembly and all five of the Security Council permanent members approved *Resolution 1990*. The resolution would not take effect until December 20, 1971, which goes to show the difficulty faced in enacting it.⁴⁵ To date, *Resolution 1990* has been the only significant reform effort passed.⁴⁶ Now known as the “E10,” the elected countries are elected in the following numbers from the following regions: Three are elected from Africa; two from Latin America; one from the Middle East; one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe; and two from Western Europe.⁴⁷

For the past fifteen years, fierce debates over membership reform of the Security Council have been pushed to the forefront of several countries’ agenda as well as that of the United Nations Secretariat’s. Calls for reform have been in response to many things, such as to increase effectiveness and to have fair and even handed decisions.⁴⁸ However, many reform supporters base most of their efforts off of one or two aspects. First and foremost, the Security Council’s “controversial action and inaction” during the crisis in Rwanda and Iraq have led many nations to question the accountability and legitimacy of the organization.⁴⁹

Secondly, the shape of membership in the UN has changed with the addition of more than a hundred new members since the UN’s inception.⁵⁰ Advocates claim that it is unfair for new and economically emerging nations to be left out of one of the most important international organizations. Hence, there is a strong urge for Security Council to be reformed by having it enlarged to hold between twenty-one to twenty-six members, with the possibility of adding two to six new permanent seats, thereby, once again, becoming “more reflective of today’s international realities.”⁵¹ For instance, former Axis powers Japan and Germany, which opposed the Allied Powers in World War II, now wish to attain permanent status on the Security Council, especially since they contribute a large portion of the United Nation’s budget. Influential countries such as these have also joined with India and Brazil in the Group of Four (G-4), in actively supporting one another’s intentions to attain permanent status on the Security Council. However, what Japan and Germany are only beginning to realize is that by being involved with the G-4 may be providing support to their claims, it is also bringing new opposition that Brazil and India face within their regions.⁵²

“‘Reform’ is always a loaded word because its meaning is often subjective and because any significant change will affect power relationships and the status of particular member states.”⁵³ The Security Council is loosely organized, and, therefore, depends upon the management of its permanent members.⁵⁴ So permanent members who “have

⁴⁴ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁴⁵ *Introductory Note*. About the UN Charter. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/introd.htm>

⁴⁶ Thomas G. Weiss. “The Illusions of UN Security Council Reform.” *The Washington Quarterly*. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Autumn 2003.

⁴⁷ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁴⁸ James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Thesess.htm>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Thesess.htm>

⁵³ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁵⁴ James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Thesess.htm>

enjoyed a preeminent role in the council” often portray calls for reform as “gratuitous tinkering” thus causing the issue to face many setbacks.⁵⁵

The period of “no reform” for the Security Council is due to many reasons, but a few are especially prevalent. To begin with, restructuring the Security Council membership would require an amendment to the United Nations Charter. However, in order for an amendment to be ratified, there must be support among the permanent members since a change in the Charter calls for a unanimous agreement among the Security Council P-5 and two-thirds vote among all Member States in the General Assembly. Also, there may be “blind” reasons, those incidences occurring behind the scenes that may be damper reform efforts. Reform issues of the Council go way beyond mere membership change. Many of the Council member’s deliberations occur behind closed doors. These “consultations of the whole” are kept away from scrutiny, yet they are also kept from having any record, which could be referenced by future Member States.⁵⁶ For example, one obscured issue that is often speculated about is that many countries are reluctant to share power on the Council. Permanent members of the UN Security Council are hesitant to allow for an alteration of its structure because they feel they may lose their rights to veto powers or their influence may be diminished in some way.⁵⁷

In light of the situation, “[s]ome insiders wonder if the reform advocates fully understand the impact of their proposed changes.”⁵⁸ According to Nancy Soderberg, a former Ambassador to the United Nations, “Any expansion [of the United Nations Security Council] risks making the council unworkable because it would become so big. If you expand it you will just have more side groups to work things out. You can’t have an effective body and negotiate with 26 people on it.”⁵⁹ Additionally, other reform critics argue that expansion of the Security Council will in fact not make it substantially more reflective of the world today. Instead, they agree that a stronger regional representation would be more effective.⁶⁰

A situation of this kind poses a difficult problem for the UN Security Council since permanent members are still the most capable of providing resources. If the P-5 members are reluctant to do so in support of UN efforts, it can undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council.⁶¹

Reducing Risk and Prevalence of War

The Danger Imposed to International Peace by Militarization

"I have seen how easy it is for nuclear contamination to occur, and how hard it is to clean it up.... Do nations possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons because of fear of attack from some other nation, or is it mainly because without them the stronger cannot otherwise exploit the weaker?"⁶²

Militarization occurs when a state increases its budgetary expenditures for the build-up of manpower, arms and military technology. Many nations that engage in this activity argue the possibility of a serious international or regional threat.⁶³ Militarization is a destabilizing force because of the reactions that occur when states engage in this activity. The potential for a stronger nation to dominate its neighbors exists. Surrounding nations of a militarizing state may engage in militarization of their own. World attention is drawn from humanitarian crises to attempting to limit potential conflict. Nations divert funds away from domestic issues that help their people and focus on military expenditures.

⁵⁵ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁵⁶ James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Thesess.htm>

⁵⁷ *The U.N Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century*. A Project of the International peace Academy edited by David M. Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. May 2004. Chapter 9: “The Use of Force” by Adam Roberts, pp.133-152.

⁵⁸ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004..

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ James Paul and Céline Nahory. *Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council*. Global Policy Forum. July 13, 2005. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/0713Thesess.htm>

⁶¹ Michael J. Glennon. “Why the Security Council Failed.” *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2003.

⁶² Andreas Toupadakis. “Geopolitics: Arms Race.” Global Issues. <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsRace.asp>

⁶³ “Geopolitics: Expansion.” Global Issues. <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Expansion.asp>

Nations that rapidly increase their military arms, fortify their borders and embrace an economy focused on war present a substantial threat to regional and international stability. The world has learned the destructive potential belonging to an uncontrolled build-up of military arms. Before World War II, nations such as Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire began a process of “militarization” and engaged in aggressive maneuvering against bordering states. Japan and Germany undertook the aggressive actions that caused World War II only after a prolonged period of military build-up. From this conflict arose the United Nations.⁶⁴ The Security Council was given the enforcement power of the United Nations’ body to work to prevent war.⁶⁵

Disarmament, or the reduction of weapons and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons, has become a core activity of the United Nations, and by extension, the Security Council.⁶⁶ Though the General Assembly and Commission on Disarmament are largely charged with dealing with disarmament issues, the Security Council also plays a role. The Security Council’s mission is to maintain international peace and security, and militarization has the potential to threaten that goal. Regional stability does not simply come from stopping a conflict that has already erupted. Reducing militarized borders and weapons proliferation helps take away two volatile catalysts that can lead to destabilization and armed conflict. When a nation rapidly increases its military might and engages in aggressive activity such as border build-up, this nation presents a threat to its neighboring state’s sovereignty and is also a threat to security.

With militarization the potential for aggression is substantially increased. Aggression may not simply be represented by violence. First, a nation with an extremely powerful military or conglomeration of arms can destabilize its neighbors by using its military power for leverage in diplomacy and international dealings. Basically this means that nations with a powerful military or arms can abuse this power in their international relations with neighboring states, thereby leading to a destabilizing influence. Leverage can be used by the militarized state in negotiations with other nations. Heavily militarized nations have the temptation to use this force in international disputes or may disregard the concerns of bordering states. The potential for resentment may arise in the region among the weaker states. This resentment and suspicion of the powerful nation can lead to an intensive military build-up by neighbor states, effectively an arms race. With nations bringing their economies in line for military expenditures, the civilian populations can suffer. Money for domestic concerns is diverted into arms and soldiers, leading to a reduction in basic human welfare.

The potential for militarization is not only seen in manpower and quantity of equipment, but also in technology. The ability of nations to build arms and threaten regional stability is greatly complicated by the development of new weapons and weapon systems that have greater destructive power and can be utilized to project power over greater distances. Long-range missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons present a way for nations to violate other states’ sovereignty in non-traditional ways without having to send an army across a border.⁶⁷

The question of militarization creating a destabilized environment has become far more complex with the advancements in technology and weaponry. Some weapons, such as conventional arms, are relatively easy to monitor and observe a build-up. However when a nation has weaponry such as a long-range missile, their ability to violate the sovereignty of their neighbor’s borders is increased. Nuclear warheads, once attached to a delivery mechanism, such as a missile, present another complication to sovereignty. Though a nation may not heavily increase its military capacity with standard arms such as soldiers and artillery, the development of a long-range missile program has the potential to be seen as militarization.

Nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons have greatly increased the potential for instability. Through the use of these weapons, a nation does not have to be in proximity of a neighboring state, but they may still be able to undertake hostile action against other states. These armaments allow aggressive nations to gain a diplomatic leverage by their ability to threaten other states without engaging in a “traditional” military build-up. Therefore the task of determining the capacity and intent of militarizing nations has become a much more intricate task for the Security Council. The necessity of effective transparency in arms trade becomes an essential task of this

⁶⁴ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

⁶⁵ *Security Council*. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>.

⁶⁶ *Disarmament*. United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/>

⁶⁷ *Weapons of Mass Destruction*. United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/wmd/>.

body. The Organization of American States (OAS) recently began ratification of a treaty to handle the task of monitoring armaments transfer or acquisition. The Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions creates a “transparency” agreement for the Americas so that the OAS is aware of any military build-up.⁶⁸

Recently, military expenditures have been rapidly increasing all over the world. The US war on terror has promoted a drastic increase in military spending. Britain and France have increased their spending, with China increasing by eighteen percent and India by nine percent in 2002.⁶⁹ These increases in military size provide a serious situation for the Security Council. As nations increase the capacity of their armed forces, their ability to destabilize a region is increased. As stated earlier, militarized nations can not only use force against their neighbors, but these nations can also employ extreme pressure in international diplomacy.

Nations that increase their armed forces may cause a similar chain reaction among their neighbors. This development can promote a tendency between states to engage in the process of drastically militarizing borders. Border fortification is another source of instability for disarmament efforts and regional stability. The border between Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea has been a source of instability in the Asian region for decades. Forty-four percent of the DPRK’s population is a part of the armed forces.⁷⁰ The 1980s and early 1990s saw an intensive increase by the DPRK in military expenditures.⁷¹ This danger has led to increased tension along the edges of the DMZ.

Treaties have shown the desire of nations to control rapid militarization through international law. The CFE treaty, which began its ratification process in 1990, was a European effort to control the build-up of military forces to prevent conflict from occurring on the continent. The spirit of the text is contained in the statement:

Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.⁷²

Other treaties, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, display the world desire to reduce the build-up of highly destructive weapons. This treaty was an effort by Latin America and the Caribbean to stop any development or acquisition of nuclear weapons by any nation in the region.⁷³

Desire for regional stability has led to resolutions from the General Assembly hoping to build confidence in areas of the world. *GA Resolution 58/43* seeks to encourage nations to abide by international agreements, work with regional organizations and work for measures to increase stability.⁷⁴ This resolution points to a significant difficulty faced in international security. This difficulty arises from a nation’s compliance with international disarmament agreements. Documents such as treaties have arisen as concrete efforts to control militarization and promote stability. *Resolution 58/43* expresses this desire in Articles 4 and 6 by urging compliance with and promotion of international agreements.⁷⁵

The United Nations has sought to monitor the development and build-up of military arms in nations around the world. *General Assembly Resolution 35/142B* provided a system for countries to report annually their military expenditures to the Secretary-General. 110 nations have used this mechanism at least one time since its inception in

⁶⁸ *Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions*. Organization of American States. June 7, 1999.

⁶⁹ DDA Occasional Papers. *Commission on Disarmament and Development*. United Nations. <http://disarmament2.un.org/ddapublications/OP9art03.pdf>

⁷⁰ “Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://csis.org/isp/conv_armscontrol.pdf

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. November 19, 1990.

⁷³ *Treaty of Tlatelolco*. Organization of American States. February 14, 1967.

⁷⁴ A/RES/58/43. *Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context*. United Nations General Assembly. .

⁷⁵ Ibid.

1980.⁷⁶ The weakness of this resolution is that nations are asked to voluntarily report their expenditures. Many that have issued any information have only done so sporadically. Another important armament resolution is 46/36L. Through this resolution, the United Nations has developed a system to monitor any international trade/transfer of arms that fit within the status of “conventional arms.”⁷⁷ *GA Resolution 46/36 L* has defined the categories of conventional arms in the United Nations Register. “The Register comprises seven categories of major conventional arms, namely, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships (including submarines) as well as missiles and missile-launchers.”⁷⁸ Conventional arms are basically all major modern military weapons excluding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Once again this resolution is limited by the fact that reporting is voluntary.

The voluntary nature of *GA Resolutions 35/142B* and *46/36L* limits their effectiveness. These efforts at transparency are progress in allowing the world community and Security Council an ability to monitor the movement and development of military arms. However, not all nations participate and a black-market of weapons trade does occur. The greatest difficulty is that transparency is aimed at the reporting and monitoring of nation-states. Rogue nations, rebel groups and terrorists not necessarily bound by any national identity do not face the requirements of a nation-state. Their activity and ability to destabilize borders is still a prevalent problem. These non-state actors present major issues in transparency. Between nations, monitoring arms transfers is achievable. However, attempting to monitor weapons transfers from non-state actors to nations or other non-state actors is far more difficult.

The 59th General Assembly has passed a myriad of resolutions confronting the military activities that could violate state sovereignty and destabilize a region. Recognizing the difficulty of implementing transparency for illicit trade of weapons, *Resolution 59/86* was passed. Simply stated, the goal of this resolution is to promote international efforts to monitor and reduce the illegal trade of small arms and light weapons.⁷⁹ *Resolution 59/88* requests that the Conference on Disarmament should consider what actions can benefit regional efforts at arms control.⁸⁰ The Security Council can reduce arms production and transfer to help prevent the destabilizing effect of a state engaging in a process of rapid militarization by taking action to promote arms control. *Resolution 59/91* is one step at addressing the complexities presented by long-range missile proliferation,⁸¹ and *Resolution 59/80* is an effort to bring the international community towards a goal of preventing non-state actors such as terrorist groups, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.⁸²

Internal conditions of poverty and civil war in developing countries also have the potential to allow excessive militarism inside nations. Developing countries may heavily fortify their borders as a matter of national pride or to potentially obtain the resources of a neighboring state. *GA Resolution 59/78* shows the concern of the United Nations with the desire for economic and humanitarian development. The goal of this resolution is to reduce arms, while increasing development.⁸³ States engaging in rapid armament of forces have the potential to cause a chain reaction of military build-up among their neighbors. Militarized nations create fear and suspicion in their regions. By ignoring the pressing demands of human rights and society to focus on military strength, nations engaging in militarization can cause a humanitarian crisis, especially in developing areas.

Increasing the effectiveness of transparency may help the Security Council to monitor the possibility of a nation increasing its arms. Working to prevent such build-up will allow countries in a region to tackle internal concerns such as health care, the economy and the general well being of their people. In this era of reform, the Security Council can become a part of this effort to enhance the methods of strengthening global peace and security. Reforms by the Security Council in areas such as transparency could be a potential action. Finally, the argument by some nations that militarization is for their own protection can pose a difficult issue. The UN Charter guarantees

⁷⁶ “United Nations Peace and Security through Disarmament: United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures.” United Nations. <http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/milex.html>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “Transparency in Armaments.” United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. United Nations. <http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/register.html>

⁷⁹ A/RES/59/86. *The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.* United Nations General Assembly.

⁸⁰ A/RES/59/88. *Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Sub regional Levels.* United Nations General Assembly.

⁸¹ A/RES/59/91. *The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.* United Nations General Assembly.

⁸² A/RES/59/80. *Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.* United Nations General Assembly.

⁸³ A/RES/59/78. *Relationship between disarmament and development.* United Nations General Assembly.

each Member State the right to individual or collective self defense,⁸⁴ and it may not be clear whether the deployment of military equipment is in self-defense or a destabilizing act.

Conflict Prevention

“Prevention of conflict is the first promise in the Charter of the United Nations. Yet, it is a promise that is constantly betrayed by local parties, governments, international organizations and, to some extent, the scholarly community which until quite recently had been unable to generate policy-relevant analysis of the circumstances in which this goal might be achieved.”⁸⁵

History reveals that the troubles of man are capable of descending into violent conflict unless their actions can be deferred in rational ways to be less aggressive.⁸⁶ Conflict is often the product of rising tensions from factors such as race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, societal prejudice, civil rights, security concerns and political involvement.⁸⁷ These factors occur in every country and region of the world. Conflicts often involve multiple numbers of these factors and are multidimensional.⁸⁸ As society changes, so do the possible sources of conflict.⁸⁹ Many of these sources of conflict span international borders, and the potential conflicts they can create may spill over across borders.⁹⁰

The United Nations was created in the hope of preventing future war. Countries joined the UN recognizing that an international coalition of countries was needed to address the international causes of conflict. Banding together in an organization based on collective security was also designed to deter aggression. The United Nations represents an effort to provide a vehicle for cooperation in “a shared commitment to collective security,” an effort better known as conflict prevention.⁹¹ Conflict prevention refers to process of eliminating or reducing threats to security before they develop into conflict. For many, the form of preventive measures is the best accomplished by regional and international organizations, who are most capable of enacting a continuum strategy of “mediation with muscle.”⁹²

Conflict prevention is highly prized because war is destructive and carries heavy costs in terms of lives and resources. Rebuilding after conflicts is expensive, and it often takes years or even decades to recover from conflict. Conflict prevention offers the potential of resolving conflicts without the outbreak of war. The potential costs of war have been raised with the number of countries that possess or are attempting to develop nuclear weapons.⁹³

The approach of conflict prevention consists of the United Nations undertaking initiatives to prevent outbreaks of violence.⁹⁴ Sometimes this process is more immediate, when the UN pursues negotiation to find a peaceful solution to a dispute between 2 or more parties. The UN also pursues the strategy of trying to eliminate or mitigate some of the root causes of conflicts. The Economic and Social Council was empowered to promote economic and social justice in part to prevent conflict.⁹⁵ Conflict prevention is a versatile process that requires the cooperation between various agencies and organizations. The UN also faces many setbacks in conflict prevention, such as politics and financial constraints. For the UN and the Security Council to be successful in the future, these two challenges must be met and resolved.

⁸⁴ Article 51. *The United Nations Charter*. 1945.

⁸⁵ Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone. “Improving the UN’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention.” *International Peacekeeping*. Spring 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.77-98.

⁸⁶ Tschirgi, Necla. *Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding*. UN Global Security. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Tschirgi_paper_devlpmt_security.pdf

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ *Briefing of Post Conflict Peace- building*. United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Revised February 17, 2004. <http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacebuilding.html>

⁸⁹ Kofi Annan. “Courage to fulfill our responsibilities.” *Economist*. Dec. 4, 2004, Vol. 373, Issue 8404.

⁹⁰ Necla Tschirgi. *Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding*. UN Global Security. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Tschirgi_paper_devlpmt_security.pdf

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² *Project Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Policy*. The United Nations System in the 21st Century (UN21 Project). <http://www.unu.edu/p&g/conflict-prevention.html>.

⁹³ UN Conference by 2006 on Eliminating Nuclear Dangers Called for. Press Release GA/DIS/3207. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/gadis3207.doc.htm>

⁹⁴ J. Brian Atwood. *Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum*. “Why are Bureaucracies Resistant to Conflict Prevention?” <http://www.sfcg.org/Documents/CPRF/CPRFJan2000.pdf>

⁹⁵ Stephen C. Schlesinger. *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press. p. 49.

The Security Council, therefore, must be able to reach agreement on the state of a particular conflict, so that appropriate measures can be taken to adequately deal with the situation by either stabilizing or defusing it altogether through the means such as mediation, sanctions or the good offices of the Secretary-General. In order for this to be accomplished, however, the Council must come to a consensus on what each security threat entails as well as deciding upon what preventative measure(s) should be implemented as countering efforts.

Today, member states are unable to agree upon the subject of conflict prevention and how its measures should be managed.⁹⁶ Members have become somewhat divided on matters, causing the entire institution to become entrapped by politics.⁹⁷ Furthermore, security issues have gained a much greater importance, ultimately causing the polarization of several states. Together, these elements pose solemn dangers to the perceptions “of what constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.”⁹⁸

A second issue that must be properly addressed when discussing conflict prevention is financial assistance. Economic aid is a key ingredient when supporting deterrence, especially since “inequality and discrimination are often the root causes of conflict.”⁹⁹ With conflict management becoming rather costly, many agree that conflict prevention is a far better way, financially, to prevent tensions from escalating into violent outbursts through implementing early warning systems and facilitating outside involvement to arrange peace talks.¹⁰⁰ Thus, it is essential that conflict prevention be a central part of an organization’s crisis management activities to help reduce costs.¹⁰¹

The United Nations is one source of development aid along with the World Bank, Official Development Assistance¹⁰² and regional development banks. The World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund are also tasked with promoting development.¹⁰³ It is clear that economic aid is critical to promoting conflict prevention.¹⁰⁴ Still, no matter which organization is seen as the justifiable actor in the conflict, efforts for economic assistance face major setbacks, and have yet to be resolved.¹⁰⁵ Many member states and regional or international organizations find it difficult to justify expenses before a conflict has exploded into a volatile situation, in hopes that it make self-correct with time. However, this is becoming more and more unlikely to occur, and so, nation-states and organizations are spending more on peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace building measures because they were not willing to invest in conflict prevention.

It is clear that the United Nations has the potential to deter aggression and prevent conflict through its vast scope of capabilities and tools such as sanctions, blockades, peacekeeping negotiations and military operations. However, every conflict “presents a unique set of circumstances.”¹⁰⁶ With ever changing situations and no precise illustration of conflict prevention, the extent of the institution’s capabilities will tend to vary from incidence to incidence.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the wide-range of problems the UN will encounter during preventative attempts will most often “reflect the combined problems associated” with societies.¹⁰⁸ Conflict prevention must come to include an approach addressing both “political and economic” characteristics as well as strive to address the pertinent issues of terrorism

⁹⁶ Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone. “Improving the UN’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention.” International Peacekeeping. Spring 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.77-98.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Necla Tschirgi. “Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding.” UN Global Security. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Tschirgi_paper_devlpmt_security.pdf

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ *Project Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Policy*. The United Nations System in the 21st Century (UN21 Project). <http://www.unu.edu/p&g/conflict-prevention.html>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Substantive Session (Geneva, 30 June to 25 July, 2003). Economic and Social Council. United Nations.

¹⁰³ *Multilateral Economic Assistance*. International Financial Institutions and International Organizations and Programs. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17784.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ Necla Tschirgi. “Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding.” UN Global Security. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Tschirgi_paper_devlpmt_security.pdf

¹⁰⁵ *Financing for Development*. Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/indxmain.htm>

¹⁰⁶ *Briefing of Post Conflict Peace-building*. United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Revised February 17, 2004. <http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacebuilding.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

and genocide.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, conflict prevention is going to require the participation of various actors and their multiple resources.¹¹⁰

On conflict prevention, the United Nations' record has been rather mixed in "preventing and resolving violent conflict."¹¹¹ Typically, the Security Council merely reacts to conflict. Yet, there is a growing need for the Council to learn better how to prevent conflict. Success will be dependent upon the Security Council changing its methods and approach. Reform of the Council has the possibilities to better assist the United Nations in attempts of deterring aggression by coming to include not only the rationale of conflict prevention, but, also, an interconnected diplomacy that better reflect societies of today. Though just about every nation around the world is a member of the United Nations, some nation-states do not have immediate interactions with the organization. Instead, they sometimes act merely as observers. For the United Nations to be successful in the twenty-first century, the Security Council must adjust accordingly to, so that nation-states that are not yet members may come to have more respect for the institution, thereby becoming more accepting of its arrangements and engagements in international affairs.¹¹²

Terrorism

*"The spread of terrorism is a threat to the very foundations of the United Nations, and to the spirit of its Charter. Over the years, the organization has played an important role in establishing a legal framework for the eradication of terrorism through on of its basic roles: the codification of international law—more specifically through twelve United Nations anti-terrorist conventions and protocols. These conventions must be strictly observed and effectively implemented if terrorism is to be defeated."*¹¹³

Though terrorism may seem like a rather new concept, in fact, it is not. Terrorism has long been a part of history, with one of the first recorded events involving a Jewish terrorist group known as the Zealots attacking Roman and Greek authorities.¹¹⁴ However, for the past three decades, the notion of international terrorism has spread rampantly throughout the world. Terrorist attacks did not receive widespread recognition until 1970.¹¹⁵ Terrorist attacks reached an all-time high in the mid-1980s with roughly 600 attacks occurring each year.¹¹⁶ Between the years of 1996 and 1998, radical activities dissipated, and the amount of attacks fell to about 300.¹¹⁷

Groups like Al Qaida, the IRA, HAMAS, the PLO and Hezbollah are associations that use religion as part of their appeal, but their aspirations are almost entirely political. However, some of these groups, along with many others, are becoming heavily dominated by religious overtones, and terrorist groups encompassing this characteristic generally utilize higher degrees of violence to effectively spread their message. The reasoning behind this is due to the belief that their religious faith is the only divine one, thereby permitting them to use whatever means necessary to advance it.¹¹⁸ As a result of the climbing amount of attacks taking place and this distinctive attribute, the issue of combating terrorism in the 21st Century has moved to the forefront of several nations' agendas.¹¹⁹

Though the terror campaign for the United Nations notably dates back to the 1940s, the topic was not regularly placed on the Security Council's agenda until the 1990s: "In January 1992, at the Security Council's first ever meeting of Heads of State and Government, the members of the Security Council expressed their deep concern over

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Necla Tschirgi. "Root Causes of Peace and Challenges to Peacebuilding." UN Global Security. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Tschirgi_paper_devlpmt_security.pdf

¹¹¹ H. Peter Langille. "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Development and UN Standing Forces." Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/canada2.htm>

¹¹² Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone. "Improving the UN's Capacity for Conflict Prevention." *International Peacekeeping*. Spring 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.77-98.

¹¹³ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

¹¹⁴ *Jerusalem History*. Jewish Virtual Library. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/vie/Jerusalem1.html>

¹¹⁵ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

¹¹⁶ Matthew J. Morgan. "The Origins of the New Terrorism." 2004. Commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Operations Company (HHOC), 125th Military Intelligence Battalion, at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Karen Mingst. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 1999.

acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts.”¹²⁰ At that time, the foremost instrument the United Nations implemented to combat terrorism was by issuing economic sanctions on nations or groups involved with known terrorist activities. However, throughout the latter part of the 1990s, economic sanctions were found not to be as effective as once thought. Many international agencies and organizations feel that at too many times sanctions cause civilian populations to suffer instead of deterring aggression. Additionally, the Security Council had made minimal efforts towards condemning states for “providing political support, financial assistance, and the sponsorship necessary to maintain and expand its struggle.”¹²¹ Therefore, critics argued that the Security Council had played merely a minimal role in the fight against terrorism, and that the international community should be better informed on how these events were being managed at the international level, remembering that terrorism is an ever-growing phenomenon.¹²²

Defining terrorism is one element of the issue. Depending upon what side of an issue a person agrees with, their mindset of what constitutes terrorism can be altered. “In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial element in the attempt to coordinate international collaboration, based on the currently accepted rules of traditional warfare.”¹²³ As with other international agencies or organizations, the United Nations, too, suffers from not having a precise explanation of terrorism.¹²⁴ With no commonly accepted definition, “the possibilities for abuse [become even more] obvious and dangerous.”¹²⁵

In the past, the United Nations has been capable of overcoming hesitance among some permanent members to initially get involved in matters of international security when others take the lead in the initiative. For instance, “the UN’s track record since the end of the Cold War shows that when the United States demonstrates leadership and determination it frequently convinces other Council members to follow its lead and take effective multilateral action.”¹²⁶ The willingness of other countries to follow US leadership in the Security Council is declining. The decision by the United States to invade Iraq in the face of much international opposition has led to the perception that the US is reluctant to cooperate with other countries and favors a unilateral approach.¹²⁷

Since 9/11, the United Nations, along with its various agencies and organizations, have taken on new responsibilities in the fight against terrorism.¹²⁸ The institution has become concerned about how quickly acts of terrorism are occurring, especially ones that are initiated by extremist groups. The UN has also become alarmed about the magnitude of deaths and destruction resulting from terrorist attacks.¹²⁹ The Security Council along with many other international and regional organizations has moved the issue of combating terrorism to the forefront of their agendas. Thus, many feel that the United Nations will be able to “strengthen and sustain multilateral cooperation,” as well as play an “instrumental [part] in establishing and maintaining international standards of accountability,” which led to the development of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, better known as the CTC.¹³⁰

On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council convened at the organization’s headquarters in New York as a reaction to the terrorist attacks made on the United States just a few weeks prior.¹³¹ “[A]cting under

¹²⁰ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. “The United Nations and the campaign against terrorism.” *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.163-176.

¹²¹ Dag Hammarskjöld Library. International Terrorism: State Sponsored Terrorism. http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/frame.htm

¹²² Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. “The United Nations and the campaign against terrorism.” *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.163-176.

¹²³ Boaz Ganor. “Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?” <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm>

¹²⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman. “The Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism.” Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. June 18, 2002. <http://www.csis.org>

¹²⁵ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. “The United Nations and the campaign against terrorism.” *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.163-176.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 163-176.

¹²⁷ Eric Marquardt. “Continued Policy of US Unilateralism May Depend on 2004 Presidential Elections.” Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/analysis/2003/1119unilateralism.htm>

¹²⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman. “The Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism.” Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. June 18, 2002. <http://www.csis.org>

¹²⁹ UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). The United Nations Security Council. September 28, 2001. <http://www.un.org>

¹³⁰ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. “The United Nations and the campaign against terrorism.” *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.163-176.

¹³¹ Anthony H. Cordesman. “The Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism.” Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy.

Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter (concerning threats to international peace and security)," the Security Council unanimously passed *Resolution 1373*, which publicly condemned any acts of terrorism.¹³² The resolution called for all 191 member states of the United Nations to take immediate steps in the prevention of future terrorist attacks and to suppress the ones already occurring.¹³³ In addition, the resolution created the Counter-Terrorism Committee, known by most as the CTC. This commission represents all member states of the United Nations, however, its membership exclusively consists of the fifteen member states represented on the Security Council.¹³⁴

Since the CTC is composed entirely of member states that represent the United Nations Security Council, there are no financial obligations. Instead, the CTC is based on the assumption that member states will provide credible information on their efforts towards countering terrorism. It is assumed by the Security Council that member states will "afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorists acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings."¹³⁵

Though "the CTC is committed to creating a global network of organizations to combat terrorism" through monitoring the "implementation of *Resolution 1373* by all States," it does not possess any lists of names distinguishing terrorists groups or persons, therefore, it must rely on exclusively on the information gathered by its member states.¹³⁶ Member states collect intelligence concerning their governments' improvements made in "seven critical areas: legislation, financial asset controls, customs, immigration, extradition, law enforcement and arms traffic." Upon receiving a report, the CTC reviews the document and makes recommendations.¹³⁷ Once the CTC has replied to the member state that submitted the report, the President of the committee reports directly to the Security Council in order for an update of its progress. Thus, the CTC merely acts as a "subsidiary organ" to the Security Council.¹³⁸

The CTC's work becomes more complicated by the day, and it takes a quantity of time just to review one report submitted by a member state. Thus, this can merely be accomplished by the Security Council allowing the CTC to publicly denounce those member states who fail to comply with various treaties and conventions to combat terrorism. Some scholars, though, have argued for the CTC to be more effective, the UN should disconnect the CTC from being under the supervision of the Security Council. If done, the CTC could be funded through "voluntary contributions or an international trust fund."¹³⁹

Even though the United Nations, the Security Council and its Counter-Terrorism Committee is committed to eradicate threats of terrorism throughout the world, member nations of the organization should still remain "vigilant."¹⁴⁰ Combating terrorism is not and will never be an easy challenge. However, measures that have been taken towards eliminating it have not been successful. For instance, the term terrorism has yet to be clearly defined. Most of the time, terrorism is referred to as a "systematic use of terror," or a "means of coercion."¹⁴¹ Unfortunately, with no clear and concise definition for terrorism, it acts as a scapegoat for many countries to not comply with the requests made from the CTC. Therefore, many people are distressed and left in an upheaval because governments across the world cannot agree upon to what the conduct entails.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. June 18, 2002. <http://www.csis.org>

¹³² CTC Website. CTC Fact Sheets on August 4, 2004. <http://www.un.org>

¹³³ Chantal de Jonge Oudraat. "The United Nations and the campaign against terrorism." *Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.163-176.

¹³⁴ Edward C. Luck. "Global Terrorism and the United Nations: A Challenge in Search of a Policy." <http://www.un-globalsecurity.org>

¹³⁵ *UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001)*. The United Nations Security Council. September 28, 2001. <http://www.un.org>

¹³⁶ CTC-a. "Mandate." CTC Website. CTC Fact Sheets on August 4, 2004. <http://www.un.org>

¹³⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman. "The Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism." Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. June 18, 2002. <http://www.csis.org>

¹³⁸ CTC-b. "Working with the Security Council." CTC Fact Sheets on August 4, 2004. <http://www.un.org>

¹³⁹ Edward C. Luck. "Global Terrorism and the United Nations: A Challenge in Search of a Policy." <http://www.un-globalsecurity.org>

¹⁴⁰ Nancy A. Collins (Interpol's Chief). "War on Terrorism." ClariNews Website. Article on March 16, 2004. <http://www.quickstart.clari.net>

¹⁴¹ Anthony H. Cordesman. "The Role of the United Nations in Fighting Terrorism." Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. June 18, 2002. <http://www.csis.org>

Management of anti-terrorism measures at an international level at the Security Council is still lacking. Many scholars believe that in order for the UN to effectively address terrorism in decades to come, the body must be welcoming of new members. The momentum for reform in recent months has grown more than ever. With many nations interested in obtaining membership on the council, new priorities will be set. However, many states agree that increasing the size of the Security Council's permanent and non-permanent member states will make the body more effective in combating terrorism. Thus, the Council will become more alike the realities of the international community.

Genocide

*"Genocide is the world's worst international human rights problem. But it is different from other problems and requires different solutions. Because genocide is almost always carried out by a country's own military and police forces, the usual national forces of law and order cannot stop it. International intervention is usually required. But because the world lacks an international rapid response force, and because the United Nations has so far been either paralyzed or unwilling to act, genocide has gone unchecked."*¹⁴²

Scholars have recently begun calculations on the number of deaths that the world had observed since Genocide Convention was adopted almost sixty years ago, and one estimate is that over 10 million people have perished due to the Security Council's lack of conviction to openly state instances as acts of genocide.¹⁴³ In the twentieth century alone, genocides and mass murder incidents have killed more people than in any other time in history, even combining all the casualties from every war that has occurred. One estimate holds, for instance, that more than 25 million Russians, 3 million Ukrainians, 2 million Sudanese and 6 million Jews have been executed for their political views, ethnicity or religious beliefs.¹⁴⁴ Though many international organizations have defined the word genocide as the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group," the United Nations continues to have difficulty in determining whether or not a particular action is genocide. This is especially evident since a large portion of its member states cannot agree upon certain acts of violence as being intentional.¹⁴⁵ Meanwhile, mass murders persist and millions continue to die. This peculiar situation has been partially due to the definition of genocide which was provided by the *General Assembly Resolution 260A (III)* Article 2, which states:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of a group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.¹⁴⁶

Some critics argue that this definition is so narrow that it would exclude any mass killing that has happened since 1948.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, this description is lacking since it does not identify any acts of violence committed on behalf of political or socio-economic groups. In the late 1930s, Soviet communist leader, Joseph Stalin, committed mass atrocities when he had millions of people detained in prison camps and then executed for their perceived political orientation, which was not that of his own.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² *Genocide Watch*. The International Campaign to End Genocide. <http://www.genocidewatch.org/internationalcampaign.htm>.

¹⁴³ John D. Steinbruner. *Principles of Global Security*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press. 2000.

¹⁴⁴ *The International Campaign to End Genocide*. Genocide Watch. <http://www.genocidewatch.org/internationalcampaign.htm>

¹⁴⁵ *Case Study: Stalin's Purges*. Gendercide Watch. http://www.gendercide.org/case_stalin.html

¹⁴⁶ UN Documentation Centre. General Assembly Resolution 260A (III) Article 2. United Nations.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/044/31/IMG/NR004431.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁴⁷ "Analysis: Defining Genocide." BBC. February 1, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3853157.stm>

¹⁴⁸ *Case Study: Stalin's Purges*. Gendercide Watch. http://www.gendercide.org/case_stalin.html

In the past, cases of mass murder and ethnic cleansing have either been ignored or denied by both the United Nations and the international community. Thus, there is grave concern over human rights abuses and what constitutes the transition from abuse to genocide. Typically, the Security Council has implemented a last resort measure to distinguish massacres as being genocide, which, of course, stems from a lack of cooperation among member states of the Security Council to standardize such an issue.¹⁴⁹

Another impediment keeping the Security Council from moving forward with classifying violent acts of murder as genocide lies within its founding document, the Charter. The reason for this is that many Member States see a difficult situation when human rights abuses are contained within a national boundary. Not only does the fragile situation then become a human rights issue but a sovereignty issue as well. “The usual response [to this] over the decades has been that international law does not cross national borders.”¹⁵⁰ However, the natural spirit of the document calls for Member States “to act when human rights are being grossly violated.”¹⁵¹

For example, between the years of 1946 to 1948, Britain oversaw negotiations for Pakistan to become an independent nation from India. However, after formal independence was established, there was a “massive dislocation of populations,” which resulted in nearly 800,000 deaths.¹⁵² As the former colonial power, Britain was precluded from intervening and the UN Security Council did not have the international support to undertake such an effort. Another example is the two time civil war in Sudan, whereby nearly a total of 2 million civilians were slain.¹⁵³ Though there were great international efforts to try and assist the individuals and victims of the region, internal conflict continued to escalate. Unfortunately, there were no will among the international community to risk the legality of intervention within a sovereign state, nor was there any group ready and willing to apply the notions of the Genocide Convention signed in 1948 for the first time, which states nations are required to prevent instances of genocide and punish any person(s) found guilty of committing such acts.¹⁵⁴

According to Secretary General Kofi Annan, sovereignty has three basic concepts. First, sovereignty is a quality enshrined in the UN Charter, promising not “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...”¹⁵⁵ Secondly, there is no definition in law regarding sovereignty. So, as “social and cultural circumstances shift, so too does the definition of sovereignty.”¹⁵⁶ Third, there is no common custom to what sovereignty is, for it embodies three separate aspects:

- 1) Jurisdictional Sovereignty – the state’s legal freedom within its territorial domain;
- 2) Political Sovereignty – freedom to pursue courses of action, both internally and in relation to other states;
- 3) International Sovereignty – status as an independent player in international relations.¹⁵⁷

The complexity of sovereignty and controlling internal strife became rather apparent in the beginning stages of the Cold War era when the United States and the Soviet Union were at odds with one another. This situation presented a great lack of communication and involvement among Member States, agencies and non-governmental organizations in escalating security situations.¹⁵⁸ Even after the Cold War dissipated, the Security Council was still hesitant to discuss and intervene in cases of internal strife. This lack of eagerness to become involved was predominant evident during the 1994 Rwandan genocide when the Hutu regime wiped out nearly 1 million Tutsi in about three months time. Instead of reinforcing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the Council pulled its peacekeeping forces out, leaving many of the civilians to defend themselves. The Security Council had declared that the situation had become too unstable, which posed great safety concerns for the troops.¹⁵⁹

¹⁴⁹ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Tom Freeman. “Mission Impossible?” *New Statesman*. October 11, 2004. pp. 34-35.

¹⁵⁵ *Issues in Sovereignty*. Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ *U.N. System and Civil Society – An Inventory and Analysis of Practices*. Background Paper for the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations and Civil Society. Prepared by the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO). May 2003. <http://www.ngocongo.org/UN-civil%20society-background%20paper1.doc>

¹⁵⁹ *Rwanda*. Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/rwaindx.htm>

While “virtually everyone would concede that [civil violence] occasionally is a necessary means of overcoming oppression or unlocking other restraints on social progress,” many began to wonder during this time whether or not the Security Council was even capable of handling such a matter.

Most people would like to believe that the United Nations is an idealistic organization, acting upon “impartial moral and legal authority.”¹⁶⁰ According to many international scholars, the organization is merely another forum where members engage in realpolitik. Many find this behavior unbecoming, thereby causing the Security Council’s effectiveness to be weakened.¹⁶¹ The General Assembly does not have enough power to effectively deal with international security, and the Security Council is restrained by those permanent members with veto powers whose national interests vary. This coupled with the belief that “sovereignty is the bedrock of international order” leaves the UN stranded when trying to determine whether or not heinous actions committed within an internal borders of a state is deemed genocide.¹⁶²

Building the political will for a task of this magnitude is a difficult task. Efforts among these actors to create the political will needed to end genocide must include three fundamental concepts of consciousness raising, coalition forming and policy advocacy. Once this has been accomplished, the actors can only then move towards implementing an effective early warning system to alert the international community, regional alliances, and, especially, the UN Security Council about “potential ethnic conflict” as well as a rapid response team to adequately handle the precarious situation.¹⁶³ In order for this to be accomplished, the Security Council must call for an “international, de-centralized global effort of many organizations.”¹⁶⁴ However, some states only see this possible if adequate reform takes place among the Security Council.

The Impact of Political Principles in the Reduction of Conflict

Democratization’s Impact on Regional Stability

“The same interests, the same fears, the same passions which deter democratic nations from revolutions, deter them also from war; the spirit of military glory and the spirit of revolution are weakened at the same time and by the same causes. The ever-increasing numbers of men of property—lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are engendered by the quality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms, all these causes concur to quench the military spirit.”¹⁶⁵

Democracy’s ability to bring stability and promote security is now under world observation in nations across the globe. Iraq’s nascent democracy is heavily under scrutiny in a region largely unfamiliar with popular control and pluralism. Mexico, after years of one-party control that featured corruption on all levels, has started the millennium with its seemingly first competitive system. Croatia, which belongs to the war-torn Balkan region, now works to form democratic roots. What is central to the issue is whether or not a democratic nation can act as a force of stabilization in its region.

The United Nations has committed itself to promoting democracy throughout the world. Kofi Annan, within his *In Larger Freedom* report, noted the UN commitment to democracy in documents such as the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. The Secretary-General also noted the support for democracy by member states working towards the goals of the Millennium Declaration.¹⁶⁶ Annan even calls for the creation of a “democracy fund” so that the United Nations can more effectively establish democratic principles in world nations.¹⁶⁷ The democratic ideal of individual

¹⁶⁰ Tom Freeman. “Mission Impossible?” *New Statesman*. October 11, 2004. pp. 34-35.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ *The International Campaign to End Genocide*. Genocide Watch.
<http://www.genocidewatch.org/internationalcampaign.htm>

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*. New York: Bantam Classic. 2000.

¹⁶⁶ *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary- General.

March 21, 2005. Article IV, Section C. United Nations. 2005. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/summary.html>

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

rights has also arisen. The Secretary-General argues that a crucial element to successful development is achieved by a state's recognition of individual fundamental rights.¹⁶⁸

The issue of democracy promoting international peace is relevant to the Security Council because of the Council's work in preventing conflict. Since the beginning of Soviet power waning in the 1990s, the world has seen another wave of modern movements to establish democratic governments across the world. Freed from Soviet control, numerous Eastern European nations have worked to establish democratic regimes. Democratic movements are not simply a modern phenomenon, as history has observed democracy's rise with the American and French revolutions. More recent, or modern, democratic movements can be found in nations such as El Salvador, Poland, Honduras and South Africa.¹⁶⁹

A glaring question arises from the consideration of democracy. Even among present nations that are considered to function under a democratic government, differences in procedure and levels of civil liberties exist. If the Security Council were to determine that democracy aided the regional stability, what conditions are necessary to fulfill the requirements of a democratic system? Free elections, protection of fundamental rights and a civilian-controlled military are just some of the principles that have been linked to the definition of a democratic government.¹⁷⁰ The World Movement for Democracy also outlines principles such as the rule of law, the protection of minority rights and an independent media as goals for democratic development within nations.¹⁷¹ Achieving a consensus on this definition may prove to be a rather difficult task.

Many would argue for democratization in nations to bring a broader range of civil liberties and popular control. The openness of a democratic system is seen as desirous in contrast to a tyrannical or autocratic system. The importance to the Security Council regarding democracy lies within the idea that democratic nations are far less aggressive and provide stability within a region. From 1945 to 1989, no democratic country had ever gone to war with another democratic country.¹⁷² This potential for peace lends credence to the argument that democracy can help bring peace and stability to a region. History has also shown, however, that "peaceful" democratic nations resort to some level of military involvement to advance their goals. A perfect example arises from the United States' involvement with the Contra rebels in Nicaragua in an attempt to oust the Sandinista regime. This activity by the US cannot be considered benevolent, and the involvement created resentment among Latin American nations. Democratic nations also have had conflicts with non-democratic ones.¹⁷³ Therefore, even if one nation in a troubled area were to develop a democratic government, this would not necessarily lead to peace in the region.

For the Security Council to achieve the UN goal of promoting democracy, it may be important to consider the method of conversion from a non-democratic to democratic state. A change in governmental structure, especially for nations with no democratic experience, is not an easy process. Security Council efforts to establish democracy have the potential to bring forth a myriad of questions on how this action is to be achieved. Many nations presently in the world do not have a modern democratic government.

To promote such an overhaul of the system has the potential for violence. Many recent nations that have converted their governments to a democratic system have managed to do so with minimal internal violence. Portugal and Spain had 100 to 200 deaths from their transition, Poland and Hungary saw no bloodshed, and Nigeria and some South American nations also saw very little violence.¹⁷⁴ Despite the relative peaceful success of these democratic transitions, nations such as El Salvador, Peru and Guatemala saw serious violence.¹⁷⁵ It is hard to argue that democratic transition which causes severe internal violence can be seen as bringing stability to a region.

¹⁶⁸ Linda Fasulo. *An Insider's Guide to the United Nations*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2004.

¹⁶⁹ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Third Wave*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991.

¹⁷⁰ "Founding Statement." World Movement for Democracy. February 17, 1999.
<http://www.wmd.org/conference/founding.html>

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Robert A. Dahl. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. p. 57.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Third Wave*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991, pp. 194-195.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Consideration of state sovereignty also comes into play for the Security Council. Does the Charter of the United Nations provide such broad power to the Security Council, basically allowing this body to coerce a change in governance? Is there a universal definition or consensus of democracy's definition that the Security Council could agree upon to decide whether or not a nation fits into this classification? As noted earlier, the nation of Mexico presented seventy years of supposed "democratic rule." However, the nation was controlled on all levels of government by a single party (the PRI) for most of the seventy years that they retained control of the national government.¹⁷⁶ The PRI allowed elections to occur and stated their ideological commitment to the democracy movement of the Mexican Revolution. Conversely these "elections" were riddled with vote fraud and tampering by the PRI and their commitment to the Revolution was superficial as corruption permeated all levels of government¹⁷⁷.

Movements for democracy have also led to internal violence. The recent events in the nation of Iraq highlight this point. Suicide bombings and insurgency come from a resistance against Iraq's steps towards a new government. The future of democracy and its ability to stabilize regions remains to be seen. The potential for the internal violence plaguing Iraq could destabilize an already volatile region in the Middle East.

Despite setbacks of this nature, the *Millennium Declaration* Article Six in Section I contains "Freedom" as an essential principle for mankind. This resolution argues that a government based upon participation, or democracy, is the best way to ensure the freedom of individuals.¹⁷⁸ Other United Nations documents imply the body's desire to promote self-determination through democratic governance. Article 21, subsections (1) and (3) of the *UDHR*, expresses the rights of all individuals to participation and government and equal access to legitimate elections.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, there remains a very delicate balance between ideological goals and practical considerations such as sovereignty.

Democracy has also led to positive action in world affairs. Costa Rica is an example of a well-established democracy promoting regional stability. Costa Rican democracy has functioned successfully with little interruption for approximately one hundred years.¹⁸⁰ The stability of Costa Rica has provided Central America with guidance from years of revolution and violence. Costa Rican leaders have negotiated the peaceful settlement of conflicts in nations like Nicaragua and El Salvador.¹⁸¹ It is important to note that the efforts of Costa Rica were of a purely diplomatic nature, and did not involve employing military force. It is important to note that Costa Rica also has no regular military forces.¹⁸² This nation actually abolished its military in 1949 when it drafted its new democratic constitution.¹⁸³ For the past two decades, Central America has observed a relative regional stability. Democracy has shown itself to be very effective in promoting international peace and security in this example.

Regions of the world such as Africa and Europe have embraced democratic values in their regional organizations. This commitment to democracy demonstrates the belief that stability and human rights can be served best by this form of governance. The African Union, whose aims are to bring stability, peace and progress, affirms democracy as one of its goals. Article 3, section (g), of the *Constitutive Act the African Union* lists "promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance" as one of its objectives.¹⁸⁴ Section (f) states, "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent."¹⁸⁵ Following a clause supporting stability is a clause supporting democracy. The African Union seems to correlate stability with governance.

The African Union in Article 4 promotes democracy with human rights and rule of law as a standard for its member nations.¹⁸⁶ The European Union is another regional organization that argues for democracy as one its fundamental

¹⁷⁶ Julia Preston and Samuel Dillon. *Opening Mexico The Making of a Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 2004.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*. General Assembly. United Nations. A/RES/55/2.

¹⁷⁹ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. General Assembly. United Nations. December 10, 1948.

¹⁸⁰ CIA World Factbook. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cs.html>

¹⁸¹ Marvis Hiltunen Biesanz. *The Ticos: Culture and Social Change in Costa Rica*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. October 1, 1998.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Costa Rica Embassy. <http://www.costarica-embassy.org/country/costarica.htm>

¹⁸⁴ *Constitutive Act*. African Union. Article 3, Section (g).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. Article 3, Section (f).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. Article 4, Section (m).

ideals. The EU website states, “Human rights, democracy and the rule of law are core values of the European Union.”¹⁸⁷ Much of this motivation probably lays in the fact that the European continent saw two devastating wars and a severe ideological division (Cold War) during the 20th century. To help the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe likely motivates this goal of solidarity on the continent.

Robert A. Dahl argues for democracy’s advantages to stability and peace. Cruel “despots” who bring suffering to their people and wage war upon their neighbors do not lead democratic governments.¹⁸⁸ He also notes that modern democratic nations tend to show more economic prosperity than other forms of government.¹⁸⁹ A nation that has obtained relative internal economic prosperity is probably less likely to engage in hostile actions against its neighbor states. To engage in war against a neighbor would most likely disrupt trade and the regular flow of market activity.

Overall the Security Council must seek to define its role in establishing democracy for the purpose of regional stability. If establishing a democracy in an area may lead to violence, the Security Council must recognize the counterproductive danger this holds. However, in the spirit of the *Millennium Declaration*, the spread of democracy is a goal of this body. The issue is really concerned with the power the Security Council has in the promotion of democracy for assuring stability in the regions of the world.

The Option of Military Preemption

The attacks upon the World Trade Center in the United States of America on September 11, 2001, brought a military concept back to the forefront of the international security debate. Shocked and angered by the severity of the attack, the United States engaged in a strategy referred to as “preemption.”¹⁹⁰ As noted by the *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, this new strategy is a large shift for the United States. The article also notes that the debate of a multilateral approach versus a unilateral approach ties in to this debate.¹⁹¹ The importance lies not only in the US engaging in this policy, but in rather whether or not this is legal under international law. A serious legal issue is preemption’s compliance with the doctrines of the United Nations Charter.

The United States initiated the principle with its military action in Iraq, but the determination of the validity of this principle has yet to be made. Initially until this decade, preemption has almost universally been regarded as an act of aggression. The United States has changed the very dynamic of the debate by arguing that their act was initiated in self-defense. They claimed the legality of their action within Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which provides for self-defense for nations that are attacked. This issue is one that obviously fits within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, for it is the promotion of a military strategy. One potential danger of preemption is that preemption can be motivated by perception. Perception is not necessarily true or accurate. Therefore, nations may attack a neighbor believing this state is an immediate threat, whether or not it is a viable reality. To partake of an action because something may happen can be a very dangerous precedent not only for this body, but the entire world community. Determining who will decide the legality of engaging in a preemptive self-defense is a crucial question for the Security Council.

What is ironic is the change of US foreign policy that can be observed in history. The San Francisco Conference, recognized as a catalyst for the development of the United Nations Charter, saw the United Kingdom attempting to expand military responses against armed attack. The British felt “self-defense” was not enough, which received opposition from the United States. The United States felt that Britain’s plan would “allow states too great a leeway, including the right of preventative actions, which could legally wreck the organization.”¹⁹² The two world wars came from “preventive attacks.”¹⁹³

¹⁸⁷ *Overviews of the European Union Activities- Human Rights*. European Union.

http://europa.eu.int/pol/rights/overview_en.htm

¹⁸⁸ Robert A. Dahl. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998, pp.46-49.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb. “Bush Developing Military Policy of Striking First.” *Washington Post*. June 10, 2002. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22374-2002Jun9.html>

¹⁹¹ “Regime Change/ Preemption Vs. Disarmament/ Multilateralism: The U.S. Foreign Policy Debate Continues.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0203Qoverview.html>

¹⁹² Stephen C. Schlesinger. *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press. 2003, p. 185.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is the basis for the Security Council's ability to initiate military action or other measures for diffusing conflicts. Article 39 provides the Security Council with the authority to be the body of the United Nations that makes strategic assessments of any threats.¹⁹⁴ The language of Article 42 may provide the Security Council the ability to adopt the action of preemption as legitimate. The first line of 42 states, "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."¹⁹⁵ This power has typically only been employed in the most extreme circumstances, such as repelling full invasions of foreign nations like Kuwait in 1991. However it is vitally important to note that nearly all authorized military action by the Security Council has been a reaction to conflict, as can be observed with Kuwait. Though the language of Article 42 could be argue to have the authorization for a proactive doctrine, precedent largely belongs to a reactive response by the Security Council.

Largely the Security Council has reserved military force to repel invasions or peacekeeping activity. Typically sanctions have been employed to deal with nations that are not fulfilling their duties required of member states. Article 42 has only been reserved for what the Council deems as the most extreme security threats, and is largely not the main issue relevant to preemption. The question of self-defense, of Article 51, lies at the center of the analysis.¹⁹⁶ Theoretically, acceptance could allow a nation to use a preemptive self-defense action against surrounding nations because of the threat the preemptive nation perceives.

The major question comes in the validity of the preemption doctrine when supported by the self-defense argument of Article 51 of the Charter. Who will determine the viability of this argument? What guidelines and standards would guide any nation or body to conclude that a first strike is truly a necessity? A principal question arises from the United States' assertion of self-defense. Can a preemptive action ever achieve the standard of self-defense advocated within Article 51 of the U.N. Charter? These are just some of the questions and problems that confront the adoption of this principle.

The general idea behind preemption is that a nation will take the battle to a potentially hostile state or group to prevent conflict from coming to itself. Can this action of government truly be perceived as part of the Security Council's efforts at conflict prevention? In 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report to the GA and the SC concerning the "prevention of armed conflict." One of the main points of his report is that:

The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments, with civil society playing an important role. The main role of the United Nations and the international community is to support national efforts for conflict prevention and assist in building national capacity in this field.¹⁹⁷

The importance in this section of the report is the supplementary role the United Nations should play in supporting the efforts of nations to prevent conflict. Governments must lead the way to prevent conflict from arising. This places the burden heavily upon those nations that would embark upon the strategy of preemption. Annan's statement would place a heavy burden of proof upon any self-defense preemptive action by a state because of a state's responsibility to ensure conflict prevention rather than initiating it over a perceived threat.

The Security Council passed a resolution in response to Kofi Annan's conflict prevention report. Within this resolution the SC notes that peace and a pacific settlement of any disagreement are the goals of this body. The SC also emphasized its power to take action as soon as any potential danger becomes immediate.¹⁹⁸ The doctrine of preemption does not seem to harmonize with the focus of the Security Council. The employment of military force by one nation to prevent a potential danger is not working with the intention of pacific dispute settlement.

¹⁹⁴ *Charter of the United Nations*. United Nations. June 26, 1945.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*. Submitted to General Assembly and Security Council. June 7, 2001.

¹⁹⁸ S/RES/1366. United Nations Security Council.

It is important to understand the difference between taking preventive action and preemption. Preventive action typically involves a high-level of diplomatic and disarmament efforts. If deemed necessary by the Security Council, sanctions can be imposed. Troops can even be deployed to prevent a conflict from continuing.¹⁹⁹ However, unlike preemption, preventive action does not authorize a military assault because of a perceived threat. Proponents of the preemption doctrine may argue that this strategy is a preventive action. However preventing armed conflict through armed conflict is contradictory to the goal originally set forth by the idea of prevention of armed conflict.

The Security Council also has the authority to enforce penalties against a nation that the Council feels has abused the preemption doctrine. Whether or not this body accepts the doctrine, the potential for abuse still remains. The precedent of attacking one's enemies before they can attack leaves a much undefined area for action. The ability to abuse such a vague concept lies with all nations. Some countries may truly feel they are strategically threatened, but others may simply use this tactic for encroachment of borders and aggression. The Security Council, with its Chapter VII powers, can work to prevent the abuse that could arise if there is any international acceptance of this doctrine. However the limited use and scope of Chapter VII powers could indicate the need for consideration of a reform in SC enforcement powers.

Preemption also has the danger of encouraging nations to spend less effort on peacemaking and diplomatic conflict dispute. The United Nations will struggle in a diplomatic arena where nations feel that difficult negotiations can be resolved by attacking the opposing party because of their potential threat. The Security Council is provided with the notification by the Secretary-General of any impending dangers to peace.²⁰⁰ The United Nations must maintain an active role in assuring the peaceful settlement of disputes. The preemption doctrine seems to go against the core mission of the body. The indistinct nature of the phrase self-defense and the possibility for abuse under this definition may lead to the continuation of international rejection of the preemption doctrine.

Conclusion and Committee Directive

In the past few years, the United Nations has realized its shortcomings, and has even tried to resolve the barriers that many find keep participation in this organization at a minimum. Nevertheless, the United Nations does not have the authority to deal with every Security Council reform setback. Instead, the permanent members of the Security Council have exclusive rights to vote down any reform efforts that are presented. Many member states see the need for reform for several reasons. First, many are afraid that without reform, there may not be a consolidated definition of terrorism, thereby leaving them incapable of taking action on such instances. Many also wonder whether or not member state will provide assistance when it comes to questionable instances of genocide. Also, there is another increasing danger to international peace concerning the rapid militarization of nation-states or rouge groups. Together, these challenges could have been handled more easily through measures of conflict prevention.

Today, there is no hiding from conflict as they are all interconnected. Therefore, all are at risk. In order to address these issues, there must be consensus on what each security threat entails and what actions are to be taken. Nonetheless, there is not a consensus. It must be maintained, though, that "the security of developed countries is only as strong as the ability of poor states to respond to and contain a new deadly infectious disease."²⁰¹ There is a need to recommit to the United Nations. However, this will require a number of fundamental changes. The significance of reform can not be overstated enough given its importance. Most agree that a comprehensive strategy needs to be devised so that United Nations Security Council may find new ways to bring member states and any affiliated organizations back together in hopes of preventing or deterring conflict.

Additionally, there are other ways that the United Nations is attempting at reducing conflict, ways that are becoming useful. One of these attempts involves the role and impact that democracy will have on regional stability, while another is the option of military preemption. Together, these two elements can serve to either help steer or provoke a nation-state depending upon the nature of the Security Council's working relationship at the time. A strong relationship will look favorable among the international community, while a relationship that is waning will be perceived as unconstructive.

¹⁹⁹ U.N. Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Conflict Prevention. United Nations.
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Kofi Annan. "Courage to fulfill our responsibilities." *Economist*. Dec. 4, 2004. Vol. 373, Issue 8404.

The United Nations' Security Council has a long ways to go before reforming its general structure, and it will take even more time to understand or determine how reform will be after being put into practice. So, when preparing your position paper, please look carefully at what your country's positions are on these subject matters, and whether or not any may not coincide with the background guide's principal theme "UN Reform." Also, be sure to check out the documents *Courage to fulfill our responsibilities* and *In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN* for they will help you to better identify with other members on the Security Council and in other committees. Some of the questions you should be asking yourself with regards to your country are: Where does your country stand on the issue of reforming the UN Security Council? What is holding your country back from greater participation? How does your country define what reform is or should be? What size does your country feel the membership for both the permanent and elected seats should be raised to, if any? How would your country address the challenges facing reforming efforts? How would your country go about creating a reforming initiative committee? How would it promote its endeavors? How would it address possible limitations of reform if it were to happen?

Once you have submerged yourself into literature, be sure to examine these documents for yourself. What measures do you feel are appropriate to take in reforming the Security Council? Do you find any other implications that many may not be widely accepting? If you were an ambassador on the Council right now, would reform be one of your top priorities? If so, how would you go about addressing it? It will be then that you will be able to better appreciate all sides of these pressing issues, which will ultimately make you a better communicator at the conference.